Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The project which finally led to this book was undertaken in summer 1996, as I was preparing to leave my country (Greece), in order to start doctoral research which was to prove more difficult and more fruitful than I had ever imagined. Having reached the end of this journey, I am aware of the fact that, despite my own efforts and the assistance I received from other people, the result of my work is less satisfactory than I would wish. However, in spite of this awareness, I think that a more or less integrated approach to the subject of this book has been substantially accomplished.

I would like at this point to thank all those who have helped me in one way or another to complete this book. First of all I would like to mention my parents. Without many sacrifices on their part, the quality not only of this book but also of my education as a whole would have been much diminished. I am grateful to a number of my professors of classics and of theology at the University of Athens. I would like to make particular mention of my professor of classics John Papademetriou, as well as of my professors of theology Vlasios Feidas, Basil Giannopoulos, Stylianos Papadopoulos, Constantine Papapetrou, and Charalampos Sotiropoulos, to whom I owe a great part of both my love for theology and my decision to undertake the research that led to this book in the first place.

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I am also particularly grateful to my supervisor, Professor Colin Gunton, King's College, London, not only for reading and rereading various drafts of my thesis—which eventually became this book—and offering criticism and **end p.vii** encouragement, but also for creating an excellent academic environment at King's College, including the research seminar in systematic theology—among the members of which Professors Alan Torrance, Francis Watson, Douglas Farrow, Michael Banner, and Drs Brian Horne, Murray Rae and Steve Holmes can be counted—which tremendously enriched my theological education. Thanks also go Dr Murray Rae, who read the penultimate draft of my thesis and offered constructive criticism. Earlier drafts of some sections of this book were read and commented upon by Dr Graham Gould and John Zizioulas. I am grateful to both.

Important aspects of my research have been discussed with Professor Richard Sorabji, Dr Basil Markezinis, Father Antonios Pinakoulas, and Dr John Bekos. I would like to thank them, as well as all my fellow students and members of our research seminar at King's who repeatedly heard earlier drafts of several sections of this book and made useful comments. Dr Paul King and Dr Jacquie King as well as Matt and Dr Linda Peacore are to be thanked for the unexpected gift of their friendship, which they offered so generously to me, particularly in the first difficult year of my research. They, as well as many others, such as Dr Paul Metzger, Dr Peter Robinson, Dr Richard Fermer, Dr Josef Lössl, Dr Douglas Knight, Dr Luke Bretherton, and Shirley Martin are also to be thanked for both their hospitality and theological engagement with some of my research interests. Thanks also go to Fred Murphy, Douglas Knight, and, in particular, to Susanne Elliott and Jean van' Altena who contributed to my use of English in this book. I am also particularly grateful to Bishop Kallistos Ware, University of Oxford, and Fr Andrew Louth, Professor of Patristic and Byzantine Studies at the University of Durham, who examined my thesis and made useful comments, which contributed to the improvement of this book. I am most grateful to the directors of Oxford Early Christian Studies, Professors Gillian Clark and Andrew Louth in particular, who suggested that I publish my thesis as a book with Oxford University Press and repeatedly gave me very helpful advice in this direction. I would also like to thank Professor Paul Blowers for his encouragement and constructive criticism of an earlier draft of my book as well as Hilary O'Shea, Lucy Qureshi, Enid Barker, Rachel Woodforde and Jean van' Altena for helping me to sort out many of the difficulties related with its preparation for publication. I also express my thanks to Peeters for allowing me to include in the book the section on the relationship between the two wills of Christ (which is to be found in the third chapter of the book), a shorter version of which was published in *Studia Patristica*. Last, but not least, I would like to thank the Dean

of the Greek Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (St Sophia), Bishop of Nazianzos Dr Theodoritos, as well as my **end p.viii** colleague Archimandrite Theonas Bakalis, for allowing me sufficient time to go through the final stages of the preparation of the book for publication. It goes without saying that none of those mentioned is to be held in any way responsible for any shortcomings that may remain.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife Kyriaki, whose support, encouragement, abnegation, love, and devotion during the years of my research and of our marriage go far beyond what I could possibly express.

Demetrios Bathrellos
The Greek Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (St Sophia), London,
9 November 2003, Feast of St Nectarius of Pentapolis end p.ix

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I am a stranger in the earth; Do not hide Your commandments from me.
Psalm 118:19
Open my eyes, that I may see wondrous things from Your law.
Psalm 118:18 end p.1

This book has both a historical and a systematic character. The questions which inspired and motivated the research that led to it relate to the traditional teaching of the Church according to which Jesus Christ has two wills, a divine will and a human will, which correspond to his two natures, the divine and the human. Is this teaching sustainable? And if it is, then how? What do we mean by the terms 'person', 'nature', and 'will'? In what sense can it be argued that Jesus Christ has two wills without splitting his personal unity? Is the will not to do with the person who wills and decides if, when, and how he will express his will? Furthermore, if Christ has two wills, how do they relate to one another? If it is simply the case that they do not oppose each other on account of the fact that the human obeys the divine—as the Sixth Ecumenical Council argued—are we left with anything more than an interplay between Christ's natures and natural wills, which leaves the person of Christ out of the picture? On the other hand, does monothelitism have a point? Might it be the case that, despite any possible doctrinal weaknesses in its Christology, monothelitism should be credited with the insightful intuition that it is the person of the Logos that must be put at the centre of the discussion and not the natures, as dyothelitism might seem to be doing? Might it be finally the case that the theological language of monothelitism expresses the unity of Christ on the volitional level more appropriately than that of dyothelitism?

The phrasing of the aforementioned questions suggests a certain engagement with historical theology. Surely, the problem of the wills of Christ can be dealt with in many different ways. It might be possible to discuss it from a purely systematic point of view, but this would rule out an in-depth exploration of the background, development and meaning of seventh-century dyothelitism, which was vindicated by the Sixth Ecumenical Council and which has become part of the common doctrinal inheritance of the Christian Church. For this reason, a historical focus, which roughly coincides with the development of ancient Christology from the fourth to the seventh century, **end p.3** was chosen, placing special emphasis on the issue of the wills, which was at the centre of what von Balthasar has called 'der christologische Endkampf'.[1]

[1] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners*, 2nd rev. edn. (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1961), 19.

of the seventh century. Particular attention is paid to the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, the most important exponent of dyothelitism and one of the most important theologians of all of Christian history.

Although in the last decades of the twentieth century patristic studies as a whole, and the study of various aspects of the theology of Maximus the Confessor in particular, have flourished,[2]

[2] See the impressive bibliographies on Maximus in M. L. Gatti, *Massimo il Confessore: Saggio di bibliografia generale ragionata e contributi per una ricostruzione scientifica del suo pensiero metafisico e religioso* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1987) and in Jean-Claude Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur* (Paris: Cerf, 1996).

surprisingly little attention has so far been paid to the monothelite controversy and to Maximus's dyothelite Christology. Despite the importance of this controversy, which dominated the interests of the Church for most of the seventh century, and to the resolution of which one of the seven Ecumenical Councils was devoted, and despite the respective importance of the dyothelite Christology

of Maximus, both in its own right and for the understanding of the whole of his thought, it is an area which has remained relatively unexplored to the present day.

Almost fifty years ago, Charles Moeller claimed that an exhaustive study of the monothelite controversy was urgent, [3]

[3] Charles Moeller, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism en Orient de 451 à la fin du VIe siècle', in Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, i (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951), 718.

but since then very little has been done in this direction. Brief references to issues relating to the controversy and to Maximus's dyothelitism occur in some studies of wider interest, but studies devoted to the controversy and to Maximus's dyothelitism are relatively few. Werner Elert focused on Theodore of Pharan and on certain aspects of the monothelite controversy in a study published in 1957. [4]

[4] Werner Elert, *Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie: Eine Untersuchung über Theodor von Pharan und seine Zeit als Einführung in die alte Dogmengeschichte* (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1957).

The thesis of Marcel Doucet Maximus's *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, submitted in 1972, is a much more thorough study, including as it does an important introduction to the monothelite controversy and a helpful discussion of some of its issues. [5]

[5] Marcel Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus': Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Montreal, 1972).

However, this thesis has not been published, and, as a result, has remained widely unavailable. Two years later, a helpful study on the Fifth and Sixth **end p.4** Ecumenical Councils was published by F.-X. Murphy and P. Sherwood, but little attention is paid there to Maximus's dyothelite Christology. [6]

[6] F.-X. Murphy and P. Sherwood, *Constantinople II et III*, ed. Gervais Dumeige, Histoire des Conciles Oecuméniques, iii (Paris: Éditions de l'Orante, 1974).

The same year, Jose Julian Prado published a book that attempted to cast light on some areas of Maximus's philosophical anthropology, including the will, [7]

[7] Jose Julian Prado, *Voluntad y Naturaleza: La Antropologia Filosofica de Maximo el Confesor*, Coleccion 'Ciencias Humanas y Filosofia' (Rio Cuarto: Ediciones de la Universidad Nacional de Rio Cuarto, 1974).

but this study has not been widely available either. A few years later, François-Marie Léthel published a short monograph on some aspects of monothelitism and Maximus's response to it; this monograph, however, is not always reliable. [8]

[8] François-Marie Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ: la liberté humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance sotériologique mises en lumière par Saint Maxime le Confesseur*, Théologie historique, 52 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979). Léthel's book was heavily criticized by Marcel Doucet, 'Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?: réflections sur un ouvrage de F.-M. Léthel', *Science et Esprit*, 35 (1983), 53-83.

Pierre Piret followed a few years later with a book devoted to the Trinitarian theology and the Christology of Maximus, which also dealt with the problem of the wills, without, however, being always as helpful and substantive as might have been expected. [9]

[9] Pierre Piret, *Le Christ et la Trinité selon Maxime le Confesseur*, Théologie historique, 69 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1983).

Felix Heinzer's book on Maximus's Christology offered some interesting insights, but did not deal with his teaching on the wills in any depth. [10]

[10] Felix Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn als Mensch: Die Struktur des Menschseins Christi bei Maximus Confessor*, Paradosis, 16 (Freibourg, Switzerland: Universitätverlag, 1980).

More focused on some aspects of Maximus's teaching on the will was the study of Joseph P. Farrell, the only one of relevance to have appeared in English. [11]

[11] Joseph P. Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor* (South Canaan, Pa.: St Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1989).

However, his treatment of the issue is at times less than convincing and has not been widely taken into account. Guido Bausenhart's impressively learned book dealt somewhat briefly with the monothelite controversy, and included an important commentary on the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, but his analysis of the controversy and of Maximus's dyothelitism is not always sufficiently penetrating and exhaustive. [12]

[12] Guido Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde': Studien zum Beitrag Maximos' des Bekenners zur altkirchlichen Christologie mit einer kommentierten Übersetzung der 'Disputatio cum Pyrrho*', Tübinger Studien zur Theologie and Philosophie, 5 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1992).

From 1992 onwards there has been no monograph devoted to the monothelite controversy and the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus, although brief treatments of, and references to, some of its aspects can be found in a few books, such as the **end p.5** second edition of Lars Thunberg's study of Maximus's anthropology, [13]

[13] Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, 2nd edn. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995).

Andrew Louth's book on Maximus, [14]

[14] Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor* (London: Routledge, 1996).

and Jean-Claude Larchet's study of man's deification according to Maximus. [15]

[15] Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*. There is another book which is relevant to my study, but it was published too late for me to take account of it: Friedhelm Winkelmann, *Der monenergetisch-monothelische Streit*, Berliner Byzantinistische Studien, 6 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2001).

A study of monothelitism and of Maximus's response can be accomplished in different ways. This book, like any other, has its own distinctive characteristics, and pays special attention to those aspects that I consider to be as the most important and interesting. As the subtitle of the book suggests, the study of the wills here is carried out alongside the study of the notions of person/hypostasis and nature/essence in Christology. The key question of the controversy was whether there is one will in Christ corresponding to his person, or two wills corresponding to his natures, and, as I came to realize very early, this question, as well as many other aspects of the controversy, cannot be dealt with adequately unless a thorough study of the notions of person, hypostasis, nature, and essence is offered. (The way the will was conceived to be related to Christ's hypostasis and natures in turn casts new light on the meaning of these notions.) Given that the notions of person/hypostasis and nature/essence had been at the centre of interest for a long time prior to the seventh century, they will be examined in part in the first chapter of this book, which is devoted to the background of the Christology of the seventh century. A consideration of this background is indispensable, because, without a sound knowledge and understanding of it, this Christology cannot be properly contextualized, understood, and assessed. This background does not relate as much to the will—which was rarely a matter of debate prior to the monothelite controversy—as to the way in which Christ's natures and hypostasis were understood. Particular attention will be paid to post-Chalcedonian Christology, which forms the immediate background of the Christology of the seventh century. [16]

[16] Study of the Christology of this period has been greatly facilitated by the monumental work of Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*. Particularly helpful for the interests of this book is the following: Aloys Grillmeier in collaboration with Theresia Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, trans. John Cawte and Pauline Allen (London: Mowbray, 1995).

A second basic component of this book is an exhaustive examination of the Christology of the monothelites. This examination is important in its own right, but is perhaps even more so because it leads to a far greater understanding of Maximus's dyothelitism. This is so because Maximus's dyothelitism **end p.6** was not a disinterested academic endeavour, but a response to a concrete and threatening heresy of his own time. For these reason, the second chapter of the book will be entirely devoted to the analysis of the monothelite doctrine.

The third chapter of the book will examine Maximus's understanding of the notions of person/hypostasis, nature/essence, and will in Christology, his defence of dyothelitism, and some aspects of his dyothelite Christology that are of crucial importance from both a historical and a systematic point of view, such as the particularity and function of the human will of Christ and the relationship between his divine and human wills. In the fourth chapter, I will examine some further related issues, such as the question of whether it is person or nature that must be identified with the subject of willing in Christology and the question of the legitimacy of the use of a carefully qualified monothelite terminology.

In addition to this outline of what this book attempts to cover, it is also important to note what lies beyond its scope. It is not possible for this book to offer detailed analyses of the Christologies of Saint Cyril of Alexandria, Severus, Nestorius, and Theodore of Mopsuestia, which, important as they are, each deserve a separate monograph. Thus, the relevant sections of the first chapter of this book are somewhat brief and aim mainly at setting the scene for the exploration of the seventh-century monothelite and dyothelite Christologies. For the sake of brevity and coherence, an extensive section

on the notion of *enypostaton* had finally to be omitted. For the same reason, some aspects of Maximus's teaching on Christ's energies are not examined exhaustively, especially after deciding that their theological import is not particularly significant. [17]

[17] This does not negatively affect this book. The core of the controversy was concerned principally with the wills. Moreover, the argumentation used by Maximus for the defence of Christ's two wills and two energies is basically the same. It is noteworthy, for instance, that during the disputation between Maximus and Pyrrhus, when the latter was convinced as to the orthodoxy of the two wills teaching, he considered the discussion of the issue of the energies redundant (*PG* 91, 333B-C).

Moreover, the examination of the relationship between Maximus's understanding of the will and the wider context of Greek philosophy had to be restricted to short references. Finally, it was not feasible here to pay sufficient attention either to the way in which Maximus's dyothelite Christology fits within his whole theology or to the implications arising from it for various aspects of doctrinal theology.

As will become apparent, this book attempts to put forward a set of interrelated arguments both by analysing the thought of the writers under review and by passing theological judgements upon various doctrinal positions. What they all add up to, in brief, is a demonstration of how ancient **end p.7** Christology gradually achieved a sound synthesis which was basically completed in the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor. It is argued that Nestorianism and monophysitism failed to articulate a convincing Christology, because they undermined the unity of Christ and the integrity of his humanity, respectively. On the contrary, it is argued that by the end of the sixth century post-Chalcedonian theologians, such as the Leontioi, had articulated a well-balanced Christology, integrating elements from the tradition of Cyril and Chalcedon, which pointed both to the unity of Christ and the integrity of his divine and human natures. It is also argued that seventh-century monothelitism was an unsuccessful endeavour to advance this synthesis on the level of Christ's wills and energies, something which was eventually achieved by Maximus's dyothelite Christology. By arguing on the one hand that Christ has two natural wills and energies, corresponding to his two natures, and by pointing on the other hand to the incarnate Logos as the personal subject of willing and acting, Maximus succeeded in expressing faith in Christ in a way that is superior both to monothelitism and to the formula of the *Tome of Leo*, which, in its expanded form introduced by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, [18]

[18] I am referring here to the phrase of the *Tome of Leo* according to which 'each nature works in communion with the other what is proper to it', which the Sixth Ecumenical Council expanded by saying that 'each nature *wills* and works . . . '. This issue is dealt with in Ch. 4 below.

seems to see in Christ two willing and acting principles, identical with his two natures. It is finally argued, on the basis of some of Maximus's own suggestions, that it is worth exploring the question of the legitimacy of the use of a carefully qualified 'monothelite' terminology, which would denote the deep unity of the two natural wills and energies of the one hypostasis of our Lord and God Jesus Christ. **end p.8**

1 From the Fourth To the Seventh Century

Introduction

The first chapter of this book aims at providing the necessary historical and theological background for understanding the monothelite controversy of the seventh century and the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor. In my exposition of this background I have been very selective. Issues are presented briefly, with an eye to what is important for Maximus's dyothelite Christology, which is the main focus of this study. Therefore, the first chapter should by no means be treated as a self-standing history of the development of Christology from the fourth to the seventh century, but rather as a brief and concise introduction to the monothelite controversy and to the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus.

In fact, it is impossible to understand the seventh-century controversies without some knowledge of what went before. The names of Apollinarius, Cyril, Nestorius, and Severus, and the theological positions they represent, come up very frequently in the theological debates of the seventh century. Without an acquaintance with the core of their teaching, the Christological positions of Saint

Maximus and his opponents cannot be understood adequately. Furthermore, the theological work done after the Council of Chalcedon in the context of the theological dialogue between the Chalcedonians and the anti-Chalcedonians, which is also examined in this chapter, forms the immediate setting within which the monothelite controversy broke.

In this chapter I briefly present the Christological positions of Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, Cyril, the Council of Chalcedon, and the Council's critics. All this is done quite sketchily, although what is necessary for present purposes is presented. Considerably more detailed is the presentation of the positions of some of the most important defenders of Chalcedon: namely, John the Grammarian and, in particular, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem.**end p.9**

For the sake of brevity, consistency, and the reader's convenience, my use of the terms 'person', 'hypostasis', 'nature', and 'essence' in the Christology before Chalcedon may seem at times a little more fixed and standardized than it actually was in that period. Things change, however, when we reach John the Grammarian and the two Leontioi. There I attempt to fathom the meaning of these terms in the context of Christology as fully as possible. This is necessary because Saint Maximus takes on board much of the work of the two Leontioi in particular, and uses it for the development of his own Christology. Maximus's dyothelitism cannot be understood without a deep knowledge of the way in which he understands the person and the natures of Christ, and his understanding depends greatly on his predecessors.

Within the purview of the Christological developments of the period up to the seventh century falls also an examination of different views on the question of the wills of Christ. Once more, this is necessary in order to understand the emergence of the seventh-century monothelite and dyothelite Christologies. Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, Cyril, Leo, Severus, and the Leontioi, in one way or another, touch upon the question of the wills of Christ, and all of them, apart from the Leontioi, are referred to frequently by Maximus and his opponents, as well as by modern scholarship, [1]

[1] Some modern scholars refer to the Leontioi as well.

as exponents of either monothelitism or dyothelitism.

It is hoped that by the end of the first chapter all that needs to be said with regard to the background of the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus will have been sketched. My presentation will now start with Apollinarius, a distinguished theologian, condemned heretic, and important exponent of monothelitism.

2. Apollinarianism

Apollinarianism can perhaps be regarded as the first integrated attempt to articulate a thoroughgoing theory of the person of Christ. [2]

[2] For issues relating to the theological sources of Apollinarius's Christology, see Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i, 2nd rev. edn., trans. John Bowden (London: Mowbray, 1975), 329-30.

The driving force behind Apollinarius's Christology was his determination to oppose any divisive understanding of the person of Christ. As Prestige has aptly put it, 'any theory which suggested that the historical figure of the Redeemer was that of a good man only united to the divine Son through being the recipient of divine grace and the subject of divine inspiration, he repudiated'. [3]

[3] G. L. Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics: Six Studies in Dogmatic Faith with Prologue and Epilogue* (London: SPCK, 1958), 106; cited also by R. A. Norris jun., *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 95. end p.10

The main concerns of Apollinarius's Christology were two: first, to secure the ontological unity of Christ, and second, to secure his ethical unity by denying his actual or potential sinfulness. [4]

[4] See also Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, iii, Christian Classics, Inc. (Westminster, Md.: [n. pub.], 1986), 382, and Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics*, 109-12.

Both concerns were perfectly legitimate, despite the fact that he tried to serve them by mutilating the humanity of Christ. Let us consider them in turn.

Apollinarius seems to have fallen prey to the philosophical axiom that two perfect things cannot become one. [5]

[5] Pseudo-Athanasius considers this axiom as one of the basic traits of Apollinarius's thought: see *PG* 26, 1096B. For the origin of the axiom see Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 1039^{a} 9-10.

He states that 'if perfect God has been conjoined to perfect man, they would be two, a Son of God by nature and a Son of God by adoption'. [6]

[6] Hans Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1904), 224. 14-15.

In order to avoid the theory of two Sons, Apollinarius denied the existence of a complete humanity in Christ. What Apollinarius in fact excluded from the humanity of Christ was a rational soul as the centre of thought and willing activity. [7]

[7] For the issue of inconsistency as a result of Apollinarius's use of a dichotomous anthropology in his earlier works and a trichotomous one in his later works, see Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 82-94. Norris argues that these two ways of speaking are not contradictory, but complementary, and must be understood under the Pauline scheme

In his view, the existence of a human mind in Christ would render the incarnation impossible. [8]

[8] Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 222. 6-8.

It seems that, as has been noticed in ancient and modern times alike, Apollinarius came very close to identifying human hypostasis with human mind, which for this reason must not be predicated of Christ. [9]

[9] Opposing Apollinarius, the ancient heresiologist Epiphanius of Salamis wrote: 'I do not consider our nous as a hypostasis, nor does any of the Church's sons' (see his *Adversus Haereses*, iii, ii—*Haeres*. lxxvii, *PG* 42, 692D); he also writes that '[Christ] had . . . the human mind in truth, not that we affirm that nous is a hypostasis, as other people do' (ibid. 812A; in all probability, by 'other people' the Apollinarians are implied). As Marcel Richard has argued, for Epiphanius, Apollinarianism contends that 'man is a hypostasis by virtue of his nous' ('L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 2 (1945), 5-32, 243-270, at 9-10; on this, see also Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 339). Stylianos Papadopoulos is right in arguing that, for Apollinarius, human hypostasis resides in the mind (*Πατρολογία*, ii (Athens: [n. pub.], 1990), 533-5. Apollinarius seems to be in line with Irenaeus in taking for granted the necessity of the assumption of human flesh, but differs from Gregory of Nazianzus who thinks that it is the mind, not the flesh, which is most in need of salvation (see his *Epistle* 101, *PG* 37, 188B, and Paul Gallay in collaboration with Maurice Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Lettres théologiques: introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes*, Sources Chrétiennes, 208 (Paris: Cerf, 1974), 58. 51-2. **end p.11**

This quasi-identification relates to the general and widespread inability of many theologians of the ancient Church, including the Apollinarians, to distinguish between hypostasis and nature. According to Apollinarius, if Christ is one (person), he must have but one nature, otherwise he would be divided into two hypostases, obviously one divine and one human. [10]

[10] Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 257. 13-16. See also how Polemon, one of the disciples of Apollinarius, starts from the oneness of the person of Christ in order to infer the oneness of his nature, will, and energy (ibid. 276. 9-12).

This is why, for Apollinarius, the enfleshed Logos is 'one nature, one hypostasis, one energy, one person, the same fully God and fully man'. [11]

[11] Ibid. 199. 16-17.

However, as previously mentioned, Apollinarius's interests had also to do with the ethical unity and integrity of the enfleshed Logos. It seems that, according to him, man is sinful almost by definition, and this is why Christ is not and cannot be a complete man. [12]

[12] Ibid. 243. 14-20. As Pseudo-Athanasius has noticed, for Apollinarius, 'wherever there is a complete man, there is also sin' (*PG* 26, 1096B). Therefore the dilemma is inexorable: either Christ is a sinner, or he is not a complete man. Apollinarius opted for the second.

It is the human mind again which has to be excluded from Christ, if his sinlessness is to be secured. For Apollinarius, if the Logos had assumed a human mind, he would be full of sinful thoughts, which the human mind is (inevitably) subject to. This is why 'the Word . . . did not assume a human mind, which is subject to change and the captive of filthy thoughts, but was a divine and heavenly immutable mind'. [13]

[13] Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 256. 4-7.

For Apollinarius, the human mind is incapable of controlling and redeeming the flesh due to its lack of (true) knowledge. This is why Christ needed to have a divine *nous* capable of conforming our sinful flesh to himself. [14]

[14] Ibid. 222. 22-4. Georges Florovsky has rightly pointed out that by condemning the Apollinarian heresy with its pessimistic view of the human mind, the Church ratified the possibility, and even the obligation, of studying theology (see Georges Florovsky, *Collected works*, iii: *Creation and Redemption* (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland

Publishing Company, 1976), 30-1). For more on various theological and practical implications of Apollinarianism, see Demetrios Bathrellos, ' ', *Σύναξη*, 74 (2000), 10-18.

But nowhere is Apollinarius's concern for the ethical unity of Christ to be discerned more clearly than in his consistent denial of a human will to the incarnate Logos. Apollinarius denies that God and man were united, because this would result in the destruction of human self-determination, which is, for him, unacceptable. [15]

[15] Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 226. 1-6.

Furthermore, he believes that it is impossible for a single person to have two principles of thinking and willing, because they would necessarily oppose one another by their respective wills and energies. [16]

[16] Ibid. 204. 11-14 and 247. 23-7. **end p.12**

Apollinarius applies this metaphysical principle to his Christology. If there were in Christ two minds, a divine and a human, an opposition between them would be bound to occur due to the unavoidable mutability of the latter. This mutability seems to be mutability from the good, and this is why it results in the human mind's opposing by its will the immutable divine mind and its will. [17]

[17] Ibid. 247. 30-248. 5. Commenting on this fragment, Norris notes that 'his [Apollinarius's] suggestion is that for a mutable rational creature, sin is in fact not avoidable': *Manhood and Christ*, 113.

Apollinarius's disciples usually argue along similar lines. Polemon, for instance, holds that the human mind naturally moves towards opposite options through its natural will. [18]

[18] Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 274. 7-8.

For him, dyothelitism amounts to ontological division and ethical opposition alike. [19]

[19] Ibid. 275. 22-6.

Furthermore, mutability is so deeply rooted in the human will that even a deified will can sin, as Polemon maintains in overt contrast with Gregory of Nazianzus, who had stated the opposite. [20]

[20] Ibid. 274. 6-12. This relates to what Apollinarius himself writes: namely, that it is impossible for a human will to achieve real righteousness (ibid. 245. 7-8). For Gregory's statement see Sermon 30, 12 (*PG* 36, 117C), and Paul Gallay in collaboration with Maurice Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31 (Discours théologiques): introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes*, Sources Chrétiennes, 250 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 248. 5-6).

For these reasons, Apollinarius and his disciples finally attribute to Christ only one will, the divine, and only one energy. [21]

[21] See Apollinarius's statement in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 232, 29-31; see also ibid. 248. 6-7.

Even the dialogue between Christ and his Father in Gethsemane does not indicate, for Apollinarius, two wills but one, and this is certainly not identical with the human will. [22]

[22] Ibid. 233. 2-8. For more on this, see Ch. 3 sec. 4.1.

The exclusion of two wills and energies is an important characteristic of the Apollinarian system. Some of Apollinarius's followers, such as Eunomius of Thrace and Julianus, also excluded two wills and energies from Christ. [23]

[23] See Lietzmann, *Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 276. 23-30 and 277. 10-11 respectively.

As Grillmeier has justifiably argued, 'the Apollinarian system is rather a monergetic or monothelitic creation and exerted its great influence in this form'. [24]

[24] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 339.

It is noteworthy that for Apollinarius will and energy seem to be interrelated. One will entails one energy, and vice versa, whereas presumably two energies would presuppose two wills, which means two wills opposing one another. We will encounter this line of thinking and arguing again in the monothelites of the seventh century.**end p.13**

There is, however, another characteristic of Apollinarius's thought that is worth mentioning. Based on the fact that Apollinarius does not attribute to Christ a human nature, Wolfson, in *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, considered it important to ask whether Apollinarius attributes to Christ an irrational animal nature. His conclusion was that Apollinarius puts forward a union of predominance in which the weaker and passive element survives not as a nature, but only as a property, or quality, or quantity. [25]

[25] Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*, 3rd rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 434-44.

If Wolfson's conclusion is sound, [26]

[26] Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 107-11, criticized Wolfson's views as expressed in the 1956 edition of *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, but Wolfson did not take Norris's criticism into account in the third revised edition of his book, to which reference was made above. A deeper examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this book.

we can probably see in Apollinarianism a precursor of Severus, [27]

[27] On this, see also Wolfson, *Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, 444-51.

who, as we will see, attributed to Christ not a human nature but only human qualities, as well as of those monothelites who spoke of one energy of Christ by predominance.

2.1 Conclusions and Assessment

It seems that for Apollinarianism human person, nature, mind, will, energy, mutability, and sinfulness belong together. [28]

[28] For Apollinarius's soteriology and its antinomies, see Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 112-22.

Apollinarianism asserts the unity and the sinlessness of the person of Christ by excluding a human nature, mind, will, and energy from him. [29]

[29] The tendency to identify personhood with nature or natural qualities and especially with the mind, which characterizes Apollinarianism, seems to occur quite often in the history of human thought. It is remarkable that in our own day some philosophers of ethics give a definition of 'person' based on mental and volitional capacities, and in doing so make it possible to justify, e.g., abortion and even infanticide: see e.g. Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

In this way, however, it seriously mutilates Christ's humanity, and this is why its Christology cannot be accepted.

But Apollinarianism is characterized not only by its concern for the unity and the sinlessness of Christ, or by its inability to draw necessary distinctions: it is equally marked by an unbridgeable ontological and ethical dualism. [30]

[30] For the negative implications of dualism in Christology see Colin E. Gunton, *Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology* (London: SPCK, 1997), 86-102.

To say that for Apollinarius God and man are 'eternal opposites' may be going too far, [31]

[31] Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 113-14, mentions that, according to Raven, for Apollinarius, God and man are considered as 'eternal opposites' (C. E. Raven, *Apollinarianism: An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 183) and believes that, for Apollinarius, sin is a result of the mutability of man.

but it is nevertheless true that in the Apollinarian system God and **end p.14** man cannot be fully, hypostatically united (in Christ), and the same goes for their respective wills. Apollinarius and his disciples could not conceive of a coexistence and cooperation between the divine and the human natures and wills in Christ that would respect the particularity and integrity of both. [32]

[32] By 'will' here I mean the natural faculty in virtue of which one is capable of willing. More will be said on this matter in Ch. 3 below.

As Norris has rightly noticed, for Apollinarius 'perfect cooperation between human and divine wills is impossible', [33]

[33] Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 119.

which means that the one (viz. the divine) can and must be affirmed only at the expense of the other. Thus, by excluding a human will from Christ, Apollinarianism could not make sense either of Christ as being tempted as we are in everything, sin apart, [34]

[34] Heb. 4: 15.

or of his human obedience to the Father, on which Saint Maximus the Confessor insisted so much three centuries later.

Apollinarius's interpretation of the mystery of the union between God and man in the person of Christ is seriously flawed. He succeeds in holding fast to the unity of Christ and in pointing to God the Logos as the personal subject in Christology in a way that the Nestorians could never have done. Yet, this is achieved at a very high cost: the mutilation of the humanity of Christ. It comes as no surprise that his heresy incurred devastating criticisms by some of the greatest theologians of the fourth century. Gregory of Nazianzus saw Apollinarius as vitiating not only Christ's humanity but our salvation too. If what is unassumed remains unhealed, then in the Apollinarian system our soul remains unredeemed, claimed Gregory. [35]

[35] For Gregory's refutation of Apollinarianism, see his *Epistle* 101, *PG* 37, 176A-193B, and in Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Lettres théologiques*, 36-69 and for his famous axiom, see *PG* 37, 181C-184A, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Lettres théologiques*, 50. 32.

He and Gregory of Nyssa [36]

[36] For Gregory of Nyssa's anti-Apollinarian treatises, see Fridericus Müller (ed.), *Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora*, pars I (Leiden: Brill, 1958), 119-233.

expressed the faith of the Church, which, whilst opposing the theory of the two Sons as well as any reduction of the unity in Christ to an external and ethical unity of grace, could never accept either Apollinarianism's 'anthropological minimalism' [37]

[37] The phrase belongs to Georges Florovsky: see Georges Florovsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. viii: *The Byzantine Fathers of the Fifth Century*, ed. by Richard S. Haugh, trans. Raymond Miller, Anne-Marie Döllinger-Labriolle, and Helmut Wilhelm Schmiedel (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 1987), 213.

or its grounds and implications.

After condemnations by Councils in Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch in **end p.15** 377, 378, and 379 respectively, Apollinarianism was finally condemned by the Second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople in 381. Condemnation of Apollinarius is also found repeatedly in the writings of almost all the important Christian writers of the following centuries. Yet, one has to wait until the seventh century to see the full development of Apollinarianism and its ramifications, and their final refutation by Saint Maximus the Confessor.

3. Nestorianism

3.1 Introduction

In this section Nestorianism and its understanding of the person of Christ will be examined. The reasons for doing this are manifold. Nestorian Christology forms a large part of the overall Christology of ancient Christianity. Two Ecumenical Councils had as their task the refutation of Nestorianizing conceptions of Christology. [38]

[38] The Third (431) and the Fifth (553) Ecumenical Councils.

In addition, some of the healthiest strands of ancient Christology were unduly labelled as Nestorian. Chalcedon, for instance, was accused of having restored Nestorianism, and the exponents and supporters of Chalcedon's doctrine were characterized as Nestorians by the anti-Chalcedonian opposition. Later, Maximus himself was characterized as a Nestorian by his monothelite adversaries. Furthermore, it is certain that the orthodoxy of almost every attempt by theologians after the Council of Chalcedon (in 451) to articulate a sound Christology was, at least partly, judged on the basis of anti-Nestorian sensitivities. What is more, the exponents of Nestorianism raised questions and suggested answers which are of significance for the Christology of all times. For all these reasons an examination of Nestorianism seems to be indispensable for the purposes of this book. Of course, given that the main focus of this book is the monothelite controversy, an in-depth examination of all the writers who might be characterized as Nestorian is clearly beyond its scope. However, an interpretative description needs to be provided, and a theological judgement passed, on Nestorian Christology, with particular reference to its main representatives, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius.

The study of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius has been facilitated thanks to the discovery in the twentieth century of some of their works hitherto considered lost. [39]

[39] See Nestorius, *The Bazaar of Heracleides*, trans. and ed. with an introduction, notes and appendices by G. R. Driver and Leonard Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925) and Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Commentary on the Nicene Creed*, ed. and trans. A. Mingana, Woodbrooke Studies, 5 (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1932) and *Commentary on the Lord's Prayer and on the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist*, ed. and trans. A. Mingana, Woodbrook Studies, 6 (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1933).

We are now better able to grasp the quintessence **end p.16** of their teaching and perhaps mitigate some excessively negative assessments of it. However, contrary to what some scholars think, the newly discovered works do not suffice to counteract the evidence provided by other sources, including those which the ancient Church used in its condemnation of these theologians. On the contrary, they confirm the conclusion that both were proponents of a divisive, 'Nestorian' Christology. As to the profoundness of Nestorius's teaching, McGuckin has correctly claimed that 'one ought to be wary of studies which hail him as a misunderstood genius who has much to offer contemporary theology'. [40]

[40] John A. McGuckin, *Saint Cyril of Alexandria, the Christological Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 173. For useful, albeit not up-to-date, overviews of the issue of the orthodoxy of Theodore of Mopsuestia, see John S. Romanides, 'Highlights in the Debate over Theodore of Mopsuestia's Christology and Some Suggestions for a Fresh Approach', *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 5 (1959-60), 140-85, at 140-53,

and Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 246-62; for an overview of the issue of the orthodoxy of Nestorius, see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 559-68. It should also be noted that the question of the alleged interpolations of *Heracleides* cannot be discussed here (for more on this, see Frances M. Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and its Background* (London: SCM Press, 1983), 230-3). The same goes for the question of the authenticity of some of the extracts attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia.

It is not strictly within the scope of this book, however, to decide the question of the orthodoxy of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, the main representatives of Nestorianism. The focus will be on the salient features of their teaching, and how it contributed to later Christological development. [41]

[41] The latter of these issues will be partly addressed in later sections.

The examination of their Christology will hopefully lead to a deeper understanding of some of the problems which arose in the course of the monothelite controversy, and to a more informed judgement of the monothelite and dyothelite positions.

3.2 Theodore Of Mopsuestia and Nestorius On the Person Of Christ

In sharp contrast to Apollinarius, the theologians of the school of Antioch were interested in affirming the fullness of the humanity of Christ. Their Christology has frequently been characterized as Logos-man Christology, in contradistinction to the Alexandrian so-called Logos-*sarx* Christology. [42]

[42] However, the Logos-*sarx* Christological theory does not apply to as many theologians of the ancient Church as some historians of doctrine seem to believe.

However, if one is keen to insist on the completeness of the humanity **end p.17** assumed by the Logos, the question which arises in all its force is how the unity of Christ is subsequently to be secured. It is at precisely this point that the main deficiencies of Nestorianism become apparent.

Both Theodore and Nestorius tried to conceive of the unity of Christ not on the level of nature, as Apollinarius had done, but on the level of person. However, they tended to speak of the divinity and the humanity of Christ in a way which suggests that they conceived of them as two persons. The truth encapsulated in the statement of Gregory of Nazianzus that in Christ we have two 'whats' (ἄλλο *καὶ* ἄλλο) but not two 'whos' or 'I's', namely persons (ἄλλος *καὶ* ἄλλος), [43]

[43] See *Epistle* 101, *PG* 37, 180A and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Lettres théologiques*, 44. 20.

seems to have escaped their attention. Both used to speak of the assumed man as if he were a second personal subject (an ἄλλος) alongside the Logos. [44]

[44] Although Nestorius mentions that there are not in Christ an ἄλλος and ἄλλος (Friedrich Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana: Die Fragmente des Nestorius, Gesammelt, Untersucht und Herausgegeben* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905), 224. 12-13 and 281. 7), overall, what he says suggests the contrary. Theodore is more explicit than Nestorius, and states that (*PG* 66, 1004C).

The situation was aggravated by the fact that they applied to the humanity of Christ not only the predicate of nature, but also the predicates of hypostasis and person. For instance, as Grillmeier has noted, 'Theodore always puts physis and hypostasis side by side.' [45]

[45] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 439.

Likewise, Nestorius argues that 'the ousia of the likeness of God and the ousia of the likeness of the servant remain in their hypostases', [46]

[46] Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 172.

and often speaks of the two persons which coalesce in one, as Driver and Hodgson have remarked. [47]

[47] See Driver and Hodgson's Introduction to ibid. p. xxxii.

Thus, the fact that both verbally denied the theory of two Sons [48]

[48] For Theodore, see e.g. *PG* 66, 985B, and, for Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 47, 54, etc.

does not seem to suffice to clear them of the accusation of Nestorianism, as will become clear in the course of this section.

How did they use the notion of person in order to define Christ's unity? Grillmeier has aptly remarked that Nestorius 'sometimes speaks of two *prosopa*, sometimes of one *prosopon* in Christ'. Theodore does the same, as can be seen in a relevant fragment. [49]

[49] This fragment is cited by Leontius of Byzantium: see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 432; see also *PG* 66, 981B-C.

The one *prosopon* to which Theodore refers does not express a real unity, as can be deduced by the fact that he constantly refers to the Logos and the assumed man '*as if* to one Son'. [50]

[50] See e.g. Theodore's *Commentary on the Nicene Creed*, 64, 66, and *passim*.

As a matter of fact, Theodore and Nestorius attempted to secure the unity of Christ by **end p.18** referring to the 'one person of the union'. The problem was not only that they expressed unity and distinction in Christ by the same term—that is, the term *prosopon*,—but also that for both *prosopon* meant simply the external appearance. [51]

[51] Grillmeier is right in noticing this: *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 463.

As a result, the 'person of the union' signified merely an external unity between the divine and the human in Christ. Thus, Nestorius, for instance, expressed this unity by insisting that the assumed man and the Logos are one in terms of ἀξία, αὐθεντία, τιμή and ἀξίωμα as well as in terms of one βουλή and θέλησις (will). [52]

[52] See e.g. Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 196. 15-17, 224. 5-15, 273. 12, 354. 9-11 and 354. 14-18.

The fatality of their inability to articulate an ontology of person/hypostasis as distinct from nature must be emphasized. In so far as the Antiochenes' Trinitarian theology is concerned, the Logos seems at times to be identical with and indistinguishable from the divine nature. [53]

[53] Sellers has noted that 'in their theology they [the Antiochenes] start, not, like the Alexandrians, from a Trinitarian conception of God, but from the conception of his unity': R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon: A Historical and Doctrinal Survey* (London: SPCK, 1953), 158-9. Nestorius occasionally quasi-identifies God the Logos with the divine nature: 'God the Word is indicative of the nature' (*Bazaar of Heracleides*, 308.) As Romanides has remarked, Theodore cannot distinguish the Logos from the divine nature; for him 'the terms Logos and divine nature are actually interchangeable' ('Highlights in the Debate', 161). This quasi-identification may also be reflected in the fact that the divine nature, and not the Logos, is at times presented as the subject of working in passages such as the following: 'the one who assumed is the Divine nature that does everything for us' (*Commentary on the Creed*, 87). See also Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 231-42, where the fact that Nestorius confuses God the Logos with the divine nature leads him to the conclusion that, since the High Priest of the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot be identified with the divine nature [= the Logos], he is identified with the assumed man. According to Florovsky, Cyril, by contrast, in maintaining that it is the Logos as man who is identified with the arch-priest, in fact argues against the human functioning of the sacraments (Florovsky, *Byzantine Fathers of the Fifth Century*, 283).

For them, it was absolutely unacceptable to go along with the basic tenet of Alexandrian Christology: namely, that the Logos became man, without ceasing to be God, and thus was born of Mary and suffered in the flesh. This was so because, in their view, to say that God the Logos was born of Mary or that the Logos suffered was the same as saying that the divine nature was born or suffered. [54]

[54] Nestorius repeatedly denies that God the Logos was born of Mary (see e.g. Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 176. 17-18) and that he was the subject of suffering (see e.g. ibid. 229. 14-15, and Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 150).

Hence their determined opposition to Alexandrian Christology.

On the level of the humanity of Christ, for Theodore and Nestorius the word 'hypostasis' is identical with the word 'nature' and not with the word 'person', which implies that they placed the real ontology of a being on the side of nature rather than on that of person. For them, person, as we have **end p.19** already seen, seems to be nothing beyond nature's external appearance. Thus, the term 'person', which they used in order to express the unity in Christ, is very weak compared to the terms 'nature', 'hypostasis' (and 'person') which they used to express the distinction between the divine and the human in Christ. The Antiochenes were unable to grasp the importance of speaking of one *hypostasis* in Christ, [55]

[55] The Antiochene Theodoret of Cyrus identified 'person' with 'hypostasis', but for him 'person' (and consequently 'hypostasis') still means merely the countenance, so he cannot base the unity of Christ on an ontologically secure ground (for more, see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 488-95). For the crypto-Nestorianism of Theodoret, see John S. Romanides, 'St. Cyril's "One Physis or Hypostasis of God the Logos Incarnate" and Chalcedon', in Paulos Gregorios, William H. Lazareth, and Nikos A. Nissiotis (eds.), *Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite? Towards Convergence in Orthodox Christology* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981), 50-70, at 59-61.

understood either in terms of the one end-product of the hypostatic union in which the two natures are fully united, albeit distinct, or/and as identical with the hypostasis of the Logos. [56]

[56] The double meaning of the term 'hypostasis' will be discussed further in the treatment of the two Leontioi and of Maximus.

In addition, this pre-ontological understanding of person [57]

[57] For the achievement of an ontological understanding of the notion of the person in Trinitarian theology, see John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 27-49.

(a sort of 'Sabellianism' in Christology) was coupled with both Theodore's and Nestorius's continuous refusal to identify Christ, as they called 'the person of the union', with the Logos, in sharp contradistinction to their Alexandrian opponents. The outcome of this was that, for them, the subject of our salvation was not identified with the Logos, but with Christ, [58]

[58] The distinction between the Logos and Christ is one of the recurrent motifs in Nestorius: see e.g. Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 254, 358. 9-18 and Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 144 (Christ is 'the person of the union', whereas God the Word is a person in his own nature), 146, 252, etc.

who in turn is sometimes identified with the assumed man. [59]

[59] In Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 259. 16-17, Nestorius denies that Christ is a simple man and claims that he is both God and man. However, in other instances, such as ibid. 275. 10-11 and 289. 6-15, it is implied that Christ is identified with the assumed man. Theodore of Mopsuestia also denies that Christ was a mere man (*Commentary on the Creed*, 54). However, he elsewhere clearly associates the 'I' (ἐγώ) of Christ with the man (*PG* 66, 1000B-C). In addition, there are statements in his *Commentary on the Creed* which put forward the identity between Christ and the assumed man: e.g. '*in one Lord Jesus Christ*. This name is that of the man whom God put on' (36).

And since 'the man Jesus was [for Theodore, and, I would add, for Nestorius as well], so to speak, only figuratively and honorifically the Son of God', to cite Mingana, [60]

[60] See Mingana's introduction to Theodore of Mopsuestia's *Commentary on the Nicene Creed*, 17.

the accusation made against them of being man-worshipping, though extreme, was perhaps not wholly unjustified. [61]

[61] It is noteworthy that in his *Commentary on Baptism* Theodore comes very close to identifying the head of the Church with the assumed man (64-5), whereas in his *Commentary on the Creed* he says that he who will judge the living and the dead is the assumed man: 'They [the Fathers] rightly ascribed the sentence: *To judge the living and the dead* to the prosopon of the man who was assumed on our behalf' (80). **end p.20**

This impression is corroborated by Theodore's statement that 'the only begotten Son of God, God the Word, was pleased to assume a man for us, whom He raised from the dead, took up to heaven, *united to Himself*, and placed at the right hand of God', [62]

[62] See *Commentary on the Lord's Prayer and on the Sacraments*, 98.

which implies that the assumed man went through a procedure of gradual unity with the Logos brought to completion only after the resurrection. It is also corroborated by the example of the unity of husband and wife in one flesh which he uses in order to cast light on the unity between the Logos and the assumed man. [63]

[63] See *PG* 66, 981 A-B.

Another distinctive characteristic of the Antiochenes was their interest in ethics. For Sellers, 'that theirs is a moral rather than a philosophical outlook is not surprising when we take into account their close connection with Judaism. . .and their consequent interest in the Old Testament, to which they constantly turned for inspiration'. [64]

[64] Sellers, *Council of Chalcedon*, 158; for his treatment of the Christological thought of the school of Antioch see ibid. 158-81 as well as *idem, Two Ancient Christologies: A Study in the Christological Thought of the Schools of Alexandria and Antioch* (London: SPCK, 1954), 107-201.

So far, so good. The question remains, however, whether their moral outlook conditions the way they understood the union in Christ. According to the fragments of Theodore of Mopsuestia's treatise *On the Incarnation*, which were collected in order to serve his condemnation by the Fifth Ecumenical Council, Theodore believes that God the Logos chose to unite himself to the assumed man because he foreknew his good disposition and his future exceptional virtue. As Swete has summarized Theodore's teaching, deduced from his commentaries on the epistles of Paul, 'if it be asked in what sense God dwelt in this Man, we must reply that it was by a special disposition towards him, a disposition of entire complacency (Eph. i. 22, 23; iv. 9). God, in his uncircumscribed Nature and Essence, fills the universe, nay, is all in all; in Christ, He dwells in the Person of the Word by a moral union . . . (Rom. i. 2-3; Phil. ii. 8; 1 Tim. iii. 16)'. [65]

[65] H. B. Swete (ed.), *Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni, in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1880-2), i (1880), p. lxxxii.

Moreover, as Romanides has noticed, 'for Theodore, God unites Himself by will to the assumed man, but this union is dependent on God's foreknowledge of the assumed man's merits', [66]

[66] Romanides, 'Highlights in the Debate', 168; see also *PG* 66, 977B and C, 980B and C, 989C-D and 1004D. Furthermore, it can be argued that, according to Theodore, the man is united to the Logos due to the man's good will (γνώμη) (*PG* 66, 977C). In addition, in his *Commentary on the Creed*, Theodore says that the Son along with the Father and the Spirit dwelt in Christ because the latter kept God's commandments (92).

and there seems to be evidence that the same goes end p.21 also for Nestorius. [67]

[67] See Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 220. 1-6 and 224. 8-10.

Needless to say, this 'Christological Pelagianism' undermines the Gospel of man's redemption by God in a subtle but extremely dangerous way. [68]

[68] Is it simply a historical accident that the Third Ecumenical Council condemned the 'anthropological maximalism' (the phrase belongs again to Florovsky) not only of Nestorianism but also of Pelagianism? A further treatment of the issue of the historical and systematic connections between Nestorianism and Pelagianism cannot be undertaken here. For more on this, see Florovsky, *Byzantine Fathers of the Fifth Century*, 209, 213, 224-7.

Bearing in mind the importance assigned by Theodore and Nestorius to the will of the assumed man, together with their teaching as a whole, it can be argued that their alleged monothelitism and monenergism is of an ethical, not an ontological, character. [69]

[69] This is the way the excerpts in Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 224, must be understood, and not as expressing a real, ontological monothelitism.

To call the exponents of the school of Antioch monothelites and to connect the monothelitism of the seventh century with theirs is erroneous and unfair. [70]

[70] Romanides is wrong here ('Highlights in the Debate', 170), as was Maximus himself, although the latter drew the line from seventh-century monothelitism back to Nestorianism for obvious tactical reasons (on this, see Ch. 3 below).

On the contrary, it seems that for them the assumed man is endowed with a will, [71]

[71] See e.g. Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 163, where dyothelitism is implied, and ibid. 240, 251, and 314 where a human will is clearly attributed to Christ. Theodore also states that Christ had one will and energy 'οὐ λόγῳ φύσεως ἀλλ' εὐδοκίας' (*PG* 66, 1004D). Adolph Harnack has justifiably argued that 'the thought that Christ possessed a free will was the lode-star of their [the Antiochenes'] Christology' (*History of Dogma*, iv, trans. E. B. Speirs and James Millar (Oxford: Williams & Norgate 1898), 165). On the importance of the assumed man's will for the Antiochenes, see also Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, 243-57.

and is also the personal agent who wills in virtue of it, as can be deduced from their emphasis on the assumed man's ethical struggle to achieve righteousness progressively, [72]

[72] J. Gross noticed long ago that 'on account of the fact that in his [Theodore's] eyes the two natures of Christ are also two persons, he admits a progressive deification of the man Jesus. . . . According to him, the union of the Logos with the man Jesus went through a continued intensification', which resulted in the 'radical transformation of the *Assumptus Homo*': *La Divinisation du chrétien d' après les Pères grecs: contribution historique á la doctrine de la grâce* (Paris, 1938), 268, cited in Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 278.

which is in turn coupled with their tendency to understand him as ontologically, albeit not ethically, sinful. [73]

[73] The Antiochenes did not accept that the assumed man sinned—i.e. that he was ethically sinful—but they understood him as sinful in his very being (ontologically). Nestorius wrote in the *Bazaar of Heracleides*. 'But although he [Christ] had all those things which appertain unto our nature, anger and concupiscence and thoughts, and although also they increased with the progress and increase of every age [in his life], he stood firm in thoughts of obedience' (63). Theodore of Mopsuestia was accused of, and subsequently condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council for, attributing sinfulness to Christ (see the section on the Fifth Ecumenical Council below; a kind of sinfulness of Christ is also implied in some of his extracts found in *PG* 66, esp. in 992C; Romanides also contends that 'Theodore comes pretty close to saying that Christ was actually sinful prior to His resurrection ('Highlights in the Debate', 169). It seems that not only for Apollinarius, but also for the Antiochenes, full humanity goes hand in hand with sinfulness, which is perhaps why Nestorius and Theodore, who conceived of Christ as a complete man, attributed a kind of sinfulness to him. **end p.22**

3.3 Conclusions and Assessment

[a]The Nestorians failed to articulate a convincing theory of the person of Christ. The unity and sinlessness of Christ were compromised for the sake of an emphasis on the integrity of the humanity of the assumed man and its moral dimensions. [74]

[74] However, it is noteworthy that John J. O'Keefe draws attention to the position held by H. Chadwick, M. Anastos, J. Pelican, and F. Young, according to which Nestorius was interested primarily in protecting God from suffering, and not in the integrity of his humanity: 'Impassible Suffering? Divine Passion and Fifth-Century Christology', *Theological Studies*, 58 (1997), 39-60, at 41.

Nestorianism was condemned in the Third and the Fifth Ecumenical Councils, about which more will be said in later sections.

The condemnation of Nestorianism, however, should not blind us to the positive elements of the Christology of the school of Antioch. To assert the fullness of the humanity of Christ at a time when different forms of at least latent monophysitism held sway in various parts of the Empire should not pass unnoticed. [75]

[75] As regards terminology, it should be noted that Nestorius and Theodore frequently speak of two natures (e.g. in Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 242. 18 and 254. 10, and in *PG* 66, 981C, where Theodore speaks of two natures and one person (though he speaks there of two persons as well).

Their moral sensitivities concerning Christ's obedience to the law and the will of the Father also point to an important dimension of Christology. Nestorius and Theodore must also be credited with alluding to the human will of Christ, in virtue of which he was able to carry out his mission in a human way. [76]

[76] See e.g. Nestorius, *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 62-9, where the voluntary obedience of Christ and the importance of his temptations are given appropriate emphasis. In the same passage, the human will is implicitly referred to. Attention should also be paid to Grillmeier's note that Theodore succeeded in making the soul of Christ a theological factor, in contrast to the Logos-*sarx* Christology, where Christ's soul is, in his view, (at best) a physical factor only (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 426).

All these elements, if properly integrated, cannot but be part and parcel of a healthy Christology, and it may be argued that Maximus, despite the fact that he belonged to the Alexandrian Christological **end p.23** tradition, was able to enrich the Christology of the Church by expressing some of the interests which the great Antiochenes had also tried to express, albeit awkwardly, two centuries before him.

4. Saint Cyril Of Alexandria

We have seen that Nestorianism posed a serious threat to the faith of the Church because it undermined the personal unity of Christ. The most prominent opponent of Nestorius' Christology was Saint Cyril of Alexandria. It is beyond the scope of this book to present the Christology of Cyril in detail, but some brief remarks on its main traits and significance are necessary if we are to understand later developments.

The Christology of Cyril had the unity of Christ as its guiding principle. Cyril insisted that Christ is identical to God the Logos incarnate. The personal agent of our salvation was not a man standing in whatever relationship to God the Logos, but God the Logos incarnate himself. [77]

[77] On this, see two of his anathemas at the end of his third epistle to Nestorius: viz. anathemas X and XII, in *PG* 77, 121 B-D.

Understandably, Cyril could not tolerate Nestorianism. For him, Nestorius was like the Pharisees, who were able to see the man Jesus, but failed to see that this man was God the Logos in the flesh. Cyril saw Nestorius as asking Jesus the same question as the Pharisees: 'Why do you, being a man, make yourself God?' [78]

[78] St Cyril, *Explicatio Duodecim Capitum*, *PG* 76, 293B. Cf. John 10: 33.

In Cyril's view, Nestorius's failure was fatal.

In attacking the divisive teaching of Nestorianism, Cyril expressed the traditional sensitivity of the Church to the unity of the person of Christ. Cyril was in line with traditional Christological orthodoxy on this matter, and it comes as no surprise that it was he who won the day. In fact, not only the Third Ecumenical Council, presided over by Cyril himself, but also the whole development of ancient Christology from the fifth century up to Maximus the Confessor and Saint John of Damascus (seventh and eighth centuries respectively) followed Cyril and considered him as authoritative in matters of Christology.

To combat Nestorianism, Cyril emphasized the unity of Christ. Unfortunately, however, some of Cyril's readers, both ancient and modern, failed to see that Cyril stated the distinction between the divinity and humanity in Christ as well, and, as a result, believed that he came dangerously close to monophysitism, or even that he was a moderate monophysite himself. There are three main reasons for this misunderstanding. **end p.24**

The first is the 'extreme' Alexandrian Christology and language that Cyril used, for instance in his third letter to Nestorius and the 'twelve anathemas'. The second is that he made frequent use of the

'monophysite' formula 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos'. The third reason is that the anti-Chalcedonian monophysites appealed to him to support their Christological claims. Let us briefly examine these three reasons.

Cyril's twelve anathemas were written in a way that strongly reflected the Alexandrian Christological tradition with its emphasis on the enfleshed Logos's personal unity. We can concede that they are one-sided: namely, that they stress Christ's personal unity more than the integrity of his humanity. This is mainly due to the heresy he was attacking: that is, Nestorianism (Chalcedon was later to be accused of Nestorianism for exactly the opposite reason: namely, because it emphasized the distinction between the divine and human natures in Christ; but again, the enemy there was different: namely, monophysitism). To be one-sided, however, is not the same as being false. Cyril's anathemas must be read and understood in connection with his whole Christology, which, even in its most 'Alexandrian' expressions, is perfectly orthodox. It is noteworthy that even Chalcedon vindicated Cyril's Christology, including the anathemas, and the same was true of most, if not all, subsequent Orthodox theologians. [79]

[79] As we will see in the following section, Chalcedon was to a great extent a Cyrillian Council. The Fathers of Chalcedon were able to read Cyril correctly, and to see that his Christology and theirs was virtually identical.

Cyril used the formula 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos', because he thought that it came from Saint Athanasius, the hero of Nicaea's Trinitarian theology and his predecessor on the throne of Alexandria. [80]

[80] The formula is of Apollinarian provenance (it comes from the Apollinarian forgery *Ad Jovianum*, which was falsely attributed to Athanasius; it can be found in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 251. 1-2), and points to the terminological influence which Apollinarianism exercised over the Church during the centuries. Cyril interpreted the formula in an orthodox way, but its Apollinarian origin and connotations constitute one of the factors which show its inferiority to the Chalcedonian formula. Needless to say, Cyril condemns Apollinarianism many a time.

But it would be unfair to accuse Cyril of monophysitism because of this formula, and to ignore the rest of his Christology on the basis of which the formula must be understood.

In fact, Cyril was more flexible and open-minded than some people think. Orthodoxy for him was not simply a matter of words. This is borne out by his agreement with the oriental representatives of Antiochean Christology, which found expression in the famous *Formulary of Reunion* of 433. The substance of Cyril's Christology was included in the *Formulary of Reunion*, but some of his expressions were superseded or complemented by others **end p.25** derived from the Antiochean tradition. Thus a more 'catholic' expression of the truth was reached, to be followed by the great achievement of Chalcedon, less than twenty years later. [81]

[81] For the text of the *Formulary of Reunion*, see *PG* 77, 173C-181C.

The third reason to suspect Cyril of 'monophysitism' is that monophysite or monophysitizing theologians and groups from the fifth century onwards seem to have had the same sensitivity as Cyril about the importance of the unity of the person of Christ. Severus and the anti-Chalcedonians in particular often appealed to him as to a spiritual father and frequently turned to him in order to seek support for their doctrines. The monothelites of the seventh century appealed to Cyril too, in order to back up their Christology. The critical question here, of course, is whether these theologians read Cyril correctly. It is well known that the Chalcedonians appealed to Cyril and always saw in him a profound exponent of the soundest orthodox Christology, even though his language had not yet reached the clarity that was achieved later by Chalcedon.

As a matter of fact, Cyril is one of the most misread theologians of the early Church. In my view, his Christology is far more 'Chalcedonian' than is usually thought. [82]

[82] An element of Cyril's well-balanced Christology that has not been noted so far is the way in which he interprets Jesus's prayer in Gethsemane. For more on this, see Ch. 3, sec. 4.1.

In his texts, we see not only an uncompromised insistence on Christ's personal unity, but also an unambiguous distinction between his divinity and his humanity. In his Christology we find a clear and unmistakable acknowledgement of the existence of his divine and human natures *after* the union.

It is beyond the scope of this book to enumerate all the citations that support this claim. We will therefore restrict ourselves to just one short treatise by Cyril, in order to see the ways in which he indicated the existence of Christ's natures after the union. In his *Scholia de Incarnatione Unigeniti*, he wrote that 'the *natures* [plural] *remained* without confusion'. [83]

[83] *PG* 75, 1381A-B.

He also wrote that 'we know the difference of the natures [plural] and we keep them without confusion with each other'. [84]

[84] Ibid. 1386C.

He also devoted a whole paragraph to explaining how the natures—namely, the nature of the Logos and the nature of the humanity—coexist. He wrote that each of the natures is in the other, that there is a difference in the natures etc. It is clear, of course, that Cyril refers to the natures of Christ after the union. [85]

[85] Ibid. 1397C-D.

It must be finally mentioned that the *Formulary of Reunion*, which Cyril whole-heartedly accepted, speaks of *two* natures after the union. [86]

[86] See *PG* 77, 173A in Cyril's famous epistle *Laetentur coeli*. **end p.26**

A similar conclusion has been also reached by Aloys Grillmeier:

It is not difficult to cite *many* places in Cyril in which the distinction between the two natures is expressed. Equally the Patriarch let there be no doubt that this distinction remains preserved too in the uniting of the two natures. For this reason the conclusion would also be clear that the Logos made flesh in the incarnation '*has two natures*' or '*is in two natures*'. [87]

[87] Grillmeier with Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 29, italics added.

The fact that we do not find in Cyril exactly the same language that Chalcedon used some years *after* Cyril's death does not of course necessarily mean that his Christology differed from Chalcedon's. The main effort of many orthodox theologians after Chalcedon was to show the compatibility and essential identity between Cyril and Chalcedon, and thus to prove that Cyril's alleged 'monophysitism' rests upon a false reading. More will be said about this in later sections, for we must now turn our attention to the Council of Chalcedon and its Christology.

5. The Council Of Chalcedon

As we have just seen, the decisive blow against Nestorianism was given by the agreement between Cyril and the oriental representatives of Antiochean Christology, which found expression in the *Formulary of Reunion*. The *Formulary of Reunion* represented an important integration of the Christological traditions of Alexandria and Antioch. Despite its paramount significance, however, this integration was not conclusive. The Church was still in need of a better way to express unity and distinction in Christ. The decisive step in this direction was finally taken by the Council of Chalcedon, which was convened in order to refute Eutychean monophysitism. [88]

[88] Regrettably, historical and theological details cannot be discussed here. For more on the Council of Chalcedon and its significance, see the rich bibliography on the issue, with the following recommendations: Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3 vols. (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951-4); Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 543-57; Sellers, *Council of Chalcedon*; Gregorios, Lazareth, and Nissiotis (eds.), *Does Chalcedon Divide or Unite*? and J. van Oort and J. Roldanus (eds.), *Chalkedon: Geschichte und Aktualität. Studien zur Rezeption der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon* (Leuven: Peeters, 1998).

Eutyches was in all probability no great theologian. His condemnation by the Council of Constantinople in 448 was due to his insistence that Christ had one nature after the union, and in particular to his denial of Christ's **end p.27** consubstantiality with us. But Eutyches was not the only one who adhered to the one nature formula. Some of Cyril's followers, less flexible than him, considered the confession of the 'one incarnate nature' as the shibboleth of Christological orthodoxy. Dioscorus, for example, who succeeded Cyril at the see of Alexandria, appears to have been one of the most extreme exponents of Alexandrian Christology at that time. Under his leadership, the notorious 'Latrocinium Ephesinum', in 449, rehabilitated Eutyches and anathematized the two natures formula along with its supporters, including the leaders of the Council of Constantinople of 448.

This is a highly compressed account of the historical and theological background of the Council of Chalcedon. The Council was convened two years after the 'Robber Synod' of 449, and aimed at overturning its decisions. Its main purpose was to express the true faith in Christ in a manner which would keep at bay not only Nestorianism but also, primarily, monophysitism. The *Tome of Pope*

Leo, which reflected the Tertullian-inspired Western Christological tradition with its clear recognition of the integrity of the humanity of Christ, was particularly helpful in this respect.

However, at this point certain crucial remarks need to be made. It must be noted that the Council of Chalcedon was more or less a 'Cyrillian' Council. As can be deduced from its proceedings, and as scholars such as Patrick Gray have convincingly shown, for the vast majority of the Fathers of Chalcedon, Cyril was the supreme Christological authority. [89]

[89] See Patrick T. R. Gray, *The Defence of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 7-16.

In addition, André de Halleux, [90]

[90] André de Halleux, 'La Définition christologique à Chalcédoine', *Revue théologique de Louvain*, 7 (1976), 3-23, 155-70.

George Martzelos, [91]

[91] George D. Martzelos, (Thessalonica: Π. Πουρναρᾶς, 1986). In his summary in English, Martzelos remarks: 'Thus, not only the verses which come directly from Cyril, but also those which come from modifications and additions to the original Definition give witness that the Chalcedonian Definition has a completely Cyrillian character. Certainly there is a synthesis of Alexandrine, Antiochean and western Christological elements in the Definition, but this synthesis was produced completely within the framework of Cyril's Christology' (230). Grillmeier is certainly right in arguing that Ephesus and Chalcedon must not be seen dialectically (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 550).

and others have traced the Cyrillian elements of the Chalcedonian definition of faith. This definition insists repeatedly on the personal unity of Christ, and, further, states clearly that Christ is to be identified with God the Logos. [92]

[92] The definition reads: (see N. P. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i: *Nicaea I to Lateran 5* (London: Sheed & Ward; Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 86. However, it must be mentioned here that, as Grillmeier has noted, Chalcedon applied the word 'hypostasis' 'not to the one Logos-subject' but 'to the final form of him who had assumed flesh' (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 277). In later sections devoted to the Leontioi and to Maximus there will be an opportunity to see how the word 'hypostasis' was used to denote both the divine person of the Logos and the end-product of the union.

As David Coffey has noticed, 'the latter part **end p.28** of the dogma [of Chalcedon] speaks of the person of Christ as "one and the same Son, only-begotten, divine Word". . . . In other words, properly speaking the one who was "made known in two natures" was not so much "Christ" as the "divine Word".' [93]

[93] David Coffey, 'The Theandric Nature of Christ', *Theological Studies*, 60 (1999), 405-31, at 410.

However, we must not forget that Chalcedon's principal aim was to condemn monophysitism and to exclude the possibility of an asymmetrical monophysite interpretation of Cyrillian Christology. The Fathers of the Council could choose either the formula 'out of two natures' (ἐκ *δύο φύσεων*) or the formula 'in two natures' (ἐν *δύο φύσεσιν*), and they chose the latter. The reason for this was that Cyrillian formula ἐκ *δύο φύσεων* did not clearly indicate the existence of a full humanity after the union. In addition, Dioscorus had used this formula at the Council of 449 which had rehabilitated the monophysite Eutyches. Thus, when the Fathers of Chalcedon had to choose between 'Dioscorus, who denied the two natures in Christ, [and] Leo, who argued that there are two natures', they unanimously chose the latter, and this led them to adopt the expression ἐκ *δύο φύσεσιν*. [94]

[94] See Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" ', 267-8.

The importance of Chalcedon in both historical and theological terms can hardly be overestimated. By introducing into Christology the terminology which had been used in the fourth century to denote unity and distinction in God, it brought about a helpful integration of 'theology' and 'economy'. [95]

[95] In later sections, we will see how Maximus made use of this integration, which, furthermore, points to the connection between Trinitarian theology and Christology and, consequently, anthropology and ecclesiology in a potentially fruitful way.

In addition, it provided the Church with a terminology capable of protecting faith from both Nestorian and monophysite aberrations. By stating that the one person of Christ is one *hypostasis*, it demonstrated its determined opposition to Nestorianism. [96]

[96] For more on the background of the use of the term 'hypostasis' in Christology before the Council of Chalcedon see Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" ', esp. 258-70, where the contributions of the archbishops of Constantinople, Proclus and Flavianus, as well as of Basil of Seleucia, are illustrated. For the importance of the introduction of the term 'hypostasis' in the definition of Chalcedon, Richard has aptly remarked that the Fathers of

the Council wanted thereby to 'exprimer fortement . . . leur foi en l'unité personnelle du Christ', and that the formula 'ἓν πρόσωπον n'offrait pas toutes les garanties souhaitables. Il n'est pas douteux que les rédacteurs de la definition', he continues, 'ont ajouté καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν pour écarter cette fausse interprétation du dogme qui ne voulait voire dans le Christ qu' une union purement morale' (269). For the Christology of Basil of Seleucia and its

contribution to the formation of the definition of Chalcedon, see George D. Martzelos, (Thessalonica: Π. *Πουρναρᾶς*, 1990).

On the other hand, by saying that this hypostasis is **end p.29** known in *two* natures, not only in a divine but also in a human nature, it showed that it is unacceptable to confuse Christ's natures, to jeopardize his consubstantiality with the Father and with us, or to undermine the fullness of his humanity after the union. [97]

[97] It should be noted that neither Ephesus nor Chalcedon were the first orthodox expositions of Christology. Earlier theologians, such as the two Gregories (Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa), for instance, had put forward a Christology of profound orthodoxy, although they had not developed a detailed teaching on Christology due to the fact that they were preoccupied with questions of Trinitarian theology. I do not claim that until the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon Apollinarianism and Nestorianism were the two prevailing approaches to Christology.

However, the definition of the Council gave rise to a couple of relentless and bedevilling questions, which have puzzled theologians up to the present day. Is the Chalcedonian definition compatible with the Christology of Cyril? What is the distinction between nature and person/hypostasis to which the Council refers? For those who rejected Chalcedon—namely, the anti-Chalcedonian 'monophysites'—the Christologies of Cyril and Chalcedon were incompatible. According to them, there was no distinction between nature and person/hypostasis, at least on the level of economy, hence their dismay at the Council, which had ostensibly restored the heresy of Nestorius by attributing two natures to Christ. We will now investigate their reasons for opposing the Council in some detail.

6. The Anti-Chalcedonian Challenge

Chalcedon faced determined opposition from a substantial number of Cyril's followers, who saw in it the rehabilitation of Nestorianism. The opposition to Chalcedon, which was widespread in some areas in the East and the South, eventually led to the establishment of anti-Chalcedonian Churches. This meant that the controversy between the Chalcedonians and their opponents was not a marginal academic theological exercise, but had important implications for the unity of both the Church and the Empire. We will later have the opportunity to see some of these implications in more detail. For now, we will focus on the theological reaction of Chalcedon's opponents.

From the point of view of theology, the most prominent and influential **end p.30** exponent of anti-Chalcedonian Christology was Severus of Antioch. His teaching and argumentation constituted the quintessence of the soundest anti-Chalcedonian Christology, which is why a large part of Chalcedonian apologetics implicitly or explicitly aimed at refuting his objections. A study of the challenge he posed to Chalcedon and of the response of the followers of the latter will cast some light on post-Chalcedonian Christology, take us into some of the most interesting Christological issues, and help us to clear the ground on which the battle of the seventh century was to be fought. The basic characteristics of Severus's Christology will be presented here briefly, but trying to avoid, as much as possible, the danger of oversimplification.

Severus did not accept the distinction between nature and hypostasis on the level of economy. As Joseph Lebon has noticed, for Severus, as well as for anti-Chalcedonian Christology generally, between the terms 'nature', 'hypostasis', and 'person' there is a 'synonymie parfaite'. [98]

[98] See Joseph Lebon's extensive and magisterial article 'La Christologie du monophysisme syrien', in Grillmeier and Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, 425-580, at 463.

To attribute two natures to Christ would entail not only that his humanity was individualized, but also that it existed separately from the Logos, [99]

[99] As Lebon remarks, for Severus 'l'affirmation de *δύο φύσεις* inclut donc nécessairement celle de deux êtres individuels, le Verbe et l'homme, existant à part et de leur existence propre' (ibid. 464). The same holds true of Philoxenus of Mabbug, who believed that the humanity of Christ cannot be a nature for 'elle n'a jamais existé et n'existe pas séparément et par elle-même' (ibid. 463).

which is tantamount to Nestorianism. [100]

[100] Ibid. 464.

For this reason, the anti-Chalcedonians denied that Christ is one person/hypostasis in two natures. According to Severus, 'the *mia physis* remained not just the starting-point, but became the result of the union'. [101]

[101] Grillmeier with Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 158-9.

How, then, is one to distinguish between divinity and humanity in Christ? Severus believed that they can be distinguished only on the level of natural qualities. He wrote:

where, then, we confess the one out of two, Lord and Son and Christ, and one incarnate nature of the Word himself, we understand the *difference* as it were in the *natural characteristics* [my italics] of the natures from which Christ is. But, if we speak of two natures after the union, which *necessarily* [my italics] exist in singleness and separately as if divided into a duality, but united by a conjunction of brotherhood [i.e. a prosopic union] . . . the notion of *difference* reaches to the extent of *division*, and does not stop at natural characteristics. [102]

[102] This fragment is from Letter X of Severus and is cited by Roberta C. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies: Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob of Sarug* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 16-17. end p.31

These natural qualities, however, cannot be attributed to different natures. Grillmeier noticed that 'the apportioning of the "physical qualities" into purely divine and purely human and their appropriation to "divinity" and "humanity", was, according to the general conviction of the anti-Chalcedonians, *per se* Nestorianism and the teaching of the detested Tome of Leo'. [103]

[103] Grillmeier with Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 85. Chesnut remarks that, according to Severus 'Christ is one in identity, one nature to which belong two sets of properties' (ibid. 36). Sergius the Grammarian (the monophysite) was justified in asking Severus why it was wrong to say that Christ possesses one set of qualities (which was his position) instead of two, given that Christ is one nature: 'every propriety belongs to an underlying nature, and if we speak of two proprieties, we are obliged also to speak of two natures', Sergius claimed (see Iain R. Torrance, *Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite* (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1988), 30. Whether Severus was right in understanding Sergius's 'propriety' as quality cannot be discussed here; for more on this, see the study of Torrance, *passim*). Sergius seems to use basically the same axiom as Maximus: viz. that natural qualities presuppose the existence of the nature that bears them; but it seems that Sergius, starting from the acceptance of one nature, asserts one set of natural qualities, whereas Maximus, starting from the acceptance of two natures, argues for the existence of divine and human natural qualities, including the human and divine faculties of will and energy.

So, as a result of denying a human nature in Christ, Severus believed that 'the properties of the humanity become those of the divinity of the Logos'. [104]

[104] Joseph Lebon, *Le Monophysisme Sévérien* (Louvain, 1909), 429.

Another aspect of Severus's thought which is of particular interest is his conviction that the number 'two' entails division. [105]

[105] Grillmeier remarks that, for Severus, it is not acceptable to number the natures, for this means to divide them (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 29-30). Lebon points out that for our 'monophysites' 'l'union n'a pas d'ennemi plus radical que le nombre' ('La Christologie du monophysisme syrien', 467). Metropolitan of Nitropolis Meletios Kalamaras also agrees that for the anti-Chalcedonians, 'every reference to the number two amounts to Nestorianism' (Η Πέμπτη Οἰκουμενικὴ Σύνοδος (Athens: *Ἱερὰ Μητρόπολις Νικοπόλεως και Πρεβέζης*, 1985), 81).

This conviction seems to have contributed to his rejection of the formula 'in two natures', by which Chalcedon indicated the difference between divinity and humanity in Christ. It also seems to relate to the anti-Chalcedonians' monothelitism and monenergism, which does not allow for a clear distinction between the divine and human faculties of will and energy in Christ either. [106]

[106] Severus's and the anti-Chalcedonians' monothelitism and monenergism is debatable, as is their monophysitism. However, Grillmeier, for instance, believes that for Severus 'there is a two only in the effect of Christ's activity, never in himself, be it in relation to the natures, the powers of knowing and *willing*, and whatever else is within Christ (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 163, my italics) and states that '*without a doubt* Severus already contributes to the monoenergist, monothelite crisis of the seventh century' (ibid. 149, my italics). The same writer repeatedly draws attention to the monothelitism and monenergism of the anti-Chalcedonian camp, which is not always identical with the moderate version, which suggests the existence of a compound (theandric) will and energy, but is at times closer to the more extreme version that asserts the existence of the divine will and energy only (see e.g. his treatment of Theodosius's view of Christ's ignorance in 368-74). As we will see later, for Maximus, Severus's monophysitism, monenergism, and monothelitism are indisputable.

It is also probable that **end p.32** the anti-Chalcedonians' monothelitism is due to their emphasis on the divinity of Christ, which in fact overshadows his human will as it does his human nature.

6.1 Conclusions and Assessment

Strictly speaking, it is not fair to characterize the anti-Chalcedonians as monophysites. Most of them were clearly far from being at one with Eutyches. However, it seems doubtful that their monophysitism was totally verbal and that they were absolutely clear of monophysitizing tendencies and traits. At any rate, it is difficult to be other than negative in our judgement of the Christology of Severus and the anti-Chalcedonians overall. Their Christology seems to have been one-sided, emphasizing the unity of Christ and failing to safeguard equally well the distinction between the divine and human elements in him. Their rejection of the Chalcedonian distinction between person/hypostasis and nature/essence, related as it was to a certain interpretation of Cyril and a kind of Cyrillian fundamentalism, [107]

[107] P.T.R. Gray has argued that the anti-Chalcedonians were representatives of a narrow traditionalism, which is apparent in their use of a poor, exclusive Christological terminology, by contrast with their neo-Chalcedonian adversaries, who were open-minded and able to reflect on the tradition and interpret it fruitfully in their historical context ('Neo-Chalcedonianism and the Tradition: From Patristic to Byzantine Theology', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 8 (1982), 61-70).

kept them from taking advantage of the Council's terminological achievements, which, by comparison with the language of Cyril, unquestionably marked a step forward. As Grillmeier has observed, the fact that the anti-Chalcedonians sought unity and distinction on the same level, the level of nature, inevitably led them into a contradiction, which seems to be relevant to the fact that in their camp various Trinitarian and Christological heresies evolved together with internal schisms, fractions, and splinter groups. [108]

[108] The anti-Chalcedonians' Christology and Christological terminology may perhaps be related to the tritheism of Philoponus (for more on this, see Aloys Grillmeier in collaboration with Theresia Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 4, trans. O. C. Dean jun. (London: Mowbray, 1996), 131-5). It is also related to the monophysitism of Sergius the Grammarian; one can also mention the cases of aphthartodocetism (even though it is not certain that its main exponent, Julian of Halicarnassus, was a heretic) and the *agnoētism* of Themistius, which were also produced in anti-Chalcedonian quarters.

Their prejudice against the number 'two' is as suspicious as their relegation of the humanity of Christ to a set of qualities of the Logos. [109]

[109] Given that the natural *qualities* do not ever seem to have had the same ontological weight as *nature*, the fact that the anti-Chalcedonians attributed to Christ only human qualities (albeit not a human nature) is a sign of their tendency to stress the divine over the human (I owe this remark partly to Dr Brian Horne).

Their unwavering opposition to Chalcedon and its post-Chalcedonian exponents indicates that in all probability their Christology differed from theirs. Finally, their monothelitism and monenergism exerted a negative influence on those theologians of the official Church who, by trying to bridge the gap between the Church and the anti-Chalcedonians, ended up by adopting those positions that led to the outburst of the monothelite controversy of the seventh century.

The anti-Chalcedonians' only positive contributions to the cause of theology were the definite exclusion of Nestorianism from the Church and the stimulation they offered to post-Chalcedonian theologians to interpret Chalcedon, including in particular its distinction between nature and hypostasis, in a deep, detailed, and often satisfactory way. It is to some of these theologians that we will now turn our attention.end p.33

7. The Post-Chalcedonian Response

7.1 Introduction

As we have seen, anti-Chalcedonian Christology raised against Chalcedon the objection that, since nature and hypostasis are to be identified at the level of economy, the attribution of a human nature to Christ amounts to the attribution of a human hypostasis, namely to Nestorianism. The anti-Chalcedonians were keen on repeating that 'there is no nature without a hypostasis' (οὐκ ἐστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος), which means that the human nature that Chalcedon had attributed to Christ cannot but be a human hypostasis too.

There is justification for this view, for indeed human nature exists only as, in, and through particular human persons. The post-Chalcedonian theologians [110]

[110] By 'post-Chalcedonian' theologians I refer to the orthodox theologians after Chalcedon, such as the two Leontioi, wishing to avoid the terms 'strict Chalcedonians', 'neo-Chalcedonians', etc., which often presuppose a certain understanding and o of their Christology, with which I am not always in agreement. For more on 'neo-Chalcedonism', see the following section.

constantly argued that Chalcedon had attributed a human nature to Christ without thereby introducing into Christology a human person/ hypostasis alongside the Logos. Admittedly, by attributing a human nature but not a second—human—person/hypostasis to Christ, Chalcedon had **end p.34** drawn a distinction between person/hypostasis and nature/essence at the level of economy; but the inevitable question as to what this distinction consists in remained. Undoubtedly, the orthodoxy of Chalcedon was conditional upon a satisfactory response to this question.

The post-Chalcedonian theologians grappled with this question, as well as with a host of issues with which it was inextricably bound up, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully. Since it is neither possible nor expedient to examine all the exponents of post-Chalcedonian Christology, I have chosen just three post-Chalcedonian theologians to examine: John the Grammarian, Leontius of Byzantium, and Leontius of Jerusalem, in an attempt to highlight some aspects of their Christology which are relevant to my project. The selection is based not only on the (positive or negative) importance of the aspects of their Christology which will be presented, but also on the fact that they will provide us with the necessary background for a better understanding of the monothelite controversy of the seventh century. Before examining their Christology, however, it will be helpful to say a few things with regard to so-called neo-Chalcedonism.

7.2 'Neo-Chalcedonism'

'Neo-Chalcedonism' is a term that has been used to describe a certain theological movement which arose after the Council of Chalcedon. [111]

[111] Nowadays, instead of the term 'neo-Chalcedonism', the term 'Cyrilline Chalcedonism' is sometimes used with reference to the same theological movement.

Characterized as neo-Chalcedonians were those theologians whose main concern was to interpret Chalcedon along the lines of Cyrillian Christology or, at any rate, in close connection with it. Their aim was to counter the anti-Chalcedonian reading of Chalcedon, and in so doing to contribute to the restoration of Church unity. Neo-Chalcedonism has often been assessed negatively, and some have argued that its Christology is to be found underlying the monothelite heresy. More will be said about this in later sections. For the time being, I will just make some brief comments about this term and its meaning, which will help us to understand better the Christology from Chalcedon onwards, including the Christology of the monothelites and of Maximus the Confessor.

According to Grillmeier's informative account, the term 'neo-Chalcedonism' was first used by Joseph Lebon to refer to a group of post-Chalcedonian theologians who had recourse to Cyril in order to validate the Christology of Chalcedon. [112]

[112] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 430.

Lebon argued with reference to Nephalius and John the **end p.35** Grammarian that they 'believed that they could restore unity by proposing a simultaneous usage of both the Alexandrian *mia-physis* formula and the Chalcedonian *dyo physeis* formula—one to ward off Nestorianism, the other to exclude Eutychianism'. [113]

[113] Ibid. 431.

Later, Richard and Moeller redefined the distinction between Chalcedonism and 'neo-Chalcedonism' by distinguishing between the exponents of the former and the exponents of the latter on the grounds that, for the latter, the simultaneous use of both Christological formulae, the 'one nature' of Cyril and the 'two natures' of Chalcedon, is 'the essential condition of a correct presentation of faith'. [114]

[114] Ibid. Marcel Richard, 'Le Néo-chalcédonisme', *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 3 (1946), 156-61. Moeller, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 666f. The quotation is from ibid. 666.

This is the way in which the distinction was subsequently adopted and used thereafter.

However, Grillmeier recently endorsed a more nuanced distinction between 'extreme neo-Chalcedonians'—namely, those who demand the simultaneous use of both formulae disregarding the

incompatibility of the conceptual systems to which they belong—and 'moderate neo-Chalcedonians'—namely, those who, while employing the Chalcedonian distinction between hypostasis and nature and retaining the formula 'one hypostasis in two natures', seek 'to *supplement* the language of Chalcedon by the additional incorporation of Cyrillian terms and formulas . . . without demanding, however, the simultaneous use of the *mia-physis* formula or allowing it (this occurring, at the most, under definite conditions)'. [115]

[115] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 434.

Grillmeier drew attention to the following elements of neo-Chalcedonian terminology: (1) the distinction of the natures according to 'theoria'; (2) the synthesis of the formulae 'from two natures', 'in two natures'; (3) the reference to one composite Christ; (4) the reference to the union according to hypostasis; and (5) the characterization of Christ as one of the Holy Trinity. [116]

[116] Ibid. 434-6.

As an effort to reunite the anti-Chalcedonians with the Church, neo-Chalcedonism failed. In terms of theology, however, its main theological tenet—namely, that Cyril and Chalcedon are exponents of essentially the same Christology—is correct, although, for tactical reasons, the neo-Chalcedonians did not always make clear that the dyophysite terminology of Chalcedon is superior to the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril.

More on neo-Chalcedonism will be said in later sections. We will examine **end p.36** its relationship to monothelitism and to Maximus, and this will give us a clearer idea of the character of Christology after Chalcedon.

7.3 John the Grammarian

John the Grammarian, bishop of Caesarea, wrote an apology for the Council of Chalcedon in the first decades of the sixth century. Despite the fact that he was a relatively sound defender of Chalcedonian Christology, [117]

[117] André de Halleux, 'Le "Synode néochalcédonien" d'Alexandrette (ca 515) et l'"Apologie pour Chalcédoine" de Jean le Grammairien', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 72 (1977), 593-600, at 593, and Gray, *Defence of Chalcedon in the East*, 115, seem to agree that John the Grammarian was a sound theologian, whereas Grillmeier seems to imply the opposite: *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 25 and *passim*.

the way he interpreted and used the Cappadocian legacy to clarify Christological issues led his Christology into an impasse. John tried to show that Chalcedon, in spite of attributing to Christ two natures—that is, a human nature next to the divine—did not thereby introduce a human person next to the divine person. In order to do this, he used the distinction between hypostasis and essence which Saint Basil the Great had put forward in his famous epistle to Terentius: 'ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the particular. Every one of us both shares in existence by the common term of essence (ousia) and by his own properties is such a one and such a one.' [118]

[118] *PG* 32, 789A (see also the edition of Y. Courtonne, Saint Basil, *Lettres*, ii (Paris: les Belles Lettres, 1961), 205). The translation is taken from *Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd ser., vol. 8 (1997), 254.

It should be recalled here that when Basil used this or other similar definitions, his objective was to clarify problems of Trinitarian theology, wishing to point out that the three hypostases of the Trinity can be distinguished from their common essence through the particular idioms they bear. However, his language may at times have given the erroneous impression that he reduced personhood to particularity. As a result of his probable misunderstanding of Basil in that direction, John the Grammarian subsequently fell into the trap of fallaciously applying Basil's definition to Christology, by arguing that the human nature of Christ does not introduce a human person into Christology because it lacks particular idioms, which would ostensibly turn it into a human person. [119]

[119] Marcellus Richard (ed.), *Iohannis Caesariensis Presbyteri et Grammatici Opera quae supersunt*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 1 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1977), 56. 208-11; see also 9. 105-10 in the Latin translation of the Syriac text. The influence of this particular definition of Basil's can be inferred from the fact that it is partly cited in the Greek text (49. 20-2) as well as in the Syriac text (9. 113-16) in order to corroborate the Grammarian's point. **end p.37**

Before elaborating on this, I should point out that John did not wish to deny the existence of a real humanity in Christ. Grillmeier, in my view, misreads him in suggesting that he drew a distinction between essence, which is to be understood as a generic entity, and nature, which is to be understood as a concrete one, in order to attribute to Christ only the former. [120]

[120] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 54-61.

On the contrary, John identifies the terms 'nature' and 'essence', [121]

[121] See e.g. Richard (ed.), *Iohannis Caesariensis*, 49. 10-11, 53. 132, and 54. 167. Furthermore, John uses the terms 'essence' and 'nature' interchangeably throughout the Greek fragments of his *Apology*.

and, furthermore, seems to accuse his adversaries of drawing a false distinction between them. [122]

[122] Ibid. 50. 33-51, 69, and 54. 165-7. Athanasios Paravantsos, '*Διάλογος μὲ τοὺς Ἀντιχαλκηδονίους*', *Σύναξη*, 63 (1997), 125-35, at 131, cites a text by Severus, in which he stated that his adversaries should not be so foolish as to say that nature is to be identified with essence, for this would mean that the Holy Trinity was incarnate in the whole humanity: E. W. Brooks (ed.), *A Collection of Letters of Severus of Antioch*, Patrologia Orientalis (1973), 198). The similarity between the view that John opposes here and Severus's above-mentioned view is striking. Grillmeier also observes that Severus understands the 'tota natura' of the Grammarian as the universal nature (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 60).

The Grammarian argues that the whole divine nature, not merely a part of it, is united with the whole human nature, not merely a part of it, but this does not mean that the whole Trinity was united with all the human hypostases. John wishes to argue only that the Logos, who possesses the fullness of the divine nature, united to himself a full, complete human nature, including a body and a rational soul, [123]

[123] See Richard (ed.), *Iohannis Caesariensis*, 50. 33-51. 79.

and, moreover, states that the human nature of Christ is individual. [124]

[124] Ibid. 8. 66-7.

However, taking his cue from his Cappadocian-derived assumption that an nature/essence becomes a person/hypostasis in virtue of possessing particular idioms, he ends up by denying the existence of particular idioms in the human nature of Christ in order to defend the orthodoxy of Chalcedon. [125]

[125] However, there is an instance in which John seems to accept the existence of a particular (ἰδικ) flesh in Christ and its particular (ἰδικά) idioms, which, though, are attributed to the Logos and finally seem to be identified with and absorbed into the flesh's ownership by the Logos (ibid. 55. 183-8).

The Grammarian's suggestion that the human nature of Christ is not identical with a person because it lacks particular idioms does not stand up to criticism. It goes without saying that if the human nature of Christ lacked particular characteristics, it would not be a real one. His suggestion in fact 'swallows up' the human (historical and) ontological particularity of Jesus in a way which effectively renders his humanity unreal, and at the same time, his quasireduction **end p.38** of personhood to particularity is dangerously minimalistic for the former. The failure of his suggestion must have been generally obvious, and this is probably why it was not adopted by other post-Chalcedonian theologians, such as the Leontioi, but was instead left to pass into oblivion. His effort only serves to highlight the predicament of post-Chalcedonian Christology, which was aggravated by the necessity of dealing with the Cappadocian association between personhood and particularity. Post-Chalcedonian Christology could not avoid dealing with this association, not only because the Cappadocians were highly respected Fathers of the Church, which meant that their theology could not be ignored or rejected, but also because Chalcedon had used the distinction between person/hypostasis and nature/essence which the Cappadocians had employed in order to define its Christology.

However, John adduced some additional reasons why the human nature of Christ is not a hypostasis. Two only will be referred to here. The first is the '*enypostatos* union' between divinity and humanity in Christ; [126]

[126] John introduced the term *enypostatos* into the Christological controversies. Here reference will be made only to his argument that the humanity of Christ is *enypostatos* in the sense that it exists, it is real (ibid. 55. 207-56. 208, as well as 55. 200-2), but not in the sense that it is a hypostasis (ibid. 55. 206-7). John also speaks of the '*enypostatos* union', which is the union that results in one person-hypostasis (ibid. 52. 95-6 and 53. 133-6).

the second is the fact that the human nature of Christ did not subsist by itself (*καθ' ἑαυτ*ν). [127]

[127] Ibid. 55. 187-8.

These reasons bring us to our next two theologians, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem.

7.4 Leontius Of Byzantium and Leontius Of Jerusalem

7.4.1 Some Preliminary Remarks

Before embarking on a presentation and interpretation of the Christology of the two Leontioi, a few preliminary points must be raised. First is the question of whether we are dealing with two Leontioi or with one and the same person. The assumption made here is that these are two different writers. This is both my personal opinion and the consensus view. [128]

[128] The distinction between the two owes much to Marcel Richard's article 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *Mélanges de science religieuse*, 1 (1944), 35-88. The identification of the two Leontioi has been skilfully argued for by the Romanian priest Ilie Fracea, '*Ο Λεόντιος Βυζάντιος: Βίος καί Συγγράμματα* (*Κριτική Θεώρηση*) (Athens: [n. pub.], 1984); for a favourable summary of Fracea's thesis, see the review by André de Halleux in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 81 (1986), 139-43. The thesis, however, is not conclusive. Nowadays, to Leontius of Byzantium are attributed the following: (1) *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos, PG* 86, 1273A-1316B; (2) *Contra Aphthartodocetas, PG* 86, 1316D-1357A; (3) *Deprehensio and Triumphus super Nestorianos, PG* 86, 1357B-1396A; (4) *Epaporemata, PG* 86, 1901B-1916B; (5) *Epilyseis, PG* 86, 1916C-1945D; and (6) *Adversus Fraudes Apollinaristarum, PG* 86, 1948A-1976A (on this, see Brian E. Daley, ' "A Richer Union": Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in Christ', in *Studia Patristica*, 24 (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 239-65 at 239-40). The treatises *Contra Monophysitas, PG* 86, 1769A-1901A, and *Adversus Nestorianos, PG* 86, 1400A-1768iB, are attributed to Leontius of Jerusalem. The treatise *De Sectis, PG* 86, 1193A-1268A, is attributed to neither of them (on this, see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 185-6). Dirk Krausmüller has made the suggestion that Leontius of Jerusalem is a theologian of the seventh century, but the discussion of this suggestion is beyond the scope of the present book ('Leontius of Jerusalem: A Theologian of the Seventh Century', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 52 (2001), 637-57).

Having said **end p.39** that, I wish to make clear my opposition to those writers who have exaggerated the different Christological outlooks of these two men. [129]

[129] This has been done by Moeller, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 687; Gray, *Defence of Chalcedon in the East*, 102; Nicolaos Karazafeires, ' ' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Thessalonica, 1985), 74; etc.

My research has convinced me that, despite their differences, the two Leontioi are in essential agreement. However, I shall treat them separately, in order to do justice to the particularity of their respective approaches to the Christological exigencies of the post-Chalcedonian era.

Secondly, I should mention at the outset that, in my view, the profound orthodoxy of both Leontioi is indisputable. Neither of them flirts with either Origenism [130]

[130] Marcel Richard came to grips with the question of Leontius of Byzantium's Origenism as early as 1947 ('Léonce de Byzance était-il origéniste?', *Revue des études byzantines*, 5 (1947), 31-66). The most elaborate exposition of Leontius's alleged Origenism is found in David Beecher Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* (Washington: J. J. Augustin, 1970). John Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 61-8, and Gray, *Defence of Chalcedon in the East*, 90-103, are of the same view. For a negative judgement of this thesis, see John J. Lynch, 'Leontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology', *Theological Studies*, 36 (1975), 455-71; Brian Daley, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 27 (1976), 333-69; Fracea, '*Ο Λεόντιος Βυζάντιος*, *passim*; and Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 181-229, esp. 189.

or Nestorianism [131]

[131] Gray, e.g., seems to attribute to Leontius of Byzantium a kind of semi-Nestorianism (*Defence of Chalcedon in the East*, 90-103).

or monophysitism, [132]

[132] Harnack likened Leontius to Apollinarius with respect to the of the former (*History of Dogma*, iv. 233-4). Charles Moeller is an outstanding example of a negative assessment of Leontius of Jerusalem's neo-Chalcedonian interpretation of Chalcedon ('Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 687, and 701-17; see also his article 'Textes "Monophysites" de Léonce de Jérusalem', *Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses*, 27 (1951), 467-82). Kenneth Paul Wesche has argued against the alleged monophysitism of Leontius of Jerusalem ('The Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem: Monophysite or Chalcedonian?', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 31 (1987), 65-95), reflecting the positive assessment of Leontius that the majority of the theologians of the Eastern Orthodox Church have expressed (see e.g. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 73-80). As we know, one of the two treatises of Leontius of Jerusalem is *Contra Monophysitas*!

despite the symmetrical **end p.40** or asymmetrical overtones that can be traced in different parts of their writings. The Christology of both is not only immune from the dangers of Nestorianism and monophysitism; it is organized in opposition to them.

Thirdly, an account of some basic aspects of their Christology is necessary for two principal reasons. The first is that these theologians interpreted the fundamental concepts person/hypostasis and nature/essence of the Chalcedonian definition in a profound way, which made better sense of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. The second is that the monothelite controversy, and especially the dyothelite Christology of Maximus the Confessor, cannot be understood other than against the background of the Christology after Chalcedon and the work of the two Leontioi. It is not an overstatement to say that if Maximus had not achieved a sound and deep understanding of the meaning of the personal unity and the natural distinction in Christ, which was partly a result of his direct or indirect acquaintance with the Leontian interpretation of Chalcedon, he would probably have been considerably less able to work out his 'Chalcedonian logic' and expand its application to the wills and energies of Jesus Christ.

7.4.2 Person/hypostasis and Nature/essence In Leontius Of Byzantium

Leontius of Byzantium was aware of the Cappadocian distinction between hypostasis and nature based on the respective distinction between the common and the particular. [133]

[133] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos, PG* 86, 1280A; all references to the Leontioi will be to *PG* 86.

However, he seems also to have believed that this distinction was not very helpful with regard to the humanity of Christ, since that humanity must be a particular one—otherwise it would not be real—and at the same time must not be identified with a human person—otherwise Nestorianism would be unavoidable. We shall see at a later stage how he dealt with the Cappadocian legacy. For the time being, attention will be focused on his own ways of defining hypostasis and nature.

In Leontius's view, to nature applies the logos of being, whereas to hypostasis applies also the logos of being by itself (*καθ' ἑαυτὸν*). [134]

[134] Ibid. 1280A.

In addition, for Leontius, essence denotes a really existing thing, [135]

[135] Ibid. 1277D.

whereas hypostasis denotes 'somebody'. [136]

[136] See e.g. ibid. 1277D and 1280A.

When Leontius **end p.41** was asked by his anti-Chalcedonian interlocutor whether the Logos assumed the human nature that is seen in the *eidos* or an individual one, he responded that he assumed an individual human nature. [137]

[137] *Epilyseis*, 1917B. Leontius seems to take for granted what the main thrust of the Byzantine Christian thought points to: viz. that the *eidos* is not self-existent but exists in the many. For more on the philosophical atmosphere of the time in this respect, see Linos Benakis, 'The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thought', in Dominic J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982), 75-86.

Leontius's interlocutor then went on to ask what the difference is between this individual nature and the hypostasis, clearly implying that there is none. Leontius, however, retorted that to partake in a

hypostasis makes one different not in kind but in person . [138]

[138] See *Epilyseis*, 1917B.

He explained why there are not in Christ two different hypostases/persons (*ἄλλος ἀπὸ ἄλλου*), by saying that this is so because the Logos is neither consubstantial with [139]

[139] Leontius argued that the hypostasis distinguishes those that are different in number but have the same nature (*Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1280A). However, this is not the case in Christ, for those that differ in number do not have the same nature, but are precisely two natures.

nor separated from the human nature but co-subsists with it. [140]

[140] *Epilyseis*, 1917B-C.

Leontius seems to be in agreement with his interlocutor that 'hypostasis' means whatever exists by itself and in division (from everything else). [141]

[141] Ibid. 1917C-D. The understanding of hypostasis according to which hypostasis subsists by itself and in separation from other hypostases reflects an earlier tradition, but the way the Leontioi use it marks a breakthrough, for they now give a formal definition of hypostasis which consists in exactly these lineaments and which enables them to explain why the human nature of Christ is complete, yet not a person distinct from the Logos. For more on this see Marcel Richard, 'Le Traité "De Sectis" et Léonce de Byzance', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 35 (1939), 695-723, at 705.

Leontius seems to relate personhood to separation and division. [142]

[142] It is noteworthy that the terms 'individual' (ἄτομον), 'person' (πρόσωπον) and 'hypostasis' are used as synonyms by most post-Chalcedonian writers, including Leontius (see e.g. *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1305C).

But what does he actually mean? Let us recall the two basic meanings of the word 'hypostasis'. The first denotes the real existence of a being, and the second signifies the person. According to the first meaning, it is clear that if the human nature of Christ was separated from the Logos and his divine nature, it would be a separate reality, as fire is a different 'hypostasis' from the sword when they are not united in one 'hypostasis', in one glowing sword. Now that the Logos, or the divine nature, and the human nature are united, they are one hypostasis, as sword and fire are one thing, one glowing sword, one 'hypostasis'.**end p.42**

However, this is not all that Leontius intends to say, for he furthermore argues that if the human nature of Christ were separated from the Logos, it would also be a personal subject distinct from him (an ἄλλος *vis-à-vis* him).[143]

[143] *Epilyseis*, 1917B-C.

But why would this be so? Leontius never gives an explicit answer to this question, but it is not very difficult to deduce one. For Leontius, as well as probably for all post-Chalcedonian theologians, nature is not self-subsistent. Both Leontioi argue that only hypostasis is self-subsistent.[144]

[144] See *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1280A, for Leontius of Byzantium and *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1572D, for his namesake.

As Wesche points out, 'the ontological foundation of being is not nature, but person. Nature does not exist except in a hypostasis.'[145]

[145] Wesche, 'Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem', 82; see also Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 76-7.

Leontius's opponents were keen on repeating that 'there is no *anypostatos* nature'.[146]

[146] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1277B. Leontius at times accepts the validity of this axiom (see e.g. 1277D, 1280A) but at other times seems to deny it (see e.g. ibid. 1277C).

By this claim they did not mean that there is no nature that does not exist (this would be nonsensical in this context). The word *anypostatos* in this context means without a person/hypostasis.[147]

[147] John the Grammarian had already reported the argument of one of his opponents, according to which there is no *prosopon-less* nature (οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀπρόσωπος): Richard (ed.), *Iohannis Caesariensis*, 51. 82-3.

What the anti-Chalcedonians wanted to prove by appealing to this principle is that, since there is no nature without a person, if there is in Christ a second (human) nature, as Chalcedon claimed, there is also inevitably in him a second (human) person, which is to be rejected as sheer Nestorianism.[148]

[148] Leontius himself interprets the thought of his opponents in this way: *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1277B-C.

Leontius's argument, however, seems to be that only if Christ's human nature existed in separation from the Logos, would it exist as and in a (human) person distinct from the Logos. Now that it subsists with the Logos and not in separation from him, they are not only one hypostasis/reality but also one hypostasis/person.[149]

[149] The connection between personhood, on the one hand, and separation and division, on the other hand, must be understood within this context, and not as contradictory to the notion of divine personhood, which is bound up with intimate ontological relationship. The separation which in Leontius's context defines personhood does not mean lack of relationship (Nestorius's Jesus had a close relationship with the Logos) but lack of deep ontological unity in one hypostasis.

However, this discussion prompts the question who this one person/hypostasis in Christology is identical with in Leontius's view. It is to this question that an answer will now be sought. end p.43

7.4.3 Leontius Of Byzantium and the Hypostasis In Christology

Brian Daley has rightly remarked that 'Leontius is careful to present his Christ "symmetrically". He is careful to attribute the human soul and flesh, as well as the human actions and experiences of the Incarnate Word, to "Christ" or "the Lord" rather than to "a person of the blessed Trinity".'[150]

[150] Daley, 'Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', 360, cited by Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 187.

This certainly holds true of Leontius, who tends to focus on Christ as the one end-product of the incarnation rather than on God the Logos. Leontius identifies person, or hypostasis, or individual, or

subject, with the result of the union according to essence (*κατ' οὐσίαν ἕνωσις*), which is, in his view, one. [151]

[151] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1305C. The symmetry of Leontius can also be seen in the parallel he draws between man (soul and body form a man) and Christ (divinity and humanity form Christ): ibid. 1288D-1289B.

He argues that the Logos *co*-subsists with the human nature, and thus contributes to the whole in which the union results. [152]

[152] *Deprehensio and Triumphus super Nestorianos*, 1380C.

He elsewhere claims that Christ is the whole, and that his natures are the parts of this whole. [153]

[153] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1289A.

Christ does not signify nature but hypostasis, and the end-product of the union is identical with it. [154]

[154] *Epilyseis*, 1925D-1928A.

According to Leontius, the identity of the person (in Christology) is realized through the concurrence (*συνδρομή*) of the two natures in one hypostasis. [155]

[155] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1293B; the word *συνδρομή* is reminiscent of the word *συντρεχούσης* which is used in the definition of faith of Chalcedon (see Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i. 86).

In the hypostasis of Christ the natures can be seen, and in them the person (of Christ) is defined. [156]

[156] *Epilyseis*, 1928A.

The parts of which Christ consists, Leontius argues, are constitutive of the person of Christ's hypostasis. [157]

[157] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1289A.

Therefore, Leontius tends to see the person in Christology from the point of view of the *fait accompli* of the hypostatic union, which he refers to by using the name 'Christ', as Daley has observed, and this gives to his Christology a certain Chalcedonian, symmetrical flavour. However, we should not make too much of this. Nowhere does Leontius say or imply that Christ and the Logos are not the same person, as the Nestorians did, and in one instance he explicitly identifies them. [158]

[158] Leontius writes:: *Contra Aphthartodocetas, 1316D. To the best of my knowledge, this identification has not been given appropriate attention.*

Thus, even though he does not deal with the relation **end p.44** between the Logos and Christ sufficiently, his Christology is perfectly orthodox.

Indeed, Leontius made an important contribution by showing that the human nature of Christ is not a distinct person, because it does not subsist in separation from the Logos, but is united with him in one hypostasis. However, he did not emphasize the identification of the Logos with Christ. This identification needed to be stated with more emphasis, and worked out more thoroughly, if the fruitful integration between Cyril and Chalcedon was to be forwarded. This was achieved by Leontius of Byzantium's namesake, Leontius of Jerusalem, to whom we now turn.

7.4.4 Leontius Of Jerusalem and the Humanity Of Christ

Leontius of Jerusalem, like his namesake, is adamant in asserting the reality and particularity of the human nature of Christ. [159]

[159] In *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1485D, 1548C, and 1552D, Leontius characterizes the human nature of Christ as ἰδικ and in 1493D he attributes to it hypostatic [*sic*] idioms.

However, this human nature must not be understood as identical with a human hypostasis. Leontius defines hypo-stasis as apo-stasis (distance), [160]

[160] Ibid. 1529D; the same connection between hypostasis and apo-stasis is taken for granted by Leontius's Nestorian interlocutor: see e.g. ibid. 1549D and 1552B.

dia-stasis (separation), [161]

[161] Ibid. 1568B, and *Contra Monophysitas*, 1797D.

separation, [162]

[162] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1529D.

and subsisting by itself. [163]

[163] Ibid.

So, for Leontius, the human nature of Christ is not a human hypostasis because it was never separated from the Logos. [164]

[164] *Contra Monophysitas*, 1876B; in *Contra Monophysitas*, 1800D, Leontius says that if the human nature of Christ was particular and subsisted without the Logos, it would amount to a hypostasis.

At this point it is worth noting a criticism voiced by Dorner and repeated in one way or another by many scholars. Dorner claimed that 'the teachers of the Church . . . when their aim was to effect the union of the two natures, they were only able to accomplish their object by declining, after the example of Apollinarianism, to assert the completeness of the human nature of Christ, and by assuming a mixture, or transubstantiatio, in the sphere of the *persona*, similar to that which Monophysites assumed in the sphere of the *natura*'. [165]

[165] I. A. Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, i. trans. D. W. Simon (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, [n.d.]), 152.

This claim is erroneous. It implies that a human nature without a human person is incomplete, which in turn implies that a person is a part of nature. The exponents of post-Chalcedonian orthodoxy, including the Leontioi, stated in an unambiguous way their conviction that the human nature of Christ is a **end p.45** complete and authentic human nature. This nature, however, did not exist in a separate human person because it had never been separated from the Logos.

A repetition of what has been said already in the treatment of Leontius of Byzantium on this issue need not be reiterated here, since both theologians seem to be in essential agreement with each other in defining hypostasis and arguing why the human nature of Christ is not a hypostasis. What is now required is to see whether Leontius of Jerusalem identifies the hypostasis in Christology with the Logos or with Christ.

7.4.5 Leontius Of Jerusalem and the Hypostasis In Christology

Most of the time Leontius of Jerusalem identifies the hypostasis in Christology with the Logos. When, for instance, his Nestorian adversary argued that the Logos is one person out of nature, whereas Christ is one person out of union (implying that they cannot be identical), Leontius retorted that the person in Christology is only one, the Logos, because the union took place 'in the natural person of the Logos'. [166]

[166] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1592B-C. For the Logos as the person in Christology according to Leontius, see also ibid. 1500C, 1513A (implicitly), 1577C, 1577D, 1749D, etc.

However, contrary to what Grillmeier thinks, [167]

[167] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 277-82.

for Leontius it is not always the case that the hypostasis in Christology is identified with the Logos. Leontius often identifies the Logos with Christ, [168]

[168] Leontius claims that Christ is the Logos (*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1577D), or the enfleshed Logos (ibid. 1573A).

but at other times he distinguishes, at least implicitly, between the two, [169]

[169] See e.g. *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1676A, 1676D-1677A, 1712C; *Contra Monophysitas*, 1796A, 1801C-D.

and claims that the hypostasis in Christology is identical with Christ, whereas the Logos is referred to as a part of this hypostasis. [170]

[170] Leontius argues that the Logos is a part of the compound hypostasis (*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1445D), and also that he is a part of the whole Christ (ibid. 1444D). For similar statements see e.g. ibid. 1524A, 1524C, 1797A, 1752C-D, etc. In ibid. 1440A he seems to deny that God can be seen as a part of the whole and thus contradicts himself, but, as this is probably no more than a reflection of his imperfectly constructed Christology, too much should not be made of it. Later, he admits that the Logos becomes a part of the whole, yet without simultaneously becoming inferior to it (ibid. 1444B-D). We have to bear in mind that Leontius is by no means a Nestorian. He defends the view that Mary is the mother of God (almost the entire fourth book of his *Adversus Nestorianos* (1649D-1721C) is devoted to this end), and adheres to orthodox theopaschism: viz. the view that the Logos suffered in the flesh. For him, however, this amounts to attributing the passion 'to the whole person of Christ' (ibid. 1768eD).

This, of course, poses a huge and intractable problem, which must be confronted. **end p.46** Let us recall once more the two basic meanings of the word 'hypostasis'. [171]

[171] It is necessary to simplify and focus on the essentials, otherwise mention of and comment on all fourteen different meanings of the word 'hypostasis' that Leontius gives in ibid. 1528D-1532A, would be required. More on the notion of hypostasis will be said in sects. 2.2 and 2.3 of Ch. 3.

'Hypostasis' can signify either one undivided reality, or a person, or of course both. In regard to the first meaning, it is noteworthy that Leontius often applies the term 'hypostasis' to two different things that form one reality, even if this reality is not 'personal'. A sponge and the water in it, for instance, or

the iron and the fire in the case of the glowing iron, form one hypostasis, despite the fact that they simultaneously remain two natures. [172]

[172] *Contra Monophysitas*, 1813D-1816A. Similarly, Leontius applies the term 'hypostasis' to a house (composite of stones and pieces of wood: ibid. 1816A), to a temple, to the world (*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1564D), etc.

It seems that Christ is sometimes seen by Leontius from this point of view—namely, as the end-product of the incarnation, as one undivided hypostasis/reality—and in this case the hypostasis/person of the Logos is thought of as a part of this hypostasis/reality.

However, when Leontius argues that the person in Christology is the Logos (and not Christ), it seems that he understands the hypostasis as identical with the personal subject, which is to be identified with the Logos. In this respect, the Logos is not a part of the hypostasis of Christ but the (whole) hypostasis of Christ. According to Leontius, the hypostasis of the Logos was initially simple, but is now composite in Christ. [173]

[173] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1585B. For Leontius, the hypostasis of the Logos has changed from ἰδικ ή to κοιν ή and ποικιλωτέρα (ibid. 1568A-B), from ἁπλ ή to σύνθετος (ibid. 1585B, 1716D), from μονοφυ ής to διφυ ής (ibid. 1593C, 1716D), and now exists ἀλλοίως not because the Logos has changed in his own being but because he has assumed something which is different from him (ibid. 1693D-1696A).

However, this did not happen through the Logos's synthesis with any other person. [174]

[174] See, e.g. ibid. 1496A.

So, the 'composite hypostasis' must not be understood as composite of two persons. It must be understood either in the sense of the one composite, undivided reality in which the Logos and his human nature coexist, as described above, or as the Logos having now two natures, the divine and the human, while remaining the unique personal divine subject of both his divinity *and* his humanity. However, for Leontius, the unity between the Logos and his humanity is so deep that the personal 'I' in Christology somehow includes the human nature of the Logos too. [175]

[175] Ibid. 1601A.**end p.47**

7.4.6 Critical Reflection

Leontius of Jerusalem and, less so, his namesake provide a profound integration between appropriate forms of Christological symmetry and asymmetry. The radical asymmetry at the level of the person, which is identified with God the Logos, is complemented by a symmetry at the level of the natures, whenever the hypostasis in Christology is seen from the point of view of the end-product of the hypostatic union, and whenever Christ is put forward as the hypostatic whole in which the Logos and his human nature coexist as its parts. Thus, on the one hand, the Antiochean-Western-Chalcedonian emphasis on the importance of the existence of a full human nature as an indispensable part of the composite hypostasis of Christ is not downplayed. [176]

[176] It should be mentioned that Nestorianism was averse to Chalcedonian Christology. This is obvious, e.g., in the Nestorian texts edited and translated by L. Abramowski and A. E. Goodman, which attack the notion of the one composite hypostasis (a recurrent theme of Leontius of Jerusalem's Nestorian interlocutor too), and insist on the formula 'two natures, *two hypostases* and one person in Christ' (see *A Nestorian Collection of Christological Texts*, ii: *Introduction, Translation, Indexes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), xix).

The human nature is not swallowed up in the face of the sovereignty of God the Logos and/or for the sake of unity, as happened with Apollinarius and the monophysites; nor is it reduced to a set of attributes of the divinity, as with Severus. On the other hand, it is made unmistakably clear that the divine Logos is the *unique* (in sharp contrast to Nestorianism) *and unaltered* person in Christology, who now has a human nature united to him and to his divine nature.

The importance of the balance between the asymmetry at the level of the person and the symmetry, as it were, at the level of the two natures (in so far as there can be any symmetry between the divine nature and the human nature), which are parts of the one hypostatic whole, coexisting as they do in the hypostasis of Christ (seen as the end-product of the hypostatic union) or in the divine person of the Logos, [177]

[177] Two different ways of understanding 'the doctrine of "enhypostasia" ' are implied here. To the best of my knowledge, no one so far has remarked that when the hypostasis is identified by Leontius with Christ, then the Logos (or the divinity) and the humanity are said to subsist *in the hypostasis of Christ* (*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1540C-D, 1541D-1544A), but when the hypostasis is identified with the Logos, divinity and humanity are said to subsist *in the hypostasis of the Logos* (ibid. 1524B, 1548C, 1552D, 1553C, 1584D, 1585A, 1761B). I have

restricted myself to this remark and to offering only a few references, since a further and fuller treatment of the issue of 'the doctrine of "enhypostasia" ' would require an additional extensive section, which, as mentioned in the Introduction, I have finally decided to omit.

can hardly be overestimated. This balance marks the Cyrillian Chalcedonism or Chalcedonian Cyrillism of post-Chalcedonian Christology, which, in so far as the person and the natures of Christ are concerned, is well along the way to the symmetrical asymmetry or **end p.48** asymmetrical symmetry which corresponds to the mystery of the incarnate Logos and must be an indispensable characteristic of every Christology. We will see later how Maximus completed the post-Chalcedonian Christological synthesis in the way he developed his dyothelite Christology and related Christ's two wills and energies with the natures and the person of Christ.

7.4.7 A Constructive Utilization Of the Cappadocian Legacy By the Leontioi

The Cappadocian-derived connection between person and particularity, and its dangers for Christology, have already received mention here. A plausible, albeit false, quandary has also been mentioned: whether to opt for a human nature with particular idioms, which would ostensibly amount to a person, or for a human nature without particular idioms, as John the Grammarian did, which, as has been said, cannot be a real one. The two Leontioi neither took issue with the Cappadocian legacy, nor followed John the Grammarian. They instead used the Cappadocian legacy to serve their own Christological interests in a fashion compatible with Christological orthodoxy. Let us briefly see how they did so.

In the course of his disputation with an exponent of Severan Christology, Leontius of Byzantium was asked whether the distinguishing idioms of the humanity of Christ separate its particular existence from the common human nature. The implicit and unspoken part of the argument is of course that, if this is the case, then the humanity of Christ cannot but amount to a human person. Leontius cleverly retorted that the particular idioms of the humanity of Christ do not separate it from the Logos but from his mother, the human genus, and other human beings. Likewise, the (divine) distinguishing idioms of the Logos do not separate him from his humanity, but from the Father and the Spirit. On the contrary, through the distinguishing idioms of his natures, the Logos is in union and communion with himself. [178]

[178] *Epilyseis*, 1917C-D.

As Brian Daley has pointed out:

[A]lthough those two levels of being [divine and human], distinguished from each other by the characteristic qualities of God and of humanity, can never simply be blended into one—can never form 'one nature' as the Severans had argued—the unique set of personal characteristics that result from the Son's place within the Trinity and Jesus' place within human history, all 'owned' by one subject, all held together in one act of being, are precisely what make the Incarnate Word a single, cohesive, historical (and trans-historical) individual, who is at once 'truly God and truly human'. [179]

[179] Daley, ' "A Richer Union" ', 251-2. As has been said, the Severans denied the existence of a human nature in Christ, but accepted the existence of his human natural qualities. Leontius of Byzantium denied the existence of a human hypostasis in Christ, but recognized the existence of human particular idioms, although he was careful enough to call them not 'hypostatic' but 'distinguishing' (ἀφοριστικά). By contrast, Leontius of Jerusalem was not so careful, and spoke of the hypostatic idioms of the flesh (*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1493D), which perhaps renders him vulnerable to the objection that, as it is not possible to have human natural qualities in Christ without a human nature that would bear them, as the post-Chalcedonians constantly claimed against the Severans, it is not possible to have human hypostatic qualities/idioms without a human hypostasis that would bear them either. John of Damascus argued on this matter that the hypostatic-differentiating idioms between two beings of a different nature (e.g. a man and a horse) must be considered as tantamount to natural differences and not to hypostatic ones. Likewise, the distinguishing idioms of the two natures of Christ are not indicators of the presence of two hypostases but of two natures, and belong to the same composite hypostasis (John of Damascus, *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, in Bonifatius Kotter (ed.), *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus*, iv, Patristiche Texte und Studien, 22 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 2. 12-33 (pp. 174-5).**end p.49**

Leontius of Byzantium does not attribute unequivocally the distinguishing characteristics of divinity and humanity to the divine person of God the Logos. By contrast, Leontius of Jerusalem, who is more inclined to employ the unity of the distinguishing idioms by way of explaining the unity of person in Christology, unambiguously refers to the Logos as the bearer of all (divine and human)

particular idioms. When in Leontius of Jerusalem's *Adversus Nestorianos* his Nestorian interlocutor contended that the hypostasis of the Logos is unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος), which entails, in his view, that it is impossible to say that the simple hypostasis of the Logos became composite, Leontius responded by saying that the Logos had a composite idiom already before the incarnation, for he is begotten of the Father, and the Spirit proceeds through him, [180]

[180] Christ is referred to as ##(*Adversus Nestorianos*, 1485B).

and that by reason of his incarnation he acquired more idioms, and thus now has a more composite idiom (*συνθετώτερον ἴδιωμα*). [181]

[181] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1485A-1485D. The phrase *ἀλλ' ἀσυνθετώτερον* must be corrected to *ἀλλὰ συνθετώτερον* (ibid. 1485D).

Leontius of Jerusalem repeatedly expresses views similar to this. [182]

[182] See ibid. 1501D, 1529C, 1584A, 1596C; in some of these passages it is not very clear whether the idioms which come together are natural, hypostatic (particular), or both.

He contends that Christ is made out of the unity of the idioms of the Logos and the flesh. [183]

[183] Ibid. 1585C.

He even goes so far as to say that the Logos somehow changed with regard to his hypostasis (*ἀλλοιωθέντα πως τὴν ὑπόστασιν*), because he assumed the idioms of the man Jesus and thus has more natural and hypostatic idioms. [184]

[184] Ibid. 1716C-D. Differently, ibid. 1493C-D, Leontius writes that the Logos has the same unaltered hypostasis, which now possesses the additional 'hypostatic' [*sic*] idioms of the flesh; for a similar statement see ibid. 1497D.

end p.50

However, neither of the two Leontioi reduces the union in Christ to a mere union of idioms which would leave the natures themselves in separation. The unity of which both Leontioi speak is a unity of two natures, along with their natural and particular idioms, in one hypostasis. Simultaneously, both Leontioi seem to be aware of the fact that the particular idioms of the human nature of the Logos remain the particular idioms of the human nature of the Logos (the human nature is not bracketed out or put aside) and only as such do they become the particular human idioms of the Logos, who has become man and bears a human nature.

7.4.8. A Final Question For the Leontioi: Monothelites Or Dyothelites?

Post-Chalcedonian Christology has repeatedly been regarded as paving the way for the appearance of the monothelite heresy of the seventh century, which supposedly sprang from its theological parameters. There will be an opportunity to say more about this in the next chapter. For the time being, it is worth examining whether there are traces of monothelitism in the two greatest post-Chalcedonian theologians, the Leontioi, or whether their Christology points to the contrary. [185]

[185] A recent effort to indicate how so-called neo-Chalcedonism may have paved the way for seventh-century monothelitism was made by Karl Heinz Uthemann in his article 'Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus: ein Beitrag zum eigentlichen Anliegen des Neuchalkedonismus', in *Studia Patristica*, 29 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 373-413. Uthemann examines the role of the Leontioi at 385-9.

With regard to Leontius of Byzantium, in my view, nowhere does he seem to imply, let alone express, any kind of monothelitism or monenergism. On the contrary, he seems to accept the distinction of energies between the two natures of Christ, [186]

[186] *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos*, 1269C.

and, furthermore, clearly mentions the will of Christ's soul. [187]

[187] *Contra Aphthartodocetas*, 1332D-1333A. Very significant words occur here in relation to the soul, such as *αὐτεξουσίστης*, *θέλειν*, *θελούσης*, whereas in a later passage Leontius speaks of *ὄρεξις* (appetite) in connection with the humanity of Christ.

As Grillmeier has argued, Leontius of Byzantium undoubtedly follows Gregory of Nyssa in viewing Jesus 'as a true human being [who] stands there with his intellectuality and *power of will*', and stresses '*Christ's human will and freedom*'. [188]

[188] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 225 and 433 respectively, emphasis added.

Furthermore, Leontius uses the term 'natural energies', [189]

[189] *Contra Aphthartodocetas*, 1333A.

and elsewhere refers to 'natural powers and energies' (*φυσικὰς δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας*) of Christ's body. [190]

[190] Ibid. 1336D-1337A. Could this be one of the sources that inspired Maximus to introduce and establish the technical terms 'natural will' and 'natural energy'? Given Maximus's acquaintance with Leontian Christology, this possibility cannot be excluded. Furthermore, Leontius relates the energies with the essence while dealing with the humanity of Christ. One wonders why Uthemann, who refers to a passage in this work of Leontius in order to support the view that he may have contributed to the preparation of the ground for the monothelite heresy, has overlooked these astonishingly important passages (Uthemann's references are to 1352D-1353B: see 'Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus', 385-6). **end p.51**

Likewise, Leontius of Jerusalem does not lend support either to monothelitism or to monenergism, although some of his texts could be interpreted as allowing for an incipient monothelitism and monenergism, if they are not read carefully, and if the whole of his thought is not borne in mind. For instance, in *Adversus Nestorianos*, he writes that we are justified by our own self-determination (*αὐτεξούσιον*), whereas Christ was justified by the Spirit, which could imply that Christ lacks human self-determination. [191]

[191] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1484C-1485A.

However, what Leontius probably wishes to point out is merely that the personal agent of Christ's justification is the Logos (whose nature is Spirit and with whom the Spirit coexists, as he writes [192]

[192] Ibid. 1485A.

) and not a human personal willer. [193]

[193] In addition, there may be an implicit reference to the role of the human *λόγος* of Christ in this respect, in the same passage. Uthemann has misinterpreted this passage in order to lend support to Leontius's alleged monenergism ('Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus', 388); the same passage has been commented upon by Moeller, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 714.

When elsewhere Leontius characterizes the flesh as an instrument of the Logos, it is only in the sense that after the incarnation the Logos works through his flesh. [194]

[194] See e.g. *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1453A-1460A, 1757B-C.

In addition, it seems that the passages where energies are related to the composite Christ, in ways that resemble Pseudo-Dionysius's epistle to Gaius and its alleged monenergism, signify no more than the unity of the act done. [195]

[195] See ibid. 1448A-B.

This becomes obvious if these passages are read in the light of a statement in *Contra Monophysitas*, for instance, where Leontius alludes to Pseudo-Dionysius's epistle to Gaius and expresses dyoenergism. [196]

[196] *Contra Monophysitas*, 1773A:###.

Finally, in *Adversus Nestorianos*, Leontius draws a parallel between the soul, which gives life to the body ###, the fire which causes the iron to glow ###, and the Logos who causes the deification of his flesh ###. [197]

[197] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1757A-B.

However, to say that the Logos causes the deification of his flesh does not mean that his flesh lacks a (human) energy, but that it lacks a deifying—that is, a divine—energy.

In addition, there are indications that Leontius of Jerusalem favours the **end p.52** doctrine of two wills and energies. When he tackles the objection that if the 'Dominical man' (*Κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος*) [198]

[198] By this expression of Leontius, the humanity of Christ is signified. For more on its use in Patristic literature, see Aloys Grillmeier, 'Jesus Christ, the Kyriakos Anthrōpos', *Theological Studies*, 38 (1977), 275-93 (on Leontius of Jerusalem's use of the term, see 289-91).

is moved by the Logos, he would be without mind and reason (*ἄνους καὶ ἄλογος*), he argues that rational beings are moved by others (soldiers by their general, for instance), but this does not prove that they are without reason (*ἄλογα*), because their movement is voluntary. [199]

[199] *Adversus Nestorianos*, 1464A-C.

In addition, he elsewhere ascribes to Christ a maximally good disposition (*πανάγαθος πρόθεσις*), [200]

[200] Ibid. 1581D.

and, as we have just said, accepts the existence of Christ's natural energies. [201]

[201] See the aforementioned passage in *Contra Monophysitas*, 1773A.

In fact, when he speaks of the coworking ### divine and human natures, one is reminded of the 'dyoenergism' of Pope Leo. [202]

[202] Ibid.

However, is the whole Christology of Leontius of Byzantium, and particularly of Leontius of Jerusalem, responsible for the emergence of monothelitism, on account of its insistence that the one hypostasis in Christology is identical with the Logos, in the hypostasis of whom the human nature subsists? [203]

[203] Uthemann seems to suggest that the 'doctrine of "enhypostasia" ' contributes to the subsequent emergence of monothelitism ('Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus', 388).

This is a very complex and delicate issue, which requires close attention.

It is true that an overemphasis on the *divine* hypostasis of the Logos in Christology may overshadow and eventually undermine the completeness and integrity of Christ's humanity. However, two points need to be made. First, there is no necessary connection between accepting that Christ has a divine hypostasis, on the one hand, and monothelitism on the other. If the will and the energy are *natural* faculties—that is, faculties of the nature—as Maximus was later to contend, the divinity of the person (which, as will be seen, Maximus himself accepts) does not endanger them, in so far as the natures and their qualities remain intact and distinct. [204]

[204] If the view that the humanity of the Logos subsists in his hypostasis is understood properly, it does not imply a diminution of the human nature, but, on the contrary, points to its deification and participation in the life of the Trinity. In this sense, by saying that the human nature subsists in the hypostasis of the Logos, it is not an anthropological minimalism that is being introduced, but an anthropological maximalism!

Secondly, it would be grossly unfair to both Leontioi, as well as to a considerable extent to the Christology endorsed by the Fifth Ecumenical **end p.53** Council, which will shortly be examined, to say either that they organized their Christology around an exclusive emphasis on the divine person of the Logos, [205]

[205] I have already pointed out the well-balanced asymmetrical symmetry or symmetrical asymmetry that characterizes the Christology of both Leontioi.

or that they respectively failed to place sufficient emphasis on the integrity and distinction of the natures and their qualities after the incarnation. It seems that not only linguistically, but also theologically, a point of contact between post-Chalcedonian Christology and monothelitism can hardly be established. More will be said about this, however, in later sections, for it is now time to turn to the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

8. The Fifth Ecumenical Council

Between Chalcedon and the seventh century stands the Fifth Ecumenical Council, held in Constantinople in 553, which obviously cannot be circumvented. An examination of its Christology will help us to highlight some important theological attitudes that the Council sanctioned and promoted, and will facilitate our understanding of post-Chalcedonian Christology.

The Fifth Ecumenical Council is one of the most controversial Councils of the ancient Church. Concerning the motives which led to its convocation, the majority view is that the Council was intended to show Chalcedon's compatibility with Cyril, or even to subject Chalcedon to Cyril, in order to facilitate the long-hoped-for union with the anti-Chalcedonian Churches. According to this view, it was to this end that there was condemnation of the 'Three Chapters': namely, of the person and the heretical works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the anti-Cyrillian writings of Theodoret of Cyrus, and the epistle of Ibas to Maris. [206]

[206] This view has been challenged by Kalamaras, Ἡ Πέμπτη Οἰκουμενικὴ Σύνοδος, *passim*, who has claimed that the purpose of the Council was to rescue the West, a considerable part of which was under the spell of the Nestorianism of the 'Three Chapters'. It is not for me to adjudicate on this question, but it would seem that insufficient attention has been paid by the relevant scholarship to Kalamaras's suggestion.

However, it should be borne in mind that for the Fifth Ecumenical Council, as for the Leontioi and a great number of other theologians of the time, including the Emperor Justinian, [207]

[207] With regard to Justinian's edict of 551, Grillmeier has remarked that 'from the conditions which the Emperor set for tolerating the use of the mia-*physis* formula . . . it follows that he himself was not a supporter of the demand for a simultaneous use of the two formulas discussed here [one nature and one hypostasis (in two natures)]. He decided unambiguously for Chalcedon' (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 456).

Chalcedon remained the supreme and **end p.54** *incontrovertible Christological authority*. The Council of course paid tribute to the Cyrillian insights brought to the fore by theologians such as Leontius of Jerusalem. [208]

[208] John Meyendorff has pointed out that the Council 'essentially ratified the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem' (*Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 80).

For instance, there are references to the fact that the one hypostasis in Christology is identical with God the Logos, [209]

[209] See particularly the third anathema of the Council, in Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i. 114.

whose human birth and passion in the flesh find explicit expression. [210]

[210] See the second (ibid.) and the sixth (ibid. 116-17), as well as the tenth (ibid. 118) anathemas respectively.

But the Christological synthesis of the Council was worked out within a predominantly Chalcedonian theological framework.

Let us take this a little further. First of all, it is noteworthy that the Council did not formulate any definition of faith of its own, which, in my view, testifies to the fact that it did not conceive of its task as correcting, improving, complementing, much less superseding Chalcedon's definition of faith. Grillmeier has rightly noticed that 'it is only from Chalcedon that the Council of 553 drew its christological content, which its anathemas alone were not able to offer'. [211]

[211] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 475.

Secondly, in sharp contradistinction to anti-Chalcedonian Cyrillian fundamentalism, the Council showed a flexibility in the use of various Christological expressions. It is noteworthy, for example, that it accepted the Cyrillian formula 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos' as a legitimate Christological expression. It did so, however, only with the proviso that the Cyrillian formula be interpreted on the basis of, and in the light of, Chalcedon. [212]

[212] Richard remarked that the Chalcedonians who wished to keep the formula had two options: either to understand the word 'nature' as equivalent to hypostasis, or to take the word 'enfleshed' as an indication of a second nature. Ephraim and Justinian (in *Confessio Rectae Fidei*), e.g., opted for the first, and John the Grammarian, Justinian (in *Contra Monophysitas*), Leontius of Byzantium, Theodore of Raithu, and the writer of the treatise *De Sectis* opted for the second (Richard, 'Le Traité "De Sectis" ', 711). The Council accepted the formula with qualifications in its eighth anathema (Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 117-18).

In this way, the formula was rendered virtually equivalent to the Chalcedonian formula 'one hypostasis—two natures'. Furthermore, the Council did not demand that this formula be confessed in order that either the orthodoxy of the dyophysite formula or even the orthodoxy of the faith in Christ was guaranteed. [213]

[213] On this, see also Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 456.

Surely, the Cyril-derived Christological insights which the Council incorporated, the acceptance of the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, and the **end p.55** condemnation of the 'Three Chapters' excluded all possibility of interpreting Chalcedon along Nestorian lines. Still, it is Chalcedon's definition of faith and its terminology 'one hypostasis—two natures' that remained for the Fifth Ecumenical Council, as well as for the overwhelming majority of Christians of the time, the shibboleth of Christological orthodoxy. It would certainly be a mistake to think that the Fifth Ecumenical Council undermined Chalcedon in any way.

A final contribution of the Council to the cause of Christology that is usually overlooked is the condemnation of the ontological sinfulness [214]

[214] By 'ontological sinfulness' I signify sinfulness with regard to what somebody is. A man full of sinful passions, such as Theodore's Christ—according to the Fifth Ecumenical Council, is a sinner, even if he has not perpetrated any sinful actions.

of Christ as propounded by Theodore of Mopsuestia, at least as the latter was understood by the Fathers of the Council. The Council condemned the view that

Christ was troubled by the passions of the soul and the desires of human flesh, was gradually separated from that which is inferior, and became better by his progress in good works and faultless through his way of life . . . and . . . became after the resurrection immutable in his thoughts and entirely without sin. [215]

[215] See Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i. 119. I have used Tanner's translation with some minor alterations.

By anathematizing the aforementioned views, the Council distanced itself from the Nestorian tendency to make our redemption the work of a sinful man, who was enabled to gradually overcome his sinfulness through obedience, moral struggle, and divine support. Maximus later sided with the Council, but was at the same time able to show the contribution of the human will of Christ and of his human obedience to the cause of our salvation in a fruitful and theologically sound way.

9. Conclusions

By the end of the sixth century, a remarkable synthesis had been achieved in the area of patristic Christology. [216]

[216] By using the word 'synthesis' I wish neither to apply the well-known Hegelian scheme to the development of ancient doctrine nor to see ancient Christology merely as a compromise between different Christological outlooks. What I wish to signify is rather a satisfactory articulation of a well-balanced Christology.

The doctrine of Chalcedon had put an end to an early stage of the controversies initiated by Nestorianism and monophysitism. However, Chalcedon itself was not immune to criticism, and, as **end p.56** one might expect, it was in fact rejected by both Nestorians and anti-Chalcedonian 'monophysites'. The rejection of Chalcedon, nevertheless, led post-Chalcedonian theologians to interpret and elaborate some aspects of its doctrine in a fruitful way. My conclusions regarding the achievements and the failures of the Christology of that period may be summarized in the following way.

The fundamental insight which characterized not only Apollinarianism but also the Christologies of the Cappadocians, Athanasius, and Cyril—namely, that the personal subject of our redemption was not a mere man but God the Logos himself—and which also found expression at Chalcedon, was also clear in the Christology of the sixth century. But this went hand in hand not only with a repeated condemnation of Apollinarianism, but also with the unqualified recognition that God the Logos, without ceasing to be God, had become fully man, in everything like us, sin apart. To that end, Chalcedon had explicitly attributed to Christ two natures, one divine and one human. Post-Chalcedonian Christology showed its adherence to this doctrine in two ways. On the one hand, it refused to compromise the doctrine of the two natures for the sake of the anti-Chalcedonian proclamation of one nature and the subsequent reduction of the humanity of Christ to a set of qualities of the divinity; on the other hand, it managed to assert the particularity of the humanity of Christ, without which its reality would in fact be denied.

Post-Chalcedonian Christology proved capable of employing the distinction between person and nature in a helpful way. At the level of divinity, by distinguishing the Logos from his divine nature, post-Chalcedonian Christology was able to affirm, following Cyril, that God the Logos was born of the Virgin and suffered on the cross. [217]

[217] For the importance of the acceptance of the formula 'one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh' and the relevant disputes in the sixth century, see Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 69-89.

However, this did not mean for the proponents of such a Christology that *the divine nature* was born of the Virgin or that the divine nature suffered on the cross; it meant that the person who redeemed us was not a human person, but God himself as man. At the level of humanity, the distinction between nature and person—more precisely, the distinction even between individual and particular human nature, and human person—enabled post-Chalcedonian Christology to affirm that the human nature of Christ was an individual and particular human nature, without being a human person; it was the human nature of a divine hypostasis, of God the Logos. [218]

[218] Wolfhart Pannenberg reflects the mind of many modern scholars in seeing an artificial dilemma in ancient Christology which he considers insoluble. This dilemma is between Nestorianism, on the one hand, and the attribution to the Logos of a universal, abstractive human nature, on the other hand (*Jesus: God and Man*, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM Press, 1996), 291-2). In fact, ancient Christology chose to attribute to the Logos an individual and particular human nature, whilst denying its identification with a human person. **end p.57**

Furthermore, in post-Chalcedonian Christology, legitimate symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to Christology belonged together. The symmetrical way of looking at the one hypostasis of Christ as the end-product of the incarnation in which divinity and humanity coexist (as soul and body coexist in man) was there alongside the more asymmetrical trend, which emphasized the hypostasis of God the Logos, in whom his divinity and his humanity subsist. Thus, the symmetry at the level of hypostasis understood as the one undivided reality, the one end-product of the hypostatic union, coexisted with the asymmetry at the level of hypostasis understood as the personal subject in Christ, which was identical with God the Logos.

Post-Chalcedonian Christology also allowed for variations in terminology. The essential agreement between Cyril and Chalcedon, for which the post-Chalcedonians constantly and rightly

argued (thereby definitively eliminating the possibility of a Nestorian interpretation of Chalcedon), found expression at the level of terminology, too. A properly qualified use of the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril was claimed to be legitimate—or even, by some theologians, necessary—yet only on condition that it be interpreted on the basis of Chalcedonian dyophysism, which, let it be said again, in comparison with the terminology employed by Cyril, marks a decisive step forward.

Finally, post-Chalcedonian Christology declared Christ's absolute sinlessness, reflecting the relevant long-standing tradition of the Church. This was appropriately coupled with the theme of the deification of the humanity of Christ—so dominant in theologians such as Leontius of Jerusalem.

But what were the failures of post-Chalcedonian Christology? Of significance here is John the Grammarian's exclusion of particularity from the human nature of Christ, which undermines its reality. But this was not the only asymmetrical aberration. Also of relevance here is the alleged aphthartodocetism of Justinian, [219]

[219] On this, see the instructive discussion in Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 467-73. See also Asterios Gerostergios, *Justinian the Great, the Emperor and Saint* (Belmont, Mass.: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1982), 147-54.

as well as the tendency to attribute omniscience to Christ as man, lest he be relegated to the state of a sinner, as the Nestorians had arguably conceived him. [220]

[220] Ignorance and sinfulness are often linked, but this does not mean that sinlessness implies omniscience. In his evaluation of the solutions given to the question of Christ's knowledge, Grillmeier notes that 'the Chalcedonian *asynchytos* [*sic*] was almost forgotten in this discussion' (*Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 382). This was an ominous sign of the forgetfulness of *asynchytōs* on the level of the wills that was to follow in the seventh century.

end p.58

In addition, the emphasis on the deification of the humanity of Christ, accomplished at the time of his conception, did not always go hand in hand with an emphasis on Christ's human will and its contribution to our salvation. This reflected the failure of Alexandrian Christology to articulate fully the theological significance of Christ's soul and will, and to work out the implications of this for Christology and soteriology. At the same time, the question of Christ's energies was still somewhat nebulous, and perhaps potentially controversial. On the one hand, Pseudo-Dionysius, for instance, spoke of Christ's 'theandric energy', and Anastasius of Antioch occasionally attributed to him one energy, as will be seen in later sections. On the other hand, the *Tome of Leo* mentioned two working natures, which did not simply presuppose two energies but also seemed to turn Christ's natures into principles of action. [221]

[221] For more on this matter, see Ch. 4, sect. 2.

With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that the unsettled question of the wills and energies of Christ was particularly significant in view of the fact that, on the one hand, the anti-Chalcedonian Churches, themselves in favour of monothelitism and monenergism, remained adamant in their rejection of Chalcedon, and, on the other, the Empire remained extremely interested in incorporating the anti-Chalcedonians into the official Church in order to secure for itself the vitally important regions they inhabited.

All these were disquieting signs of the turmoil which was to come. The outburst of the monothelite controversy both marked the final battle on the ground of ancient Christology and led to the final patristic Christological synthesis. It is therefore to this controversy that we must now turn.**end p.59**

2 The Monothelite Heresy Of the Seventh Century

1. Introduction

So far I have presented briefly some of the most important Christological developments up to the end of the sixth century, in order to provide the necessary background for understanding the monothelite controversy of the seventh century, and the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor in particular. I will now present the historical context of the controversy, as well as a short biography of Maximus, in order to facilitate the examination of the doctrinal issues. This chapter will be mainly devoted to a presentation of the Christology of the monothelites of the seventh century.

The monothelites of the seventh century constitute a small team of rather amateur theologians, most of whom were patriarchs, whose interests often lay not in the purity of Christian doctrine but in matters of ecclesial policy. Their Christology is worth examining for three reasons: first, because it represents an alternative to dyothelitism which is interesting in its own right; secondly, because without a sound knowledge of monothelitism it is impossible to fathom both the controversy and the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, which he developed as a response to monothelitism; thirdly, because hardly any thoroughgoing studies of monothelitism can be found, and those that do exist sometimes confuse rather than illumine.

The attitudes reflected in the secondary literature towards the monothelites of the seventh century are puzzling. The kernel of their thinking and, accordingly, their orthodoxy or heterodoxy became quite a controversial issue in the twentieth century, partly because most of the theologians who have written accounts of the monothelite controversy have been Roman Catholics, whose considerable sensitivity with regard to the orthodoxy of **end p.60** Pope Honorius has confused things even further. [1]

[1] Pope Honorius was condemned as a monothelite heretic by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, in 681.

Therefore, in order to present their Christology in a fair and proper way, after providing the necessary historical background, I will first present the different understandings and assessments of the monothelite Christology that the secondary literature has offered. Then I will analyse and reflect on the Christology of the monothelites, on the basis of their own writings. Later, I will attempt to place their thought in the context of the development of Christology up to the seventh century. Finally, I will present my conclusions and assessment of seventh-century monothelitism.

2. Historical Outline

The seventh century can be seen as a turning point in world history. The consummation of the articulation of the doctrine of the person of Christ, the rise of Islam, and the eventual conquest of many eastern Byzantine regions by the Arabs mark this century's history. It is within this historical context that the monothelite controversy broke. [2]

[2] As the principal task of this book is to examine the systematic dimensions of the monothelite controversy, a detailed exploration of the history of its development is beyond its scope. For more on the history of the controversy, see Venance Grumel, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme', *Échos d'Orient*, 27 (1928), 6-16, 257-77; 28 (1929), 19-34, 272-82; 29 (1930), 16-28, *passim*; Marcel Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 4-57; Murphy and Sherwood, *Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 133-260; Judith Herrin, *The Formation of Christendom* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 183-219, 250-9 and 277-80; Aidan Nichols, *Byzantine Gospel: Maximus the Confessor in Modern Scholarship* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 1-14; Basil N. Giannopoulos, Οἱ Οἰκουμενικὲς Σύνοδοι καὶ ἡ Διδασκαλία τους (Athens: Το Οἰκονομικό, 1995), 47-94; Panayotis A. Yannopoulos, 'Le Troisième Concile de Constantinople (680-1)', in *Les Conciles Oecumeniques*, i: *L'Histoire* (Paris: Cerf, 1994), 127-32 (though this account is not always reliable); Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, 3-18. Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (eds.), *Maximus the Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile*, ed. with introduction, translation, and notes, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-30.

In the sixth century, Justinian succeeded in restoring Byzantium, or, more accurately, the Roman Empire, to what it had been in the glorious days of Augustus. By his death in 565, not only the eastern areas, but also Italy, North Africa, and even part of Spain belonged to the Byzantines, who could justifiably claim that the Mediterranean had become once more *mare nostrum*.

But this was not destined to last for long. The Slavs in the North and the Persians in the East were becoming a considerable threat. The wars with the Persians in particular were long and costly for both parties. The first war was **end p.61** victorious for Byzantium. In 591, an 'everlasting' peace was agreed with the Persians, and Chosroes II ascended the Persian throne as an ally of Maurice, the Byzantine Emperor.

In 602, however, the situation changed. Phokas, supported by the army, entered Constantinople, had Maurice murdered, and became Emperor himself. Chosroes seized the opportunity to renew the war, and started to expand into eastern Byzantine territory. In 613 he captured Antioch, and the following year Damascus and Jerusalem. He led thousands of captives into exile, and even dared to take the True Cross, the most important symbol of the Christian faith.

Heraclius, the new Emperor, encouraged and supported by Patriarch Sergius, made a peace treaty with the Avars in 620, and embarked upon something like a holy war against the Persians in 622. This brought victory in 628. During Heraclius's absence, in 626, the Avars and the Slavs besieged Constantinople. Sergius organized processions of icons of Christ and the Virgin round the walls of the Queen City and encouraged its defenders. The attempt to capture Constantinople failed. Thanks to these two great men, Heraclius and Sergius, the Empire managed to survive and to regain a great part of its power and glory. On the other hand, precisely because of these wars, Byzantium and Persia both became considerably less strong and less capable of defending themselves against new enemies.

In fact, very soon a new enemy appeared. After Muhammad's death (632), the Arab tribes, united under the new religion of Islam, started to expand rapidly and to conquer the newly recovered eastern areas of Byzantium. They captured Damascus in 634, Alexandria in 635, and Jerusalem in 638. By the 640s, they were already establishing their own Empire.

The above-mentioned historical developments are closely related to the monothelite controversy. Byzantium sought to reintegrate into the official Church regions in which the anti-Chalcedonians constituted a considerable proportion of the population, such as Armenia, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Syria. In fact, the threat that first the Persians, then the Arabs posed to the Empire made this reintegration even more urgent, for the dissenters were not always willing to defend the Empire whose official Church had espoused the abominable doctrines of Leo and Chalcedon—at times, some of them even welcomed the invaders. The reconciliation of the Church with the anti-Chalcedonians was understood to serve the interests of both the Empire and the Church.

Emperor Heraclius found in Sergius once more a very fervent ally. The patriarch seems to have worked in a multifarious and well-organized way in order to prepare the ground for the reconciliation between the Church and **end p.62** the anti-Chalcedonians. [3]

[3] Grumel rightly points out the importance of Church policy for the rise of the monothelite heresy ('Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1929), 19), in contradistinction to Beck, who surprisingly remarks that Sergius did not have 'the slightest interest in fishing in the troubled waters of church policy' (Hans-Georg Beck, 'Justinian's Successors: Monoenergism and Monothelitism', in Hubert Jedin and John Dolan (eds.), *History of the Church*, ii: *The Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Ages*, trans. Anselm Briggs (London: Burns and Oates, 1980), 457-63, at 458). Hefele mentions Theophanes' information that Sergius came from Jacobite—anti-Chalcedonian parents. If this is true, it does not necessarily imply that Sergius wanted to lead the Church back to the monophysite heresy, as Hefele rightly remarks (Charles Joseph Hefele, *A History of the Councils of the Church*, v, trans. William A. Clark (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1896), 11), but might be a pointer to a certain affinity and affection of Sergius for Jacobite—anti-Chalcedonian monophysitism.

If Maximus's testimony and Grumel's chronological reconstruction are to be trusted, [4]

[4] See Maximus's *Disputatio cum Pyrrho* (hereafter *Disputatio*), *PG* 91, 332B-333A. For Grumel, see 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1928), 257-77.

already before 619 Sergius contacted Theodore of Pharan, sent him the *libellus* of Menas, [5]

[5] The *libellus* of Menas is a text allegedly written by the patriarch of Constantinople, Menas, in the middle of the sixth century. For more on the *libellus* and its authenticity, see below.

and asked his view of the teaching of one will and energy that was included in it. In 619, he communicated with the Egyptian monophysite George Arsas, asking for texts that included this teaching, and promising that he would work for their reconciliation on the basis of it. In 622, he took advantage of Theodore's positive response, and tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to come to terms with the Severan, Paul the One-Eyed. Finally, in 626, in response to a relevant question by Cyrus of Phasis, Sergius sent him a letter which favoured the doctrine of one energy.

Despite failure in Armenia, the intense efforts of Emperor Heraclius to bring about the long-hoped-for reconciliation between the anti-Chalcedonians and the Church must have borne some fruits in Syria and Mesopotamia by 630. Moreover, in June 633, the joint efforts of Heraclius, Sergius, and Cyrus of Phasis, who had been nominated patriarch of Alexandria by Heraclius in 631, were crowned with success in Alexandria. The Pact of Union united the Chalcedonians and the anti-Chalcedonian Theodosians in Alexandria through the mutual acceptance of Christ's two natures and of 'one theandric energy'—an expression which was attributed to [Pseudo-] Dionysius. [6]

[6] Rudolf Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, 2nd ser., ii, pt. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 598. 21-2. In fact Pseudo-Dionysius's letter to Gaius refers to a '*new* theandric energy' and not to '*one*' such (see *PG* 3, 1972B). However, Louth has aptly remarked that 'since all the Greek manuscripts of the Dionysian writings go back to the edition prepared by John of Scythopolis in the middle of the sixth century, and John was himself

anxious to present Denys as an orthodox Cyrilline Chalcedonian, the authenticity of the Monophysite/Monenergist/Monothelite reading "one theandric activity" cannot be ruled out' (*Maximus the Confessor*, 54). However, the facts that the manuscripts read 'new' and that there is no compelling reason to believe that 'new' should not be ascribed to the *manus scriptoris* render it *lectio potior*.**end p.63**

This news alarmed monk Sophronius, Maximus's spiritual father, who visited Cyrus, and later Sergius, and begged for the withdrawal of the doctrinal innovation of the 'one energy'. Sergius issued an official document, the *Psēphos*, in which he forbade any reference either to one or to two energies, perhaps wishing to forestall the turmoil that was bound to occur within the Chalcedonian camp if Sophronius started to denounce publicly the new heresy. [7]

[7] The passage of time favoured the union of Alexandria, because it would be easier to challenge it at the beginning than later. Perhaps Sergius took into account the fact that Sophronius was already in his eighties and would not represent a danger for his ecclesial policy for long.

Shortly after his meeting with Sophronius, Sergius sent an epistle to Pope Honorius, which favoured the teaching of one energy and attacked the teaching of two wills. In his response to Sergius, Honorius endorsed whole-heartedly Sergius's views, which he coupled with the notorious expression 'one will'.
In the meantime, Sophronius was elected patriarch of Jerusalem, [8]

[8] Schönborn thinks that this happened at the beginning of 634: C. von Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jerusalem: vie monastique et confession dogmatique*, Théologie Historique, 20 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 91.

and soon afterwards sent a synodical epistle to the other patriarchs, as was the ecclesial custom of the time, in which he virtually confessed a dyoenergite Christology, although he did not use the expression 'two energies', as had been agreed with Sergius. [9]

[9] The synodical epistle of Sophronius is fully quoted in the proceedings of the Sixth Ecumenical Council: Rudolf Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, 2nd ser., ii, pt. I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 410. 13-494. 9.

In 638, probably after Sophronius's death, [10]

[10] Schönborn believes that the most probable date for the death of Sophronius is 2 March 639 rather than 2 March 638, as is usually considered to be the case (*Sophrone de Jerusalem*, 97). However, it seems unlikely that Sergius would promulgate the *Ekthesis* while Sophronius was alive.

Sergius promulgated the *Ekthesis*, an official document bearing the signature of the Emperor, which included the doctrinal quintessence of Sergius's epistle to Honorius along with the expression 'one will'. [11]

[11] Honorius and Sergius died in 638. Doucet argues that Sergius may have waited for the death of Honorius before promulgating the *Ekthesis* ('Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 28). Similarly, Grumel claims that Sergius's hands were freed by Honorius's death ('Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1930), 16-17) and that, if Honorius had been alive, he would have rejected the *Ekthesis* (ibid. 20). However, these views are hardly sustainable, because the *Ekthesis* is virtually no more than the dogmatic part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius, of which Honorius had whole-heartedly approved, plus the expression 'one will', which Honorius himself had introduced.

Two synods, one **end p.64** under Sergius and one under his successor Pyrrhus, ratified the *Ekthesis*, which was also approved by the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.
This course of events triggered a dyothelite reaction. Sophronius was now dead, but Maximus, his disciple, was able to continue his work. [12]

[12] For the details of Maximus's life, I follow the account of his Greek *Life*, disregarding a Syriac *Life* edited by Dr Sebastian Brock. According to the Syriac *Life*, Maximus was born as a result of an adulterous union in Palestine and later became a monk in Palaia Lavra, where he met Sophronius. It is beyond the scope of this book to say more on the matter, but I find the Syriac version of Maximus's life less than convincing. For the Greek *Life*, see *PG* 90, 68-109. For the Syriac *Life*, see Sebastian Brock, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', *Analecta Bollandiana*, 91 (1973), 299-345.

By then, Maximus was a mature man and a famous theologian. Born of noble parents in Constantinople in 580, he was well educated and became secretary of Emperor Heraclius in his early thirties. After some years, he left the imperial court in order to become a monk at Chrysopolis. Later, in 624 or 625, he moved to Cyzicus, another place not far from Constantinople. In 626, he fled the Persian raids, and reached Carthage in North Africa, probably by 630. It was there that he met Sophronius.

Like Sophronius, Maximus first tried to avert the outburst of the controversy. When Pyrrhus, in late 633 or early 634, then abbot of Maximus's first monastery in Chrysopolis and later patriarch of

Constantinople, sent Maximus an epistle asking his opinion of the *Psēphos*, Maximus replied very carefully. He greatly rejoiced at what seemed to amount to the undoing of the Pact of Union, but also expressed doubts and defined the orthodox position cautiously, in order not to offend his correspondent, whom he praised excessively. After the publication of the *Ekthesis*, however, he had no other option than to denounce monothelitism publicly and to defend the dyothelite position. Popes John IV (640-2) and Theodore I (642-9) also defended dyothelitism. In 645, in the wake of the famous disputation between Maximus and the then ex-patriarch Pyrrhus, and the complete defeat of the latter, a few African Councils also condemned monothelitism.

In 648, however, Constans II promulgated an imperial decree, the *Typos* (probably drafted by Paul, patriarch of Constantinople at that time), which forbade any reference whatsoever to either one or two wills or energies on pain of deposition, exile, and confiscation. In spite of this threat, Pope Martin convoked the Lateran Council of 649, which basically followed the Christology of Maximus, rejected the *Typos*, and condemned the doctrine of one will and energy. Some time later, this pope would become a martyr for dyothelitism. Maximus himself shared a similar fate. He was tried, mutilated, and exiled, eventually to die in exile on 13 August 662.**end p.65**

The final act of the controversy roughly coincides with the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which ratified the dyothelite position and condemned monothelitism and its exponents in 681. Before presenting the Christology of the monothelites, however, it will be useful to examine the attitude of the secondary literature to this Christology. [13]

[13] Obviously this review cannot be exhaustive, but it attempts to indicate the main thrust of the secondary literature with regard to the monothelitism of the seventh century.

3. Reviewing the Literature

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Charles Joseph Hefele, the famous historian of the Ecumenical Councils, gave a detailed account of the monothelite controversy, in which he seemed to accept the traditional view, according to which the monothelites denied the existence of a human will in Christ, which, for him, meant that their Christology was not orthodox. [14]

[14] Hefele, *History of the Councils of the Church*, 1-259. We shall not mention writers belonging to the period before Hefele, since their importance for the present state of the problem is limited.

A few decades later, Venance Grumel expressed a similar view. In his opinion, the monothelitism of the seventh century was a heresy, which combined the two natures doctrine taken from dyophysitism with the doctrine of one will and energy taken from (Severan) monophysitism. [15]

[15] Grumel, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1928), esp. 257. Grumel seems to hold a similar view in regard to monothelitism in his article 'Les Textes Monothélites d'Aetius', *Échos d'Orient*, 28 (1929), 159-66.

At around the same time, J. Tixeront argued that monothelitism can be understood as a form of Apollinarianism 'from which Monothelism evidently springs'. [16]

[16] J. Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, iii, 2nd edn., trans. H. L. B. (London: Herder, 1926), 168.

However, he seemed also to sustain the view that the mistake of the monothelites was that they reduced the human will of Christ to a passive state rather than that they denied it. As he put it,

it may be assumed that [for the monothelites] the human faculties, *including the will*, no longer perform any spontaneous acts, but only act at the command and under the impulse of the divine will, which moves them and applies them to action, while the human will, which is also moved, merely transmits the divine impulse to the other faculties. The human will being thus reduced to a passive state, there is in Christ but one will, ἓν *θέλημα*, the divine or hypostatic *θέλημα*, and only one operation, *μία ἐνέργεια*, if considered in its primary source. [17]

[17] Ibid. 166-7, italics added. **end p.66**

To the same period belongs perhaps the most influential treatment of seventh-century monothelitism, which was written by M. Jugie. Echoing some of Tixeront's suggestions, Jugie claimed that [the monothelites] did not want to deny the existence of the human will of our Lord taken as a natural, physical faculty. They did not want to deny that this physical faculty was actually exercised, produced its natural act, its *κίνησις*, as they said. But they affirmed that this will was not self-moved in action . . . on its own initiative, independently and separately from the divine I, from the person of the Logos. [18]

[18] M. Jugie, 'Monothélisme', in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, x (1929), cols. 2307-23, at 2310.

Jugie argued that, for the monothelites, the will is the initial act by means of which the agent—namely, the Logos—decided to will and to act.[19] ([19] Ibid.) For Jugie, the monothelites' error was that they refused 'to name and to number each one of the natural wills', which means that the whole issue was rather a problem of terminology.[20] ([20] Ibid. 2313.)Thus, seventh-century monothelitism was, in Jugie's view, 'more verbal than real'.[21] ([21] Ibid. 2314.) Agostino Mayer set forth an interpretation of monothelitism that basically followed Jugie's suggestions.[22] ([22] Agostino Mayer, 'Monothelismo', in *Enciclopedia Cattolica* (Vatican City, 1949-), viii, cols. 1319-24.) Similarly, J. Ternus argued that, for Theodore of Pharan (an exponent of monothelitism), Christ had a human will, which yet was merely an *organon* subject to the hegemony of the Logos.[23] ([23] J. Ternus, 'Das Seelen und Bewußtseinsleben Jesu', in Grillmeier and Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzilvon Chalkedon*, 81-237, at 103.)

Likewise, Hans-Georg Beck argued that 'what was harmful here [in the monothelite *Ekthesis*] was not theology but terminology',[24] ([24] Beck, 'Justinian's Successors', 460.) and that the Sixth Ecumenical Council condemned simply 'a terminology, which could meanwhile be regarded as out of date'.[25] ([25] Ibid. 462.)

P. Galtier accepted that Sergius was a monothelite,[26] ([26] P. Galtier, 'La Première Lettre du pape Honorius: sources et éclaircissements', *Gregorianum*, 29 (1948), 42-61, at 46.)but argued that Honorius was orthodox.[27] ([27] Ibid. *passim*.).

Doucet was at one with Jugie in regard to the monothelites' teaching on Christ's energies, but took issue with him as regards their teaching on Christ's wills. Doucet opposed Jugie by arguing that **end p.67** by the 'natural movement' (*φυσικ*ὴ *κίνσις*) that Sergius, for instance, ascribed to the humanity of Christ, only the human energy was being referred to, not the human will, which is not a form of human energy, although related to it.[28]

[28] Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Phrrhus', 89-92. Doucet showed that not only the monothelites of the seventh century, but also Eunomius, Apollinarius, and Severus thought that the will is not a form of energy.

Therefore, in contradistinction to Jugie, Doucet believed that the monothelites of the seventh century were not orthodox on the question of the wills, and did not hesitate to draw lines from their teaching back to the Apollinarian heresy of the fourth century.[29] ([29] Ibid. 97-9.)

A few years later, however, Doucet contradicted himself by arguing that in his epistle to Pope Honorius the monothelite Sergius did not deny two wills in Christ but only two contrary wills; thus he now stated that Sergius 'is orthodox on the question of the wills'.[30]

[30] Doucet, 'Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes'?, 62. Doucet argued that monothelitism would become explicit only later in the *Ekthesis* (63).

On this basis, he sustained the orthodoxy of Honorius, who responded positively to the epistle of Sergius.[31]

[31] Ibid. 63-4. Doucet used the worn-out argument that by one will Honorius meant the unique object of willing of the divinity and the humanity of Christ (64).

Léthel and M. J. Le Guillou also defended the orthodoxy of the monothelites. The former drew a triple distinction between (a) monophysite monothelitism, (b) Byzantine monothelitism, and (c) vulgar monothelitism.[32]

[32] Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 26-7.

The second type of monothelitism is the official monothelitism of Sergius, which, in Léthel's view, does not constitute a doctrinal compromise.[33] ([33] Ibid. 26.)

In the preface to Léthel's book, Le Guillou endorsed his triple distinction and accused the Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council of not discerning the difference between the Byzantine and the other two types of monothelitism, as well as of condemning Pope Honorius.[34] ([34] Ibid. 10.)

In a similar fashion, Bausenhart argued that after the Council of Chalcedon a real monothelitism would be an anachronistic return to Apollinarianism,[35]

[35] Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 129-30.

and claimed that the model which conditions the thought of the monothelites of the seventh century is the acceptance of one source of initiative, which is located in the divine person of the Logos.[36]

[36] Ibid. 112-21.

Finally, there are scholars, such as Piret for instance, who seem to express a certain ambivalence concerning the monothelites' orthodoxy,[37]

[37] Piret, *Le Christ et la Trinité*, esp. 301-78.

whereas others, such as Murphy and Sherwood seem to accept their heterodoxy.[38]

[38] Murphy and Sherwood, *Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 133-260.

In **end p.68** so far as scholars belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church are concerned, the characterization of monothelitism as a heresy is, to the best of my knowledge, unanimous. [39]

[39] I will restrict myself to mentioning only the following: John Karmires, , 2nd edn., i (Athens: [n. pub.], 1960), 201-21; Panayotes N. Trempelas, , 2nd edn., ii (Athens: Ἀδελφότης Θεολόγων Ὁ Σωτήρ, 1979), 105-10; John Or. Kalogerou, Ἱστορία Δογμάτων, ii (Thessalonica: Π. Πουρναρᾶς, 1984), 362-447; Karazafeires, Ἡ Περὶ Προσώπου Διδασκαλία, 159-64; Dumitru Stăniloae, Introduction to Maximus's *Μυσταγωγία*, Ἐπὶ τὰς Πηγάς, i (Athens: , 1989), 39-72; John Meyendorff, *Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: The Church 450-680 AD* (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989), 333-72; Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, passim*; Vlasios Feidas, Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἱστορία, i (Athens: [n. pub.], 1992), 727-63; Despoina D. Kontostergiou, Ἡ ΣΤ' Οἰκουμενικὴ Σύνοδος καὶ ἡ Θεολογία της (Thessalonica: Π. Πουρναρᾶς, 1992), 61-71 and *passim*; Nicos Matsoukas, *Δογματικὴ καὶ Συμβολικὴ Θεολογία*, ii (Thessalonica: Π. Πουρναρᾶς, 1992), 308-49; Giannopoulos, *Οἱ Οἰκουμενικὲς Σύνοδοι*, 47-94; Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, 12-18, 54-62.

This review of the secondary literature indicates the existence of substantial disagreement as to what the seventh-century monothelites really - intended to say, and hence what kind of monothelitism they actually wished to propound. This prompts me to examine their writings and analyse their thought very carefully before attempting to pass a judgement upon their teaching. [40]

[40] I have decided to present the teaching of each exponent of monothelitism separately, in order to be able to examine the details of it, to do justice to the particularities of their thought, and to avoid unfair and inaccurate generalizations and judgements.

4. The Christology Of the Monothelites Of the Seventh Century

4.1 Theodore Of Pharan

The proceedings of the Lateran and of the Sixth Ecumenical Councils have saved for us a few short excerpts from Theodore's monothelite treatise addressed to Sergius, bishop of Arsenoes. [41]

[41] É. Amann argued that Theodore was an anti-Chalcedonian monophysite: 'Théodore de Pharan', in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, xv (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1946), cols. 279-82. On the contrary, Venance Grumel ('Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme', 1928, 262-5); Elert, *Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie*, 185-90; and Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 14-16 have convincingly shown that Theodore was a Chalcedonian. Doucet characterizes him as the spiritual father of the monothelite-monenergite heresy ('La volonté humaine du Christ spécialement en son agonie: Maxime le Confeseur interprète de l'Écriture' in *Science et Esprit*, 37 (1985), 123-59, at 133), and Maximus himself claimed that the *Ekthesis* was little more than a copy of Theodore's ideas (see *Opusc*. 10, *PG* 91, 136C-D).

According to these excerpts, the **end p.69** energy of Christ is one, because Christ is one, and corresponds to the whole Christ. [42]

[42] First excerpt, in Rudolf Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, 2nd ser., i (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 120. 10-11.

Due to the fact that Christ felt hungry, thirsty, weary, etc. whenever he willed, the movement of these (passions) must be attributed to the energy of the Logos, Theodore held, which means that Christ had one energy. [43]

[43] Second excerpt, ibid. 120. 15-18.

Everything in the salvific economy of Christ was caused by the divine and proceeded through the soul and the body, Theodore wrote. This is the case not only with the miracles, but also with the natural movement (*φυσικὴ κίνησις*) of Christ's humanity—namely, the so-called (blameless) passions, such as desire for food and sleep, weariness, pain, sadness and agony, which is why all this must be called one energy of one and the same Christ. [44]

[44] Seventh excerpt, ibid. 122. 8-18.

Everything that Christ did originated from the wisdom, goodness, and power of the Logos, and proceeded through the intellectual soul and the body without division, which indicates that the whole Christ had one energy, being one himself. [45]

[45] Third excerpt, ibid. 120. 22-7.

All in Christ was the work of God, whether it resembled the divine nature or the human nature, and this is why his divinity and his humanity had one energy, [46]

[46] Fourth excerpt, ibid. 120. 31-4.

which Theodore elsewhere characterizes as divine. [47]

[47] Fifth excerpts, ibid. 120. 39; eighth, ibid. 122. 23; ninth, ibid. 122. 27; eleventh, ibid. 124. 6-7.

In one of the excerpts, Theodore claimed that the one energy of Christ was created by God the Logos, whereas his humanity was no more than an instrument. [48]

[48] Eleventh excerpt, ibid. 124. 3-7.

For him, the natural qualities (*φυσικαὶ ἰδιότητες*) of Christ's body were dispensed with, as is shown by the fact that Christ passed through his mother's womb, the tomb, and the doors and walked on the sea 'without bodily mass and, so to speak, without body'. [49]

[49] Tenth excerpt, ibid. 122. 32-9. In this excerpt, Theodore stressed the predominance (*ἐπικράτεια*) of the divine over the human.

Furthermore, according to Theodore, Christ had only one will (*θέλημα*), the divine. [50]

[50] Sixth excerpt, ibid. 122. 3-4.

It is apparent that there are some fundamental motifs that run through Theodore's thought. Emphasis on the divine initiative, on the complete subordination of the human to the divine, and on the unity of Christ are prominent among them. Theodore draws on the traditional view that the blameless passions of Christ (such as hunger, thirst, etc.) were under the command of the Logos, in order to argue that his divinity and his humanity had one energy, **end p.70** which is often characterized as divine. As we have seen, he attributes every initiative to the divine energy or power of the Logos, [51]

[51] See e.g. the third excerpt, ibid. 120. 22-7.

and conceives of Christ's humanity as a mere vehicle through which the acts are accomplished. [52]

[52] Third excerpts, ibid. 120. 22-7, and seventh, ibid. 122. 8-18.

For Theodore, the humanity of Christ is a more or less passive instrument of his divinity. The active aspect of Christ's soul never enters into the picture. He mentions only the soul's *passions* of sadness and agony. Thus, the active participation of the humanity of Christ in the work of our salvation is jeopardized. The importance of the fact that Christ saved us not merely as God but as *incarnate* God fades away for the sake of an over-asymmetrical emphasis on redemption as exclusively the work of God. Moreover, such is the *predominance* of the divinity over the humanity—and we should recall here the Apollinarian and monophysite overtones of this view—that the human qualities of Christ are said to be dispensed with, at least on some occasions, in contrast to what the definition of Chalcedon had stated. [53]

[53] The definition of Chalcedon reads: ### (Tanner's translation reads: 'but rather the property of both natures is preserved' (*Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 86)), which contradicts monophysite (as well as cenotic) versions of Christology. The point that Theodore's Christology contrasts with Chalcedon on this matter was made also by Pope Martin: see Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 126. 1-130. 26. It is plain that Theodore alludes to Pseudo-Dionysius's aforementioned epistle to Gaius, which he interprets in a monenergite way.

In addition, at least in regard to Christ's energy, a careful distinction between divinity and humanity is lacking, and the energy is repeatedly ascribed to Christ as a unified whole. [54]

[54] This is the case in the first and third excerpts.

However, although Theodore frequently characterizes the unique energy of Christ as divine, [55]

[55] Theodore is theologically awkward when saying that the Logos is the creator of this energy (eleventh excerpt, in Riedinger, *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 124. 3-7), for this would render the unique energy of Christ human/created in contradistinction to what he actually wishes to argue. (A similar point was made by Pope Martin : ibid. 124. 23-33.)

he also refers to Christ's human natural movement (*φυσικὴ κίνησις*), which may indicate the existence of a 'human energy' as a subordinate part of his unique energy. [56]

[56] See e.g. the seventh excerpt, ibid. 122. 8-18.

But this is not the case with the will. As we have seen, for Theodore, the one will of Jesus Christ is identical with the divine will. [57]

[57] In regard to Theodore's orthodoxy, Amann is not far from the truth in claiming that Theodore was an exponent of a subtle docetic Christology, as Pope Martin had characterized him, and that his monenergism is 'far from being verbal' ('Théodore de Pharan', col. 282). On the contrary, Elert's judgement on Theodore seems to be quite lenient (*Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie*, 221-7). **end p.71**

4.2 Sergius Of Constantinople

As we have seen, Sergius acted in various ways in order to bring about the reconciliation of the Church with the anti-Chalcedonians on the basis of the one energy doctrine. Already in his epistle to Cyrus of Phasis, who had asked him whether it was proper to confess one energy or two, [58]

[58] This epistle is found in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 588. 7-592. 4.

he sided with the confession of one energy. He claimed that some of the Fathers, such as Cyril and Menas of Constantinople, had spoken of one energy (the latter had also allegedly spoken of one will). [59]

[59] Ibid. 528. 12-19.

He also claimed that the teachers of the Church who defended Leo's *Tome* against Severus did not argue that Leo's formula, according to which 'each form works in communion with the other', necessitates the confession of two energies in Christ. In fact, none of the Fathers has ever spoken of two energies in Christ, he argued. However, according to him, if we should find any of the Fathers speaking of two energies in Christ, then we should do the same, for we should follow not only the teaching of the Fathers but also their very words. [60]

[60] Ibid. 528. 24-530. 20. If Sergius's adherence to the Fathers was sincere, we may assess his motives in a more positive way. However, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of his position is a different matter from his motives.

In his second epistle to Cyrus, [61]

[61] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 136. 3-138. 33.

Sergius congratulated him on the reconciliation achieved in Alexandria between the Chalcedonians and the anti-Chalcedonian Theodosians, and stated that Christ does the divine and the human works by one energy, for every divine and human energy went forth from one and the same enfleshed Logos. Sergius restated that this is in accordance with the aforementioned formula of Pope Leo. [62]

[62] Ibid. 136. 36-138. 1.

The most important texts of Sergius are his epistle to Pope Honorius and the *Ekthesis*. [63]

[63] There was a third significant text, the so-called *Psēphos*, an official document promulgated in 633, which is no longer extant. Grumel, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1928), 13, gave as the text of the *Psēphos* a passage from Sergius's epistle to Honorius (J. D. Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio* (Florence, 1764), xi. 536E-537A). Polycarp Sherwood, by contrast, argued that the *Psēphos* is identical with a passage a few paragraphs above, which Grumel had overlooked (Sherwood refers to Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, x. 533C8-533E10) and which is textually repeated in the *Ekthesis* of 638 (ibid. xi. 993E10-996B7). Sherwood believed that the *Ekthesis* is no more than the *Psēphos* promulgated over the imperial signature (*An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor*, Studia Anselmiana, 30 (Rome: Herder, 1952), 10, 37-9). The question, though, is whether the *Psēphos* referred to the will(s) of Christ, as the passage that Sherwood identifies with the *Psēphos* does, or not. Pyrrhus, who was a priest at that time, sent to Maximus a copy of the *Psēphos*, probably seeking the approval of the greatest theologian of the Empire. In his response to Pyrrhus's epistle, Maximus did not mention anything concerning the wills, but referred only to the *Psēphos*'s teaching on Christ's energies (according to Sherwood, Maximus's response was written between the end of 633 and the beginning of 634: ibid. 37-9, 60). Grumel argued that since Maximus's response did not mention the teaching on the wills, this teaching must not have been included in the *Psēphos* (Grumel, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1928), 10-15). This seems most likely to be the case, unless Maximus chose to ignore the *Psēphos*'s reference to the will(s) for diplomatic reasons. Moreover, in his epistle to the Sicilians, Maximus mentioned that in his letter to him (which must have included the *Psēphos*), Pyrrhus had raised (only) the energies question (129C). However, in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus mentioned that the *Psēphos* anathematizes everyone who speaks of two wills in Christ (*PG* 91, 305A; both Grumel and Sherwood have overlooked this). Thus, it seems that a definitive answer as to the exact content of the *Psēphos* is rather difficult to reach.

In fact, the latter is almost identical with the basic doctrinal **end p.72** part of the former, so we do not really need to treat them separately. [64]

[64] The doctrinal part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius is found in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 542. 2-544. 8, and the respective part of the *Ekthesis* in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 4-29.

According to both texts, one should adhere to what the Councils handed down: namely, that one and the same only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, performed both divine and human acts, and that every divine-like and humanlike energy went forth from one and the same God the Logos enfleshed, without division or confusion, and referred back to him.

According to these texts, no one is allowed to refer to one energy, even though some of the Fathers had mentioned it, because some people believe that it entails the denial of Christ's two natures and, as a result, are offended by it. Any reference to two energies is also forbidden, because none of

the Fathers ever spoke of two energies. In addition, acceptance of two energies entails acceptance of two wills opposing one another, as if God the Logos willed to endure the passion and his humanity opposed his will, which would introduce two willers, willing opposing things, which is impious. For Sergius, it is impossible that one and the same person has two wills which contradict each other. [65]

[65] This axiomatic sentence is part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 542. 16-17), but is omitted in the *Ekthesis*.

Even Nestorius did not dare to proclaim two wills in Christ, but spoke of the like willing (*ταυτοβουλία*) of the two persons that he imagined. How, then, is it possible that we, who confess one Lord Jesus Christ, admit two wills in him, and those two opposed to each other? Hence, Sergius went on to say, following the Fathers, we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ, [66]

[66] The reference to Nestorius and to the one will is part of the *Ekthesis* only (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 20-6).

for his intellectually ensouled flesh never performed its natural movement (*φυσικὴ κίνησις*) separately,

on its own impulse and in opposition **end p.7**3 to the command of God the Logos, who was hypostatically united with it, but only when and in the manner and in the measure in which God the Logos willed. Sergius concluded the doctrinal part of his epistle to Honorius [67]

[67] This part of Sergius's epistle is not included in the *Ekthesis*.

by drawing a parallel between divinity and the soul, as well as humanity and the body, and by referring to a passage of Gregory of Nyssa [68]

[68] Riedinger (*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 544) gives the following reference: Gregory of Nyssa, *Adversus Eunomium*, 3 (4) 8, *PG* 45, 713A, ed. W. Jaeger II (1960), 136. 19-24.

in order to substantiate the view that Christ's humanity was moved by his divinity.

Sergius's teaching on Christ's will and energy cannot be adequately understood unless a helpful distinction is drawn. Both terms may denote either the faculties in virtue of which one is able to will and to act, or the actualization of these faculties in willing and acting, or even the results, the object willed or the work done. Sergius did not draw such a distinction, therefore we have to speculate about which aspect of the will or energy he may have had in mind each time.

It can be assumed with good reason that when Sergius referred to one or two energies, something close to the natural faculties was implied. It does not seem plausible that he had in mind the actualizations of the energies as faculties, for every being actualizes its energy not once or twice but innumerable times in the course of its life. On the contrary, when Sergius referred to all the divine and human energies and the like, apparently the actualizations of the energy in concrete acts were implied, and not the faculties. It could be argued that Sergius presupposed two (not one) energies as faculties in virtue of which many human and divine actions took place. However, the fact that he preferred the doctrine of one energy to the doctrine of two energies renders such an assumption rather implausible. Indeed, Sergius does not consider the doctrines of one energy and two energies of equal value. [69]

[69] Sergius's preference for the one energy has been pointed out by Hefele, who spoke of 'the seeming juste milieu of Sergius's (*History of the Councils*, v. 22), Galtier ('La Première Lettre du pape Honorius's, 45-6), Grummel ('Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1929), 23-4, (1930), 19-20), and Murphy and Sherwood (*Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 159).

For him, the one energy doctrine finds support in the works of the Fathers, whereas the two energies doctrine does not. Sergius forbids reference to one energy not because the one energy doctrine is erroneous, but merely because some people think that it implies the denial of Christ's two natures. [70]

[70] Sergius seems to imply that it is these people's fault if they believe that one energy teaching leads to such a conclusion.

By contrast, he forbids reference to the doctrine of **end p.74** two energies because it entails the existence of two wills opposing one another, which is, for him, heretical.

Let us now move on to the question of the wills. Sergius argues in both texts that two energies introduce two wills. It may be assumed that by two wills the faculties are implied, and not only the acts or the objects of willing. [71]

[71] Sergius might have had in mind two objects of willing in the passage found in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 20-1.

It would not be feasible to associate two energies as faculties with two acts or objects of willing without having introduced two wills as faculties, as it would not be feasible to relate two wills as

faculties with two actions without having introduced two energies as faculties in virtue of which acting is possible. At any rate, one of the questions that Sergius's position raises is why these two wills are understood as opposing one another. It seems logical that two energies which oppose one another imply the existence of two wills which oppose one another, but Sergius does not mention two energies which oppose one another, but simply two energies. It seems that, for Sergius, two wills in Christ amount to two wills opposing one another, and since it is impious to admit two wills opposing one another in Christ, we must exclude from him two wills and speak of one will instead.

Léthel has argued that the problem with Sergius was that he believed that two different wills are necessarily contrary to one another, and thus confused difference with contrariety. [72]

[72] Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 39.

Doucet, however, has made a more subtle suggestion. He has argued that '[Sergius] draws from the hypothesis of two energies the implication of two distinct willing wills (difference), which, according to him, will be *also* contrary through their objects [contrariety]'. Therefore, claims Doucet, the problem with Sergius, as well as with Apollinarius and Polemon, is not that he confuses difference with contrariety, but that he believes that difference (on the physical level) and contrariety (on the moral level) are inevitably connected. [73]

[73] Doucet, 'Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?', 58. Farrell seems to follow Léthel, without mentioning Doucet's criticism (*Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 72-81).

However, it can be asked, why do two wills mean necessarily two wills opposing one another? Are we not in this way straight back to the Apollinarian frame of thought? Why not conceive, as Maximus later did, two natural wills in conformity with one another? If by 'two wills' Sergius had in mind the faculties (and not the objects of willing), we are bound to see traces of Apollinarianism in his thought.

Moreover, Sergius argues that the humanity of Christ was moved by his **end p.75** divinity, as the body is moved by the soul. He thereby reduces the human nature of Christ to passivity and allows very little room for both a human, self-determining will and a human energy. [74]

[74] The main reason why in post-Chalcedonian Christology the parallel between soul and body, on the one hand, and divinity and humanity in Christ, on the other, was drawn was in order to show that it is possible to have two natures in one hypostasis. But Sergius takes the same example and uses it to stress the passivity of the humanity of Christ vis-à-vis his divinity.

The passage of Gregory of Nyssa to which Sergius refers, and which attributes energy to God and passion to humanity, simply indicates that our redemption is to be attributed to God, and that the passion of Christ is a passion not of his divinity but of his humanity. In the context of his anti-Eunomian polemics, through which Gregory tried to prove that whatever the Logos has which is not proper to God, such as passion, belongs to his humanity, this makes very good sense. However, Sergius misuses this passage in order to stress the passivity of Christ's humanity vis-à-vis his divinity.

Another argument of Sergius for the existence of only a divine will in Christ was that his humanity did not perform its natural movement on its own impulse, separately from the Logos and in opposition to him. [75]

[75] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii. pt. I, 224. 9-15. Sergius uses here the expression 'natural movement' (*φυσικ*ὴ *κίνησις*), which of course reminds us of Theodore of Pharan. It has been argued that this expression points not only to Christ's human energy but to his human will too (see e.g. Jugie, 'Monothélisme', col. 2310). The 'natural movement' is indeed very close to the 'natural energy', but is not necessarily identical with it. In his seventh epistle (which was written in 628 or perhaps 643, according to Sherwood, *An Annotated Date-List*, 31), Maximus, for instance, does not identify them, but contends that it is impossible to have the former without the latter (*Epistula* (hereafter *Ep*.) 7, *PG* 91, 436C-D). However, the term 'natural movement' as used by Theodore and Sergius by no means implies the existence of a human, rational, self-determining will. Theodore mentions at best the desire for food, which he characterizes as a *passion*, and which is an instinctive desire of the human body having nothing to do with the self-determining aspect of the human soul where a human will is to be primarily located.

But the fact that the humanity of Christ did not perform its natural movement on its own impulse, separately from the Logos and in opposition to him, does not prove that it was not endowed with a human will. Rather, it proves that it was not identical with a human personal willer, willing and acting in a sinful manner.

Sergius's writings are relatively nebulous. As we can see in the *Ekthesis*, one of the things he clearly objected to was an internal opposition in Christ, an opposition between the humanity of Christ and the Logos. [76]

[76] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 20-4.

The question is whether he believed that the way around this was to exclude from the humanity of Christ a faculty of will and to relegate it to a passive state. This seems probable, although it is difficult to give a conclusive answer. An examination of the teaching of other exponents of monothelitism who drew on the same **end p.76** reservoir of ideas as Sergius will cast more light on the content of the monothelite doctrine. Attention will be now paid to the theological positions of Pope Honorius.

4.3 Honorius

Pope Honorius contributed to the promotion of monothelitism. His two extant epistles (the second is incomplete) give us some idea of his position vis-à-vis the new doctrinal dispute, which was to monopolize the interests of the Church for some decades to come.

In his first epistle, Honorius responded to the epistle that Sergius had sent him, and which we have just examined, in a most welcoming way. The doctrinal points and the practical instructions of Sergius were accepted without reservations. Already at the outset of the epistle, Honorius accused 'somebody named Sophronius' of introducing quarrels and quests for new doctrinal expressions 'against our brother Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, who had proclaimed one energy'. [77]

[77] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 548. 4-8.

Honorius accepted that Christ performs divine and human acts, [78] ([78] Ibid. 554. 11-12.) but forbade reference to one or two energies. [79] ([79] Ibid. 554. 5-6.) Moreover, he commented in a rather pejorative way that the question of whether Christians should use the expressions 'one energy' or 'two energies' pertains to the grammarians. [80] ([80] Ibid. 554. 13-15.) Furthermore, after exposing a clumsy version of the communication of idioms, Honorius confessed one will in Jesus Christ, on the grounds that the divinity assumed a sinless and pre-lapsarian human nature. [81] ([81] Ibid. 550. 16-19.) For this reason, the words of Christ's prayer in Gethsemane did not express a different will (from the divine will of the Father), but pertained to the economy of Christ's assumed humanity, and were said because Christ wanted to teach us to prefer the will of God to our own will. [82] ([82] Ibid. 552. 10-19.) In his second epistle, [83] ([83] Ibid. 622-4.). Honorius held that neither one nor two energies should be confessed, but that instead of one energy, one should refer to the one Christ who works in both his natures, and instead of two energies, to Christ's two working natures: the divine, which works what pertains to God, and the human, which works what pertains to the flesh. [84]

[84] See esp. ibid. 622. 16-20 and 624. 4-9.

Honorius's views are similar to those of Sergius in many respects. He held fast—even in his second epistle—to the view that the expression 'two energies' must be avoided. In addition, by associating the teaching of two wills **end p.77** with the sinfulness of Christ's humanity, he seems to have accepted the bond established by Sergius between human will and sinfulness, which smacks of Apollinarianism. Furthermore, Honorius interpreted Christ's prayer in Gethsemane in a way which did not take seriously either the human will of Christ or his human obedience to the Father. For Honorius, Christ in Gethsemane wanted to teach us something (namely, to obey the will of God), [85]

[85] Ibid. 552. 15-19. Following S. J. Schneemann, *Studien über die Honoriusfrage* (Freiburg: Herder, 1864), 47 f., Hefele, *History of the Councils*, 38-40, argued that, according to Honorius, Christ expressed his own human will in Gethsemane. Galtier tried to elaborate the same point as Hefele ('La Première Lettre du pape Honorius's, *passim*). However, both seem to do violence to the text, according to which Christ merely wanted to teach us to obey the will of God.

which ostensibly he did not do himself.

From a practical point of view, it is indisputable that Honorius contributed to the promotion of monothelitism. Whereas in his first epistle Sergius had not referred to 'one will', in the *Ekthesis* he did so, adopting Honorius's expression. Furthermore, Honorius's epistles made it possible for the monothelites of the seventh century to appeal to him in order to support the orthodoxy of their Christology against the dyothelite position.

However, in so far as the doctrinal content of his epistles is concerned, it must be admitted that Honorius, like Sergius, belongs to the early stage of the development of monothelitism, which is

characterized by a certain ambiguity and vagueness. This renders it difficult to pass conclusive judgement on him. Doubtless, if his arguments and expressions are taken at face value, he cannot be acquitted of the charge of monothelitism, in spite of the repeated efforts of a host of Roman Catholic theologians to do so. [86]

[86] A full overview of the discussion of Honorius's orthodoxy does not interest us directly here. To what was mentioned earlier in this chapter, let me briefly add the following. It has been argued that (a) the letters of Honorius and the proceedings of the Sixth Ecumenical Council were falsified, and (b) that the sessions of the Sixth Ecumenical Council that anathematized Honorius did not have an ecumenical character. Both arguments were refuted by Hefele (*History of the Councils*, pp. x-xi). In the first edition of his book, Hefele accepted the heterodoxy of Honorius by arguing that he had exchanged the moral unity of Christ with physical unity (ibid. 33). In the second edition, he contradicted himself (something which, according to Harnack (*History of Dogma*, 255), caused much surprise), for instance, by arguing that Honorius accepted the divine will and the incorrupt human will of Christ (*History of the Councils*, 33). He also argued that according to Pope Leo II, who ratified the decisions of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, the fault of Honorius did not have to do with doctrine but with the fact that he practically promoted the heresy 'by *negligentia*' (ibid. xi, his italics). By contrast, Dorner, *History of the Development*, 423, and Karmires, , 219, have rightly argued for the opposite (for the relevant passage of Leo II, see Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 878. 3-5). Others, such as Galtier ('La Première Lettre du pape Honorius's, *passim*) and Carcione have tried to place Honorius's Christology within the wider Christological tradition up to the seventh century, without, as far as I can see, offering insights that would dramatically change the picture (see Filippo Carcione, 'Enérgheia, Thélema e Theoktnetos nella lettera di Sergio, patriarcha di Costantinopoli, a papa Onorio Primo', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 51 (1985), 263-76; see also *idem*, *Sergio di Costantinopoli de Onorio I nella controversia monotelita de VII secolo: Alcuni chiarimenti sulla loro dottrina e sul loro ruolo nella vicenda* (Rome, 1985)). Léthel tried to support the orthodoxy of Honorius by saying that Maximus accepted the *Psēphos* at least as warmly as Honorius did (*Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 59-64), something which is erroneous, as Doucet has convincingly shown ('Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes'?, 64-7). On the issue of Honorius's orthodoxy, see also: J. Chapman, *The Condemnation of Pope Honorius* (London, 1907); Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, ii: *The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 150-4; G. Kreuzer, *Die Honoriusfrage im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 1975); and G. Schwaiger, 'Die Honoriusfrage: zu einer neuen Untersuchung des alten Falles', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 88 (1977), 85-97.

end p.78

It is true that Maximus the Confessor himself frequently attempted to defend Honorius, but it seems that he did so in order to secure the support of Rome, the only patriarchal see sympathetic to his Christology. In order to interpret Honorius's first epistle in a manner compatible with dyothelite orthodoxy, Maximus had to use arguments that do not stand up to criticism. [87]

[87] In *Opus*. 20 (written by 640: Sherwood, *Annotated Date-List*, 41-2), Maximus argued that Honorius meant by one will the divine will of the Logos to which alone the incarnation is attributable (*PG* 91, 240B-C, 244A: it is noteworthy that Maximus there takes it that the 'one will' of Honorius is the *divine* will). A little later, Maximus maintained that by saying that Christ did not have a will different from or contrary to the will of the Father, the Pope did not intend to exclude from Christ a natural human will but only a sinful will (241B-D). In 244A-B, he additionally claimed that from Honorius's statement that Christ did not have a will different from or contrary to the will of the Father, it can be unambiguously deduced that he had, according to Honorius, a human natural will, and, therefore, two natural wills. In the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus mentioned that the person who wrote down the epistle of Honorius believed that by one will Honorius referred to the *human* will of Christ (in contrast to what Maximus had argued in 240B-C and 244A), for this is what Sergius had asked him about (328C-329B). Obviously Maximus sided here with Pope John IV (640-2), who, as Amann has pointed out, was the first to defend the orthodoxy of Honorius by arguing that he had spoken of one will of the human nature of Christ, for there was not in him the contrariety of wills that exists in us due to the original sin (É. Amann, 'Honorius', in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vii (Paris: Letonzey et Ane, 1922), cols. 93-132, at 108).

However, he may have realized that the epistle as it stands supports and promotes monothelitism, as can be deduced from the fact that he sought refuge in the claim that the epistle was falsified. [88]

[88] *Opusc*. 20, *PG* 91, 244B-245B.

As to the Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, they did not have the slightest misgivings in regard to Honorius's monothelitism, as can be unambiguously deduced from the proceedings of the Council. All of them, including the Roman delegates, took for granted that he was a heretic and anathematized him, as they also took for granted that to be a pope and a heretic at the same time does not constitute a contradiction in terms. **end p.79**

4.4 Pyrrhus

Pyrrhus was closely linked to Sergius. As has been already mentioned, when Sergius issued the *Psēphos*, Pyrrhus sent it to Maximus. When he later succeeded Sergius at the see of Constantinople, he supported the monothelite doctrine, which his predecessor had introduced. [89]

[89] Meyendorff goes so far as to say that the *Ekthesis* was 'drafted by Sergius with the cooperation of the abbot Pyrrhus' (*Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, 354). There seems to be not only a personal but also a deep theological link between Sergius and Pyrrhus. Thus, it might be assumed that the analysis of Pyrrhus's positions might cast some light on Sergius's Christology too.

As we shall see, with Pyrrhus, Sergius's ideas were taken on board and deployed fully. Let us, therefore, examine Pyrrhus's positions and arguments on the issue of Christ's wills and energies.

In his *Dogmatic Tome*, Pyrrhus argued that Cyrus was justified in using the expression 'one theandric energy' in place of 'a new theandric energy' because the former is equivalent to the latter. [90]

[90] In this respect Pyrrhus is at one with Severus of Antioch, who understood the 'new' energy of Dionysius as equivalent to 'one' (see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 170).

However, it seems that for Pyrrhus the 'one energy' is not understood as equivalent to the sum of the two, but rather as superseding them, as the expression ### suggests. [91]

[91] For Pyrrhus's epistle, see Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 152. 27-39.

In his epistle to Pope John, Pyrrhus excluded the possibility of two wills existing in the same subject, on the grounds that they would oppose each other. [92]

[92] Ibid. 338. 18-19.

Pyrrhus's adherence to Sergius's ideas is shown by his insistence that the *Ekthesis* be subscribed to by the bishops. [93]

[93] Ibid. 168. 3-170. 7. In a fourth extract from his works, Pyrrhus complains about those members of the flock who attacked their shepherds (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 626. 6-9). Maximus must have been one of these disobedient sheep.

It is of interest to look briefly at the positions and arguments that Pyrrhus put forward in the course of his public disputation with Maximus, which is, from the point of view of theology, probably the most important text of the whole monothelite controversy. Pyrrhus argued that Christ has one will and one energy, because he is one and he wills and acts as one. [94]

[94] *Disputation with Pyrrhus, PG* 91, 289A, 340A.

It is impossible to have two wills in one person without their opposing one another. [95]

[95] Ibid. 292A.

The wills and the energies introduce the persons who will and act. [96] ([96] Ibid. 289C, 336D.) The will cannot be natural, for three reasons: first, because, since, as the Fathers have said, God and the saints have one will, this would mean that they also have one nature; [97] ([97] Ibid. 292B.) secondly, if the will were natural, human beings would have different natures, because, as we know, they will different things; in addition, **end p.80** every time our will changes, our nature would change too; [98] ([98] Ibid. 292D.) and thirdly, given that what is natural is compelled, if Christ had two natural wills, he would be deprived of every voluntary motion. [99] ([99] Ibid. 293B.) To support his monothelitism, Pyrrhus pointed to the fact that Christ's flesh was moved by the command ### of the Logos. [100] ([100] Ibid. 297A.) In addition, he attributed to the monothelites of Byzantium (that is, of Constantinople) the views, first, that Christ can be said to have a human will (only) by appropriation of our human will, [101]

[101] Ibid. 304A; Maximus ironically responded that the monothelites of Byzantium were Pyrrhus's disciples (ibid.).

and second, that his one will is a gnomic will. [102] ([102] Ibid. 308A.)

After accepting that the wills are natural, Pyrrhus argued that, as we confess one (hypostasis), which is composed of two natures, we may also confess one composite will, composed of two natural wills. [103]

[103] Ibid. 296A-B.

Similarly, Pyrrhus argued that one energy should be confessed due to the mode of the union or due to the unique result of Christ's acts. [104]

[104] Ibid. 340D, 341B.

Furthermore, he mentioned that he and those who agreed with him spoke of one energy, not in order to deny the existence of Christ's human energy, but because the human energy is a passion by opposition to the divine energy. [105]

[105] Ibid. 349B-C.

To the well-known dyothelite argument that energy characterizes essence, Pyrrhus proposed the counter-argument that the connection between essence and energy belongs to theology, not to economy.[106] ([106] Ibid. 348C.) After all, he suggested, why not dispense with this technical and mystifying conceptuality and confess with simplicity that Christ is perfect God and perfect man?[107] ([107] Ibid. 300A.) It is not difficult to see that Pyrrhus is not always consistent in his positions. He connects will with person, and at the same time argues that, according to the Fathers, God and the saints had one will, which would mean that they also had one person. In addition, he argues in favour of one will, but also suggests the simultaneous acceptance of one will and two wills, eventually to claim that the whole debate is a redundant, complicated technicality.

We shall have the opportunity to deal with some of Pyrrhus's arguments later. For now, let it be noted that his understanding of the will (and the energy) is not sufficiently nuanced. By 645, when the disputation took place, Maximus had time and again drawn the distinction between the will as a natural faculty (*θέλησις* or *θέλημα*) and the will as the object of willing (*θελητόν* or *θεληθέν*). According to Maximus, the fact that in Christ there was one *θελητόν* does not mean that there was also one *θέλησις* or *θέλημα*. By not taking such a distinction seriously, and by continuing to argue for one will and **end p.81** one energy in Christ, Pyrrhus seems to verify the suspicion that his monothelitism was more than verbal.

In addition, Pyrrhus jeopardized the authenticity of the humanity of Christ by arguing that Christ had a human will only in so far as he appropriates our human will.[108]

[108] Maximus asked Pyrrhus whether he referred to the essential appropriation, according to which everyone appropriates the natural idioms that belong to his nature, or a relative appropriation, according to which we appropriate in a friendly manner things that belong to each other, and Pyrrhus responded that he referred to the latter (ibid. 304A-B).

Moreover, he repeated the Apollinarian argument that if there were two wills in one person, they would necessarily oppose one another. Furthermore, in a way which is reminiscent of Severus, he denied the use of the same principles for theology and economy—by contrast with Chalcedon's option of applying to Christology the terms and conceptuality used in Trinitarian theology earlier on.

By the end of his disputation with Maximus, Pyrrhus had fully accepted Maximus's arguments and confessed his adherence to dyothelitism. Christ has an eternal, uncreated will and a created will, which correspond to his two natures, he admitted. Thus, Christ wills as God and obeys as man, willing in a manner appropriate to his two natures.[109]

[109] Ibid. 301D.

Likewise, Pyrrhus recanted the teaching of one energy, admitted that he and his forerunners had said what they had said out of ignorance,[110]

[110] Ibid. 352C.

and promised to confess the dyothelite faith in front of the pope.[111]

[111] Ibid. 353A.

However, after doing so, he relapsed into monothelitism, the exponents of which would continue to oppose dyothelite Christology.

4.5 Paul Of Constantinople

Paul succeeded Pyrrhus at the see of Constantinople in 641.[112]

[112] See Jean-Claude Larchet, Introduction to *Saint Maxime le Confesseur. Opuscules Théologiques et Polémiques*, trans. and notes by Emmanuel Ponsoye (Paris: Cerf, 1998), 68.

We possess one of his epistles, addressed to Pope Theodore I. In this epistle,[113]

[113] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 196. 18-204. 8.

Paul repeated the already well-known thesis that every divine-like and human-like energy goes forth from the enfleshed Logos and refers back to him.[114]

[114] Ibid. 200. 15-17.

After a reference to the communication of idioms strongly reminiscent of Honorius,[115]

[115] Ibid. 200. 23-4. Paul is more accurate than Honorius, for he says that the Son of man has come down from heaven (ibid. 200. 24), whereas Honorius said that Christ's humanity had come down from heaven (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 550. 15-16), which, it taken literally, is heretical.

Paul likewise confessed one will, lest any opposition or difference
end p.82

in wills, or two willers be introduced, or Christ is presented as fighting with himself. [116]

[116] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 200. 25-8.

Through its union with the Logos, the soul of Christ acquired the Logos' divine will, and not a different one, and was always led and moved by it (or by him). [117]

[117] Ibid. 200. 32-4.

Paul cited the part of the *Ekthesis* which argued that the flesh never moved separately, on its own initiative, and contrary to the command of the Logos, but when, in the manner and measure in which God the Logos willed. [118]

[118] Ibid. 200. 35-7; cf. *Ekthesis*, ibid. 160. 26-9.

He then argued that neither when Christ said that '[I have not come down] to do my own will but the will of him who sent me', [119]

[119] John 6: 38.

nor when he prayed to the Father in Gethsemane, did he express a will different from or opposed to the divine will. [120]

[120] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 202, 3-8. Paul claimed that this view is in accordance with Saint Gregory's *Oration* 30, 12 (see *PG* 36, 117C-120B and Gallay and Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 248-52).

Christ in Gethsemane simply expressed our nature, which loves life and does not want to die. [121]

[121] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 202. 10-12; see also Pseudo-Athanasius, *De Incarnatione et contra Arianos*, *PG* 26, 1004B-C.

If the humanity of Christ had a will contrary to the Father or to the Logos, it would deserve the rebuke which Christ addressed to Peter. [122]

[122] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 200. 38-202. 3.

Paul concluded by saying that all the teachers of the Church, including Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, and Honorius, pope of Rome, agree on the teaching of one will. [123]

[123] Ibid. 202. 21-5.

Paul is also considered to be the writer of the *Typos*. [124]

[124] Ibid. 206. 20-1.

The *Typos* distinguishes between two different approaches to the problem of the wills and energies of Christ. Some people confess that Christ has one will, on the grounds that he is one person, who wills and acts without confusion and without division. Others confess two wills and two energies, because the natures of Christ and their qualities remain intact after the union; so Christ does divine and human works in accordance with his natures. [125]

[125] Ibid. 208. 3-14; the dyothelite position as presented by the *Typos* is strongly reminiscent of Maximus.

Because this dispute has damaged the peace of the Church, the *Typos* forbids any reference to either one or two wills or energies, and threatens severe penalties for those who disobey. [126]

[126] Ibid. 208. 14-210. 15.

It is obvious that Paul operates with the same stock of ideas and terms as his monothelite predecessors. He considers impermissible not only an opposition but also a difference of wills, and supports the one will teaching. He **end p.83** claims that the soul of Christ acquired the divine will on account of its unity with the Logos, which seems to allow no room for an affirmation of the human will of Christ. Given that Paul, unlike Sergius and Honorius, wrote after Maximus had drawn distinctions which cleared up the confusion between the willing faculty and the willed object, his monothelitism seems to have been real, not simply verbal.

An interesting development in the controversy was Paul's attempt to settle the dispute through the *Typos*. But this attempt was quixotic, and was bound to fail. The only way forward would be a unity forged on a sound doctrinal basis, rather than an attempt to put an end to the dispute by silencing both parties regardless of the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of their respective positions. [127]

[127] Paul had not realized that the times had changed since the promulgation of the *Psēphos*, and that to attempt a solution simply through silence would be futile.

Two monothelite arguments, put forward by Theodore, a deacon of Patriarch Paul, should be briefly mentioned here. According to the first, the Fathers put will and ignorance into the same category. So, if a human will is attributed to Christ other than by way of appropriation, ignorance must also be attributed to him. This, however, would be tantamount to the condemned heresy of agnoetism. According to the second argument, the Fathers did not speak of natural wills, which meant that the

dyothelites were in the wrong, because they put in the Fathers' mouths words alien to them in order to serve their own theological interests. [128]

[128] *Opusc*. 19, *PG* 91, 216B-217A.

Theodore clearly excludes from Christ a human will. His patristic fundamentalism, which considers the use of the expression 'natural wills' inappropriate only because it does not occur in the Fathers, is not coupled (as is often the case with fundamentalisms) with a careful exegesis of the texts of the Fathers. In fact, Theodore misinterprets the passage of Gregory of Nazianzus [129]

[129] See Oration 29, 18, in *PG* 36, 97A-C, and in Gallay and Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 200. 1-202. 22. Gregory does not associate will with ignorance, as Theodore claimed.

to which he appeals, as Maximus subsequently showed in his refutation of Theodore's arguments. [130]

[130] *Opusc*. 19, *PG* 91, 217B-224B.

4.6 Peter Of Constantinople

We do not possess any texts by Peter of Constantinople. However, according to the testimony of the proceedings of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, he sent Pope Vitalian an epistle in which he suggested the simultaneous acceptance **end p.84** of one and two wills and energies. [131]

[131] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 108. 18-20 and 110. 14-16.

When the epistle was read out in the presence of the Fathers of the Council, the Roman delegates noticed that some parts of the excerpts from patristic texts that were cited therein were mutilated in such a way as to serve the teaching of one will and energy that Peter wanted to promote. [132]

[132] Ibid. pt. 2, 610. 1-10.

Connected with Peter is an important document of the monothelite controversy: namely, the doctrinal dialogue between his representative, Bishop Theodosius, and Maximus the Confessor. This dialogue took place in Bizya, where Maximus was exiled, in 656. [133]

[133] According to Mavritius Geerard, the dialogue between Maximus and Theodosius was recorded by Maximus's disciple Anastasius Apocrisiarius: see *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, iii (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979), 7735. See also R. Devreesse, 'La Vie de saint Maxime le Confesseur et ses recensions', *Analecta Bollandiana*, 46 (1928), 5-49, and C. N. Tsirpanlis, 'Acta sancti Maximi', *Θεολογία*, 43 (1972), 106-24. According to Sherwood, the discussion was held in August-September 656 (*Annotated Date-List*, 56). The editors of the recent critical edition of the *Disputatio Bizyae* note that *Disputatio Bizyae* 'has been attributed to Anastasius the Apocrisiarius or Anastasius the Monk, perhaps in conjunction with Maximus, and elsewhere to Theodore Spoudaeus and Theodosius of Gangra'. They believe that the dispute took place in August 656 and that the account 'was written in late 656 or 657 before the end of August': see Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII, vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia, una cum latina intrepretatione Anastasii Bibliothecarii iuxta posita*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 39 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), XV and XVI.

Maximus accused the supporters of monothelitism of having introduced 'innovations', [134]

[134] Maximus offered a synopsis of the various positions that the representatives of seventh-century monothelitism held along with a short refutation of them (*Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 141A-144A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 83. 118-89. 166).

proclaimed one energy [135]

[135] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 141A and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 83. 118-19.

and one divine will, [136]

[136] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 141C and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 85. 138-9.

and promulgated the *Typos*, which prohibited any reference to either one or two wills and energies. Theodosius did not deny the accusations, but simply responded that he was personally opposed to the *Typos*, which was nevertheless promulgated for tactical reasons (*δι' οἰκονομίαν*). [137]

[137] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 144A-B and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 89. 167-8 and 89. 175-80.

Theodosius tried to support the doctrine of one will and energy by appealing to the *libellus* of Menas, [138]

[138] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 148B and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 97. 262-4. Theodosius showed Maximus other patristic passages, which Maximus proved to stem from heretics: *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 148C-D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 99. 276-101. 293.

and later suggested to Maximus that they confess one hypostatic energy. [139]

[139] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 149D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 105. 343-4.

Theodosius mentioned **end p.85** that even though he and those who agreed with him believed that Christ had both a divine and a human will, as well as a divine and a human energy, they did not use the word 'two', in order not to present Christ fighting with himself. [140]

[140] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 152D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 109. 387-92. Theodosius's refusal to utter the word 'two' betrays affinities with anti-Chalcedonian theological positions.

At last Theodosius accepted the existence of two energies and two wills in Christ. [141]

[141] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 153C, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 133. 425-7.

Nevertheless, he later argued again in favour of one will, [142]

[142] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 156D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 119. 490-2.

to be convinced once more by Maximus of the falseness of this doctrine. [143]

[143] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 160B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 125. 562-3.

Some time later, however, Theodosius and some officials of the Empire visited Maximus for a second time, and asked him to subscribe to the *Typos*. [144]

[144] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 161D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 131. 629-34.

One of these officials, named Epiphanius, said that he and those who agreed with him accepted that Christ has two wills and two energies, but subscribed to the *Typos* in order to protect the people from detrimental technical doctrinal disputes. [145]

[145] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 164D-165A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 135. 676-82, 137. 687-8, and 137. 692-4.

They urged Maximus to do the same, but Maximus refused to compromise. [146]

[146] *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 165B-C, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 137. 700-139. 712. It is interesting that Maximus was subsequently accused of profaning the mother of God—an indirect accusation of Nestorianism—which he denied by publicly confessing that Mary is the natural mother of God (*Disputatio Bizyae*, 168B-169A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 143. 760-145. 789).

It is obvious that Bishop Theodosius is a supreme example of inconsistency and unreliable opportunism. The effort of his patriarch to mediate between monothelitism and dyothelitism by clumsily suggesting the simultaneous acceptance of one and two wills and energies does not seem to have been anything more than an opportunistic attempt either. Theodosius's, as well as probably Peter's, subjection to the imperial claim to dictate the doctrinal options of the Church [147]

[147] See e.g. *Disputatio Bizyae, PG* 90, 164B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 133. 653-4, where Theodosius's loyalty to the Emperor is strikingly apparent.

abnegated the possibility of taking seriously the important doctrinal issues involved in the controversy, and of reaching a theologically satisfactory solution to the hotly disputed issues. The martyrdom which was finally inflicted upon Maximus and his disciples marked a disgraceful Pyrrhic victory that was not to be rejoiced over for long.**end p.86**

4.7 Macarius Of Antioch and His Followers

Macarius defended monothelitism before the Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. He denied the existence of two wills and energies in Christ, and instead confessed one will and a theandric energy. [148]

[148] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 212. 8-9.

He stated that this one will is the will of the Father and of our Lord Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit, [149]

[149] Ibid. 216. 6-7.

which implies that he referred to the divine will. According to Macarius, Christ had neither (sinful) fleshly desires (*θελήματα*) nor (sinful) human thoughts (*λογισμοί*), but had one hypostatic will and a theandric energy. [150]

[150] Ibid. 216. 17-18, 24-5.

Macarius contended that every divine-like and human-like energy proceeds from Christ, [151]

[151] Ibid. 222. 18-19.

as his forerunners had also done. He later attributed the energy to the divinity, and confessed one divine will in Jesus Christ, on the grounds that there was not in him a will different or contrary to the divine will. [152]

[152] Ibid. 224. 7-1.1.

It is impossible to have in Christ two wills either identical (*ὅμοια*) or contrary to each other, Macarius claimed as he started to cite Sergius's epistle to Honorius at some length. [153]

[153] Ibid. 224. 11-12. Macarius mentioned here the axiom which Sergius had included in his epistle to Honorius (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 542. 16-17), the only difference being that Macarius considered impossible the existence not only of two different but also of two identical wills. It is also noteworthy

that in the same text Macarius characterized Theodore of Mopsuestia as the teacher of Maximus's divisive heresy (ibid. 228. 12-13) and anathematized Maximus and his disciples, because of his Manichaean (!) and divisive teaching (ibid. 15-18; see also 230. 2-3). It is noteworthy that Macarius believed that he shared the ideas of Honorius, Sergius, Paul, and Peter (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 216. 22-3).

When he was asked by the Emperor and the Council whether he confessed two natural wills and energies in Christ, he responded that he would not do so, even if he had to be martyred. [154]

[154] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 232. 7-13. Jugie appealed to Macarius in order to prove the orthodoxy of the monothelites. According to Jugie, when Macarius was asked by the Fathers of the Council whether he accepted two *natural* wills and two *natural* energies 'he replied that he does not say two wills or two energies . . . but one will and a theandric energy' (my italics). Jugie argued that Macarius 'avoided well denying two natural wills, two natural energies'. According to Jugie, Macarius responded in his own way, which is compatible with orthodoxy ('Monothélisme', col. 2309). In response to Jugie, Doucet rightly noticed that not to deny (the two natural wills) is not the same as accepting them ('Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 89). However, both Jugie and Doucet overlooked the piece of dialogue just mentioned, in which Macarius said, 'I do not say *two natural wills* or *two natural energies* in the fleshly economy of our Lord Jesus Christ, even if I am to be cut into pieces and thrown into the sea'. This statement of Macarius (mentioned also by Murphy and Sherwood, *Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 201 and by Pelican, *Christian Tradition*, 70) is a further reason for being wary of Jugie's and others' contentions with regard to the ostensibly non-monothelite character of the monothelites' teaching.

When **end p.87** the Council asked him and his disciple Stephen whether Christ had a natural human will, they responded that he did not have a human will, but only a divine one, for he was free of (sinful) fleshly desires (*θελήματα*) and (sinful) human thoughts (*λογισμοί*). [155]

[155] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 242. 17-20.

Before the fall, Adam had a divine will too, for he willed together with God (he was , Stephen claimed. [156]

[156] Ibid. 244. 14-15.

To the question of whether Adam had a natural will or not, Macarius and Stephen refused an answer. [157]

[157] Ibid. 246. 8-11; however, they characterized the will of Adam as proairetic and self-determining: ibid. 244. 14, 246. 6.

Three other monothelites presented and defended their views at the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Theodore, bishop of Melitine, refused to confess either one or two wills or energies. [158]

[158] Ibid. 202. 26-7. Theodore claimed that his confession of faith was given to him by Stephen, the pupil of Macarius: ibid. 204. 23-5.

Polychronius confessed one will and a theandric energy. [159]

[159] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 676. 17 and 19.

Constantine of Apameia seems to have confessed one divine will. [160]

[160] Ibid. 696. 20-23 and 698. 2-5.

He accepted that the humanity of Christ had a natural will, relating it to the desire to eat, to drink, and to sleep, but since, as he argued, Christ on the cross cast out his flesh and blood, and did not need any more to eat, to drink, to sleep, and to walk, he also cast out his human will. [161]

[161] Ibid. 698. 7-700. 15. Constantine presented himself as Macarius's disciple: ibid. 700. 10-11.

The monothelitism of Macarius and his followers must be taken for granted. Macarius's and Stephen's thought is characterized by some typical motifs of most seventh-century monothelites: two wills and two energies must not be attributed to Christ; human will is connected with sinfulness; the energy of Christ is at times characterized as theandric, whereas his will is described as divine, etc. The fact that both denied the existence of two *natural* wills and energies in Christ suggests that their monothelitism was natural, and not merely ethical. [162]

[162] Macarius and Stephen may not have been fully capable of or willing to draw a distinction between the will as faculty and the act of willing, which accounts for their belief that Adam had a divine will before the Fall and their refusal to say whether or not he had a natural human will. However, it may also be the case either that they reduced pre-lapsarian humanity to passivity, or that they refused to respond positively to the question of whether Adam had a natural will before the Fall because this would imply that Christ also had a human natural will.

In addition, their rejection of the Christology of **end p.88** Maximus points to a real difference between his Christology and theirs. As to Polychronius and Constantine, in so far as they can be taken seriously, [163]

[163] From their words and actions, it seems quite likely that Polychronius and Constantine were mentally deranged.

it is worth noting the connection which Constantine established between the human will and the human body—the intellectual soul is again lost sight of—as well as his heretical view that Christ did away with both at his death.

5. The Background Of the Monothelite Heresy Of the Seventh Century

Several suggestions have been made with regard to the background of the monothelite doctrine of the seventh century. Dumitru Stăniloae, for instance, has argued that Origenism, with its negative view of human motion (*κἳνησις*), which caused the removal of souls from God and their subsequent fall into the world, and was thus understood as the origin of sin, [164]

[164] Romanides has argued that this goes back to Plato, and characterizes the mentality of Saint Augustine as well as of Protestantism (see his 'Comments on Paul Verghese's paper "The Monothelite Controversy: A Historical Survey" '; *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 13 (1968), 208-11 at 208).

was behind the monothelite Christology, which could not see the positive character of human energy. For Staniloae, this must have been Maximus's intuition too, since he wrote his earlier, anti-Origenistic *Ambigua* at a period when not Origenism but monenergism represented a real danger for the Church. [165]

[165] See Dumitru Stăniloae, Introduction to Maximus's ### , iv, 2nd edn. (Athens: ###, 1990), 13-51, at 17-21.

There might be a grain of truth in what Staniloae suggests, but his point should not be pressed too far. [166]

[166] Sherwood believes that Maximus's earlier *Ambigua* were written between 628 and 630 (*Annotated Date-List*, 61): viz. before the beginning of the official promotion of monenergism. If Maximus wanted to attack incipient monenergism by his earlier *Ambigua*, he must have been acquainted with the heresy at a very early stage, which does not seem very likely. Sherwood argues that 'the first clear indication of his diffidence or rather nonacceptance of Monenergism is found in the later *Ambigua*, showing the influence of Sophronius' synodicon of 634 and in his reply to Pyrrhus (ep 19) which is subsequent by but a little to Cyrus' Pact of Union and to Sergius's judgement (*psēphos*) against the disputed terminology' (ibid. 9-10).

Others have argued, as we have already seen, that monothelitism originates from Cyrillian Christology and its reinforcement and mediation through neo-Chalcedonism, and thus have held Cyril and neo-Chalcedonism **end p.89** responsible for laying the foundations on which the monothelite edifice stands. [167]

[167] Moeller, e.g., claimed that monothelitism was the result of excessive neo-Chalcedonism ('Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcedonism', 720); Bausenhart ('*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 127) and Uthemann ('Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus', *passim*) have argued along similar lines, as we shall see.

But is this position tenable?

It is true that Cyril once spoke of one energy in Christ. [168]

[168] See Cyril's commentary on John, in which he discusses the healing of the daughter of Jairus (*PG*73, 576C-596C). This is the only Cyrillian passage which has a certain apodictic force for the monothelite cause.

However, the proper question to be asked is: Was Cyril a monothelite? This question cannot be answered on the basis of a catch-phrase, but only on the basis of the whole of his work. There is a passage in Cyril, for instance, which the dyothelites were very keen on citing, because it points to an unambiguous dyoenergism. This passage explicitly states that God and creatures cannot have one natural energy on account of the difference of their natures. [169]

[169] Cyril writes: ##; see *PG*75, 453B-C.

In the light of passages like this, and of the whole of Cyril's Christology, the argument of Maximus that Cyril was a dyothelite whose aforementioned monenergite phrase indicates no more than the unity of the two energies in their acting seems sound.

Moving on to post-Chalcedonian Christology, we should recall once more that, for it, the authority of Chalcedon remained indisputable, and at least as important as that of Cyril. As we have already seen, the Fifth Ecumenical Council argued that the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos', must be understood as equivalent to the two natures of Chalcedon, which remained for the post-Chalcedonians the basic Christological formula. Since the post-Chalcedonians claimed that Cyril's 'one incarnate nature' is to be understood along these lines, there is good reason to believe that for them the case would have been the same for other monadic expressions of Cyril, such as his reference to 'one energy'. [170]

[170] For the connection between essence and energy, see below.

In addition, the monothelites were not able to cite many post-Chalcedonian writers to serve their cause. Pseudo-Dionysius is a *sui generis* case, and his 'new' energy could be understood as indicative of the unity of the natural energies. The *libellus* of Menas was in all probability a falsified text. [171]

[171] The Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council proved that the *libellus* was inserted in the proceedings of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, and characterized it as spurious (see e.g. Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 638. 1-648. 3). It seems that the monothelites themselves were not very confident in regard to the authenticity of the *libellus*. Pyrrhus did not insist on its authenticity and significance in the course of his disputation with Maximus, when the latter pointed to the contradictory testimonies by Pyrrhus and Sergius with regard to whether Pope Vigilius had received it or not (*Disputatio, PG*91, 328A-B). Furthermore, in the course of the same disputation, Maximus seems to have expressed doubts with regard to the authenticity of the *libellus* by saying *ὃν φησι λίβελλον Μηνᾶ* (*Disputatio, PG* 91, 332C; on this see Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 253). In addition, Maximus contested the authenticity of the *libellus* during his conversation with the monothelite bishop Theodosius (pace Hefele, *History of the Councils*, 132, and Doucet, 'Dispute', 253) by saying that the *libellus* was written after the (Fifth Ecumenical) Council (whereas Menas died on 25 August 552, shortly before the Council began; see Kalamaras, *Ἡ Πέμπτη Οἰκουμενικὴ Σύνοδος*, 123). The fact that Theodosius did not insist on the significance of the *libellus* probably testifies to (at least) his diffidence with regard to the *libellus*'s authenticity (see *Disputatio Bizyae, PG*90, 148B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi* VII, 97. 262-99. 73).

The 'one energy' of Anastasius of Antioch seems to signify the unity end p.90 and *perichōrēsis* of the energies, as well as their result, as will be seen in detail in a later section. [172]

[172] Anastasius' text can be found in *Opusc*. 20, *PG*91, 229B-233B.

Finally, an obscure passage from Heracleianus of Chalcedon seems to favour one and two natures and movements/energies; but again it is likely that Heracleianus merely wished to be open to a monadic way of expression which points to the unity of Christ's natures and their energies. [173]

[173] Maximus is the only one to mention this position of Heracleianus: *Opusc*. 9, *PG*91, 125C-D.

In the extant texts of our monothelites and of Maximus, these are the only post-Chalcedonian excerpts that the monothelites used to support their cause. However, there could have been some other texts too. In an important article, Sebastian Brock has published some post-Chalcedonian excerpts belonging to a Syriac monothelite florilegium, in all probability compiled by a Chalcedonian monothelite. [174]

[174] Sebastian Brock, 'A Monothelete Florilegium in Syriac', in C. Laga, J. A. Munitiz and L. van Rompay (eds.), *After Chalcedon: Studies in Theology and Church History* (Leuven: Peeters, 1985), 35-45.

The first excerpt of the florilegium is ascribed to Pope Vigilius, and attributes to Christ one energy. [175]

[175] Ibid. 36. The authenticity of the text is to be taken for granted, for it can be found in the Latin proceedings of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (ACO iv, 1, 187. 31-2).

The second and the third excerpts may be from the *libellus* of Menas, to which the monothelites repeatedly referred. [176]

[176] According to Brock, this seems very likely, and if proved to be true, the case for the authenticity of the *libellus* will become somewhat stronger ('A Monothelete Florilegium', 38).

The first of these argues that in Christ the will of his divinity is not different from the will of his humanity (the opposite would mean that Christ is in opposition to himself and divided into God the Word and the man), and that Christ has one will, [177] ([177] Ibid. 37.) and the second **end p.91** attributes to Christ one will and one energy. [178] ([178] Ibid. 38.) The fourth excerpt comes from an *Edikton* of Emperor Justinian against the agnoetai, and simply mentions that 'the entire will of the divinity is in Christ'. [179] ([179] Ibid. 39.) The two excerpts that follow are ascribed to Anastasius of Antioch. The first affirms one will and one energy in Christ, and the second, one energy. [180] ([180] Ibid. 40-1.) The final excerpt is from Symeon the Stylite the Younger (521-96), and attributes to Christ one energy. [181] ([181] Ibid. 42-3.) What is the significance of this florilegium? To begin with, it is debatable whether the texts cited put forward a real or a verbal monothelitism. [182]

[182] Before the articulation of an explicit real dyothelitism, reference to one will and one energy could be more easily understood as a legitimate expression of a verbal monothelitism. In regard to Anastasius's excerpt, for instance, Brock notes that it is well known that Anastasius used 'monoergist phraseology', and refers to G. Weiss, *Studia Anastasiana I: Studien zum Leben, zu den Schriften und zur Theologie des Patriarchen Anastasius I. von Antiochien*, Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia, 4 (Munich, 1965), 203-10, who considers him 'implicitly "orthodox" on the monothelite issue' ('A Monothelete Florilegium', 42).

In addition, as Brock has noted, the florilegium was compiled in Syriac, not Greek, [183]

[183] Brock, 'A Monothelete Florilegium', 44.

which rather precludes the possibility that it played any role in the formation of the theology of our monothelites. [184]

[184] After all, Brock points out that it was probably compiled sometime in the late seventh or early eighth century (ibid.).

The excerpt from Vigilius, the only one which is certainly authentic, does not seem to have been known to any of our monothelites. With regard to the other excerpts, the *libellus* of Menas may well have been a falsified text, as we have already seen. Nowhere is an edict of Justinian against the agnoetai mentioned. [185]

[185] Ibid. 39.

The excerpts from Anastasius are otherwise unknown, and this is also the case with Marinus of Apameia, to whom they are addressed. [186]

[186] Ibid. 41-2. It should also be noted that in the first excerpt of Anastasius the will is characterized as *αὐτεξούσιον καὶ γνωμικόν* (ibid. 41), which is suspiciously reminiscent of the terminology of the seventh century.

Symeon's text and addressee are also otherwise unknown. [187]

[187] Ibid. 43.

It seems that we need much more robust and reliable evidence in order to establish a linguistic, never mind a theological, link between *some* post-Chalcedonian theologians and the monothelites of the seventh century. [188]

[188] It is not surprising that consciously or unconsciously falsified quotations may have been used in monothelite florilegia. It is worthy of note that in the course of his encounter with Maximus, Bishop Theodosius showed him texts of Julian of Rome, Gregory the Wonder-Worker, Athanasius, and John Chrysostom containing the one energy doctrine, but Maximus was able to prove that the first three were by Apollinarius, and the fourth by Nestorius (see *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG*90, 148B-D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 99. 273-101. 296). **end p.92**

Let us briefly consider some other suggestions. Bausenhart has drawn attention to the *organon* motif of Athanasius and Cyril, according to which the Logos moves his flesh as an instrument, and its mediation through neo-Chalcedonians such as Leontius of Jerusalem, down to the seventh-century monothelites. [189]

[189] Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 127.

However, the view that the human is moved by the divine is not a distinct characteristic of Athanasius, Cyril, or Leontius of Jerusalem. In fact, it was a commonplace in ancient Christology, *including Nestorian Christology*, which presents Christ as acted upon ### by the Logos. [190]

[190] Maximus, for instance, characterized Pyrrhus's position that Christ's flesh was moved under the command of the Logos as Nestorian (*Disputatio*, *PG* 91, 297A).

Leontius of Jerusalem, for instance, agreed with his Nestorian interlocutor that the Logos is the moving principle in Christology. Their difference had to do with whether what was acted upon was a human person or a human nature. Leontius argued in favour of the latter, [191]

[191] See *PG* 86, 1757A-C, to which Bausenhart himself refers ('*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 127); we must note though that these passages of Leontius must not be interpreted in isolation but in relation to the whole Leontian Christology.

which is preferable, because it excludes a human person from Christology. But neither Leontius nor his Nestorian interlocutor were monothelites, as has already been argued.

Furthermore, it is not necessarily problematic to say that the Logos moves his humanity, in so far as the reality and the authenticity of the will and the energy of this humanity are not undermined. Bausenhart fails to distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate use of the *organon* concept in Christology. Maximus, for instance, also stated that the Logos moved his humanity, although he was the most important exponent of dyothelitism. [192]

[192] See e.g. his fifth *Ambiguum*, *PG* 91, 1049D, and in Bart Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam una cum Epistula Secunda ad Eundem*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 48 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 24. 93-4. However, in *Opusc*. 5, *PG* 91, 64B-C, Maximus rejects an illegitimate understanding of the view that humanity is the *organon* of the Logos, which was used to support the view that divinity and humanity have one energy. Moeller also drew attention to the tendency of Alexandrian Christology to present the Logos as using his human nature as an instrument ('Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 711). However, this is not necessarily problematic (for more on this, see Ch. 3, sect. 5.5). On the contrary, to say (as Moeller does, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 716-17) that the proper solution to the problem of Christ's energies is offered by the formula of Leo ('agit enim utraque natura cum alterius communione') is problematic, as we will see in Ch. 4.

Uthemann has argued that neo-Chalcedonism paved the way for monothelitism by putting forward the unity of the 'actiones communes', which, with the assistance of 'the doctrine of "enhypostasia" ', were finally attributed to the Logos. [193]

[193] See e.g. Uthemann, 'Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus', 413. Apart from Moeller, Bausenhart, and Uthemann, the case for a connection between neo-Chalcedonism and monothelitism has been also made by Murphy and Sherwood, *Constantinople II et Constantinople III* (see e.g. 134) and Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 68f). By contrast, Larchet seems to be opposed to the view that monothelitism and monenergism have their origin in neo-Chalcedonism, and to ally himself with Maximus in believing that seventh-century monothelitism originates in (Severan) monophysitism (Introduction to *Maxime le Confesseur. Opuscules théologiques*, 93).

It should be noted here that by what Uthemann **end p.93** refers to as 'actiones communes' some post-Chalcedonians denoted the unity of Christ's energies in acting, and nothing more. In addition, the fundamental point of 'the doctrine of "enhypostasia" '—namely, that the Logos is the unique hypostasis in Christology, in which his divine and his human natures subsist—in and of itself does not necessarily cause any problems, in so far as the integrity of the humanity of Christ is not undermined, and it is important here to remember the insistence of the post-Chalcedonians (against the anti-Chalcedonians) that the humanity of Christ is a full and complete nature. Furthermore, the view that the Logos is the unique hypostasis in Christology is characteristic not only of monothelite Christologies, such as that of Apollinarius or those of the seventh-century monothelites, but of their opponents too, such as the two Gregories and Maximus. Finally, to argue on the basis of 'the doctrine of "enhypostasia" ' that the Logos is the unique subject of willing and acting is not objectionable, in so far as the Logos is considered to be the subject not only of divine but also of human willing and acting in virtue of his having two wills and two energies.

In sum, the arguments which have been used to support the thesis that post-Chalcedonian Christology paved the way for the monothelitism of the seventh century seem less than convincing. On the contrary, a full examination of post-Chalcedonian Christology shows quite the opposite: namely, that monothelitism is not in continuity with post-Chalcedonian Christology, but a deviation from it.

As we have already seen, the Christology of the Leontioi is quite close to dyothelitism and dyoenergism. Moreover, it should be mentioned that, by contrast with the monothelites, the dyothelites were able to cite quite a few passages from post-Chalcedonian theologians in support of their position. The proceedings of the Sixth Ecumenical Council cited passages from Justinian, Ephraim of Antioch, Anastasius of Antioch, [194]

[194] The proceedings of the Lateran Council also provide an extensive florilegium with dyoenergite passages from Anastasius, which aims to show that he was not a monenergite, as the passage mentioned above might suggest: see Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 435-6.

and John of Scythopolis, [195]

[195] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 350. 9-368. 14.

which explicitly indicate the existence of two energies in **end p.94** Christ. [196]

[196] It is noteworthy that even Moeller recognizes the genuine dyoenergism of quite a few post-Chalcedonian writers ('Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 711-12).

The dyoenergism of the aforementioned theologians is not surprising if one bears in mind that the connection between will, energy, and essence was quite common in patristic theology. Particularly in the context of the anti-anti-Chalcedonian Christology, one would expect such a sensitivity with regard to the duality of Christ's energies (corresponding to the duality of Christ's natures) against the anti-Chalcedonian emphasis on Christ's one nature and energy, which must have sounded alarming to post-Chalcedonian ears.

In addition, the few times that the monothelites referred to post-Chalcedonian theologians have to do with Christ's energies, not his wills. However, it must be pointed out that, as has been seen, the fundamental matter of dispute in the seventh century was not the energies of Christ but his wills. The basic reason why Sergius, for instance, considered two energies unacceptable was that they allegedly introduced two wills. When Maximus and Pyrrhus completed their discussion on the question of the will(s) of Christ, the latter thought that to go into the question of the energies would be redundant. [197]

[197] *Disputatio, PG* 91, 333C.

Besides, at times some monothelites seem to have been quite close to an orthodox position with regard to the question of Christ's energies. But this is not the case with regard to the question of Christ's wills.

It is note-worthy that the monothelites did not point to even a single post-Chalcedonian passage suggesting one will in Christ, apart from the probably falsified *libellus* of Menas. The passages which they cited were by theologians of an earlier period, and citing them often seems to be self-defeating. [198]

[198] A case in point is the often cited extract from Saint Gregory of Nazianzus that '[Christ's] will was not contrary to God because it was wholly deified' (Oration 30, 12, in *PG* 36, 117C, and Gallay and Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours* 27-31, 248. 5-6), which the dyothelites counter-interpreted as pointing to two wills, the divine and the deified human. For more on this, see Ch. 3 below.

By contrast, the dyothelites were able to produce extensive dyothelite florilegia from the Fathers in favour of two wills, [199]

[199] It is noteworthy, e.g., that in his *Apology for the Council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo*, the post-Chalcedonian Ephraim of Antioch takes for granted that Christ has two wills, and claims that this proves that he also has two natures (this passage is cited in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 360. 1-362. 2). For more on this, see Ch. 3 below.

as well as quite robust evidence from heretics, notably Arians, Apollinarians and anti-Chalcedonians, in favour of one energy and one will.

At this point the real background of monothelitism comes into sight. As Bishop Kallistos Ware among others has noticed, monothelitism was 'a **end p.95** revival of the heresy of Apollinarius'. [200]

[200] Kallistos Ware, 'Christian Theology in the East, 600-1453', in Hubert Cunliffe-Jones assisted by Benjamin Drewery (eds.), *A History of Christian Doctrine* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978), 181-225, at 188.

It might seem surprising to see the heresy of Apollinarianism to the fore again in the seventh century but on reflection it is not perhaps difficult to see how it may have got there. It seems probable that, as we have already mentioned, the refutation of some aspects of Apollinarius's doctrinal system, notably those related to the wills of Jesus Christ, had not been sufficiently assimilated by all the Christians of the Empire. [201]

[201] It is noteworthy that the Chalcedonian-monothelite writer of the Syriac *Life* of Saint Maximus implicitly accused him of having attributed to Christ 'two wills and two energies and *two minds*': Brock, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', 316, my italics.

Thus, when the ecumenical interests of the patriarchs brought about a dangerous approach, even a union with some anti-Chalcedonians by sharing aspects of their monophysitizing Christology, the question of the wills came forcefully into the open and along with it the Apollinarian and over-asymmetrical traits of the monothelites' thought. One is truly amazed at the similarities between Apollinarianism and monothelitism. Not only the theology and the argumentation, but even the very wording of some Apollinarian passages, are strikingly similar to some monothelite passages, as if passages of the Apollinarians had been inserted in the texts of the monothelites. [202]

[202] I will restrict myself to citing a few passages by Apollinarian writers alongside passages by monothelites of the seventh century which have striking similarities with them: ### (Apollinarius, in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, 235. 26, and in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 320. 38); ### c(Theodore of Pharan, in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 124. 1-3); ### (Apollinarius, in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, 247. 24-6); #### (Sergius, in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 542. 15-17); ### (Polemon, in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, 275. 22-5, and in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 324, 11-13); ### (Paul of Constantinople, in Riedinger I (ed.) *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 200. 25-8).

Similarities also exist between monothelitism and anti-Chalcedonism. [203]

[203] I will cite here two texts, one by Apollinarius and the other by the anti-Chalcedonian Themistius, which bear striking similarities to each other, as well as to some passages of the monothelites of the seventh century (for more on this, see Ch. 3, sect. 4.1): ### (Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*, 233. 2-6); ### (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 326. 31-4). **end p.96**

The one will and energy doctrine, along with the emphasis on the unity of Christ and on the divine person and nature of the Logos, are predominant characteristics of both camps, the anti-Chalcedonian and the Chalcedonian-monothelite. Theological and terminological points of contact are found between the monothelites of the seventh century, on the one hand, and the Apollinarians and anti-Chalcedonians, on the other hand, and not between the monothelites and the post-Chalcedonians. However, with these last remarks we are taken into the final section of this chapter.

6. Conclusions and Assessment

The Christology of the monothelites of the seventh century seems at times to come close to orthodoxy with regard to the energies of Christ. In addition, the suggestion which some of them put forward, to accept one and two wills and energies at the same time, in so far as it is more than sheer opportunism, overcomes strict monothelitism and attempts to bridge the gap between the monothelite and dyothelite positions.

On the other hand, the monothelites repeatedly denied two wills and two energies in Christ. They constantly attacked dyothelitism, whether propounded by Maximus or the Lateran Council or the bishops of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, and argued in favour of one energy, which they characterized as either divine or, more often, theandric, and of one will, which they usually identified with the divine will. The existence of a human will in Christ was usually accepted only in so far as Christ appropriated *our* human will and accommodated *our* way of willing.

Therefore, it must be concluded that the monothelites of the seventh century were exponents of a real monothelitism. To postulate, as Bausenhart for instance has done, that a real monothelitism after Chalcedon would be an improbable anachronism begs the question, because it presupposes that the monothelites (or any others) were able to draw the proper conclusions from the Christology of Chalcedon and apply them to the question of the wills, which is exactly what needs to be shown. Furthermore, the view that the **end p.97** Christology of the monothelites did not differ from dyothelitism, because what the monothelites wished to do was simply either to emphasize the divine person of the Logos or the divine will as the unique source of initiative, or to put forward an ethical monothelitism, must be dismissed as contradicting to the existing evidence, and consequently erroneous. What the monothelites did was to use these principles at times to deny the existence of the human will of Christ. In this way they did not do justice to the profound axiom of Gregory of Nazianzus according to which the unassumed is unhealed, which successfully illuminates the soteriological necessity of the assumption of our will by the Logos. [204]

[204] As Kallistos Ware notes, 'Sergius denied Him [Christ] a human will, distinct from the divine will', but 'Christ's human will, like His human soul, is vital for soteriology: for the part of us that requires to be redeemed and healed is above all else our power of free will and moral choice' ('Christian Theology in the East', 188).

Therefore, the assessment of the Christology of the monothelites cannot but be negative. It must be admitted that the monothelites pointed to the unity of will and energy in Christ, adhered to an ethical monothelitism, dismissed false interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer which imply an opposition between the humanity of Christ and the Logos, and often enough identified the Logos, and not his humanity, with the subject of willing in Christology. [205]

[205] More on some of these issues will be said in Chs. 3 and 4 below.

But they did all this at the expense of the integrity of the humanity of Christ. The suppression, or even negation, of the human will, so widespread in Eastern thought as well as in many quarters of the ancient philosophical and religious world, found expression in the Christology of the monothelites too. [206]

[206] Vladimir Soloviev has powerfully criticized monothelitism as an expression of the fatalism and quietism that suppresses human freedom and activity and that has often held sway in various forms of Eastern religious life and thought, including Islam, which swept the south-eastern regions of the Byzantine Empire. See a summarized account of Soloviev's thought by M. J. Le Guillou, in his preface to Juan Miguel Garrigues, *Maxime le Confesseur: la charité, avenir divin de l'homme*, Théologie historique, 38 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1976), esp. 11-19.

However, the exclusion of a human will from Christ denies that human will is capable and worthy of assumption, healing, and redemption. It also underestimates the importance of the fact that it was the *incarnate* Logos who redeemed us, not by suppressing our humanity but by enabling it to participate actively in the work of our redemption. In the monothelite Christology, Christ's salvific human obedience to the Father is eliminated, and his humanity is relegated to a state of passivity. But such a Christology could not be sustained theologically, as was to be shown by Saint Maximus the Confessor. end p.98

3 The Dyothelite Christology Of Saint Maximus the Confessor

1. Introduction

In this chapter, the dyothelite Christology developed by Maximus as a response to the challenge of monothelitism will be examined. As has already been mentioned in the Introduction to the book, and as will become apparent, the teaching of Maximus on the two wills of Jesus Christ cannot be fully understood without reference to his understanding of the notions 'person'/ 'hypostasis' and 'nature'/'essence' in Christology, and vice versa. Actually, the way in which Maximus conceived these notions, as well as the way in which he employed them in order to denote unity and distinction in Christology, form the necessary theological background against which his theology of the wills finds its place, and against which it can be properly understood. Correspondingly, his theology of Christ's wills contributes to the improvement of our knowledge of his understanding of person/hypostasis and nature/essence in Christology. For this reason, this chapter will begin with a presentation of Maximus's teaching on the hypostasis and the natures of Christ before going on to his theology of Christ's wills. [1]

[1] All references to Maximus will be to *PG*91, unless otherwise stated.

2. Person/hypostasis, Nature/essence, Unity, and Distinction In the Christology Of Saint Maximus

2.1 Saint Maximus's Rejection Of the 'Composite Nature' As a Way Of Conceiving Unity In Christology

Following his post-Chalcedonian predecessors, Maximus rejected the anti-Chalcedonian view that Christ had a composite nature, as an unhelpful way **end p.99** of conceiving unity in Christology and, furthermore, as destructive for the whole edifice of the theology of the Church. For Maximus, if Christ had a composite nature, he would be neither God, consubstantial with the Father, nor man, consubstantial with us, [2]

[2] See e.g. *Ep.* 12, 489A-C, and *Ep.* 13, 516C-D, 520C.

and so Trinitarian theology, Christology, and soteriology would collapse at once.

Maximus objected to the way in which the parallelism between Christ and man had been used by the anti-Chalcedonian monophysites. Their argument was that as man is one composite nature out of two (soul and body), so Christ is equally one composite nature out of two (divinity and humanity). [3]

[3] Interestingly, Maximus argued that man is one nature not with regard to his constitutive elements, because soul and body are two different natures, but with regard to the human species under which all individual men fall (*Ep.* 12, 488B-C).

Maximus retorted that every composite nature is marked by three basic traits: first, its parts are simultaneous, neither exists prior to the other; secondly, they come together unwillingly; thirdly, they result in a creature that complements the species of the universe. [4]

[4] *Ep.* 13, 516D-517A.

For Maximus, none of these traits is applicable to Christ. [5]

[5] *Ep.* 12, 489A-C.

God the Logos exists prior to his humanity, and willingly undertakes to become man for our salvation. He is not subject to natural necessity, and his incarnation is a free expression of his love for man. [6]

[6] See *Ep.* 12, 492A; *Ep.* 13, 517B-C, 529B, 529D; and *Ep.* 14, 537B.

In addition, Christ is not a nature which can be classified under any species as one of its members; nor can he be relegated to an integral part of an overarching universal synthesis. [7]

[7] *Ep.* 13, 517A-B.

Maximus seems to hold that the distinction of God from the world, his aseity, his sovereign lordship over it, and the free, loving character of his act to become incarnate for our salvation are all compromised by the notion of a composite nature, which is therefore to be rejected.

In addition, as Garrigues has noted, Severan Christology, with its notion of a composite nature, expressed an essentialist metaphysics, in which 'the composition of the created and the uncreated cannot be understood but as a passive participation of the inferior and an active preponderance of the superior'. [8]

[8] Juan-Miguel Garrigues, 'La Personne composée du Christ d'après saint Maxime le Confesseur', *Revue Thomiste*, 74 (1974), 181-204, at 192. The role of preponderance in the Christology of Apollinarius has already been mentioned in Ch. 1.

This, however, makes both parts of the composition mutually dependent in a way which compromises not only the human but also the divine freedom. Maximus wrote with reference to man that 'the soul holds the body without deliberately willing it and is also held by it, and gives it life **end p.100** without its choice (ἀπροαιρέτως) by the very fact that it is in it, and takes part in suffering and pain because its relevant innate power is able to experience it'. [9]

[9] *Ep*. 12, 488D.

So, in the composite nature of man, even the stronger element, the soul, is dependent upon the weaker element, the body, and experiences its sufferings. In addition, there is a correspondence and mutual dependability between the energies of the soul and the natural powers of the body.

However, according to Maximus, this is by no means applicable to Christ, because there is no correspondence between the natural energies of the Logos and the powers of the nature that he assumed. [10]

[10] *Ep*. 13, 532B. It is noteworthy that Maximus uses the stronger word 'energy' for the divinity and the soul, and the weaker word 'power' for the body and the humanity. In this way, he perhaps points not only to the similarity between the divinity and the humanity (both the divinity and the soul have energies), but also to the dissimilarity between them (divinity has energies, whereas humanity has powers).

For Maximus, neither the divine and the human natures, nor their respective faculties, can form a composite unified whole of mutually corresponding and dependent parts. In his dyothelite works Maximus rejected a monenergite argument according to which there is in Christ one energy by preponderance. He argued that it is wrong to say that there is one energy in Christ on the grounds that the divine energy has a preponderance over the human, for 'that which dominates belongs itself to those that suffer, because it is itself held by the dominated element', [11]

[11] *Opusc*. 5, 64A-B.

and this, for Maximus, cannot be the case in Christ.

Maximus insisted that Christ has two full and distinct natures, on the basis of which he sustained the view that he also has two distinct natural wills and energies. He sought the unity of Christ not on the level of nature but on that of hypostasis. Therefore, it is to his understanding of the notions of 'hypostasis' and 'person' in Christology that attention will now be paid.

2.2 Person/hypostasis In the Christology Of Saint Maximus

For Maximus, the distinction between person/hypostasis, on the one hand, and nature/essence, on the other, is indispensable for the articulation of a proper Christology. Severus's fatal mistake consists precisely in his refusal to distinguish between them, because, without this distinction, it is not possible to denote unity and distinction in Christ in a satisfactory way. [12]

[12] *Ep*. 15, 568C-572B. Maximus argues that by identifying hypostasis with nature, Severus confuses divinity and humanity. By the same token, by arguing that there is a distinction in the natural qualities of Christ, he introduces a distinction in hypostatic qualities too, because, since nature and hypostasis are the same, 'natural qualities' equals 'hypostatic qualities'; thus, for Maximus, Severus falls into . . . Nestorianism (*Ep*. 15, 568D). **end p.101**

How, then, does Maximus define hypostasis and distinguish it from nature? Maximus follows the Cappadocian tradition, according to which nature is related to what is common, and hypostasis to the particular. In the opening part of his extensive letter to Cosmas on essence and hypostasis, he quotes definitions from Saint Basil's letters, including the definition from his letter to Terentius discussed previously, to this effect. [13]

[13] *Ep*. 15, 545A. For Saint Basil's definition, see the section on John the Grammarian in Ch. 1, sect. 7.3.

But Maximus also defines hypostasis in other ways. Hypostasis is an essence with idioms or, put differently, the essence of an individual man that includes all his idioms. [14]

[14] *Ep*. 13, 528A-B. In *Opusc*. 26, 276B, Maximus says that the definition of hypostasis as essence with idioms belongs to the 'philosophers', whereas, for the Fathers, hypostasis is the individual man who is personally distinct from other men.

Hypostasis is identified with individual, [15]

[15] In *Opusc*. 16, 197C-D, the word *atomon* (individual) is used synonymously with hypostasis, whereas in *Opusc*. 16, 201C-D, it is used synonymously with person. However, this term should not be understood on the basis of anachronistic connections with the individualistic overtones that the term *atomon*/individual bears nowadays, having in mind that the ancient term signifies no more than a concrete, particular reality that cannot be divided.

but also with what is distinguished by number from its consubstantials. [16]

[16] *Opusc*. 14, 152D.

It is also used as a formal, grammatical category, [17]

[17] See e.g. *Ep*. 15, 549C-D, where hypostasis is applied to God, men, and angels, but also to oxen and dogs.

in order to denote the particular differentiated being that exists on its own, as Yeago has argued. [18]

[18] David S. Yeago has remarked that 'it is extremely difficult to argue textually for a metaphysical notion of "personhood" in the Patristic uses of the terms hypostasis and prosopon. Thus Maximus uses the example of "a crowd of people or horses or cattle or the like" of which we know that "they exist each on its own and each is differentiated distinctively ### by the hypostases" (Migne, *PG* 9[1], [*Ep*. 12], 476C). . . . I would argue that this is not a defect, a metaphysical shortfall, but an altogether normal use of an open-textured, formal-grammatical category. This is not to say that an ontology of the person might not be developed legitimately from Patristic christology and soteriology as a whole, but it is not already present in the concept of hypostasis' ('Jesus of Nazareth and Cosmic Redemption: The Relevance of Saint Maximus the Confessor', *Modern Theology*, 12 (1996), 163-93 at 189). Yeago is right in saying that the term 'hypostasis' is used as a formal-grammatical category, but is wrong to confine its meaning to this. It seems that in the Fathers, including Maximus, sometimes person means more than an individual entity. We have seen that Leontius of Jerusalem, for instance, identified the person (*prosopon*) in Christology with the 'I' of Christ (*Adversus Nestorianos*, *PG* 86, 1601A). It should also be noted that the term 'person' may usually have borne more 'personal' overtones than the term 'hypostasis' (the fact that the terms are identical in some contexts does not mean that they always have exactly the same connotations and overtones and that they are interchangeable in all contexts without the slightest change of meaning: according to modern linguistics, there are no synonymous words in such a strict sense).

In spite of the fact that Maximus adopts Saint Basil's definition of essence **end p.102** and hypostasis, he, like the Leontioi, avoids the pitfall into which John the Grammarian fell. He is absolutely clear that the humanity of Christ had its own distinctive, particular idioms. Furthermore, the idea that the humanity of Christ was merely notional, or that it included the individual natures of all human hypostases, is alien to his thought. [19]

[19] *Mirabile dictu*, Larchet argues that Maximus embraced the idea that Christ assumed and deified the nature of all human beings, and claims that since we are all deified on the natural level, what remains to be accomplished is our deification on the personal level (*La Divinisation de l'homme*, 365-75). Both parts of this thought are erroneous and alien to Maximus's Christology. For Maximus Christ assumed and deified an individual human nature, which had its own distinctive particular idioms. Nevertheless, the deification of that particular nature laid the foundations for the deification of all human beings.

In this connection, it is worth devoting a few thoughts to the famous couplet logos of nature—mode of existence (*λόγος φύσεως—τρόπος ὑπάρξεως*), which Maximus uses quite often. Summing up Maximus's teaching on this issue, as well as the main points of the secondary literature relating to it, Nicolaos Loudovicos has rightly noted that it is impossible for beings to exist without their mode of existence. [20]

[20] Nicolaos Loudovicos, *Ἡ Εὐχαριστιακὴ Ὀντολογία* (Athens: *Δόμος*, 1992), 146.

However, his view, which also seems to reflect the main thrust of the secondary literature, that Maximus 'identifies the mode of existence with the reality of the person', and that mode of existence, person, and hypostasis are for Maximus identical [21]

[21] Ibid. 149 and 150 respectively.

requires qualification.

First, for Maximus, as we shall see shortly, person is not identical with mode of existence (with the

'how': or *ὅπως* of a being), but is distinct through its unique mode (*τρόπος*) from other persons. Secondly, the connection (not identification) between mode of existence and person must be applied to Christology, notably to the humanity of Christ, in a very nuanced way, so that we avoid the false dilemma of either depriving the humanity of Christ of its own particular mode of existence (and mode of willing and acting, as we shall see later) or of turning it into a human person.

It can be argued that the relative dissociation of personhood from particularity shows, as has been noted in the previous treatment of Leontioi, that personhood is identical neither with the 'what' of a being, with which nature is identical, nor with the 'how' of a being, despite the fact that it is related to it, [22]

[22] This is why the particular idioms of both Christ's divinity and his humanity are eventually attributed to his person, as has been seen in the treatment of the Christology of the Leontioi.

but with the 'who' of it. As Maximus writes, hypostasis denotes 'somebody' . [23]

[23] *Opusc*. 23, 264B.

And, as Hans Urs von Balthasar has **end p.103** rightly put it, hypostasis 'responds to the question "who?" and indicates an "I" '. [24]

[24] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Liturgie cosmique: Maxime le Confesseur*, tran. L. Lhaumet and H.-A. Preutout (Paris: Aubier, 1947), 164.

However, this 'I' must not be understood as a psychological or existential 'I'. The patristic notion of personhood is strictly ontological. As Balthasar remarks, 'hypostasis is a term of pure ontology. It does not have to do with the existential domain in the modern sense, nor is it the unity of conscience.' [25]

[25] Ibid. 158.

Contentions such as those of Karazafeires—namely, that 'person . . . consists in a self-conscious entity' and that it 'is the thinking, self-conscious and free subject of the soul' [26]

[26] Karazafeires, '*Η Περί Προσώπου Διδασκαλία*', 106 and 121 respectively.

—do not seem to reflect the Confessor's thought.

This issue will be discussed again shortly. For the time being, we will look at how Maximus distinguishes the human nature of Christ from a human person. On this issue, Maximus follows the Leontioi. For him, hypostasis is characterized by subsisting by itself. [27]

[27] *Opusc*. 14, 152D; *Opusc*. 23, 264A-B, etc.

The humanity of Christ was not a hypostasis, Maximus argued, for it never subsisted by itself. [28]

[28] *Ep*. 15, 560B.

Thus, the unity of the humanity with the Logos accounts for its not being personally distinct from the Logos. The union between divinity and humanity in Christ is called union according to hypostasis (*ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν*), [29]

[29] The expression was already there in the second anathema of Cyril's third letter to Nestorius (see Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 59), was widely used by post-Chalcedonian theologians, and was vindicated by the Fifth Ecumenical Council (see the eighth anathema of the Council, in ibid. 117-18).

signifies the union of two (different) essences that remain distinct in one hypostasis, and is contrasted to the relative union (*σχετικὴ ἕνωσις*) which is the union of two persons through their unity of willed object and their mutual loving disposition. [30]

[30] *Ep*. 12, 484A-B. Paradoxically, Maximus at times identifies the 'hypostatic union' (*ὑποστατικὴ ἕνωσις*) with the relative union (*Opusc*. 20, 233D; obviously hypostatic union means there a union of two hypostases, which, for Maximus, cannot be united in one hypostasis), and at other times identifies it with the union according to hypostasis (*Opusc*. 14, 152B).

The union between the Logos and his humanity results in a so-called composite hypostasis. Christ is a hypostasis composite of two natures. A deeper exploration of this expression will follow in the next section. [31]

[31] Some of the insights of the section have been anticipated in the earlier treatment of the Leontioi, but a fuller exploration of various meanings of the term 'hypostasis' in Christology is now offered. It should be noted that my triple distinction is partly inspired by, but also differs from, that of Felix Heinzer, who, while referring to the Leontioi, distinguishes between the formal and the material aspects of hypostasis, the former being related to the person and the latter to the composition of the idioms (*Gottes Sohn als Mensch*, 81). end p.104

2.3 Personal, Formal, and Material Aspects Of Hypostasis

Maximus is clear that the hypostasis in Christ is divine, identical with God the Logos, the second person of the Holy Trinity. So, whatever 'composite hypostasis' might mean, it definitely does not mean the outcome of a sort of composition between the Logos and a human person. In Christ there is not a composite person, 50 per cent divine, 50 per cent human, in the aforementioned sense. On the 'personal' level, on the 'who' and 'I' level, the hypostasis in Christ is strictly identical with God the Logos. Thus, Maximus argues that 'Christ is not by hypostasis mortal and immortal, nor is he powerless and omnipotent, visible and invisible, created and uncreated, but he is the former by nature and the latter by hypostasis', [32]

[32] *Opusc*. 24, 268B.

which clearly indicates that he identifies the hypostasis in Christ with God the Logos.

As previously stated, the composite hypostasis of Christ is not composed of two persons. It is composed of two natures: that is, *it is composed if seen from the point of view of its natures*. [33]

[33] Balthasar argued that the logic of the composite hypostasis leads to Nestorianism (*Liturgie cosmique*, 186-8). However, this would be true only if there were a 'personal' composite hypostasis in Christ. Georges Florovsky, by

contrast, rightly argued that the Logos is the personal centre of both natures, and that the 'composite' aspect of his hypostasis is to be found in the unity of the two natures, which remain without change as regards their natural properties (Georges Florovsky, *Collected Works*, ix: *The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century*, ed. Richard S. Haugh, trans. Raymond Miller, Anne-Marie Döllinger-Labriolle, and Helmut Wilhelm Schmiedel (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt 1987), 231).

The composite hypostasis is the whole that is the end-product of the union of the two natures, whereas the two natures are the parts of this whole. [34]

[34] See e.g. *Ep*. 12, 492D-493A.

Here 'hypostasis' does not mean, strictly speaking, the 'person' (which is identical with the Logos), but the one reality in which the two natures are united without separation and without confusion. Therefore, Christ, the incarnate Logos, is a composite hypostasis in terms of his two natures, on the level of 'what', or of 'material' hypostasis. [35]

[35] It is interesting that Maximus calls the glowing iron one hypostasis (in which iron and fire are united); but this makes sense only in terms of 'material' (not of 'personal') hypostasis (see *Opusc*. 16, 189C-D).

On that level, it is a mistake to say that Christ is either a divine or a human hypostasis. The Logos incarnate—namely, the divine person of the Logos which has assumed a human nature—is a divine personal, albeit a theandric 'material' hypostasis.

Two issues require mention here. The first is that the parallelism between Christ and man has been used, at least by orthodox post-Chalcedonians, and must be used to illustrate *this* aspect of the hypostasis of Christ. [36]

[36] Maximus often uses this parallelism: see e.g. *Ep*. 12 488A-C.

In man, the **end p.105** hypostasis does not exist prior to the union between soul and body. By contrast, in Christ the Logos (and the divine nature, of course) exists prior to his human nature and is the cause of the hypostatic union. Moreover, whereas the Logos is by nature identical with his divinity but not with his humanity, as we shall see later, it would be erroneous to say that in man the person is identical by nature only to the soul (or only to the body). The symmetry in the way man is constituted (two natures, soul and body, are united and result in one composite hypostasis, a man, who is the whole, whereas the natures are its parts) is analogous to the symmetry in Christ only if Christ is seen as a 'material' hypostasis (two natures, divinity and humanity, are united and result in one composite hypostasis, Christ, who is the whole, whereas his natures are the parts of this whole). [37]

[37] The difference here between man and Christ is that, in Christ, the divine nature exists prior to the human, whereas in man the soul comes into existence simultaneously with the body.

On the contrary, if Christ is seen from the point of view of the 'personal' aspect of his hypostasis, there is a dissimilarity between Christ and man due to the fact that the person in Christ is identical only to the Logos, who exists prior to his humanity. This dissimilarity accounts for an asymmetry in Christology [38]

[38] Georges Florovsky frequently used the term 'asymmetry' with regard to Christology. For more on this, see George H. Williams, 'The Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky', in Andrew Blane (ed.), *Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993), 287-340, at 299-301.

that does not have an equivalent in the case of man. [39]

[39] There would be such an equivalent if the person in man was identical with a pre-existing soul.

Secondly, if the distinction between the divine 'personal' hypostasis and the theandric 'material' hypostasis is not endorsed, Maximus will seem to contradict himself. For, as we have seen, on the one hand he states that the hypostasis of Christ is divine, and on the other hand he also states that 'we know that no one confesses in Christ either a divine or a human hypostasis apart from the dividing and man-worshipping Nestorius', [40]

[40] *Opusc*. 16, 204C.

which suggests that Christ's hypostasis is neither divine nor human, but theandric. In fact, Maximus integrates successfully the asymmetry on the level of 'personal' hypostasis (which is divine) with the symmetry on the level of the two (divine *and* human) natures, whose unity constitutes the 'material' hypostasis. It seems that if the asymmetry on the level of the 'personal' hypostasis is not balanced adequately by the symmetry on the level of 'material' hypostasis, and vice versa, Christology is in danger of losing its well-balanced symmetrical asymmetry or asymmetrical symmetry to over-symmetrical or over-asymmetrical and, therefore, detrimental directions. Maximus has rightly

end p.106

been very careful to keep these two aspects of the mystery of the hypostasis of Christ in complementary tension. [41]

[41] V. Grumel has accused Leontius of Byzantium of giving the same ontological weight to divinity and humanity for the creation of the hypostasis of Christ and of characterizing both natures as constitutive (*συμπληρωτικά*) of Christ's hypostasis ('L'union hypostatique et la comparaison de l'âme et du corps chez Léonce de Byzance et saint Maxime le Confesseur', *Échos d'Orient*, 25 (1926), 393-406, at 399. Note that Maximus uses the same expression with regard to the hypostasis of Christ: ### : *Ep*. 15, 556C, as well as with regard to man: *Ep*. 15, 552A-553A). Grumel accuses Maximus for the same reason, even though he recognizes that in *Opusc*. 24, 268B, Maximus claims that the hypostasis of Christ is uncreated (ibid. 405-6). Had Grumel drawn and applied the distinction between the personal and the material aspects of hypostasis correctly, his judgement on the two writers would probably have been different.

It has been argued here that, for Maximus, the divine Logos is the unique person in Christ. However, the Logos is not the 'form' or the 'how' or the mode of existence of his two natures. In Christ we have a divine 'how' as well as a human 'how', inextricably bound up with one another. Maximus once more used the anthropological example to illustrate this point. The idioms of one's body that distinguish it from other bodies and the idioms of one's soul that distinguish it from other souls are, for Maximus, united, characterize the hypostasis that they constitute, and distinguish it from other hypostases. [42]

[42] *Ep*. 15, 552C-D.

Similarly, the idioms of the Logos that distinguish him from the divine nature (as well as from the Father and the Spirit, as can be deduced from the text) and the idioms of his flesh (humanity) that distinguish it from the rest of the people [43]

[43] It is noteworthy that Maximus makes it unmistakably clear that these are distinguishing idioms of Christ's flesh/humanity.

are united in one hypostatic identity. [44]

[44] *Ep*. 15, 557A-C.

Maximus went as far as to say that the particular idioms of the Logos and of his humanity become, as it were, characteristics common to both natures, for they characterize the hypostasis, which is common to both natures. [45]

[45] *Ep*. 15, 556C. It seems that, for Maximus, since the particular idioms of Christ's human nature become the particular idioms of Christ's hypostasis, the connection between particularity and personhood remains valid.

The unity of divine and human particular idioms constitutes the 'formal' aspect of Christ's hypostasis. [46]

[46] Heinzer has rightly argued with reference to the Leontioi that 'the composition of the idioms does not constitute the Person, but merely marks it' (*Gottes Sohn als Mensch*, 81). However, it must be mentioned that the unity of the idioms constitutes the 'formal' aspect of the hypostasis.

Therefore, it seems that the hypostasis in Christology can be regarded from these three different, albeit interwoven, aspects: the personal, the material, and the formal. It is often important to be aware of which one of these three we are speaking, although it is not always easy or expedient to apply the distinction at issue with precision. **end p.107**

2.4 Further Characteristics Of the Christology Of Saint Maximus

2.4.1 Saint Maximus's Formula 'Christ Is Out Of Two Natures, In Two Natures and Two Natures'

That Christ is out of two natures, divinity and humanity, was a formula characteristic of Cyril and his followers. However, this formula was not sufficient to show that the reality of Christ's two natures remains after the union. Eutyches (and Dioscorus) accepted the formula 'out of two natures', but denied that there were two natures *after* the union. The close connection between accepting that Christ is out of two natures and denying two natures after the union was one of the reasons why Chalcedon omitted the expression 'out of two natures' and used the expression 'in two natures' instead, in order to make clear that the two natures remain intact after the union. The Chalcedonian formula 'in two natures' reflects not only an acknowledgement of the existence of Christ's two natures after the union which is characteristic of the *Tome of Leo*, but also, as Nicholas Madden has pointed out, Cyril's *τέλειος ἐν θεότητι . . . καὶ ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι*. [47]

[47] Nicholas Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', in *Studia Patristica*, 27 (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 175-97 at 183. The Cyrillian citation is to be found in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 1. 4, pp. 18 and 25.

Post-Chalcedonian Christology combined the two formulae in its endeavour to prove that Cyril and Chalcedon were not only compatible but perhaps even complementary. Moreover, contrary to what is commonly held, it was Leontius of Byzantium who took the step of stating that Christ is identical with his two natures, and of shaping, for the first time, the tripartite formula 'Christ is out of two natures, in two natures and two natures', which combines the statement that Christ is identical with his natures with the formulae of Cyril and Chalcedon. [48]

[48] To the best of my knowledge, all scholars agree that Maximus was the first to identify Christ with his natures (see e.g. Piret, *Le Christ et la Trinité*, 370, and Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 330) and to combine this statement with the 'out of two' and 'in two' formulae (see e.g. N. Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', 183). No one seems to have noticed the following passage of Leontius of Byzantium, in which he does both almost a century before Maximus: ## (*PG* 86, 1904A). Maximus used the same wording in saying that Christ is ### (*Ep*. 15, 573A).

However, it was Maximus who turned this formula into an often-repeated way of referring to Christ. [49]

[49] Maximus very often uses jointly either the formulae 'out of which (natures)' and 'in which (natures)' (e.g. *Opusc*. 7, 73C-D, 80C, 84C, 85C; *Opusc*. 16, 205B-C; *Ep*. 12, 468B-C; *Ep*. 13, 524D, 525A) or the formulae 'out of which' and 'which' (e.g. *Opusc*. 8, 96B, and *Ep*. 19, 593A-B), as well as the three formulae that form his tripartite formula (e.g. *Opusc*. 6, 68A; *Opusc*. 8, 96B; *Opusc*. 9, 121D; *Opusc*. 19, 221B, 224A-B; *Ep*. 12, 500B-C; *Ep*. 15, 573A). Maximus employs a similar tripartite formula, in which the 'out of which' and 'in which' formulae are followed by the expression 'and of which he is the hypostasis' (###: see *Opusc*. 6, 68C-D).end p.108

Pierre Piret has claimed that the ### clause indicates the exteriority, the ### clause the interiority, and the "εστι clause the identity between Christ and his natures. [50]

[50] Pierre Piret, 'Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur, d'après sa formule des natures "desquelles, en lesquelles et lesquelles est le Christ" ', in Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schönborn (eds.), *Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 Septembre 1980* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1982), 215-22, at 219-22.

Piret is wrong with regard to the first and second parts of his claim, and only partly right with regard to the third. In fact, the first clause usually refers to the natures *before* the union—although it may also be understood to signify the two natures of which Christ consists after the union. The second clause refers to the two natures *after* the union. As to the identity between Christ and his natures, which the third clause expresses, the following qualifications are necessary.

Maximus identifies the divine essence with the three persons of the Trinity, [51]

[51] *Ep*. 15, 552A. Maximus writes that the divinity is in the divine persons, and that it is identical with the divine persons. The identification between the divine persons and the divinity can be traced back to the fourth century (see e.g. Gregory of Nazianzus, Sermon 39, *PG* 36, 345D).

but this is aimed not at erasing the all-important distinction between nature and hypostasis, but rather at excluding any sort of tetratheistic conception of God, in which the essence would be a fourth God alongside the three persons. With regard to Christology, Maximus identifies Christ with his two natures in order to emphasize that Christ is not anything external or additional to his two natures, a *tertium quid* that would exist alongside them, [52]

[52] This is why Maximus says that without the natures the composite hypostasis vanishes too (*Opusc*. 16, 197D). Note also his statement that Christ is nothing other than his natures, out of which and in which he exists (*Disputatio*, 289B).

but that he is identical with them, as man is identical with his body and soul. [53]

[53] Maximus applies his tripartite formula to man as well: see e.g. *Ep*. 12, 488C.

This identification, however, applies to Christ in so far as the material aspect of his hypostasis is concerned, as can also be inferred from the fact that Maximus uses this identification alongside the example of man as well as alongside his favourite analogy of Christ as the whole and the natures as its parts. [54]

[54] See e.g. *Ep*. 13, 524D-525A, where Maximus says that Christ is out of two natures, as a whole is out of (its) parts, and in two natures after the union, as a whole is in (its) parts (cf. *Ep*. 12, 492D-493A). In *Ep*. 12, 501A, he adds the third part of his formula and says that Christ is two natures as a whole is recognized through its parts.

The Logos, as the personal hypostasis, by contrast, **end p.109** cannot be reducible to the sum of his natures. In this respect, Nicholas Madden is right in writing that 'Maximus will insist that Christ is not

anything else but his natures. The "who" is identified with the two "whats" *without being reduced to them*.'[55]

[55] N. Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', 184, emphasis added. It is worth recalling here that the core of Maximus's criticism of Severus is in the fact that the latter identifies hypostasis with nature (see e.g. *Ep.* 15, 568C-572B, and *Opusc.* 2, 40A-45B). Given this, if Maximus were to reduce hypostasis to nature, he would contradict himself (on this, see also the remarks above on the 'material' aspect of hypostasis).

At any rate, the fact that Maximus was the first to use the tripartite formula (which goes back to, and reflects, the rather symmetrical Christology of Leontius of Byzantium) so extensively bears witness to his ability to integrate symmetrical traits into his Christology.[56]

[56] Nicholas Madden rightly characterizes the ἐστί through which Christ is identified with his natures as Antiochean ('Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor', 183).

2.4.2 The Ontological Priority Of Person / Hypostasis Over Nature / Essence

To attempt to read modern personalism into Maximus would be an illegitimate anachronism. However, it is fair to say that, in his thought, hypostasis seems to have a certain ontological priority over nature. It is not our task to insist on the Trinitarian dimensions of the issue here, but in so far as Christology is concerned, some remarks are justified.

At least as early as the fourth century, Saint Gregory of Nazianzus distinguished between nature, which subsists by itself, and accident (συμβεβηκός), which subsists in another, in order to argue that the Holy Spirit is a nature, not a mere accident.[57]

[57] See Sermon 31, 6 (*PG* 36, 140A-B, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 286. 2-22).

The Leontioi moved beyond this, claiming that it is hypostasis, not nature, that subsists by itself.[58]

[58] For Leontius of Byzantium's move beyond Gregory, see also Marcel Richard, 'Léonce et Pamphile', *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 27 (1938), 27-52, at 29-31.

Gregory's distinction between essence and accident on the basis that essence exists by itself whereas accident subsists in another is also found in Maximus,[59]

[59] Maximus characterizes the soul as essence: that is, as self-subsistent, subsisting for itself and by itself, in contradistinction to the accidents (*Ep.* 7, 436D, 437A-B).

but basically, and certainly in his Christology, Maximus follows the tradition of the Leontioi, according to which it is hypostasis, not nature, that subsists by itself *par excellence*.

Maximus claims that 'to nature pertains the common logos of being, but to hypostasis pertains also the logos of being by itself'.[60]

[60] *Opusc.* 23, 264A-B. This definition is virtually identical with the definition given by Leontius of Byzantium in *Contra Nestorianos and Eutychianos, PG* 86, 1280A.

The human nature of Christ along with its particular idioms is not a hypostasis, for it does not subsist **end p.110** separately (from the Logos and) by itself.[61]

[61] *Ep.* 15, 557D.

That human nature 'came into being in the Logos and for (or because of) the Logos and became the flesh of the Logos by union'.[62]

[62] *Ep.* 15, 560C.

So, the existence of the Logos's human nature is grounded in a person: namely, in the Logos's own person. Karazafeires is right in holding that 'person then is not the product of nature, but, on the contrary, nature subsists in person and this [the person] is the principle of its existence'.[63]

[63] Karazafeires, '*Η Περί Προσώπου Διδασκαλία*', 109.

There are other ways in which Maximus indicates the ontological priority of hypostasis over nature. He argues that 'hypostasis is necessarily nature . . . but nature is not necessarily hypostasis'.[64]

[64] *Opusc.* 23, 264A.

He also mentions Gregory of Nazianzus, who claimed that the will refers (ἀνάγει) to the willer (namely, the person),[65]

[65] *Opusc.* 16, 188B-C.

and similarly argues that 'the energy refers (ἀνάγει) to him who acts and the nature to him who subsists (namely, the hypostasis)'.[66]

[66] *Opusc.* 16, 200D.

Bearing these last remarks in mind, it can be observed that the expression that Christ is out of two natures may be misleading. Piret has rightly drawn attention to the fact that the natures cannot generate a person. [67]

[67] Pierre Piret, 'Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur', 219.

Christ can be said to be out of two natures only if he is seen as the end-product of the union of two natures, the divine and the human: that is, only if he is seen from the point of view of the material aspect of his hypostasis. In fact, Christ can be also said to be 'out of two persons', born of his Father with regard to his divine nature, which is derived from his Father, and of his mother with regard to his human nature, which is derived from Mary. [68]

[68] Cf. ibid.

2.4.3 The Logos Is Identical With the Divine Nature According To Nature and With Both Natures According To Hypostasis

For Maximus, the Logos is the same before and after the incarnation, namely God, [69]

[69] See e.g. *Ep*. 19, 592C.

a divine person. This has been discussed previously, so mention will be made here only of the following. Maximus says that the flesh became one with the Logos according to hypostasis. [70]

[70] *Opusc*. 8, 105A.

However, although the Logos is identical with the human nature according to hypostasis, he is not identical with it according to nature. [71]

[71] *Ep*. 12, 493B. In *Ep*. 15, 565D, Maximus says that the Logos is identical with his flesh according to hypostasis, for to deny this would introduce a fourth person into the Trinity. Obviously, to refuse to identify the Logos with the flesh, namely the human nature, according to hypostasis would mean that the flesh is a hypostasis different from the Logos, namely a fourth hypostasis.

Maximus draws a distinction between 'the **end p.111** nature/essence of the flesh' and 'the nature/essence of the Logos', [72]

[72] See e.g. *Ep*. 12, 469B, 472C, 496B, and *Ep*. 17, 581D.

and insists that the flesh differs from the Logos according to essence. [73]

[73] *Ep*. 12, 501C.

He also states his opposition to Apollinarius, who argued that the Logos was identical with the flesh according to nature, as well as to Nestorius, who contended that the Logos and the flesh differed according to hypostasis. [74]

[74] *Ep*. 15, 568B.

Therefore, it is clear that, for Maximus, whereas the Logos is identical with both natures according to hypostasis—since both natures are united in one hypostasis, which is identical with the incarnate Logos, who is their hypostasis—he is identical only with the divine nature according to nature. The fact that Maximus considers that the Logos is identical with his divine nature according to hypostasis and according to nature does not amount to his denying the distinction between (divine) hypostasis and (divine) nature, but perhaps accounts for the fact that, as will be seen later, at times he uses the Logos and the divine nature interchangeably.

2.4.4 The Neo-Chalcedonian Character Of the Christology Of Saint Maximus

We have already seen the main characteristics of the so-called neo-Chalcedonism in Chapter 1. In the light of what was said there, it will become apparent that Maximus must be classified as a typical exponent of extreme neo-Chalcedonism. To begin with, Maximus undoubtedly belongs to the Alexandrian tradition, which identifies the personal subject in Christ with God the Logos. Following Cyril, Maximus takes it that it is the Logos to whom the Creed refers. [75]

[75] *Ep*. 14, 537A-B. By contrast, Nestorius argued that the Creed refers to Christ, whom Nestorius still refused to identify with the Logos (see his epistle to Cyril in Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 174. 1-180. 20).

He repeatedly accepts the two births of the Logos, [76]

[76] *Ep*. 14, 537A.

calls the Virgin God-bearer, and considers her the mother of the Logos, the one of the Holy Trinity. [77]

[77] *Ep*. 12, 504A.

With regard to the Cyrillian formula 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos', Maximus maintains that the word 'incarnate' denotes our nature. [78]

[78] See e.g. *Ep*. 12, 501B; *Ep*. 13, 524A; *Ep*. 17, 584A.

At times he combines the formulae 'out of two natures' and 'in two natures' with the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, [79]

[79] *Ep*. 13, 524D-525A.

and thinks that this formula signifies the 'union according to hypostasis'. [80]

[80] *Ep*. 12, 481C; cf. ibid. 480A.

He also contends that the formula 'in two natures' is not averse to the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, provided that it is not understood in a Nestorian way. [81]

[81] *Ep*. 12, 481A.

In addition, he regards the simultaneous use of both formulae as an integral part of orthodox **end p.112** Christology. He maintains that it is *necessary* to use both formulae, the 'monophysite' in order to denote the union according to hypostasis, and the dyophysite in order to show the difference between the two natures. [82]

[82] *Ep*. 12, 480A-B.

Furthermore, he asserts that '*he who does not confess that Christ . . . is one incarnate nature of God the Logos . . . does not believe that the union took place* and likewise he who does not confess the two natures after the union . . . is not able to say that the difference [between the natures] remains'. [83]

[83] *Ep*. 18, 588B.

It is noteworthy, and perhaps surprising, that Maximus does not content himself with the confession of the 'one hypostasis' of Chalcedon to denote the hypostatic unity in Christ, but considers the confession of the Cyrillian 'monophysite' formula as *necessary* to this end. It is also noteworthy that he emphasizes the complementary function of both formulae when he argues that we must state the difference of the natures after the union in order to refute the heresies of Apollinarius and Eutyches, and that we must use the Cyrillian 'monophysite' formula in order to deter the heresy of Nestorius. [84]

[84] *Ep*. 15, 568A-C; see also *Ep*. 14, 536C-537A, as well as the comment in *Ep*. 14, 544C.

Moreover, Maximus employs the neo-Chalcedonian terminology to which Grillmeier refers. [85]

[85] See Ch. 1, sect. 7.2.

He refers to the difference of the two natures according to *θεωρίαν*, [86]

[86] *Ep*. 12, 477B.

and explicitly characterizes Christ as one of the Holy Trinity. [87]

[87] See e.g. *Ep*. 15, 573C, 568A-B.

He also combines, as has been seen, the formulae 'out of two natures' and 'in two natures', and refers to the composite hypostasis of Christ and to the union according to hypostasis. Thus, he makes use of all the elements which are, according to Grillmeier, characteristic of neo-Chalcedonian terminology.

But what about an additional neo-Chalcedonian characteristic: namely, the formula according to which 'one of the Holy Trinity suffered in the flesh'? Lars Thunberg has claimed that 'the so-called Theopaschite formula, *unus ex Trinitate passus est*, seems to be the only Neo-Chalcedonian area of interest which cannot be traced in Maximus's writings'. [88]

[88] Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 48.

However, this remark is erroneous. The fact that Maximus attributes the passion to one of the Holy Trinity can not only be inferred indirectly from the fact that he states that Christ is 'one of the Holy Trinity', [89]

[89] *Ep*. 15, 568A-B.

but is also stated by him in explicit terms. [90]

[90] See *Ep*. 12, 468A-D, where Maximus makes a lengthy reference to the one of the Holy Trinity, who, as he further remarks, suffered in the flesh for our sake.

The conclusion of this section must therefore be that Maximus must be counted among the so-called extreme neo-Chalcedonians. [91]

[91] The neo-Chalcedonian character of Maximus's Christology has also been pointed out by Garrigues, 'La Personne composée du Christ', 186.

His Christology, however, incorporates Chalcedonian-symmetrical elements among which **end p.113** the following must be included. First is his insistence that the natures of Christ must be numbered, [92]

[92] See e.g. *Ep*. 12, 469A-473B (esp. 473A), 485A-488C, 492D-500A; *Ep*. 13, 524B-D, etc.

because the number, when applied properly to Christ's natures, does not divide. [93]

[93] See e.g. *Ep*. 12, 473A-481A; *Ep*. 13, 513A-B; *Ep*. 15, 561C-568A, etc.

Second is his extensive use of the tripartite formula, to which references have already been made. Third is the way in which he uses the notion of *perichōrēsis. Perichōrēsis* in his Christology is not unilateral—that is, from the divinity to the humanity—but is characterized by mutuality and reciprocity. [94]

[94] Thunberg (*Microcosm and Mediator*, 23-36) and Larchet (*La Divinisation de l'homme*, 333-46) have dealt exhaustively with the issue of *perichōrēsis*. With reference to *Ambiguum* 5, 1053B (see also Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 26. 150-27. 155), Thunberg makes the following remark, which reflects his overall understanding of the use of *perichōrēsis* in Maximus: 'the term *perichōrēsis* is not just an expression of the predominance of the divine over the human, but rather regarded as an appropriate expression of a union without confusion in its consequences of full reciprocity' (*Microcosm and Mediator*, 28). Larchet also notes the mutuality of the Maximian *perichōrēsis* (see e.g. *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 335-6).

Fourth, and most important, is his recognition that Christ has two wills and two energies, which will be the focus of following sections.

2.5 Conclusions

Maximus tried to do full justice to the two aspects of the mystery of the incarnation: the unity of hypostasis and the distinction of natures. With regard to the former, the facts that he emphasized the unity of Christ's natures and that he identified the unique hypostasis in Christ with God the Logos must be singled out as signs of his orthodoxy. The often repeated accusation of Nestorianism, with which he had to fight during the whole of his dyothelite theological activity, and which continued to shadow him even after his death, cannot be detected in any of his writings dealing with Christ's hypostasis and natures, and there will be an opportunity to see that this is the case with regard to his teaching on Christ's wills and energies as well.

On the other hand, Maximus equally tended to safeguard the distinction of the two natures. His constant and fervent attacks on the composite nature of Severus bear witness to his concern to defend the 'without confusion' of Chalcedon. [95]

[95] Balthasar (*Kosmische Liturgie, passim*) is only partly right in implying that this was the primary concern of Maximus, for Maximus was equally keen to stress the hypostatic unity of Christ.

His concern to allow no room whatsoever for any pantheistic confusion that would jeopardize the aseity of the divine nature and the integrity of the human nature is also expressed by his insistence that the natures of Christ must be numbered. The attribution of particular and distinguishing **end p.114** idioms to the humanity of Christ is a clear proof of the fact that he was far removed from any docetic or monophysite deviations that would undermine the reality, integrity, and authenticity of the humanity of Christ.

In spite of his ferocious attacks on anti-Chalcedonian monophysitism and his uncompromising faithfulness to Chalcedon, Maximus's Christological thought proves him to be an exponent of extreme 'neo-Chalcedonism'. This must certainly come as a surprise to those whose knowledge of Maximus's Christology is limited to his opposition to monothelitism, the alleged brainchild of neo-Chalcedonian Christology. The fact that the most determined and profound exponent of dyothelitism was an extreme neo-Chalcedonian is scarcely compatible with theories that see an almost inevitable systematic and/or historical link between neo-Chalcedonism and monothelitism, and only serves to expose the long-held prejudice against neo-Chalcedonism, which requires drastic revision.

However, in spite of its profundity, the Christology of Maximus is not immune to criticism. It is true that neither Maximus nor any of the other post-Chalcedonians succeeded in offering an absolutely satisfactory, integrated account in terms of terminology and exemplification which would foster a clearer understanding of the way in which the hypostatic constitution of Christ must be conceived. [96]

[96] Even John of Damascus, for instance, would say that the hypostasis of Christ is uncreated in so far as the divine nature is concerned and created in so far as the human nature is concerned, without mentioning that the 'personal' hypostasis itself remains totally uncreated because there is no human person in Christ (see John of Damascus, *Expositio Fidei*, in Bonifatius Kotter (ed.), *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus*, ii, Patristiche Texte und Studien, 12 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 78. 1-10 (p. 177).

The post-Chalcedonian claim that the hypostasis of Christ is composite, coupled as it was with the exceedingly symmetrical parallelism between Christ and man, as well as between Christ and the whole to which the parts/natures belong, seems to contradict the insistence that in Christ the hypostasis is

divine. We have seen that in Leontius of Jerusalem the (seeming) contradiction becomes explicit, because the Logos is said to be both the hypostasis of Christ and part of the hypostasis of Christ. In Maximus the (seeming) contradiction remains implicit but none the less present. It must be admitted that the whole treatment of this issue by post-Chalcedonian Christology is deeply puzzling, and dealing with it can easily give rise to misunderstandings. In this respect, it is hoped that the distinction between 'personal', 'material', and 'formal' aspects of hypostasis which I have drawn in this book will facilitate an understanding of what was meant by the seemingly inconsistent and contradictory claims about Christ which post-Chalcedonian Christology put forward.**end p.115**

In addition, it could be argued that Maximus was somewhat extreme in his treatment of the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, not simply allowing its use under definite interpretative conditions, as the Fifth Ecumenical Council had done, but also considering its confession to be an indispensable part of orthodox Christology. This, quite aside from Maximus's deference to anterior Fathers, such as Cyril, indicates the extent to which he was at ease with diverse ways of confessing the orthodox faith in Christ, as long as the essence of faith was preserved. However, the 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos', which is nowadays attributed to Apollinarius, is a rather infelicitous expression, which tends to overstress the unity in Christ and fails to indicate in a satisfactory way the distinction on the natural level—unless it is interpreted in a proper way. The Chalcedonian formula 'one hypostasis in two natures' is a more satisfactory way of signifying unity and distinction in Christ, and one would have hoped that the terminological achievement of Chalcedon might have allowed Cyril's formula to pass into oblivion. But history does not always take the shortest path to the solution of its problems. Anti-Chalcedonian fundamentalism obliged orthodox post-Chalcedonians, including Maximus, to make use of the formula, even to consider its confession as necessary, in order to prove the compatibility of their Christology with Cyril's. For better or for worse, from Chalcedon onwards, theological argument and terminology had frequently to be shaped in accordance with ecclesial politics and apologetics.

However, none of the aforementioned points touches on the essence of Maximus's Christology, which remains deeply orthodox. We can see how his teaching on Christ's person and natures paves the way for his dyothelitism. His insights that nature represents what is common, that Christ's natures must be numbered, that there can be no composite nature, and that nature and natural qualities belong together would enable him to argue that the will is a natural quality (since all men have a will), that the wills of Christ must be numbered, as his natures are, and that there can be no composite will, as there can be no composite nature.

Maximus was an orthodox neo-Chalcedonian of the highest calibre, and, as has already been shown, knew how to supplement neo-Chalcedonism with symmetrical traits. His most important contribution in this regard, as has already been mentioned, is his attribution of two wills and energies to Christ. Chalcedon, with its use of the concepts of 'person'/'hypostasis' and 'nature'/'essence', perhaps represents a somewhat static approach to the mystery of the incarnation. The dynamic aspects of its reality were to be brought into play by Maximus's doctrine of Christ's wills and energies, to which attention will now be given.**end p.116**

3. The Notion Of Will In Saint Maximus

3.1 Introduction

Before presenting the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus, it is necessary to explore and clarify the range of meanings of the term 'will' as it is used in his dyothelite writings. It is also necessary to analyse the meaning of other volitional terms used by Maximus, and see in what ways they relate to, and differ from, the will. This must be done at the outset, in order to facilitate a proper understanding of Maximus's dyothelite Christology, for it seems that not only in the seventh century but nowadays too one of the most important reasons why people fail to appreciate the depths of dyothelitism is a result of misunderstanding what is meant by the term 'will' and the expression 'two wills'.

It should also be mentioned at the outset that despite the underlying coherence running throughout the various dyothelite works of Saint Maximus —at least as far as the basic points are concerned— absolute consistency and systematicity at the level of his argumentation and volitional terminology, even at the level of his thought and judgement upon some minor issues, is not to be found. We must

not forget that Maximus's dyothelite works have a somewhat fragmentary character: they consist of various epistles and treatises which were written at different times to different people, and, as will be seen in detail later, their content, argumentation, and terminology are in part dependent on the development of the controversy and the manœuvres of ecclesial politics. Bearing this in mind, in my presentation I shall attempt to do justice to both the consistency and the fluidity and variability of the Confessor's thought and terminology. Let us begin by speculating on the fundamental question of why the term 'will', and not any other, was chosen to occupy such a central position in the Confessor's volitional terminology.

3.2 Why the Term 'Will'?

It is well known that the term 'will' (θέλησις—θέλημα) did not enjoy high prestige in Greek literature. In contradistinction to other relevant terms, such as βούλησις and προαίρεσις for instance, it was not part of the philosophical vocabulary, [97]

[97] It is noteworthy that in Nemesius of Emesa's *De Natura Hominis* (see Moreno Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987) and *PG* 40, 503A-818A), which occupies a place midway between philosophy and Christian theology, volitional terms such as προαίρεσις, προαιρετικός, προαιρετός, προαιρέω, γνώμη, βούλευσις, βουλευτικός, βουλευτός, βουλή, βούλησις, βουλητός, ὄρεξις, etc. abound, whereas the term θέλησις is not part of his vocabulary. The term θέλημα occurs only once, with reference not to Christ but to the divine will in general (Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis*, 132. 5), and the verb θέλω is mentioned a few times, but only once with reference to the volitional procedure (ibid. 57. 12).

and, as John D. Madden has pointed out, it was actually a very **end p.117** rare term in written Greek. [98]

[98] John D. Madden, 'The Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will (Thelesis)', in Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schönborn (eds.), *Maximus Confessor*, 61-79 at 64.

Certainly, Maximus was not the first Christian theologian to use the term 'will' (θέλησις—θέλημα). As will be seen in following sections, this term was already in use at least as early as the fourth century in connection with the Christological controversies. However, it does not seem to have ever been a strictly technical term, [99]

[99] Ibid. 75-6.

or to have displaced similar terms, such as βούλησις, γνώμη, or προαίρεσις, prior to Maximus.

The term 'will' stands at the centre of the monothelite controversy. The monothelites suggested that Christ had one will, and the dyothelites responded that Christ had two wills. In fact, the monothelites applied to Christ other volitional terms too, notably γνώμη and γνωμικὸν θέλημα, as well as προαίρεσις and προαιρετικὸν θέλημα. But, as will be seen in following sections, Maximus defined the terms γνώμη and προαίρεσις in such a way as to bind them to the post-lapsarian, sinful state of man, and thus to render them inapplicable to Christ. [100]

[100] Maximus did that for tactical reasons, as we shall see below.

For Maximus, the only volitional term that can properly be applied to Christ is the term 'will' (θέλησις—θέλημα). As we shall see, this was the word that he would go on to develop into a fully-fledged technical term for the first time in the history of Greek-speaking philosophy and theology.

But why did Maximus make this particular term central to his dyothelite Christology, as opposed to other terms, such as βούλησις and προαίρεσις for instance, which had a widespread currency, especially among philosophers, or, at any rate, the well educated? The answer seems obvious. The word is derived from the Gospels, which apply to Christ no other volitional term than the term 'will' (θέλημα). [101]

[101] See e.g. Luke 22: 42 (πλὴν μὴ τὸ θέλημά μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω) and John 6: 38 .

The use of this term points to the crucial role played by the Bible in the dyothelite Christology of Maximus, which can also be seen from the plethora of biblical passages that he adduced to substantiate his positions, and in particular from the paramount significance he—as well as his opponents—accorded the prayer of Christ to the Father in Gethsemane, and its proper interpretation. [102]

[102] The very title of the book of Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, indicates the importance of this passage, and by implication of Scripture, for the dyothelite Christology of Maximus the Confessor.

Maximus's dyothelite Christology **end p.118** was the result not of philosophical speculation, but of a scripturally based effort to defend the correct understanding of the mystery of incarnation and find the proper volitional terminology whereby to express it.

3.3 Some Basic Distinctions

Maximus drew an all-important distinction, without which the question of the wills of Christ cannot be properly approached. This distinction is between the will as a faculty, integral to all rational beings, in virtue of which they are capable of willing, and the object of willing: namely, that which is willed by the beings possessing this faculty. Maximus used for the former the terms θέλησις and θέλημα and for the latter the terms θελητόν and θεληθέν. The former is a permanent, indispensable part of the ontological constitution of both God and man, whereas the latter is no more than its external object. [103]

[103] Maximus uses a similar distinction between the energy (ἐνέργεια) and the result (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the energy. The first is an essential part of the constitution of a being, whereas the second is external to it (see e.g. *Disputatio*, 341B-D).

This distinction is very helpful because, according to Maximus, as will be seen shortly in more detail, whereas it makes sense to say that God and man have at times the same θελητόν or θεληθέν, to say that God and man have the same θέλησις or θέλημα would be tantamount to confusing divinity and humanity.

Let us look briefly at how Maximus elaborates this distinction. In his first dyothelite *Opusculum*, he argues that, although God and the saints may have the same object of willing (θελητόν—θεληθέν), viz. the salvation of the world, their will (θέλησις—θέλημα) is and will for ever remain different. [104]

[104] *Opusc*. 1, 21C-28A.

This is so because 'the will of God is by nature saving, whereas the will of man is by nature saved'. [105]

[105] Ibid. 25B.

God created the world through his will, therefore if the saints had the same will as God, Maximus argued, they would be creators of the world too. [106]

[106] Ibid. 25C.

In the course of Maximus's disputation with Pyrrhus, when the latter argued that the most outstanding Fathers had said that God and the saints have one will, Maximus retorted by employing again this distinction. In order to clarify the distinction further, he drew a parallel between the capacity of willing (θέλημα) and the capacity of seeing (ὀπτικόν), on the one hand, and the object that is willed (θελητόν—θεληθέν) or seen (ὁρατόν), on the other hand. [107]

[107] *Disputatio*, 292B-D.

Maximus also argued that 'if we assume that the things which were created by God, being objects of his will, pass out of existence, it does not **end p.119** follow that his essential and creative will, which is thought of prior to those things, passes also out of existence'. [108]

[108] Ibid. 293A-B. For the extracts of the *Disputation with Pyrrhus* I have consulted, but not always followed, the translation of Joseph P. Farrell, *The Disputation with Pyrrhus of our Father among the Saints Maximus the Confessor*, St Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1990.

Maximus introduced a second distinction between 'θέλειν', [109]

[109] *Disputatio*, 292B, D, 293A.

or ' ', [110]

[110] Ibid. 292B.

or 'πεφυκέναι θέλειν', [111]

[111] *Opusc*. 3, 48A; *Disputatio*, 293A.

and ' ', [112]

[112] *Disputatio*, 292D-293A.

(or 'θέλειν'). [113]

[113] The word θέλειν in *Disputatio*, 292B, D and 293A, signifies the will, in contradistinction to the term (*Disputatio*, 292D-293A), which signifies the mode of willing. In *Opusc*. 3, 48A, πεφυκέναι θέλειν signifies the will, whereas θέλειν signifies the mode of willing. We can see here the relative inconsistency which at times characterizes Maximus's use of some terms.

The first three terms are equivalent to the will, whereas the fourth (and fifth) signify the mode of willing. The mode of willing is the particular way in which the will is actualized vis-à-vis its objects and differs among persons. According to Maximus, the mode of willing ##, like the mode of seeing ##, that is to will to walk or to will not to walk and to see right or left or up or down or to see out of concupiscence or [to see] in order to understand the logoi of beings, is a mode of the use of willing and seeing and belongs only to him who uses it. . . . To will to eat or not to will to eat; or to will to walk or not to will [to walk] is not a negation of the natural will (πεφυκέναι θέλειν) but of the mode of willing ###, namely the coming to being and the passing out of existence of the objects of willing. [114]

[114] *Disputatio*, 293A.

Finally, Maximus introduced a third distinction: namely, the distinction between the will and other terms that relate to the volitional activity, such as βούλησις, γνώμη, and προαίρεσις, of which more will be said later. Before moving on to the next section, it should be mentioned that the distinctions which Maximus introduced changed the landscape of the controversy dramatically. The debate had now to be conducted with greater subtlety and precision. Thanks to his distinction between the will and the object of willing in particular, the terminological confusion that the monothelites exploited was now drastically curtailed, and the fact that their monothelitism was a natural, not merely an ethical, one became obvious.**end p.120**

3.4 The Physiology Of the Will

As has already been mentioned, the mainstream of Greek philosophy did not normally make use of the term 'will'. Albrecht Dihle also informs us that *'θέλησις* never enjoyed terminological status in Hellenistic philosophy'. [115]

[115] Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, Sather Classical Lectures, 48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 147.

In addition, in classical antiquity volition was usually very closely related to mind, and there was hardly any room for a distinct volitional faculty. [116]

[116] Ibid. *passim*.

It can be assumed that the dependence of the volitional activity upon the mind relegated the former to a secondary state, since the primary function of the mind cannot but be germane to deliberation and cognition. According to Dihle, the verb *βούλομαι*, which was normally used instead of the verb *θέλω*, 'always has—at least in classical and classicistic Greek—the connotation of planning which precedes the decision to act', [117]

[117] Ibid. 133.

and 'denotes, in its traditional use, deliberation plus decision rather than volition'. [118]

[118] Ibid. 147.

The word *προαίρεσις*, often translated in English as 'choice' or 'decision', bore strong intellectual connotations too. It was closely linked to intellectual cognition and perception, [119]

[119] Ibid. 21, 69.

and was also widely used to denote the ethical attitude of the individual. [120]

[120] Ibid. 60, 134. It this meaning of the term that has survived in modern Greek.

Aristotle used this word to signify the conjunction of desire and judgement. [121]

[121] R.-A. Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 21 (1954), 51-100, at 60; Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 222.

Nemesius thought that *προαίρεσις* is 'a mixture of deliberation (*βουλή*), judgement (*κρίσις*) and appetite (*ὄρεξις*)', [122]

[122] Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis*, 101. 4.

and undoubtedly Maximus is drawing on him when he argues that *προαίρεσις* is 'a combination of appetite, deliberation and judgement' . [123]

[123] *Opusc*. 1, 13A; for a similar definition see ibid. 16C.

On the other hand, verbs such as ### and *ὀρέγομαι* (to desire) were broadly used to express passions and irrational impulses. But, since the faculty of will was always missing, antiquity 'had left human purpose the slave of reason, or of passions, or of some conflict between the two'. [124]

[124] J. D. Madden, 'Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will', 78.

Where does Maximus stand on this point? Did he also conceive of the will as a function of the mind

? First, as Lars Thunberg has pointed out, for Maximus the mind was not identical with the intellect, but was conceived as **end p.121** man's spiritual subject, and could roughly be identified with the soul. [125]

[125] Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 111-13, 205-7.

This is one reason why the volitional and the intellectual faculties are closely related: both are connected with the mind as the spiritual subject in man. [126]

[126] Ibid. 209.

Thunberg has also argued that Maximus 'conceives of the human soul as a unit, more in the sense of the Stoic understanding than of the Aristotelian one'. [127]

[127] Ibid. 219.

Nevertheless, Maximus does not share the strong intellectualist understanding of the soul which characterizes Stoicism, and this allows space for the will to exist as an independent faculty.

Yet, at times Maximus seems to regard the mind as identical with the intellect. This is often the case in his dyothelite works, which are of primary interest to us. He seems to see a link between *νοερός* and *λογικός*. [128]

[128] *Disputatio*, 293D.

He relates the *νοερὰ φύσις* with what is *φύσει λογικόν*, and both with the procedure of deliberating and deciding. [129]

[129] Ibid. 293B-C.

As Thunberg has observed, 'Maximus obviously often sees the will as an independent element and the mind primarily as the intellect.' [130]

[130] Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 212.

It seems that Thunberg is right, and that, despite the connection between mind/intellect and will in Maximus, the latter does not become a mere by-product of the former.

Let us explore this issue a little further. With regard to the physiology of the will, there is a very instructive passage in Maximus, which is worth quoting at some length:

They say that natural will (*φυσικὸν θέλημα*), namely will (*θέλησις*), is a faculty (*δύναμις*) desirous of what is in accordance with nature, a faculty that holds together in being the attributes that belong essentially to a being's nature. The essence, being naturally held together by this, desires to be and live and move in accordance with perception (*αἴσθησις*) and mind ###, desiring (*ἐφιεμένη*) its own natural and complete being (*ὄντότης*); for it has a will for itself, and for all that is set to create its constitution, and it is suspended in a desirous way in accordance with the logos according to which it became and is. This is why others in defining this natural will (*θέλημα*) say that it is a rational and vital desire (*ὄρεξις*), whereas proairesis (*προαίρεσις*) is a deliberative desire for things that are up to us. Therefore, will (*θέλησις*) is not proairesis, if will (*θέλησις*) is a simple rational and vital desire, whereas proairesis is a combination of desire, deliberation and judgement. For it is after first desiring that we deliberate, and after deliberating that we judge, and after judging that we deliberately choose what has been shown by judgement better rather than worse. And will (*θέλησις*) is related only to what is natural, whereas proairesis is related to [or depends on] what is up to us and capable of being brought about through us. [131]

[131] *Opusc*. 1, 12C-13A. **end p.122**

Elsewhere Maximus refers to the will in the following way:

Natural will is a faculty (*δύναμις*) desirous of what is in accordance with nature. For every being, and especially the rational beings, desires by nature what is in accordance with nature, having been given by God according to essence the capacity (*δύναμις*) of that for its own constitution. [132]

[132] *Opusc*. 16, 192B.

Likewise, Maximus says elsewhere that in accordance with this [the will] alone we naturally desire (*ἐφιέμεθα*) to be and live and move and think ## and speak and feel (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*) and participate in food, sleep and rest, and not ache, nor die, and simply to possess fully everything that constitutes out nature and lack everything that destroys it. [133]

[133] Ibid. 196A.

From these excerpts, it is clear that Maximus defines the will in such a way as to include and in fact emphasize its vital (*ζωτικ*ή), non-rational, instinctive, and desirous aspect. [134]

[134] Maximus's dependence upon Aristotle, Nemesius, and the Stoics is obvious in these excerpts. As has been mentioned in the Introduction, a detailed exploration of the relationship between Maximus and earlier philosophers on the issue of volition is beyond the scope of this book.

Reason does not play any significant role here, whereas rational-deliberative choice is expressed not by the word 'will' but by the word *proairesis*. The function of the will to hold together all the attributes of man's being is something that happens more or less independently of man's reason and any rational decision on his part. The same goes for the desire for self-preservation, the desire to eat, to drink, to avoid death, etc., which seems to characterize not only human beings but also animals, and has a rather instinctive character. Thus, this instinctive desire is not relevant to self-determination. As Nemesius had remarked before Maximus, 'no one urges us not to be hungry or thirsty or not to fly, for those things are not up to us.' [135]

[135] Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis*, 114. 3-4.

So, the will appears here to have very little to do with intellect and reason, and to be quite independent of them. [136]

[136] However, in the second excerpt cited above, Maximus observes that 'every being, and *especially the rational beings*, desires by nature . . . ' (*Opusc*. 16, 192B), whereas in the third excerpt it is mentioned that we desire *to think* in accordance with the will (*Opusc*. 16, 196A). In this way Maximus shows the relationship between the will and the rational part of the human soul.

Maximus applied this conception of human will to Christ too. In the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, he argued that after the incarnation Christ willed by his human will to eat, to drink, to move, etc. [137]

[137] *Disputatio*, 288C-D.

Maximus's reference here is of **end p.123** course again to the instinctive propensity of the will towards whatever sustains man in life. However, as has been mentioned already, there is also a respective instinctive aspect of the will, according to which every being tends to withdraw from whatever destroys life. As Maximus argued in the *Disputation*, all beings are naturally characterized by an inclination (*ὁρμ*ή) towards whatever sustains them in life, and by a concomitant inclination to draw back from whatever destroys them (*ἀφορμ*ή). According to Maximus, this was also the case with the incarnate Logos, who exhibited the inclination towards whatever sustains life in making use of all natural and innocent things—what Maximus implies here is food, sleep, etc.—and also exhibited an inclination to draw back from what destroys life when he voluntarily drew back from death at the time of the passion. [138]

[138] Ibid. 297B-C.

The foregoing presentation may have given the impression that Maximus locates the will rather on the side of the instinctive, non-rational part of human being, a part that man seems to share with animals. But this is only partly true, because, for Maximus, the will has an indispensable rational dimension too. Previous quotations show that Maximus characterizes the human will not only as vital (*ζωτικ*ή) but also as rational (*λογικ*ή). Elsewhere, Maximus argues that whatever does not have a rational will is without reason (*ἄλογον*) and without mind (*ἀνόητον*). [139]

[139] *Opusc*. 8, 97B.

In this respect, it is interesting to see how Maximus distinguishes between man and other beings in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. According to Maximus, the sentient (*αἰσθητικ*ή) nature is characterized by impulsive motion (*καθ' ὁρμ*ὴν *κίνησις*), which, in my view, is similar to the aforementioned instinctive aspect of the human will. However, what is most remarkable is that Maximus notices that the rational (*νοερά*) nature is characterized by self-determining motion (*αὐτεξούσιος κίνησις*). [140]

[140] *Disputatio*, 301B-C.

Actually, Maximus goes so far as to identify self-determination with will, and thus seems to establish a link between *νοερὰ φύσις*, self-determination, and will. He openly draws on the identification between will and self-determination established by Diadochus of Photiki, [141]

[141] Ibid. 301C.

whereas later he twice attributes this identification generally to the Fathers. [142]

[142] Ibid. 304C.

Furthermore, Maximus draws a parallel between the self-determination of God and the self-determination of man, who was created in the image of God. Equally importantly, he remarks that, whereas in non-rational beings nature is the moving principle, in man nature is moved by man, who moves according to his will in a self-determining way .[143]

[143] Ibid. It is interesting that in ibid. 293B-C the whole volitional procedure, which includes intellectual activities such as deliberation and judgement, is said to take place in accordance with man's will. Thus, the will is not regarded as a by-product of intellectual activity; on the contrary, the latter presupposes it. Doucet has rightly related this passage to *Opusc*. 1, 17C-20A, and argued that the whole willing procedure is subject to man's power (ἐξουσία) ('Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 184). For more on this, see also the next section.

end p.124

Maximus may have had at the back of his mind Pyrrhus's argument that, since the natural is compelled, if Christ had two natural wills, he would be bereft of any voluntary motion. His response, which he supported by reference to the third chapter of Cyril's apology to Theodoret's accusations, was that none of the elements of the rational nature (*νοερὰ φύσις*) is subject to compulsion.[144]

[144] *Disputatio*, 293B—296A. For Cyril's text, see *PG* 76, 408A.

Comparing Maximus and Aristotle, Gauthier argued that the latter spoke of an irrational appetite (ὄ*ρεξις*), which is different from *θυμὸς* (anger) as well as from ἐπιθυμία (desire), but is still 'closed to the voice of reason'.[145]

[145] Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', 58.

Aristotle's ὄ*ρεξις* is not therefore to be identified with the faculty of will of which Maximus speaks, because will for Maximus is an ὄ*ρεξις* that is rational by nature.[146]

[146] Ibid. 78-9.

In addition, Gauthier argued that in Aristotle's concept of the soul there is only the rational part and the irrational, desiring part; the latter is the subject, and the former is the master. To give the privilege of deciding to desire, a privilege that would raise it to the level of will, would be for Aristotle impossible.[147]

[147] Ibid. 63. Gauthier remarks that Aristotle never elaborated on the concept of a natural faculty of will (ibid. 58). On the contrary, as George Charles Berthold has expressed it 'what is certain, however, is that in Maximus, perhaps for the first time, we see this vague Aristotelian appetite recognized as a full-fledged human faculty, the will' ('Freedom and Liberation in the Theology of Maximus the Confessor' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Catholic Institute of Paris, 1975), 153).

It seems that this could be done only if desire was associated with reason by nature,[148]

[148] Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', 63.

and this association was established by Maximus.[149]

[149] By contrast, Nemesius seems to follow Aristotle in saying that it is the mind that chooses: (Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis*, 114. 22-3).

Gauthier seems to be basically right, but perhaps fails to give due weight to the vital, instinctive aspects that Maximus integrates into his concept of the will. For Maximus, the faculty of will encapsulates both the irrational and the rational self-determining aspects of the human soul. Perhaps this reflects his conception of man as a microcosm, who incorporates elements from the irrational and the rational natures. It is important to note, however, that **end p.125** Maximus emphasizes the preponderance of the rational self-determining aspects of man's will over those which are irrational-impulsive. The latter are not denied a place, but are subject to the former, because, despite the fact that the latter are expressed without a prior decision or permission of the rational willer, whether or not they will be satisfied depends ultimately on him.[150]

[150] This can be deduced from what Maximus argues in *Disputatio*, 301A-304C.

Maximus developed his concept of the will for the purposes of his Christology. He attributes to Christ a human will, with all its vital and self-determining aspects. It is interesting, nevertheless, that Maximus believes that even the appearance of the natural desires for food, water, etc. in Christ are subject to a prior permission given by the Logos. Some monothelites exploited this teaching in order to support their monothelite option for the divine will, as has already been seen. But the teaching itself is not theirs; it belongs to an earlier tradition, which I do not intend to track down here. This teaching may seem unsatisfactory. Yet we must not characterize it as semi-docetic innovation too hastily. It

seems to have to do with the interpretation of Gospel passages, such as the narrative of the temptations, for, as Matthew's and Luke's Gospels read, Christ became hungry *after* he had fasted for forty days in the wilderness, which, for Gregory of Nyssa for instance, meant that Christ allowed his humanity to do what is proper to it, [151]

[151] Matt. 4: 2 and Luke 4: 2. See also Gregory of Nyssa's treatise *On the Beatitudes* (*PG* 44, 1237A, and Johannes F. Callahan (ed.), Gregorii Nysseni, *De Oratione Dominica, De Beatitudinibus* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 114. 7-8).

namely to feel hungry. It also concerns the intention of theologians, including Maximus, to emphasize the unity in Christ by showing that every human aspect of the life of Christ had a divine element to it, [152]

[152] On Maximus's teaching on this aspect of Christology, see e.g. *Disputatio*, 297D-300A.

as well as with the insight that the divine *will* of the *person* of the Logos is not subject to his human *nature* and its *natural* desires. [153]

[153] See *Ambiguum* 5, 1048D-1049A, 1053C, and Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 22. 51-2 and 27. 163-4.

The relationship between the vital, instinctive and the rational, self-determining aspects of the human will can be seen in Christ's prayer to his Father in Gethsemane. Christ's aversion to death is viewed by Maximus as an expression of his human will. [154]

[154] *Disputatio*, 297B-D.

But his decision to obey the will of the Father, a decision that plainly relates to the rational, self-determining aspect of the will, is seen as an expression of Christ's human will too, [155]

[155] See e.g. *Opusc*. 6, 68A, C.

and obviously the latter had the power to counteract the former. **end p.126**

3.5 The Willing Procedure

According to Maximus, the willing activity of man unfolds through several stages. Maximus presents these stages as follows:

Every rational being has a rational desire as a natural faculty, which is called will of the intellectual soul, in accordance with which we willingly (*θέλοντες*) think (*λογιζόμεθα*) and . . . wish (*βουλόμεθα*),

and . . . search , and consider (*σκεπτόμεθα*), and deliberate (*βουλευόμεθα*), and judge (*κρίνομεν*),

and are inclined towards (*διατιθέμεθα*), and choose/decide (*προαιρούμεθα*), and rush , and use (*κεχρήμεθα*). [156]

[156] *Disputatio*, 293B-C. In *Opusc*. 1, 21D-24A, there is the same description of the willing procedure, the only difference being that the stage which the verb *διατιθέμεθα* ('are inclined towards') signifies is not mentioned. Furthermore, in *Opusc*. 1, 12C-21C, Maximus analyses the distinct meanings of the terms *φυσικὸν θέλημα or θέλησις, βούλησις, βουλὴ or βούλευσις, προαίρεσις, γνώμη, ἐξουσία, δόξα, and φρόνημα or φρόνησις*, in order to shed light on the volitional procedure.

Scholars who have written books or articles on Maximus's anthropology have adequately dealt with the willing procedure and its stages, and have pointed out similarities and dissimilarities between Maximus and Aristotle, the Stoics and Nemesius of Emesa, who can be considered to be Maximus's predecessors. [157]

[157] For more on this issue, see Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', 57-82; Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 355-85; Prado, *Voluntad y Naturaleza*, esp. 183-214, 260-5; Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 218-26; Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 135-41.

The question that is relevant to the purposes of this book, however, is whether Christ was subject to this willing procedure to which all men are. Let us explore this question in brief.

In one of his opuscula, Maximus wrote that man is *by nature* (*φύσει) λογικός*, which means that he is also . [158]

[158] *Opusc*. 1, 24A-B.

Likewise, in the *Disputation* he argued that it is proper to man *by nature* to desire rationally, which means to search, deliberate, judge, etc. [159]

[159] *Disputatio*, 293C.

On the basis of these two passages, it would seem that, for Maximus, Christ, in so far as his human nature is concerned, is subject to the same willing procedure as all men. But the truth is otherwise. As we will see in following sections, Maximus believed that Christ is not subject to this procedure, because, if he were, he would be a mere man, subject to sinful ignorance, sinful passions, the possibility of committing sin, etc., all of which **end p.127** are excluded from him. [160]

[160] It should be briefly mentioned here that, for Maximus, if Christ had a deliberative (*βουλευτικ*ν) will, he would be a mere man, whereas if he had a gnomic and proairetic will, he would be mutable and a sinner (*Disputatio*, 329D). The attribution of *proairesis* to Christ would entail that Christ would be not passionless but abstemious (*Opusc*. 1, 28D), and that he could move not only in accordance to nature (*κατ φ*σιν) but also against it (*παρ φ*σιν), which is blasphemous (*Opusc*. 1, 29B).

Given this, a fuller exploration of the willing procedure is pertinent to studies of Maximus's anthropology, and so falls outside the parameters of this book.

3.6 Conclusions

The vital importance of Maximus's elaboration of the concept of the will can hardly be overestimated. As has been argued, Maximus was the first to raise the will to the state of a full-fledged faculty. [161]

[161] To what has been said already, it should be added that in a lecture at the University of London on 13 Jan. 1998, Richard Sorabji argued that Augustine was the first to raise the will to the stage of a full-fledged faculty in the West, whereas the first to do so in the East was Maximus. But Augustine's treatment of the will was perhaps not sufficiently shaped by *Christology*, but rather fell under the wider topic of the relationship between nature and grace, which has much bewildered Western theology up to our times, partly on account of the very treatment of the issue which Augustine bequeathed.

However, more important for the monothelite controversy were some of his distinctions: in particular, the distinction between the will as a faculty, on the one hand (*θλησις—θλημα*), and its object, on the other hand (*θελητ*ν—θελητ*ν), which supplied the terminological clarification that was necessary for a meaningful discourse on the question of whether in Christ there are two wills or one.

In addition, it is significant that Maximus emphasized the rational, self-determining aspect of the human will of Christ. By attributing to Christ a rational will, Maximus avoided a version of Apollinarianism on the level of the wills, which would see in Christ only a vital, instinctive human will, corresponding to the irrational part of the human soul. [162]

[162] In *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*, an extensive Chalcedonian-dyothelite florilegium, ed. Franz Diekamp (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1907; a 2nd edn. was edited by Basileios Phanourgakis and Evangelos Chrysos (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981)), Apollinarius is accused of having attributed to Christ only a *ζωτικ*ν (vital) soul and not a *νοερ* (rational) one (175. 26-176. 1). If Maximus had attributed only a *ζωτικ*ν (vital) will to Christ, corresponding to the *ζωτικ*ν (vital) soul, he would have supported a version of Apollinarianism on the level of Christ's human will.

If this were the case, the rational, self-determining aspect of our humanity would remain unassumed and unhealed, and the obedience of Christ to the Father to the point of death would be either a kind of fake dramatization or attributed to him as God. None of these, of course, can be accepted. **end p.128**

It has been mentioned that, for Maximus, Christ is not subject to the stages of the volitional procedure that are applicable to all men. But before moving on to the next section, we should raise the question of whether Maximus thereby removes Christ dangerously far from 'ordinary' human beings in a quasi-docetic way. In response to this, it must be said that Maximus seems to believe that ignorance and mutability are not essential parts of our nature, and do not define what humanity is. This allows him to claim that the saints will enjoy both immutability and fullness of knowledge eschatologically, [163]

[163] *Ambigua*, 1220A-C.

although they will remain, of course, authentic human beings. Likewise, Maximus argues that deliberation, which is due to ignorance, will be dispensed with eschatologically, because the truth will have then become apparent. [164]

[164] *Opusc*. 1, 24B-C.

He also argues that proairesis belongs to the law of our nature *that is prevalent now*: [165]

[165] Ibid.

namely, the law of our nature as it stands under the conditions of post-lapsarian sinfulness. Therefore, by arguing that Christ is not subject to the stages of the volitional procedure, as described above,

Maximus does not intend to render him less human, but merely to indicate his sinlessness, to stress that Christ's will was sinless, even though it was as human as ours. [166]

[166] In fact, Christ's human will was more human than ours exactly because it was sinless, for sin is not a defining characteristic of human nature but, on the contrary, its perversion and negation.

4. Maximus's Defence Of Dyothelite Christology

Maximus must have been alarmed from the very beginning by the endeavours of Patriarch Sergius and his collaborators to promote a Christology whose basic tenet was the doctrine of one energy and one will. It has been erroneously argued that Maximus did not differ substantially from the monothelites at first, as is ostensibly obvious from the undue warmth which characterizes his response to Pyrrhus's letter in which the latter asked for Maximus's opinion of the *Psēphos*. [167]

[167] See Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 59-64. For Maximus's letter to Pyrrhus (*Ep*. 19), see 589C-597B. According to Sherwood, this letter must have been written between the end of 633 and the beginning of 634 (*Annotated Date-List*, 37).

In fact, as Marcel Doucet has convincingly shown, Maximus was a dyothelite and dyoenergite throughout. [168]

[168] Doucet, 'Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?', 64-78, and *idem*, 'La Volonté humaine du Christ', 123-43.

In his reply to Pyrrhus, Maximus indeed used flattering words. But this was due to **end p.129** the fact that the *Psēphos* forbade the use of the expression 'one energy' upon which the union of 633 in Alexandria was established. In addition, as Maximus himself would write a few years later, his aim in flattering Pyrrhus was to facilitate his return to the orthodox faith. [169]

[169] *Opusc*. 9, 129C-132C. Moreover, it is well known that Maximus always used flattering words about his addressees, whereas he used to speak in a very humble way about himself.

However, as regards the doctrinal content of his letter and its terminology, Maximus followed the same lines of the dyoenergite Christology that he would confess consistently for the rest of his life. [170]

[170] Note, for instance, that Maximus wrote to Pyrrhus that Christ 'acted . . . through his flesh, which did not lack a natural energy' : *Ep*. 19, 593A. Maximus used this very phrase in *Ep*. 15, 573B (the epistle is dated by Sherwood between 634 and 640: *Annotated Date-List*, 40), which also points to his early dyoenergism.

Taking his cue from Sophronius, he opted for a moderate, diplomatic treatment of the whole issue, hoping to spare the Church the trouble of a doctrinal dispute, which could seriously have jeopardized its peace and unity. But the official promotion of monothelitism eventually obliged Maximus to launch a full-scale attack against the new heresy.

But what were Maximus's position and arguments? Maximus made repeated reference to the long-held connection between nature and will that had been established in Trinitarian theology. If a will introduced a person, and vice versa, there would be either one person in the Trinity, because of the one will, or three wills because of the three persons. If these wills were natural, we would have three Gods, whereas if they were 'gnomic', there would be an internal opposition in the Trinity, [171]

[171] See *Disputatio*, 289D-292A, and *Opusc*. 3, 52B-C.

which, for Maximus, was unacceptable.

According to Maximus, God created man self-determining by nature. [172]

[172] *Opusc*. 15, 157C.

The will is a quality of nature, [173]

[173] *Opusc*. 1, 28C.

and a characteristic of all those who share the same nature. [174]

[174] *Disputatio*, 293A; see also ibid. 304C-D.

Furthermore, the natural will is not a mere characteristic of the rational nature; far more than this, it is its first and foremost idiom. [175]

[175] *Opusc*. 3, 56A.

Deploying his 'Chalcedonian logic', Maximus argued that since every being which is rational by nature possesses a will, and since Christ had a rational soul, he had a natural human will too. [176]

[176] *Opusc*. 7, 77B.

Maximus raised the question of how it could be that the Logos became truly man without having a natural human **end p.130** will, and reached the conclusion that if the Logos did not have a natural human will, he did not become a true man, which means that he did not become a man at all. [177]

[177] *Opusc*. 3, 49A-B.

A nature without all its attributes is mere fantasy, [178]

[178] *Opusc*. 4, 61C.

so if Christ lacked any human natural idiom, he would be neither flesh nor man. [179]

[179] *Opusc*. 7, 76B.

For Maximus, the denial of Christ's human will has disastrous soteriological implications. If the Logos did not assume the self-determining power of the nature that he had created, 'he either condemned his own creation as something that is not good . . . or he begrudged us the healing of our will, depriving us of complete salvation and showing himself to be subject to passion, because he either did not want or could not save [us] completely'. [180]

[180] *Disputatio*, 325B.

Furthermore, Maximus remarked that if Adam ate willingly (*θέλων*), then the will is the first thing in us that became subject to passion (*πρωτοπαθῆς*). And since the will is the first thing in us that became subject to passion, if, according to them [the monothelites], the Word did not assume it along with the nature when he became incarnate, I have not become free from sin. And if I have not become free from sin, I was not saved, since whatever is not assumed is not saved. [181]

[181] Ibid. 325A. Maximus uses here the well-known axiom of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus that 'whatever is unassumed is unhealed'.

According to Maximus, the Logos became man not in order to distort the nature that he had created, but in order to deify it. [182]

[182] *Opusc*. 7, 77C.

However, the deification of the human nature and will does not mean its removal from its own being. In order to clarify this, Maximus uses the example of the glowing iron, where the fire makes the iron burn, without the latter ceasing to be what it is by nature. [183]

[183] *Opusc*. 16, 189C-192A.

Maximus tried to show the absurdity of monothelitism with syllogisms such as the following. If there were in Christ one natural will, it would characterize Christ's nature, and given that Christ's Father and mother are not Christ by nature, he would be consubstantial neither with his mother nor with his Father, which would entail polytheism (since Christ and the Father would have two different natures and natural wills, both being God). If the one will were gnomic, it would characterize Christ's hypostasis only, and **end p.131** therefore Christ would will differently from the Father and the Spirit, and would fight against them (he would be *ἑτερόβουλος Πατρί τε καὶ Πνεύματι . . . καὶ μαχόμενος*). If the one will belonged to Christ's divinity, his divinity would be subject to passion, willing to eat and to drink. If the one will were only human, the miracles would be inexplicable. And if the will were composite, which is absurd, corresponding to the whole Christ, it would again be different from the will of the Father, because the Father does not have a composite hypostasis to which a composite will would correspond. [184]

[184] *Opusc*. 3, 53C-56A.

Maximus took great pains to refute his opponents' arguments. He considered the argument that the human will necessarily opposes the divine erroneous. God created nature and everything that is natural, he argued, so if anything natural opposes God, he, and not nature, is to blame for having put into it the opposition against God. *Gnōmē* does not oppose God either, whenever it functions in accordance with nature. [185]

[185] *Opusc*. 7, 80A.

If the human will of Christ opposed the divine will on account of its existence, the human nature of Christ would oppose the Logos all the more. For the subject (the human nature) is much stronger than that which is in the subject (the human natural will). If the cause of the opposition were the number of the wills, number must be applied neither to the natures of Christ nor to the persons of the Trinity in order that opposition be avoided. [186]

[186] *Opusc*. 16, 193C-D.

Moreover, in opposition to his adversaries, Maximus claimed that difference does not necessarily imply contrariety. The human natural will is different from the divine, but does not oppose it. It is the gnomic will that opposes the divine will, but only when it moves against the logos of nature. On the contrary, there are times when we will by our gnomic will whatever God wills. [187]

[187] Ibid. 193A-B.

Why did the human will of Christ not oppose the divine will? As has already been implied, this was because the human will of Christ was natural, but not gnomic. For Maximus, as we shall see in one of the following sections of this book, the gnomic will is a form of actualization of the human natural will that is marked by sinfulness. Sin, not nature, is the cause of our rebellion against God, but Christ was free from both sin and rebellion against God. [188]

[188] *Opusc*. 4, 60A.

Moreover, according to Maximus, the natural human will of Christ did not oppose the divine will because it was fully deified, [189]

[189] *Opusc*. 20, 236D.

and because it was moved and modelled by the divinity of the Logos. [190]

[190] *Opusc*. 7, 81C-D. For more on this, see sect. 5 of this chapter.

Maximus had to refute many other monothelite arguments. Pyrrhus, for instance, argued that if the will is natural, then since each man has a different will and each man's own will changes (because he wills different things at **end p.132** different times), each man would have a different nature, and each man's own nature would change continuously. Maximus replied that what differs and changes is not the will, but the mode of willing. [191]

[191] *Disputatio*, 292D-293B.

Pyrrhus also argued that Christ had a human will not by essential appropriation, according to which we possess the attributes of our nature, but by relative appropriation, according to which we appropriate in a friendly manner what belongs to others, while this remains essentially alien to us. Maximus's response was that, since Christ had a human nature, and since man has by nature the faculty of will, Christ must have had this faculty too (by essential appropriation). [192]

[192] Ibid. 304A-305D. Maximus expressed similar thoughts in *Opusc*. 19, 220B-221A. The distinction between essential and relative appropriation was drawn by Maximus himself.

Pyrrhus's view that the human will existed in Christ by reason of an aptitude was considered by Maximus to be Nestorian, as implying progress in Christ. [193]

[193] *Disputatio*, 313A-B. Pyrrhus had already accepted that this aptitude exists in us according to nature , which, for Maximus, meant that by implication the will must also be natural (ibid.). Maximus's as well as other Fathers', objection to the idea of Christ's progress should not be misunderstood. What they were really afraid of in objecting to it was a progressive development in virtue and wisdom that would correspond to a progressive union with God—since wisdom and virtue are results of man's unity with God—which, in turn, would carry Nestorian overtones. Maximus would not object to Christ's following the natural course of development that characterizes human beings in other respects.

When Pyrrhus told him that the natural is compelled, and that if Christ had natural wills, he would be bereft of every voluntary motion, Maximus responded that this is wrong, because neither the uncreated nature nor the intellectual created nature is subject to natural compulsion. [194]

[194] Ibid. 293B-296A. As has already been said, Maximus supported this position by reference to the third chapter of Cyril's apology in response to Theodoret's accusations (see *PG* 76, 408A).

At one point, Pyrrhus asked Maximus whether the flesh of the Logos was not moved by his command

. Maximus wittingly turned the tables on Pyrrhus by characterizing this view as Nestorian—a very clever move on the part of Maximus, who was constantly accused of being Nestorian himself—on the grounds that it implies that the humanity of Christ has the same kind of relationship with the Logos as the saints who were moved by his command. [195]

[195] *Disputatio*, 297A-B.

Maximus also refuted the argument of the monothelite deacon Theodore that Saint Gregory of Nazianzus and Saint Athanasius had placed will and ignorance in the same category, and that both belong to Christ merely by (relative) appropriation. According to Theodore and Paul, the attribution of will to Christ would also entail the attribution of ignorance to him, and this would amount to endorsing the condemned Nestorianizing heresy of the *Agnoētai*. Maximus argued that Gregory had not connected will and **end p.133** ignorance, and pointed out the absurdity of the connection. If this connection were correct, Maximus argued, those who will by nature would be ignorant, and vice versa, which means that God, who wills according to his nature, would be subject to the passion of ignorance. [196]

[196] See Theodore's argument in *Opusc*. 19, 216B-C, and Maximus's response in *Opusc*. 19, 217B-224B.

To the argument that Christ had a human will only at the time of the passion, because only then did he mention it, Maximus responded that, by the same token, Christ cannot have had a human mind because he never mentioned it. [197]

[197] *Opusc*. 16, 196C-197B.

In addition, when, in exile, Maximus was told that he could believe anything he wanted in his heart without openly confessing it, he responded by reference to Matthew 10: 32 and Romans 10: 10 that the open confession of Christ and of the orthodox faith is obligatory. [198]

[198] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 165A-C, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 137. 695-139. 712; cf. *Disputatio Bizyae*, 144B-145A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 89. 175-91, 206.

Maximus rejected Pyrrhus's argument that the connection between essence and energy, which parallels the connection between essence and will and accounts for dyoenergism, applies only to theology and not to economy, by pointing to the fact that the Logos is the same before the incarnation (theology) and after the incarnation (economy). [199]

[199] *Disputatio*, 348C-349B.

Maximus also denied the validity of Pyrrhus's argument that we should speak of one energy, on the grounds that the human energy is passive by contrast with the divine. Although he conceded that self-movement pertains only to God, he held that it is wrong to characterize human energy as passion by contrast with the divine. [200]

[200] It is interesting that in one of his *Ambigua* Maximus refers to the 'passive power' (παθητικὴν δύναμιν) of the humanity of the Logos, by which he probably means the human energy of the Logos (*Ambiguum* 6, 1060B).

If this were the case, Maximus argued, those who accept only one nature in Christ would justifiably do so because human nature would also be passive by contrast with the divine nature. Moreover, according to this logic, human nature could be characterized as evil by contrast with the divine, which is good, and so on. [201]

[201] *Disputatio*, 349C-352A.

Another line of argument that Maximus frequently followed was to show that the alleged one will could not be given a proper name. [202]

[202] See e.g. *Opusc*. 1, 25D-29C; *Opusc*. 3, 53C-56A; *Opusc*. 8, 100A-B, etc.

For instance, in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus criticized the tergiversations of Patriarch Sergius with regard to the status of the alleged one will. Once **end p.134** Sergius allied himself to those who took it to be divine; this, Maximus claimed, amounts to Christ being only God. At another time, he accepted the view of those who characterized it as deliberative, which suggests that Christ is a mere man, who deliberates as we do. On another occasion, Sergius described it as 'hypostatic', which introduces a divergence on the level of will between the persons of the Trinity. Then again, he accepted the opinion of those who say that it is dominating (ἐξουσιαστικόν), which implies Nestorianism. [203]

[203] As is well known, Nestorius had used the word ἐξουσία in connection with the unity of Christ (see e.g. Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 224. 5-10).

At another time, he admitted the opinion of those who called it proairetic and gnomic, which implies that the Lord is not only a mere man, but that he is also mutable and a sinner. Yet, finally, he expressed the view that it is economic, which suggests that before the incarnation Christ had no will. [204]

[204] *Disputatio*, 329C-332A.

Moreover, in one of his *Opuscula*, Maximus argued that there is no name that applies to the alleged one will of Christ. If we call it theandric or composite, it will differ from the will of the Father and of the Spirit. If we call it natural, we will confuse Christ's natures. If we call it hypostatic, we will introduce three different wills in the Trinity corresponding to the three hypostases. If we call it relative, we will introduce the personal division of Nestorius. [205]

[205] It is well known that the union that Nestorius ascribed to Christ was called by the anti-Nestorians 'relative'. Thus, Maximus seems to imply here that one relative will would imply a Nestorian relative union.

If the alleged one will were against nature (παρὰ φύσιν), it would destroy the existence of him who wills. If, finally, we call it anonymous, this would be absurd. [206]

[206] *Opusc*. 24, 268D-269C.

In addition, Maximus argued that none of the Fathers had ever spoken of one will of Jesus Christ. [207]

[207] Patristic passages suggesting that Christ had one energy, and how Maximus dealt with them, will be discussed in Ch. 4.

The monothelites had tried rather unsuccessfully to find patristic excerpts that would substantiate the doctrine of one will. At a relatively advanced stage of the controversy, Pyrrhus was able to mention only four such excerpts, the most important and most often cited of which was by Gregory of Nazianzus. [208]

[208] This was during the disputation between Maximus and Pyrrhus in 645.

That excerpt reads: 'for his [Christ's] will is not opposed to God, because it is wholly deified'. [209]

[209] Sermon 30, 12 (*PG* 36, 117C, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 248. 5-6).

Maximus was able to turn the tables on his opponents by arguing that this passage indicates end p.135 dyothelitism, for it speaks of two wills, the deifying (divine) and the deified (human). [210]

[210] *Opusc*. 3, 48A-B; *Opusc*. 20, 236A; *Disputatio*, 316C-D.

'Otherwise, if the deification of the (human) will [of Christ] opposes the belief that there are [in Christ] two wills, as they say, the deification of the [human] nature [of Christ, which was taken for granted] will oppose the belief that there are two natures,' [211]

[211] *Disputatio*, 316D. For comments on the Gregory passage, see also *Opusc*. 4, 61A-C; *Opusc*. 6, 65A-68A, where Maximus points out the conformity of Christ's human will to the divine will; *Opusc*. 7, 81C-D; *Opusc*. 15, 160D-161A, 176A, where the passage is cited in order to support the two wills doctrine; *Opusc*. 20, 233B-237C, etc.

which would be for Maximus and his opponents unacceptable. Another passage which was discussed was by Athanasius, and mentioned that the will belonged only to the divinity. However, Maximus demonstrated on several occasions that the Athanasian passage refers to the divine will, which caused the incarnation and, therefore, does not indicate one will after the incarnation but before the incarnation. [212]

[212] In fact, the passage is from Pseudo-Athanasius's treatise *Contra Apollinarem*, and can be found in *PG* 26, 1149A. In *Opusc*. 20, 237C-244C, Maximus interpreted the Pseudo-Athanasian passage, and then used it to argue that by the expression 'one will' Honorius meant what Athanasius did. For the interpretation of the passage of pseudo-Athanasius, see also *Disputatio*, 320B-C. Generally, for the use of the Fathers in the monothelite controversy, see the interesting remarks of Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 183-95.

Furthermore, Maximus supported his dyothelite Christology by arguing, first, that the Fathers had spoken of two wills and two energies in Christ and, second, that the teaching of one will and energy had been promoted by various strands of heresy. In an extensive florilegium, Maximus provided passages from Fathers such as Athanasius, [213]

[213] *Opusc*. 15, 160C-D. The passage is from Pseudo-Athanasius's *De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos*, which in the seventh century was attributed to Athanasius; in fact, it is in all probability by Marcellus of Ankara (see Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 237, and Papadopoulos, Πατρολογία, ii. 351), and can be found in *PG* 26, 1021B-C.

Gregory of Nazianzus, [214]

[214] *Opusc*. 15, 160D-161A. It is the famous passage from the *Theological Oration 30*, 12, *PG* 36, 117C, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 248. 1-250. 9; for some of the following citations, Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, has been consulted.

Gregory of Nyssa, [215]

[215] Maximus offers four passages from Gregory of Nyssa. The first (*Opusc*. 15, 161A-B) is from his sermon *On the Resurrection of Christ* (*PG* 46, 616C, and ed. E. Gebhardt, *Op*. ix. 1, 292. 13-17). The second (*Opusc*. 15, 161B) is from the same sermon (*PG* 46, 616C-D, and ed. E. Gebhardt, ibid. 292. 17-22). The third (*Opusc*. 15, 161B) is from his second sermon against Eunomius (*PG* 45, 548C-D, and ed. W. Jaeger ii, 368. 9-13). The fourth (*Opusc*. 15, 161B-C) is from his treatise against Apollinarius (*PG* 45, 1193B-1196A, and ed. Müller, *Op*. iii. 1, 181. 18-27).

John Chrysostom, [216]

[216] *Opusc*. 15, 161C-164D. Saint John's text can be found in *PG* 48, 765-6.

Cyril of Alexandria, [217]

[217] Maximus cites two passages from Cyril. The first (*Opusc*. 15, 164D-165A) is from his *Thesaurus* (*PG* 75, 397A), the second (*Opusc*. 15, 165A) from his *Commentary on John* (*PG* 73, 541A).

and **end p.136** Severianus of Gabala, [218]

[218] *Opusc*. 15, 165A-B. The passage can be found in Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 119. 10-120. 3.

in order to support his dyothelitism, and from Ambrosius, [219]

[219] Maximus gives a text (*Opusc*. 15, 165C-168A) which is a paraphrase of Ambrosius's *De Fide*, ii, 8. 91-8 (*PL* 16, 598A-B, and CSEL, 78 (1962), 81.

Cyril of Jerusalem, [220]

[220] *Opusc*. 15, 168A. The text is Pseudo-Cyrillian and is found in *PG* 33, 1181B.

Leo of Rome, [221]

[221] *Opusc*. 15, 168A-B. This is an extract from Pope Leo's epistle 28 to Flavian of Constantinople, the famous *Tome of Leo* (*PL* 54, 767A-B, and Eduardus Schwartz (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, tome 2, i, pt. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1933), 14. 27-15. 1).

John Chrysostom, [222]

[222] Maximus attributes two passages to Saint John. The first (*Opusc*. 15, 168B-C) is in Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 92. 2-10. The second (*Opusc*. 15, 168C) is pseudo-Chrysostomian and is in *PG* 59, 500. 10-14.

and Cyril of Alexandria, [223]

[223] *Opusc*. 15, 168C-169A. The excerpt is from Cyril's *Thesaurus*, *PG* 75, 453B-C.

in order to support his dyoenergism. In addition, he cited passages from Apollinarian heretics such as Apollinarius [224]

[224] Maximus cites three excerpts from Apollinarius. For the first (*Opusc*. 15, 169B-C), see Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 218. 21-4. For the second (*Opusc*. 15, 169C), see ibid. 232. 29-32. For the third (*Opusc*. 15, 169C-D), see ibid. 233. 2-8.

and Polemon, [225]

[225] Maximus gives two excerpts from Polemon. For the first (*Opusc*. 15, 169D-172A), see Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 274. 6-12, and for the second (*Opusc*. 15, 172A-B), see Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 275. 22-6.

from anti-Chalcedonians such as Themistius, [226]

[226] Maximus gives two passages from Themistius (*Opusc*. 15, 172B, and 172B-C, respectively). To the best of my knowledge, neither excerpt is found in any other source.

and from Nestorians such as Theodore of Mopsuestia, [227]

[227] Theodore's passage (*Opusc*. 15, 172D-173A) is in *PG* 66, 1004D. It is clear that the monothelitism and monenergism expressed in this passage are not of a physical but an ethical character (Theodore stated that the unity is *οὐ λέγω φύσεως, ἀλλ' εὐδοκίας).*

Nestorius, [228]

[228] Maximus cites two excerpts by Nestorius. For the first (*Opusc*. 15, 173A-B), see Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 224. 5-10, and for the second (*Opusc*. 15, 173B), see Loofs (ed.), *Nestoriana*, 224. 12-15.

and Paul the Persian, [229]

[229] *Opusc*. 15, 173B-C. For this excerpt, cf. Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, iii and M. Geerard and J. Noret, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum Supplementum* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 7014.

in which they support the one will and/or energy doctrine. Furthermore, in other places Maximus accused Arius and Severus of monothelitism, but without citing any passages from their works. [230]

[230] Maximus seems to associate Arius with monothelitism in *Opusc*. 1, 28B; *Opusc*. 8, 97B-C; and *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 148B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 99. 268-70; he unambiguously associates Arius with monothelitism in *Disputatio*, 300D, and with monothelitism and monenergism in *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 165D, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 139. 729-141. 732. Maximus's attribution of monothelitism and monenergism to Severus is constant (see e.g. *Opusc*. 3, 45C, 49B, 56A; and *Opusc*. 16, 204C-D). It is interesting that Maximus attributes to some Severan bishops whom he met in Crete, and through them to Severus himself, a teaching on the wills and the energies of Christ that is very close to what the *Ekthesis* says; (for this, as well as Maximus's refutation of Severus's/*Ekthesis*'s doctrine, see *Opusc*. 3, 49C-56D).

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Apart from the patristic citations, Maximus provided numerous scriptural citations in support of his dyothelite Christology. When Pyrrhus asked him whether he could prove the correctness of his dyothelite and dyoenergite Christology by reference to Scripture, Maximus responded positively: 'For the Fathers were not moved by their own opinions, but rather having learned from the Scriptures, they taught this to us as well, out of love for man. For it was not they who were speaking, but the grace of the Spirit which had completely interpenetrated them,' he claimed. [231]

[231] *Disputatio*, 320D. With regard to the importance which Maximus and the Church of his era attached to the use of Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils, the following remark of J. Pelikan is very apposite: 'Scripture was supreme, but only if it was interpreted in a spiritual and orthodox way. The fathers were normative, but only if they were harmonized with one another and related to the Scripture from which they drew. The councils were decisive, but only as voices of the one apostolic and prophetic and patristic doctrine': see J. Pelikan, ' "Council or Fathers or Scripture": The Concept of Authority in the Theology of Maximus the Confessor', in D. Neiman and M. Schatkin (eds.), *The Heritage of the Early Church*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973), 287; cited by Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 186.

In order to prove that Christ had a human will, Maximus pointed to scriptural passages according to which Christ willed to go to Galilee, [232]

[232] John 1: 43. For the translation of New Testament passages I have consulted, but not always followed, the New King James Version.

willed his disciples to be with him where he is, [233] ([233] John 17: 24.) did not will to drink sour wine mingled with gall, [234] ([234] Matt. 27: 34.) did not want to walk in Judea, [235] ([235] John 7: 1.) did not want anyone to know when he passed through Galilee, [236] ([236] Mark 9: 30.) went to the region of Tyre and Sidon and entered a house and did not want anyone to know it, though he could not be hidden, [237]

[237] Mark 7: 24. Maximus's rationale is that the fact that Christ did not manage to pass unnoticed shows that it was by his human will that he willed to pass unnoticed, because his divine will is omnipotent (see *Disputatio*, 321C-D).

wanted to pass by his disciples walking on the sea, [238]

[238] Mark 6: 48.

and became obedient to the point of death. [239]

[239] Phil. 2: 8. Maximus adds that Christ obeyed willingly (*θέλων*: *Disputatio*, 324A-B). In the aforementioned scriptural citations, the verb *θέλω* (to will) is always used.

The refrain that follows almost all these citations is: 'therefore he [Christ] possessed the faculty of will (he was *θελητικός*) according to his being man'.

Maximus also cited the question that the disciples addressed to Christ, 'where do you want (*θέλεις*) us to go and prepare, that you may eat the Passover?', [240]

[240] Mark 14: 12; cf. Matt. 26: 17, Luke 22: 9.

as an additional reference to his human will. [241]

[241] For the aforementioned citations, as well as Maximus's comments on them, see *Disputatio*, 320D-324B.

Moreover, he cited a part of Psalm 39 that refers prophetically to Christ who willed **end p.138** (*βουλήθην*) to do the will (*θέλημα*) of his God. [242]

[242] Ps. 39 (40): 8. Maximus mentioned that the apostle (Paul) in the epistle to the Hebrews (see Heb. 10: 6-7) understood this passage of the psalm as referring to the Lord (*Disputatio*, 324C).

'But the Father is said to be Christ's God not according to Christ's being God but according to his being man', which, for Maximus, proves that the psalm refers to the human will of Christ. [243]

[243] *Disputatio*, 324B-C.

Maximus mentioned finally the fact that man was created in the image of God, [244]

[244] Gen. 1: 26.

which implies that he is self-determining (*αὐτεξούσιος*), like God. [245]

[245] *Disputatio*, 324C-D.

This, in turn, implies, for Maximus, that Christ has two wills, a divine self-determining will and a human self-determining will, because self-determination (which characterizes his two natures) and will are identical. [246]

[246] Ibid. 324D.

In order to prove that Christ had a divine will too, Maximus considered it sufficient to cite Luke 13: 34 and John 5: 21. [247]

[247] Ibid. 325B-328A. Most of the just mentioned citations can also be found in *Opusc*. 15, 157C-160B.

It seems that he did not have to insist on proving that Christ had a divine will, for what was at stake in the monothelite controversy was rather the *human* will of Christ and, along with it, the integrity of his *human* nature.

Perhaps not all of Maximus's arguments are satisfactory and convincing. For instance, his argument that Pyrrhus's position that the flesh was moved by the command of the Logos implies Nestorianism is perhaps less than convincing. His view that there is no proper name for the alleged one will of Christ presupposed his having defined *gnōmē* and *proairesis* in such a way as to render them inapplicable to Christ, as we shall see later in detail. Moreover, at times Maximus was somewhat inconsistent. Thus he argued in some of his earlier writings that the expression 'one energy' can be accepted if it is used to denote the unity of the two natural energies, but later denied it, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 4.

In addition, the apodictic force of some of his citations is not as strong as he would wish. For example, the patristic passages referring to Gethsemane suggest a different kind of dyothelitism from

that of Maximus, as will be seen shortly. Additionally, some of the passages are not authentic, as has been shown already. [248]

[248] Among the opuscula of Maximus is a florilegium with definitions of 'will', attributed to various Fathers (see *Opusc*. 26, 276B-280A; see also a definition attributed to Clement of Alexandria in *Disputatio*, 317C). However, these definitions are not authentic, as J. D. Madden ('Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will', *passim*) has shown.

As to the passages taken from Nestorian writers, they seem to be misread, for, as has already been argued, the Nestorians did not put forward a physical monothelitism: that is, they did not suggest that Christ had one will as a natural faculty, as Maximus implied. Rather, they seem to have **end p.139** put forward an ethical monothelitism, suggesting that Jesus and the Logos always shared the same object of willing.

However, on the whole, the orthodoxy of Maximus's position is apparent. The attribution of a divine will and energy to Christ reflected a well-established belief which pointed to the divinity of Christ and which the monothelites did not deny. Maximus's characterization of the will and the energy as natural attributes was founded on a principle of Trinitarian theology, according to which the three persons of the Trinity have one, common, and hence, as Maximus pointed out, natural will and energy, which the monothelites did not deny either. More importantly, Maximus argued that all human beings possess a will, which proves that the will is a common, hence natural, characteristic—although it is particularized in different personal ways [249]

[249] More will be said on this in following sections.

—and believed that if Christ did not have a human will, he would not be a real man. [250]

[250] It is noteworthy that, with regard to the two wills of Christ, Jacques Dupuis has argued that 'in fact, the human will of Christ is the one will that is his personally, while the divine will is common in the Godhead to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, even as the divine nature is common to them'; Jacques Dupuis, S.J., *Who Do You Say I Am?: Introduction to Christology* (New York: Orbis Books, 1994), 100.

Maximus is right in claiming that the Christology of the monothelites did not pay sufficient attention to the integrity of the humanity of Christ and to Chalcedon's 'without confusion'. He is also right in arguing that if Christ did not have two distinct wills—namely, a human will next to his divine will—then a basic aspect of our humanity would have been left unassumed, or would have been confused with the divinity, and this would have endangered not only the reality of the humanity of Christ and his consubstantiality with us, but also the reality of our salvation.

We have seen that Maximus not only appealed to the authority of the Fathers and the Councils, but also referred to many passages in Scripture. The most central and most hotly disputed scriptural passage in the monothelite controversy was the prayer of Christ to his Father in Gethsemane, to which we will now turn.

4.1 The Interpretation Of the Gethsemane Prayer Prior To and During the Monothelite Controversy

The prayer of Jesus to the Father in Gethsemane is one of those scriptural passages which were central to doctrinal disputes in which no less than the very identity of the Christian faith was at stake. It was repeatedly used to support divergent doctrinal positions, and its interpretations quite often reflect **end p.140** different doctrinal priorities. This passage and its interpretation by some of the Fathers were repeatedly mentioned during the monothelite controversy, not only by Maximus, but also, as we have seen, by his opponents. In order to understand its role in the controversy, as well as the importance of the interpretation offered by Maximus, we must briefly explore the different ways in which it was interpreted prior to the seventh century.

It seems that the Gethsemane prayer first came to the fore of doctrinal disputes in the fourth century. In the context of anti-Arian polemics, two different lines of interpretation of the prayer were put forward. The first belongs to Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, who devoted a short passage of one of his so-called *Theological Orations* to its interpretation. [251]

[251] See Gregory's Oration 30, 12 (*PG* 36, 117C-120B, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours 27-31*, 248. 1-252. 38).

Saint Gregory's aim was to attack the Arian position, according to which the Son had a different will from the Father, as, for instance, John 6: 38 ('I have come down from heaven not in order to do my own will but the will of he who sent me') and the Gethsemane prayer seem to indicate. According to

the Arians, if the Son had a different will from the Father, he would be of a different substance from the Father. [252]

[252] On this, see also Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 29-33, and Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 76.

According to Gregory's interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, Christ spoke to the Father on our behalf. The opposition between the will of the Father and the will of the Son merely brings to expression the opposition of our will to the will of God. It is not Christ who has a (*human*) will that opposes the will of the Father, but us. However, but us. However, for Gregory, this is the case *not because Christ did not have a human will*, but because his human will was deified and so did not oppose the will of God, as our will does most of the time.

Despite the fact that Saint Gregory acknowledged the existence of a human will in Christ, [253]

[253] Gregory wrote that the (human) will of Christ is wholly deified, which implies, for Léthel, that, for Gregory, Christ's will is 'toute divine' (wholly divine) (*Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 34). Based on this, Léthel argued that Saint Gregory was a monothelite (ibid. 29-35). Thus, Léthel accepted the erroneous interpretation of Gregory put forward by the monothelites. Maximus, on the contrary, argued that to speak of a deified will implies two wills: the divine and the deified human (*Opusc*. 3, 48A-B). Léthel's view has been successfully refuted by Doucet ('Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?', 54-6). Farrell adopted Léthel's misinterpretation of Gregory without being aware of Doucet's criticism (*Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 76-8).

his interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer is problematic. It does not take seriously the genuine character of Christ's predicament, which is expressed in his prayer. It does not recognize that Christ's will not to die belongs essentially to his humanity, even though it is overcome by **end p.141** his decision to obey the will of the Father. His view that Christ in Gethsemane merely expresses our human will, which opposes God, may have partly inspired the monothelite thesis that Christ possesses our will only by (relative) appropriation.

In the context of anti-Arian polemics, a second type of interpretation of the passage developed. In his *Contra Arianos III*, [254]

[254] This treatise was perhaps written *c*.338 (see Papadopoulos, Πατρολογία, 311).

Athanasius attributed the shrinking in the face of the passion to the flesh, and the fiat to the Logos. Moreover, he linked the words of Christ, 'O my Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me', with his rebuke to Peter: 'you are not mindful of the things of God but of the things of men', [255]

[255] Matt. 16: 23; Mark 8: 33.

in which the refusal of the passion is related to humanity ('the things of men'), submission to it to God. [256]

[256] For the Athanasian passage, see *PG* 26, 441B-C.

A second text, entitled *De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos*, which, as we have already seen, in the seventh century was attributed to Athanasius but which modern research attributes to Marcellus of Ankara, [257]

[257] See Papadopoulos, Πατρολογία, 351.

gives a similar interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer. [258]

[258] See *PG* 26, 1021B-1024A.

This text clearly mentions two wills. The human will of Christ shrinks from the passion due to the weakness (ἀσθένεια) of the flesh, whereas the divine will is willing (πρόθυμον) (to obey the Father). The writer of this text related the Gethsemane passage not only to the rebuke that Christ addressed to Peter (which is here quoted fully, i.e. including the phrases 'get behind me Satan! You are an offence to me'), [259]

[259] Matt. 16: 23; cf. Mark 8: 33.

but also to Christ's admonition to the disciples, pronounced between the first and second of his addresses to the Father during the Gethsemane prayer, according to which 'the spirit is willing (πρόθυμον), but the flesh is weak (ἀσθενής)'. [260]

[260] Matt. 26: 41; Mark 14: 38.

A third text belongs to Gregory of Nyssa's extensive treatise against Apollinarius. Gregory acknowledges two wills, the divine to which belongs the fiat, and the human, which he characterizes as weak. Gregory draws the same link as Marcellus between the words in Gethsemane and the admonition to the disciples (although he omits the rebuke to Peter), and argues that the fiat indicates the identity of will between the Father and the Son, which is due to their communion of nature. [261]

[261] *PG* 45, 1193C-1196A, and Müller (ed.), *Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora*, 181. 14-182. 5. Gregory used the words βούλημα and θέλημα. He also spoke of appropriation, but it seems that by this he meant, to employ Maximus's distinction, essential appropriation. **end p.142**

The interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer given in these three texts is highly problematic. [262]

[262] Maximus cites a passage by Severianus which seems to be addressed to heretics who denied the reality of Christ's body, and which is very close to the three aforementioned texts. According to Severianus, the agony, shrinking, sadness, and fear of Christ belong to his body, because divinity is passionless. Severianus mentions that the spirit is willing, whereas the flesh is weak, and concludes that the Gethsemane prayer points to two wills, the divine and the human. From the structure and the content of the passage, it seems that the last sentence, which refers to the two wills, may not be part of Severianus's authentic text. For the text, see *Opusc*. 15, 165A-B; see also Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 119. 10-120. 3, and Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 292. 1-9.

To the human will of Christ is attributed only the refusal of the cup. If it is assumed that this refusal is taken to be *only* an instinctive one, a quasi-Apollinarian approach to the Gethsemane prayer can be detected, since the rational aspect of the human will of Christ is left out of account, although it is not explicitly denied. But if the refusal of the cup is an expression of the whole human will of Christ (*including its rational element*), which ostensibly succumbed to the weakness of the flesh rather than obeying the will of God, a dangerous opposition between the Logos and his humanity is implied, an opposition that leads irreversibly to Nestorianism. In these texts, not only does Christ not pronounce his fiat as man, but also, as the link which our texts establish between Jesus' prayer and his admonition to the disciples shows, he seems to have given in to temptation, in accordance with what the full admonition in both Matthew and Mark reads: 'watch and pray, lest you enter into temptation, for the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak'. Furthermore, the parallelism between the humanity of Christ and Peter is also problematic. Jesus characterizes Peter as Satan, and to put Satan, Peter, and Jesus in the same category (since all three oppose the will of God vis-à-vis the passion) is unacceptable. Therefore, despite their positive elements, none of these three texts offers a satisfactory interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer. [263]

[263] It must be stressed, however, that the interpretations put forward by our texts is conditioned by the exigencies of the Arian controversy. Understandably, little attention is paid to matters of Christology, whereas the question of Christ's wills is not tackled in a definitive doctrinal way. As G. L. Prestige has remarked with regard to patristic theology, 'it is true that on occasion, in order to meet the arguments of some particular opponent, a theologian might employ a line of reasoning which failed to imply the full truth': *God in Patristic Thought* (London: SPCK, 1956), 265.

Let us now move on to Cyril and John Chrysostom. A text taken from Cyril's *Thesaurus* [264]

[264] *PG* 75, 396D-397B.

is partly quoted by Maximus, and bears some similarities to the previously mentioned three texts. Cyril argues that the shrinking belongs to the flesh and not to the Logos, and mentions Christ's words, according to which the flesh is weak whereas the spirit is willing. In Cyril's **end p.143** text, it is plain that the Logos wanted to carry out the will of the Father. However, it is also possible that Cyril attributed the fiat to Christ as man. This can be deduced mainly from the concluding part of the passage, according to which the Logos said *as man*, 'not as I will, but as you will'. [265]

[265] Ibid. 397A-B.

The same ambiguity as to whether it is the Logos as God or as man who pronounced the fiat occurs in Cyril's discussion of the Gethsemane prayer in his *Commentary on John's Gospel*. [266]

[266] *PG* 73, 529A-544C.

In this *Commentary*, however, Cyril mentions that his enemies tell him: 'do not tell us *again* . . . that [Christ] obeys as man', [267]

[267] *PG* 73, 533A.

which shows that, according to them, for Cyril the obedience of Christ to the Father pertains to him as man. If this is applied to the Gethsemane prayer, the attribution by Cyril of the fiat to Christ as man becomes all the stronger.

The last orthodox writer to be commented upon here is Saint John Chrysostom. It is possible that Saint John hinted that the fiat belonged to Christ as man, at least according to his treatise devoted to the interpretation of Jesus's prayer to the Father in Gethsemane. [268]

[268] Ibid. 31-40, esp. 40. It is interesting that Chrysostom says that, according to the wording of the passage, it seems that there were in Christ two wills in opposition (δύο θελήματα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις: 36). But he finally accepts

that the will (βούλημα) of the Father and of the Son is the same. The word βούλημα used here perhaps suggests that Chrysostom refers to the decision of the Son to conform his will to the will of the Father, so that their object of willing (βούλημα) proves to be the same ultimately (40).

In another treatise, Saint John admitted that the two opposing wills suggested by the Gethsemane passage do not belong to the Father and to the Son as God, but to the Father and to the flesh of the Son. Yet, the flesh is not to be accused, for to desire to avoid death is natural and blameless. [269]

[269] *PG* 48, 765-6, cited by Maximus in *Opusc*. 15, 164A-D.

Let us now consider a few instances of interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer by theologians who were exponents of unorthodox tendencies in Christology. From the Nestorian bloc comes an interesting interpretation, proposed by Theodoret of Cyrus as part of his criticism of the twelve anathemas of Cyril. In this passage, Theodoret seems to attribute the fiat to 'the form of the servant'

. However, since in this passage Theodoret uses the Nestorian distinction between two personal subjects, the Logos and 'the form of the servant', his interpretation is problematic. [270]

[270] *PG* 76, 409B-413A. In his retort, Cyril was no clearer as to whether the fiat belongs to Christ as God or as man (ibid. 413A-417C).

Maximus quotes two excerpts by monophysite writers. The first is by Apollinarius. Apollinarius denied that the Gethsemane prayer introduces two wills, and argued that the will in Christ is one. 'This will wants to avoid death, in a manner that pertains to economy, but is realized in a manner that

end p.144

pertains to divinity [in accepting death].' This was so, for Apollinarius, because there was no difference of wills in the flesh-bearer God. [271]

[271] *Opusc*. 15, 169C-D.

The second excerpt comes from the anti-Chalcedonian, Themistius:

We should not attribute two wills (*θελήσεις*) to Christ by reason of the fact that Saint Athanasius said that Christ showed two wills (*θελήματα*) at the time of the passion. All the more, we should not accept two wills fighting each other . . . but we should piously know that Emmanuel, being one, had one will, which moved at times in a human way and at other times in a divine-like way. [272]

[272] Ibid. 172B. Themistius refers to the Pseudo-Athanasian text previously mentioned (*PG* 26, 1021B). For a similar interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer by Themistius, see *Opusc*. 15, 172C.

The problem with these two passages is that the emphasis they place on the unity of Christ's volitional activity jeopardizes the distinctiveness of his two wills and, subsequently, of his two natures, at the cost of the integrity of his human nature (this is clearly the case with Apollinarius). It is not at all surprising that Themistius suggests this interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, given the monophysitizing and, at any rate, asymmetrical thrust of anti-Chalcedonian Christology, which already tended towards monothelitism and monenergism before the seventh century. It is even less surprising to encounter such an interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer by Apollinarius, whose monophysitism and monothelitism are to be taken for granted.

Summing up the tradition of the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer up to the seventh century, we should note that, with the exception of Cyril and Chrysostom, who may have given a satisfactory interpretation of the prayer, such interpretation either dispensed with the reality of Christ's desire to avoid the cup (Gregory of Nazianzus), or suggested a kind of monothelitism in order to strengthen the unity of Christ (Apollinarius and Themistius), or allowed for an opposition between the denial of the cup by the flesh [273]

[273] Doucet has argued that, for Maximus, Christ's repulsion in the face of death 'est du niveau rationel' ('La Volonté humaine du Christ', 135; see also 132-4). Doucet appeals to Balthasar, who is of the same opinion, and who points out that in *Opusc*. 19, 224C, Maximus uses the term *boulēsis*, which belongs to the realm of reason, in relation to Christ's wish to avoid death. The position of Doucet and Balthasar has some grounds, because, for Maximus, the will is a unity of instinctive and rational elements. However, it seems that, for Maximus, Christ's desire to avoid death is basically an expression of the instinctive inclination to life and aversion to pain and death. As to their argument with regard to the use of the term *boulēsis*, both scholars have failed to notice that in *Opusc*. 19, 224C, Maximus basically repeats an axiom of Gregory of Nyssa, which relates *boulēsis* and *physis* (nature).

For the passage of Gregory, see *PG* 45, 1192B, and Müller (ed.), *Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora*, 179. 24-7.

and the fiat that allegedly belonged to the Logos as God, or attributed the fiat to **end p.145** 'the form of the servant' (Theodoret). As has been argued, none of these suggestions is satisfactory in terms of doctrinal orthodoxy.

The monothelites of the seventh century, facilitated by the elaboration of Christology during the foregoing two centuries, realized the deeply unsatisfactory and in fact Nestorian overtones colouring the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer that implied a difference between the objects of willing of Christ's humanity and of the Logos. Let it be recalled that in the *Ekthesis*, Sergius denied

that there were in Christ 'two wills opposing one another , as if the Logos had wanted to fulfil the

salvific passion and the humanity opposed his will '. Sergius rightly argued that this would amount to an extreme case of Nestorianism, since even Nestorius himself never said that there were in Christ two wills opposing each other, but spoke of *ταυτοβουλία* (identity of the willed object). [274]

[274] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 15-22.

For Honorius, the words of Gethsemane do not indicate a different will, but were said in order to provide an example in order that we might follow God's will. [275]

[275] Ibid., ii, pt. 2, 552. 15-19.

Paul of Constantinople considered it unacceptable to argue that the humanity of Christ wished to avoid the cup and thus was liable to the rebuke that Christ justifiably addressed to Peter. As a result, he endorsed the interpretation of Gregory of Nazianzus, according to which the Gethsemane prayer does not express a will different from that of the Father, and claimed that [Pseudo-]Athanasius, [276]

[276] Paul refers here to *PG* 26, 1004B-C, which I have already mentioned.

Cyril, [277]

[277] Paul refers here to *PG* 76, 301A-304A, which I have already mentioned. Needless to say, Paul misread both Pseudo-Athanasius and Cyril.

and all the Fathers had argued that through the words in Gethsemane, Christ appropriated (by way of relative appropriation, to employ the Maximian distinction again) *our* life-loving nature, whereas *his* own human nature was neither unwilling to endure the passion, nor opposed to the Father and the Logos. [278]

[278] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 200. 38-202. 21.

The monothelites were right to dismiss the opposition between the humanity of Christ and the divine will introduced in earlier interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer. But, with the solution they offered, they threw the baby out with the bath water. They endorsed Gregory of Nazianzus's interpretation, but, unlike him, used it to deny a human will in Christ and thus approached the monothelitism of Apollinarius and Themistius.

What all these interpretations of Gethsemane failed to do justice to is *the human obedience of the Son to the Father*. Maximus was the first to point out in an **end p.146** unambiguous way that it is the Logos *as man* who addressed the Father in Gethsemane. In a piece of meticulous and insightful exegesis of the relevant passage, Maximus showed that the words 'not what I will but what you will' belong neither to us, nor to the divinity of Christ. If they belonged to Christ as God, they would imply that Christ as God had a different will from the Father, which he eventually subjected to the Father's will. However, this cannot be the case. Maximus argued that Christ wanted as God and as man to fulfil the will of the Father, whom he obeyed to the point of death on the cross. [279]

[279] See esp. *Opusc*. 6, 65A-69A.

However, he emphasized the fact that in Gethsemane Christ decided as man to obey the divine will, and thus overcame the blameless human instinctive urge to avoid death. [280]

[280] It is noteworthy that there is a place where Maximus offered an interpretation of Gethsemane in line with the earlier tradition. In *Opusc*. 7, 84B-C, Maximus argued that Christ willed as man to let the cup pass from him, whereas he willed as God to achieve our salvation in accordance with the will of the Father. But in this passage Maximus acknowledged his dependence on Cyril.

Maximus's interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer seems sound. As we read in the comments that follow Maximus's text, it is plain that the subject who says 'let this cup pass from me' and the subject

who says 'not as I will [but as you will]' are one and the same. According to the commentator, this subject cannot be Christ as God, [281]

[281] *Opusc*. 6, 69A.

but is Christ as man. Thus, Maximus related the fiat to the human nature and will of Christ, but at the same time did not damage his personal unity, because, unlike Theodoret, he did not attribute the fiat to a human person, 'the form of the servant', but to the Logos as man. [282]

[282] Note here that Maximus's insistence that will relates to nature, and not to person, could have been partly derived not only from his 'Chalcedonian logic' or the relevant Trinitarian principle, but also from the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer. For, given that the will of the Son (in 'not my will') had been understood by the Fathers as a human will, if it is accepted that will relates to person, as the monothelites claimed, then Christ must have been a human person, since he had a human will. Only if it is accepted that (human) will relates to (human) nature is it possible to interpret Gethsemane realistically, without suggesting that Christ speaks merely on our behalf, and at the same time say that the human will of Christ to avoid death, which he finally overcame, presupposes that Christ has a human nature but not a human person.

Summing up, Maximus seems to have offered a satisfactory and convincing interpretation of Jesus's prayer in Gethsemane by arguing that both the desire to avoid death and the submission to the divine will of the Father have to do with the humanity of Christ and his human will. On the basis of this interpretation, Maximus argued that the Logos had assumed a human will, which he submitted to the will of the Father and thus offered us a perfect example of obedience for the sake of our salvation. [283]

[283] See *Disputatio*, 305C-D. **end p.147**

5. The Particularity and Function Of the Human Will Of Jesus Christ According To Saint Maximus

5.1 Introduction

Our focus thus far has been on what Maximus meant by the term 'will' (*θέλησις—θέλημα*), together with the reasons why he considered the attribution of a human will to Christ as indispensable for an orthodox confession of faith. However, if we attempt to go more deeply into the Confessor's thought, we shall be faced with two more questions. The first is whether Maximus ascribes to Christ particular acts of human willing. If the response to this question is affirmative, we will then have to ask what is the relationship between the particular acts of Christ's human willing and the Logos, his divine and human natures and his divine will.

Neither the importance nor the difficulty of these questions should be underestimated. In regard to their importance, both relate not only to the relationship of the divine and the human in Christ, but also to the integrity and authenticity of his humanity, as well as to the accomplishment of our salvation through his human obedience to the Father. For to deny Christ's particular acts of human willing would render the historical actualization of this obedience void and would annihilate its soteriological consequences.

As to the difficulty of these questions, it is not hyperbole to say that, related as they are to Maximus's understanding of mode of willing, gnomic will, *proairesis*, and the rest, as well as to their real or seeming exclusion from Christ, they are among the most convoluted issues in patristic Christology. In the following sections we will deal with the first question and partly with the second, which will also be dealt with in Chapter 4.

5.2 Mode Of Willing, Gnōmē-Gnomic Will (Γνώμη-Γνωμικὸν Θέλημα) and Proairesis-Proairetic Will (Προαίρεσις-Προαιρετικὸν θέλημα) In Relation To Christology According To Saint Maximus

As we have seen, for Maximus, mode of willing is the particular way in which the will is actualized. Let us now look briefly at how Maximus defines two important volitional terms, *proairesis* and *gnōmē*. In his first dyothelite opusculum, Maximus defines wish (*βούλησις*) as a particularized will (*ποιὰ θέλησις*), oriented towards an end which is either possible or impossible. [284]

[284] *Opusc*. 1, 13B-C.

Proairesis has to do with the choice of the means which will (successfully) lead to an **end p.148** end. For instance, the desire to be healthy is the object of a wish (βούλησις), whereas the (proper) mode (τρόπος) which will lead to health comes as a result of deliberation (βουλευτόν). [285]

[285] Ibid. 13C. Instead of τρόπος, the text wrongly reads τόπος.

Proairesis relates to deliberation (βουλή or βούλευσις), [286]

[286] Ibid., 13C-16A.

which is a searching appetite (ὄρεξις ζητητική). [287]

[287] Ibid. 16B.

According to Maximus, we deliberate about things that are in our power and whose end is unknown. [288]

[288] Ibid. 16D.

We do not deliberate about the end, but about the proper means to achieve that end. If some of those means are clearly out of our reach, we do not deliberate about them. For instance, if we want to eat, and only some bread and a stone are available, we do not deliberate on what to eat, for to eat the stone is obviously impossible. [289]

[289] Ibid. 17B.

Deliberation is followed by *gnōmē* (γνώμη). *Gnōmē* is a disposition of the appetite towards what deliberation has shown to be the most appropriate thing to choose. [290]

[290] Ibid. 17C.

Proairesis, which is distinct from *gnōmē*, follows. [291]

[291] Ibid.

Proairesis seems to be the actualization of the disposition (*gnōmē*) towards what should be done in order that a desirable end is achieved. It is composite of appetite, deliberation, and judgement, and chooses what is shown by deliberation to be best. [292]

[292] Ibid. 16C.

Maximus is not always consistent in applying the distinction between *gnōmē* and *proairesis* as described above, and in fact sometimes considers them as synonymous. [293]

[293] See e.g. ibid. 28D: 'proairetic [will], which they call gnomic [will]'.

However, what is important about both terms with regard to Maximus's Christology is that they depend upon deliberation, which presupposes ignorance, and imply that it is possible to follow deviant courses of action. To have *gnōmē* and *proairesis* means to be subject not only to ignorance but also to mutability, to the possibility of committing evil deeds, to passions and to actual sinfulness. [294]

[294] See e.g. ibid. 20A, 24B, 28D-29B.

Maximus paints a very bleak picture of *gnōmē* and *proairesis*, and for this reason considers them inapplicable to Christ, as we will see shortly.

But Maximus had not always thought in this way. In some of his works that pre-date the monothelite controversy, he seems to have taken a more positive stance vis-à-vis *gnōmē* and *proairesis*. In fact, instances in which *gnōmē* and *proairesis* are considered as neutral terms or even have positive functions abound. [295]

[295] For instance, in his second *Epistle*, which Sherwood dates to before 626 (*Annotated Date-List*, 25), Maximus argued that we may have one *gnōmē* with God and with one another (*Ep*. 2, 396C). Traces of a positive view of *gnōmē*, which reflect its earlier use, can also be detected in Maximus's dyothelite *Opuscula* (see e.g. *Opusc*. 3, 48D-49A, and esp. *Opusc*. 16, 193B, where Maximus attributes a *gnōmē* to angels and to God).

However, what is at once surprising and important for my project **end p.149** is that before the monothelite controversy Maximus applied *gnōmē, proairesis*, and other relevant terms to Christ in order to indicate particular acts of his human willing.

Here are a few examples. In his sixty-first *Question to Thalassius*, Maximus wrote that Christ accepted willingly (βουλήσει) that he should die. [296]

[296] Question LXI, *PG* 90, 636C; also Carl Laga and Carlos Steel (eds.), *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, ii: *Quaestiones LVI-LXV*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 22 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 97. 226-8.

The allusion to Gethsemane is obvious. What is implied here is a particular act of willing, the decision to die, which was taken voluntarily by Christ. The word βούλησις, which Maximus later defined as a particularized will (ποιὰ θέλησις), is also quite indicative. Moreover, the wider context of the passage

—Christ is likened to Adam, whose failure he overturns—strongly suggests that the decision to die belongs to Christ as man, as an act of his human willing, a belief which Maximus was to uphold to the end of his life.

A second interesting passage is from the twenty-first *Question to Thalassius*, where Maximus says that Christ moved voluntarily according to his will (κατὰ θέλησιν γνώμ[ην]). [297]

[297] Question XXI, *PG* 90, 313C; see also Carl Laga and Carlos Steel (eds.), *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, i: *Quaestiones I-LV*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 7 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1980), 129. 49-50.

It would take us too far afield to examine the question of whether *gnōmē* is here applied to the divine or the human will of Christ. But we should take note of the fact that the term is applied to him. It must also be mentioned that Maximus devoted this *Question to Thalassius* to showing how Christ's successful confrontation of the temptations and voluntary death brought about the healing of our nature and *gnōmē*—and again the context implies that it was Christ as man who did all this. [298]

[298] Question XXI, *PG* 90, 312B-316D, and Laga and Steel (eds.), *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, i. 127-33.

It is highly suggestive that one of the *scholia* following Maximus's text notes that Christ was passionless in his *gnōmē*—the word *gnōmē* obviously has to do here with the humanity of Christ. [299]

[299] *PG* 90, 317A, and Laga and Steel (eds.), *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, i. 135. 4-8. With regard to the date of the *Questiones ad Thalassium*, Sherwood (*Annotated Date-List*, 34) places them in 630-3/4, prior to Maximus's engagement with monenergism.

A final example comes from Maximus's interpretation of the Dominical prayer. There Maximus attributes to Christ a (human) passionless *gnōmē*. It is precisely that *gnōmē* which chose/decided to die for our sake. The participle αἱρουμένην that Maximus uses here in connection with the term *gnōmē* shows **end p.150** how easily he could apply to Christ something close to a combination of the terms *gnōmē* and *proairesis* (προαίρεσις). [300]

[300] *PG* 90, 877D. See also Peter van Deun (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris Opuscula Exegetica Duo*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 23 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991), 34. 136-40.

At this point, too, Maximus refers to Christ as man, whose voluntary death resulted in the healing of our nature and *gnōmē*. [301]

[301] *PG* 90, 877D-880A, and van Deun (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris Opuscula Exegetica Duo*, 34. 135-35. 153. According to Sherwood, this work of Maximus was written between 628 and 630 (*Annotated Date-List*, 31).

By contrast, in his dyothelite works Maximus consistently excluded from Christ both *gnōmē* and *proairesis* (as well as gnomic will and proairetic will). Three questions need to be addressed here. The first is why Maximus made this shift. The second is on what grounds Maximus excluded *gnōmē* and *proairesis* from Christ. The third is whether the decision of Maximus to deny *gnōmē* and *proairesis* in Christ means that he ceased to entertain the view that particular acts of human willing are to be attributed to him.

We do not have to go too far to find an answer to the first question. The first of Maximus's dyothelite opuscula, which offers the most detailed and elaborate definitions of *gnōmē*, *proairesis*, and other relevant terms, gives us the clue we need, for it explicitly turns against those who 'identify will with wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βουλ[ή]) and *proairesis* (προαίρεσις) [302]

[302] *Proairesis* is commonly defined as choice or decision. However, so far as Maximus is concerned, this rendering of the term requires qualification, especially when employed in Christology. First, according to Maximus's previously suggested definition *proairesis* is *a particular kind of choice or decision* that has to do with the means which lead to an end (not with the end itself), depends on deliberation and goes hand in hand with mutability, sinfulness, etc. *To exclude* (gnōmē *and*) proairesis *from Christ as man means to exclude this particular kind of choosing and deciding, not choosing and deciding as such.* The fact that Christ in Gethsemane chose and decided as man to obey the Father by no means obliges us to accept that he was ignorant of the will of the Father, or that he had to deliberate or that he oscillated between obeying it or not, etc., as the attribution to Christ of *gnōmē* and *proairesis* as defined by Maximus would.

and *gnōmē* (γνώμη)' and argue that 'Christ has one proairetic will (ἓν προαιρετικὸν θέλημα)'. [303]

[303] *Opusc*. 1, 12A-B.

It seems that Maximus's opponents had chosen the epithets 'gnomic' and 'proairetic' as specifications of the one will of Christ. In fact, Pyrrhus himself told Maximus during their disputation that the monothelites of Byzantium call the one will of Christ 'gnomic'. [304]

[304] *Disputatio*, 308A.

And as one of Maximus's strategies was to deny his enemies any word that could be used to specify Christ's allegedly one will, as has already been seen, [305]

[305] Maximus devotes a whole section of his first opusculum to refuting the view that either one natural or one *proairetic* will can be attributed to Christ (*Opusc*. 1, 28B-37A). See also sect. 4 of this chapter.

he now considered **end p.151** it necessary to define *gnōmē* and *proairesis* in such a way as to render them inapplicable to Christ.

In doing so, Maximus could not in fact appeal to a commonly held, or even a forgotten, theological tradition with regard to the meaning of the terms *gnōmē* and *proairesis*. He had to cut new ground not only concerning the tradition, but also concerning his own earlier use of the terms, and this serves to validate the aforementioned explanation of the motives of his surprising move. As has been pointed out, for much of what Maximus says in defining the terms *proairesis*, 'wish', 'deliberation', etc., he draws heavily on parts of Nemesius's *De Natura Hominis*. [306]

[306] See Morani (ed.), Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura Hominis*, esp. 99. 10-101. 19.

However, we must note that Nemesius's definition of *proairesis* had not gained widespread credence. The word *proairesis* seems to have been somewhat loose even in Maximus's time. [307]

[307] It is noteworthy that the meaning of the term that finally survived in modern Greek differs considerably from Maximus's definition. In modern Greek *proairesis* usually denotes ethical disposition, and is used more often to signify good disposition, in which case it is accompanied by the epithet 'good'.

Maximus pretended that *the* definition of *proairesis* was the one he gave, simply because this served his theological interests.

The term *gnōmē* also remained extremely loose until Maximus formed his definitions. [308]

[308] For the use of the term before Maximus, see Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 213-14.

In the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, after refuting the view that the alleged one will of Christ is a gnomic will, Maximus unwittingly and unnecessarily mentioned that the term *gnōmē* had twenty-eight different meanings in Scripture and the Fathers. [309]

[309] *Disputatio*, 312A-C.

This caused Pyrrhus, as it does us, to ask, 'how is it possible for such an indefinite term with so many meanings to be indicative of some one thing?' [310]

[310] Ibid. 312C-D. It is interesting that Sergius uses here the word ἀποκληρωτικόν in connection with *gnōmē*, which the *Greek-English Lexicon*, ed. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939) translates as 'choosing . . . by lot or chance, at random' (202).

If we were to attempt to recast Pyrrhus's question in order to clarify its core content, we would probably ask why, since as Maximus himself admits, *gnōmē* is such an indefinite term in Scripture as well as in the Fathers, he is entitled to define it in such a specific way as to oblige every orthodox Christian to avoid applying it to Christ? Maximus side-stepped Pyrrhus's question, [311]

[311] *Disputatio*, 312D-313A.

but the question itself points to the answer.

On what grounds did Maximus argue that Christ could not have a gnomic or proairetic will? This question will be tackled shortly. Let us now say proleptically that for him the acceptance of a *gnōmē*/gnomic will or of a **end p.152** *proairesis*/proairetic will in Christ would introduce a human person into Christology. It is noteworthy that, by doing so, Maximus partly endorsed the connection between will and person established by his opponents. Yet, for Maximus, it is not natural will that introduces a human person. Natural will, as the term itself implies, is related to nature, whereas gnomic or proairetic will is related to (human) person. Thus, according to Maximus, it is not a natural human will that must be excluded from Christ, but a gnomic and proairetic will. But in what sense, and for what reasons, do *gnōmē* and *proairesis* relate to human person? This will be clarified in the following brief section.

5.3 Further Remarks On Saint Maximus's Understanding Of Person and Will In Christology

As has already been noted, in post-Chalcedonian Christology two options were put forward to explain how it is possible for Christ to have a human nature without having a human person. John the Grammarian suggested that this is the case because the humanity of Christ lacks particular idioms. By contrast, the Leontioi, Leontius of Jerusalem in particular, argued that this is the case because the humanity of Christ did not subsist by itself, but was from the beginning hypostatically united with him. As we have seen, the Grammarian's suggestion was left to pass into oblivion, despite the long-held

connection between particularly and personhood on which it stood. Subsequent theologians, including Maximus, adopted the view of the Leontioi, which was integrated with the Cappadocian connection between particularity and personhood through the attribution of the distinguishing idioms of the human nature of Christ to his person.

To say that the human nature of Christ does not subsist by itself, separately from the Logos and his divine nature, but subsists in him, and is fully united with the divine nature, has a corollary to which little attention has been paid here. The corollary is the so-called deification of the humanity of Christ, on which, as is well known, Leontius of Jerusalem, for instance, insists so much. As we have seen, the term 'deification' does not signify an undoing of Chalcedon's 'without confusion', which would turn humanity into divinity, but, to recall Saint Gregory of Nazianzus's well-known axiom, the healing and salvation of the assumed nature. A nature that is not assumed remains sinful, and a sinful nature is a nature that is not united with God. Therefore, to say that the human nature of Christ was sinful implies that it did not subsist in the Logos and was not fully united with the divine nature. However, a human nature that does not subsist in the Logos and is not fully united with him and the divine nature subsists separately from him, by itself—namely, as **end p.153** a distinct human hypostasis, subject to the sinfulness bequeathed by the Fall to all people.

It is worth recalling at this point the connection, previously mentioned, between Nestorianism and Christ's alleged sinfulness. It is also worth recalling that in the sixth-century controversy over the ignorance of Christ, it was made explicit that to attribute ignorance to Christ is a sign of Nestorianism. [312]

[312] As Gregory the Great put it, 'whoever is not a Nestorian can in no way be an *Agnoetes*' (Gregory M., *Registrum epistularum* (CPL 1714), x. 21: Norberg, CCL 140A, p. 854, 76-7, quoted by Grillmeier with Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 381).

This view is right, provided that by 'ignorance' we refer to the blame-worthy ignorance which is at once a consequence and a mark of the sinful status of our being after the Fall, because we should not go so far as to consider Christ omniscient as man, as Eulogius of Alexandria seems to have done. [313]

[313] For more on this and on the controversy in general, see Grillmeier with Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 2, 362-82.

In his Christological treatises that do not deal with the question of the wills, Maximus did not insist very much on the sinlessness and deification of the humanity of Christ. He did so occasionally, when for instance he wrote that the God-bearer was not the mother of a mere man who reached deification progressively through his works, [314]

[314] *Ep*. 12, 504A.

or when he mentioned that our nature was deified thanks to the ineffable power of the incarnation. [315]

[315] *Ep*. 12, 468C.

In fact, it is in his dyothelite works, as we will see, that Maximus insisted that the human nature and will of Christ were deified, and that the attribution of sinfulness and ignorance to Christ entails Nestorianism, Christ being understood as a mere man.

However, there is perhaps a third aspect which might relate to the way we understand person as distinct from nature, and has to do with the question of whether it is person or nature (or both in different ways) that must be identified as subject(s) of willing. [316]

[316] This issue will be dealt with in Ch. 4.

Therefore, the question is, for what reasons did Maximus exclude *gnōmē* and *proairesis* from Christ? Did he do it because they imply *particular* acts of human willing, which would supposedly introduce a human person? Did he do it because they imply sinfulness and ignorance, which would turn Christ into a mere man? Did he do it in order to avoid turning the human nature of Christ into a personal subject of willing and acting? Or did he do it for a combination of some or all of these reasons? The aforementioned remarks will help us to clarify the meaning of Maximus's link between *gnōmē/proairesis* and Nestorianism in Christology.end p.154

5.4 Saint Maximus's Denial Of Gnōmē And Proairesis In Christ

Before looking at Maximus's reasons for excluding *gnōmē* and *proairesis* from Christ, let us consider the views of some of the secondary literature on the matter, which will give us a general idea of the relative ambiguity that occurs in this area. Sherwood has argued that 'there are in every intellectual creature two powers, rational and volitive; in man as he now is these attain their end (use) through a series of acts which, as a whole, may be termed *gnomic*. . . . Inasmuch as most of these acts imply ignorance, indecision, mutability (the correlative of sin), they are excluded from Christ.' [317]

[317] Polycarp Sherwood, *St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, the Four Centuries on Charity*, Ancient Christian Writers, 21 (New York: Newman Press, 1955), 61-2.

For Sherwood, this is so because 'these acts are of the person or hypostasis', and thus 'they have no place in the divine person of the God-Man'. [318]

[318] Ibid. 62.

According to Sherwood, 'the human will of Christ on the personal level is exercised by the divine Person, the Son of the Father'. [319]

[319] Ibid. 62.

So far, so good; but still it seems that Sherwood fails to show in a clear way why Maximus excludes *gnōmē* (and *proairesis*) from the humanity of Christ, and to consider whether or not this affects the particularity of his human acts of willing. In another work, he wrote that 'the λόγος φύσεως, the natural will, nature are on one side; on the other are the mode of existence, gnomic will and choice, the person'. [320]

[320] Polycarp Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism*, Studia Anselmiana, 36 (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, Herder, 1955), 204.

But if we take these connections for granted and apply them to Christ, are we not in danger of disposing of Christ's particular *human* mode of existence and, by implication, of willing, which is expressed through his human acts of willing?

Thunberg argued that Maximus denies a *gnōmē* in Christ 'because uncertainty and ambiguity belong to γνώμη as such but are in principle excluded in Christ'. [321]

[321] Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 215.

For Thunberg, 'γνώμη represents the personal and actualized aspect of man's capacity for self-determination'. [322]

[322] Ibid. 219.

Gnōmē is also 'a personal and individual disposition'. [323]

[323] Ibid. 216.

However, given that Christ had an individual and particular, albeit not a personal, humanity, the question which arises is whether Christ had an *individual—particular—human* disposition, clear of sinfulness and the rest of course, albeit not a *personal—gnomic—human* disposition. Furthermore, Thunberg suggested that one of the reasons why *gnōmē* is denied in Christ's humanity is 'probably also due to the fact that he **end p.155** [Maximus] regarded the incarnate Christ not only as one human being among many but as Man, representative of all humanity'. [324]

[324] Ibid.

But if this is accepted, is the particularity, and thus the genuineness, of the human nature and of the human will of Jesus Christ not jeopardized?

Piret associated *gnōmē* with mode of willing, without making it sufficiently clear that *gnōmē* is that particular mode of willing which is marked by sin, which in turn means that to attribute it to Christ would turn him into a mere man. [325]

[325] Piret, *Le Christ et la Trinité*, 310.

In addition, the systematic problem with this association is that it implies that if we exclude a *gnōmē* from Christ, we must also exclude from him a human mode of willing, something which would endanger the integrity of his humanity. In this respect Farrell is right to say that 'the gnomic will is one sub-category within the much larger category of the "mode of willing" ', [326]

[326] Farrell, *Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 124.

which implies that to exclude from Christ the former does not necessarily imply that the latter must also be excluded. However, Farrell is wrong to relate gnomic will—and thus the sinfulness with which the latter is bound, at least in the Confessor's dyothelite *Opuscula*—to 'human created hypostasis', [327]

[327] Ibid. 123.

because *gnōmē* relates rather to human *fallen* hypostasis. Moreover, to argue, as Farrell does, that Maximus places *proairesis*, along with inquiry, examination, deliberation, etc., on the side of nature, and to characterize it as a natural property, [328]

[328] Ibid. 129-30.

which implies that it is attributable to Christ too, is a distortion of the Confessor's thought. Matsoukas [329]

[329] Matsoukas, Δογματικ῾ καί Συμβολικ῾ Θεολογία, 337.

and Bletsis [330]

[330] Athanasius B. Bletsis, (Thessalonica: Τέρτιος, 1998), 205.

believe that *gnōmē* is a consequence of the created character of beings; this is, in my view, potentially misleading, because, as previously stated, Maximus connects *gnōmē* with the sinful state of our humanity, which is not due to our having been created, but to our having fallen (Christ as man is both created and bereft of *gnōmē*). Finally, Larchet argues that the incarnate Logos is like us according to the logos of nature, but not according to the mode of existence, because 'his faculties were put in motion by Him according to a divine mode'. [331]

[331] Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 241.

However, is it not the case that to speak of a *divine*—which is *not* the same as a deified—mode in this context amounts to the negation of the human-deified mode of Christ's willing according to which the actualization of his human will takes place?

Let us now consider some important references made by Maximus himself **end p.156** to *gnōmē* and *proairesis* in relation to Christ, in order to see on what grounds he considered them inapplicable to him. In the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus accepted the definition of Cyril mentioned by Pyrrhus according to which *gnōmē* is a *mode* of life, adding that *gnōmē* is a *particularised* will (*ποιὰ θέλησις*). [332]

[332] *Disputatio*, 308B-C. This brings *gnōmē* quite close to wish (*βούλησις*), which Maximus defined as a particularized natural will (*ποιὰ φυσικ῾ θέλησις*: *Opusc*. 1, 13B); it is noteworthy that Farrell translates the aforementioned expression as 'an act of willing in a particular way' (*Disputation with Pyrrhus*, 30)) and illustrates his tendency towards inconsistency in the use of volitional terms. It is interesting that Maximus does not seem generally to exclude 'wish' (*βούλησις*) from Christ, as he does *proairesis* and *gnōmē* (I owe this remark to John Zizioulas). This is perhaps a sign of his belief that particular acts of human willing are attributable to Christ.

But in this instance Maximus excluded *gnōmē* from Christ neither on the grounds that it is a *mode* of life nor on the grounds that it is a particularized will. He observed that the mode of life indicated by *gnōmē* presupposes deliberation and choice (*ἐπιλογ῾*). [333]

[333] *Disputatio*, 308B-C.

> 'Thus, those who say that there is a *gnōmē* in Christ . . . maintain that he is a mere man deliberating like us, having ignorance, doubts and options opposing each other.' [334]

[334] Ibid. 308C-D.

Christ is not subject to all this, but, as Maximus seems to be saying, this does not diminish his humanity, for *gnōmē* does not pertain to the logos of nature (*λόγος φύσεως*) but is a mode of use (*τρόπος χρ῾σεως*) through which we gain experience of the ways in which the good is achieved. [335]

[335] Ibid. 308D.

However, does the exclusion from Christ of a gnomic mode of willing amount to excluding from him every mode of willing? Maximus says that Christ subsisted divinely, and thus had a natural orientation to the good. He did not have to choose between good and evil, as Isaiah 7: 15-16 reads. [336]

[336] Ibid. 309A.

However, does this mean that Christ did not live the life of a particular human being, which necessarily involves particular acts of willing and particular actions?

Maximus notes that the wills of the saints in heaven will be one according to the logos of nature, but different in so far as the *mode* of movement of their wills is concerned, for each saint will participate in God in a manner proportionate to his desire. [337]

[337] *Opusc*. 1, 24C-25A. The past tense of the verb *ἐπόθησεν* implies that Maximus refers to the desire for God that the saints showed in this life.

But does Christ as man not enjoy a uniqueness in his relationship with God, being the only sinless man who ever lived and loved and obeyed the Father constantly, perfectly, and unconditionally? Does this not distinguish him and the *mode* of his life, including as it does his acts of willing and his actions, from all other men?

In his first *Opusculum*, Maximus noted that *proairesis* is pertinent to us,

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because we are not immutable but able to choose virtue or passions. [338]

[338] Ibid. 24B.

If Christ had a gnomic or proairetic will, he would be able to move either according to the logos of nature or against it (*παρὰ φύσιν*). [339]

[339] Ibid. 28D and 29B.

In the first case Christ would not be passionless but (merely) continent, and would become virtuous progressively. [340]

[340] Ibid. 28D. For Maximus, Christ is undefiled by sin both in his being and in his acts.

Christ's having a *proairesis*, even if it moved according to nature, would imply that he was a mere man, as Nestorius had said, whereas to say that it moved against nature, would amount to blasphemy. [341]

[341] Ibid. 29B.

The Fathers refrained from saying that Christ had one proairetic will because *proairesis* can move towards good *and* towards evil, which is most impious to say of Christ. [342]

[342] Ibid. 32C-33A.

Maximus also excludes a proairetic will from the humanity of Christ on the grounds that it was subject neither to the procedure of deliberating and judging nor to mutability, but, on the contrary, it was deified and moved by God the Logos. [343]

[343] Ibid. 32A. Maximus seems to take for granted that Christ could not sin. This seems to be so for two reasons: first, because, for him, the person of the Logos is the subject of both divine *and* human willing. Only a human person can choose evil—hence the link between *posse peccare* and Nestorianism. However, even a human person can choose evil only if he or she is not yet fully transformed by the grace of God—hence the inability of the saints in heaven to relapse. Thus, Maximus's second reason why Christ could not sin seems to be related to the fact that his humanity was deified. But this does not compromise Christ's self-determination as man, for self-determination does not necessarily imply the possibility of sinning. More on some of these issues will be said in following sections.

Maximus recalled that it was Nestorius who had understood the unity in Christ not as a unity of hypostasis but as a unity of *gnōmē*. [344]

[344] *Opusc*. 2, 41C-D.

However, according to Maximus, a unity of gnomic wills implies that they remain different after the union, [345]

[345] Maximus alludes here to the Chalcedonian principle that unity necessarily implies that the united things remain distinct.

which in turn implies that the human *gnōmē* of Christ was not identical with the divine, which in its turn means that Christ was a sinful man, since he did not will what God willed. Thus, the unity of *βουλαί*—by which Maximus signifies the unity between the objects of divine and human willing (*ταυτοβουλία*)—which Nestorius put forward is meaningless as well as incapable of overturning the personal division in Christ. [346]

[346] *Opusc*. 2, 44C-45B; at this point Maximus hints at the mention of *ταυτοβουλία* which occurs in the *Ekthesis* (Riedinger (ed.) *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160, 21-2).

Further on in the same opusculum, Maximus argued that whereas in Christ there is a difference of natural wills, there is no difference of gnomic wills. This is so, for Maximus, because a difference of gnomic wills would entail an internal opposition in Christ, and this in turn would entail a personal

end p.158 division. [347]

[347] *Opusc*. 3, 56A-B.

Thus, as already noted, Maximus seems to accept Sergius's position that two wills in Christ would imply an internal opposition in him as well as his division into two persons, but with the crucial proviso that these wills are gnomic, not natural. At any rate, it is again clear how Maximus links gnomic will, sinfulness, and the introduction of a human person in Christ.

The instances cited so far suffice to show that Maximus denies *gnōmē* and *proairesis* in Christ because of their connection with sinfulness, mutability, ignorance, etc. But is this the only reason? Does he perhaps deny them in Christ also because they imply a particular mode of willing, which would ostensibly introduce a human person in Christology. Let us examine this question briefly. In one of his dyothelite *Opuscula*, Maximus says that when there is a personal division, *gnōmē* does not oppose God, if it moves according to nature. [348]

[348] Ibid. 48D-49A.

This seems to imply that, even when it does not sinfully oppose God, *gnōmē* introduces a person, because it is a particularized will. Therefore, a particularized human will and its acts of willing must be excluded from Christ, to avoid introducing into Christ a human person, which would amount to Nestorianism. The objection to this is that in so far as after the Fall the *gnōmē* of all men depends on ignorance and deliberation, and is subject to mutability and the possibility of choosing evil, it remains ensnared in the power of evil, even if it finally chooses good, and this is why it cannot be attributed to Christ. The deeply rooted connection between *gnōmē*, *proairesis*, and sinfulness is borne out by the fact that Maximus, as already mentioned, excludes *proairesis* from the saints in heaven. [349]

[349] At this point I must take issue with Farrell, who has, in my view, misinterpreted this passage by arguing that for Maximus, *proairesis* belongs to human nature, and that the saints in heaven will have a *proairesis* which will not be moved by the 'things in the middle' (*Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor*, 109-15, and *passim*). For Maximus, the saints in heaven will not have a *proairesis* but only an active intellectual desire (ὄρεξις ἐνεργὴς νοερά: *Opusc*. 1, 24C).

Yet, in spite of not having a *proairesis*, the saints in heaven will have a will. What is more, their wills will move in different ways, and they will vary in regard to their *mode* of moving . [350]

[350] *Opusc*. 1, 24B-25A.

The saints in heaven will have a (sinless) mode of willing—that is, wills moving in different ways—but not a *proairesis*. The same is true of Christ. He also had his own particular human mode of willing, but not a sinful *gnōmē* or *proairesis*. [351]

[351] It can be argued that one of the reasons why Maximus excludes *proairesis* from the saints in heaven is because they will not have to take decisions as men in this life do. But it must recalled that *proairesis* is not identical with choice and decision, but with a particular kind of choice and decision that bears the sinful characteristics repeatedly mentioned. For more on the relationship between personhood and mode of willing, see next section.

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Maximus says that gnomic will defines person (*προσώπου ὑπάρχει ἀφοριστικόν*), and that if Christ's alleged one will were a gnomic will, it would characterize his hypostasis only, which would in turn mean that Christ would will different things from the Father and the Spirit. [352]

[352] *Opusc*. 3, 53C.

Here gnomic will is taken to characterize one hypostasis only, *the hypostasis of Christ*, which means that if there were in Christ such a will, it would not be in accordance with what the Father and the Spirit will—obviously on the basis that every hypostatic characteristic in the Trinity is particular to only one person—and so Christ's objects of willing would differ from theirs. Can it be argued, then, that since *gnōmē* seems here to be so closely connected with particularity, the exclusion of the former from Christ necessitates the exclusion of the latter?

I think that the response to this question must be negative. Maximus refers here to *gnōmē* as characteristic exclusively of the *hypostasis* of Christ, which would by implication suggest an internal division in the Trinity, due to the opposition of Christ's will to that of the Father and the Spirit. It is, however, quite another thing to argue that *the human nature of Christ* has a particularized will, which is borne, shaped, and expressed in particular acts of human willing by the Logos in obedient conformity with the will of the Father and the Spirit and not in opposition to it.

Elsewhere, Maximus says that if there were in the Trinity three gnomic wills, they would oppose one another. But there he once more seems to bring gnomic will close, not simply to a will that is particularized towards its own objects of willing, but to a will that is particularized in such a way as to be different from and in opposition to the particularized will of the other persons (the other two persons of the Trinity, in this case) through its objects of willing. [353]

[353] Ibid. 52B-C.

And this he considers unacceptable. [354]

[354] Let it be noted that the divine will is also actualized in particular acts of willing (e.g. the act of willing that relates to the creation of the world), which are shared by all three persons of the Trinity. This seems to be relevant to Maximus's attribution of *gnōmē* to God (*Opusc*. 16, 193B). The fact that Maximus does not attribute three gnomic wills to the Trinity, which would correspond to the three persons, testifies to the fact that *gnōmē* and person are not necessarily interwoven.

On another occasion, Maximus criticized Theodore of Pharan for attributing energy to person and not the *mode* in which the energy is actualized. Energy belongs to the logos of our nature, says Maximus, but its *tropos* (mode) is formed by the person. [355]

[355] *Opusc*. 10, 136D-137A.

On these grounds it could be argued that Maximus implies that, since the mode of acting (and by implication the mode of willing) is formed by the person, and since there is no human person in **end p.160** Christ to form the mode of acting and willing of his human will and energy, the latter remain non-particularized and non-actualized in particular acts of human willing and in particular actions. However, this is not the case. Maximus does not exclude the possibility that it might be a divine person that forms the mode of willing and acting of a human nature. Since the bearer of the human nature of Christ is a divine person, it is that person who forms and determines Christ's human willing and human acting. As Maximus said elsewhere, the Logos (the divine person) moves and models his human will. [356]

[356] *Opusc*. 1, 32A; *Opusc*. 3, 45C.

To sum up, Maximus excludes *gnōmē* and *proairesis* from Christ on account of their connection with ignorance and sinfulness, which implies that they belong to a human fallen person, which is also to be excluded from Christ. Nowhere does Maximus appear to deny that Christ had a sinless, non-deliberative, and oriented-to-the-good human will, which was modelled, moved, and actualized in particular acts of human willing by the divine person of the Logos in obedience to the Father. On the contrary, his whole dyothelite Christology points to this very truth.

However, beyond what I have argued with regard to *gnōmē*, *proairesis*, and the reasons for their exclusion from Christ, are there any clear and convincing indications that Maximus regards the human will of Christ not merely as a faculty, but also as actualized in concrete acts of human willing? To find a definitive answer to this question, we must turn again to Maximus's interpretation of relevant New Testament passages. We have seen that one of his arguments for dyothelitism was that many acts of Christ's willing, such as his decision to obey the Father in Gethsemane, are to be attributed to his human will. We recall here that Maximus implies that the fact that Christ went to the region of Tyre and Sidon and entered a house, and did not will (ἠθελεν) anyone to know it, [357]

[357] Mark 7: 24.

is an expression of his human will, a deduction based on the fact that Christ did not manage to remain hidden, which, for Maximus, testifies to the weakness of his human will in contradistinction to the power of his divine will. [358]

[358] *Disputatio*, 321C-D.

Thus, it seems that Maximus accepted in Christ not only particular acts of human willing, but also such acts of his human willing that did not coincide with what he willed as God (for if he willed also as God by his omnipotent will to remain hidden, he would have remained hidden), but were different from it, though not opposed to it. [359]

[359] It is such instances that suggest that Christ as man had the possibility of choosing to do things that neither opposed God's will nor coincided with it in such a way as to imply that the whole of his life was fully predetermined. **end p.161**

The existence of a mode of Christ's human willing and the way in which it was actualized is expressed in a Maximian passage, which will be quoted at some length:

The ability to will (πεφυκέναι θέλειν) and the [mode of] willing (θέλειν) are not the same, and the ability to speak and speaking are not the same either. For the ability to speak (λαλητικόν) exists always [in man] by nature, but [man] does not speak always, for the former belongs to essence and is held by the logos of nature, whereas the latter belongs to deliberative desire (βουλή), and is modelled by the gnome of him who speaks; therefore the ever-existing ability to speak belongs to

nature, but the mode of speaking belongs to hypostasis, and the same goes for the ability to will (πεφυκέναι θέλειν) and the [mode of] willing (θέλειν). And since the ability to will and [the mode of] willing are not the same (for, as I said, the former belongs to essence, whereas the latter to the deliberative desire of the willer), the enfleshed Logos had as man the ability to will (πεφυκέναι θέλειν),

which was moved and modelled by (or according to) his divine will . For his mode of willing (θέλειν), as the great Gregory says, does in no way oppose God, because it is wholly deified. [360]

[360] *Opusc*. 3, 48A-B.

This passage implies that Christ had a human mode of willing which is here closely related with particular acts of willing. His human will did not remain a non-actualized faculty, but was moved and modelled by his divine will (or in accordance with it). [361]

[361] Whether the dative there (θελήματι) expresses the agent or not will be commented on later.

Elsewhere Maximus associates the fact that the Logos moved and modelled his human will with the fulfilment of the economy, which is of course related with, and due to, a host of acts of his human willing. [362]

[362] *Opusc*. 1, 32A-B; *Opusc*. 3, 45C-D.

The aforementioned claims, however, are related to the issue of the relationship between the Logos and his divinity and divine will, on the one hand, and his humanity and human will, on the other, which will be examined in detail in the following section. [363]

[363] For a shorter version of the following section, see Demetrios Bathrellos, 'The Relationship between the Divine Will and the Human Will of Jesus Christ according to Saint Maximus the Confessor', *Studia Patristica*, xxxvii, ed. M. F. Wiles and E. J. Yarnold with the assistance of P. M. Parvis (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 346-52.

5.5 The Relationship Between the Divine and the Human Wills Of Jesus Christ

The relationship between the divine and the human wills of Jesus Christ and the way in which this is understood by Maximus constitute a very complicated issue, which has been debated time and again in the twentieth century. **end p.162**

By and large, the terms of the debate were already set in the first decades of the century when M. Jugie crossed swords over the issue with another great Roman Catholic historian of doctrine, J. Tixeront. [364]

[364] We should note here that neither Tixeront nor Jugie referred specifically to Maximus's views on the relationship between the wills of Christ; rather they tried to define the orthodox doctrine with regard to it while giving their account of the monothelite controversy. However, Maximus seems to have been somewhere at the back of their minds, and Jugie appealed overtly to him in order to support his views.

Tixeront had argued that the fact that the human nature belongs to the person of the Logos (which is, for Tixeront, 'a simple subsistent relation'), and not to the divine nature, means that divine and human acts of willing form two series which are parallel and not subordinated, 'having the one and the other the condition of their existence in the personality of the Logos, but proceeding from each one of the two natures as their true efficient principle'. [365]

[365] J. Tixeront, *Histoire de Dogmes*, iii (Paris: Lecoffre, 1912), 173.

Thus, for Tixeront, the harmony in the Logos does not come about in a mechanistic way, but 'results from the free and spontaneous consent of the man regulating his own resolutions and acts in conformity with the divine will and acts'. [366]

[366] Ibid. 173-4.

Jugie did not fail to see the Nestorian bent of Tixeront's views. He rightly pointed out that the divine Logos is responsible for both the divine and the human acts of willing, and argued that the latter are not parallel but subordinate to the former. For Jugie, the humanity of the Logos was moved by God (θεοκίνητος). Jugie referred to a passage of Maximus, according to which Christ's human will was moved by the divinity of the Logos. [367]

[367] Jugie, 'Monothélisme', cols. 2311-13. Jugie referred to Maximus's *Opusc*. 3, 81D.

It seems that, whereas in his attempt to defend the spontaneity and freedom of the humanity of Christ, Tixeront suggests an approach which seems to reflect the over-symmetrical formula of the *Tome of Leo* ('agit enim utraque natura cum alterius communione'), which sees the natures as subjects of acting

and, so it would seem, by implication, of willing, Jugie insists on the hegemony of the Logos and of his divinity—without sufficiently distinguishing between the two—over the humanity of Christ in a fashion that is rather over-asymmetrical; as a result, he fails to show how it is that the self-determination of the human will of Christ is not violated. It seems that Tixeront's over-Antiochean approach to the question discussed in this section is not alien to his characterization of the monothelites as heretics (with the self-evident exception of Honorius, of course), [368]

[368] Tixeront, *Histoire de Dogmes*, iii. 174-7.

whereas Jugie's over-Alexandrian tendency is not irrelevant to his characterization of the monothelites as essentially orthodox. [369]

[369] Jugie, 'Monothélisme', *passim*.**end p.163**

As far as I can see, little progress has been made since then. The terms of the debate have not changed substantially, and this has rendered it fruitless and unhelpful. It seems that the majority of scholars have expressed views which bring them rather closer to Jugie. P. Parente, for instance, allied himself to Jugie, [370]

[370] P. Parente, 'Uso e significato del termine θεοκίνητος nella controversia monothelistica', *Revue des études byzantines*, 11 (1953), 241-51, esp. 251.

and argued that the human will of Christ is not parallel but subordinated to the Logos and to his divine will. [371]

[371] Ibid., *passim*.

Likewise, Gauthier claimed that the natural human will of Christ was modelled 'by the immutable divine will which is put in action by the personality of the Logos'. [372]

[372] Gauthier, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', 81.

Balthasar, by contrast, protested against 'the most dangerous tendency of the whole patristic Christology, the Logos—*sarx* pattern', which relegates the humanity of Jesus to an instrument of the Logos, and pointed out that, for Maximus, the humanity of Christ does not move passively. [373]

[373] Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie*, 224-6.

Murphy and Sherwood argued that, according to Maximus, the volitional harmony in Christ is due to the self-determinative submission of the human nature and will to the Logos. [374]

[374] Murphy and Sherwood, *Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 200.

Doucet suggested that we cannot, and should not, speak of instrumentality between the Logos and his human nature, but rather between the divine nature and the human nature. [375]

[375] Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 349-50.

Finally Larchet properly raised the question of whether the sovereignty exercised over the humanity of Christ belongs to the Logos in terms of his hypostasis or in terms of his nature; but he rather failed to answer the question. [376]

[376] Larchet, *La Divinisation de l'homme*, 313-14.

In short, it seems that those scholars who have attempted to deal with this problem can be *grosso modo* divided into two groups. The first tends to overemphasize the hegemony of the divine over the human in Christ, whereas the second tends to overemphasize the independence of the human from the divine in its effort to protect its authenticity. Despite the legitimate elements in both approaches, the first is either in danger of relegating the human nature and will of Christ to a more or less passive instrument of the divinity, or fails to show how this could be properly avoided, whereas the second is in danger of hypostasizing Christ's humanity in a quasi-Nestorian way. Thus, both are in danger of misrepresenting the profound and carefully balanced thought of Maximus the Confessor, and fail to take advantage of his insights in a way that would lead to a fruitful exploration of the question.**end p.164**

An approach will presently be attempted which aims to do justice to the Confessor's thought while at the same time taking on board the best insights of the two above-mentioned views, and which, while trying to avoid the respective dangers inherent in them, will suggest a new way of conceiving and resolving the problem. As will be explained shortly, the suggestion here is that the problem cannot be adequately dealt with if it is approached from the point of view of the natures and the natural wills. Rather, it should be approached from the point of view of the person of the incarnate Logos, who, being one and the same, wills as God by his divine will and obeys as man by his human will.

Let us now turn to Maximus himself. Concerning the relationship between the Logos and his divine nature, on the one hand, and his humanity, on the other, it is noteworthy that in one of his

Ambigua Maximus wrote that the Logos moved the assumed nature which was his own, as the soul moves the body. [377]

[377] *Ambiguum* 5, 1049D, and Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 24. 93-5.

For Maximus, Christ 'as God was moving his own humanity and as man was revealing his own divinity'. [378]

[378] *Ambiguum* 5, 1056A, and Janssens, (ed.) *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 28. 192-3.

However, Maximus argued that the fact that 'the assumed nature is not self-moving, for it is verily moved by the divinity with which it was united according to hypostasis', does not provide grounds for denying its constitutive motion, [379]

[379] *Ambiguum* 5, 1052A-B, and Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 24. 109-11. According to Sherwood, this *Ambiguum* was written in 634 or shortly after (*Annotated Date-List*, 39 and 61).

by which Maximus signified Christ's human energy. It is noteworthy that Maximus here claimed something which is very close to some of the assertions of the dogmatic part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius. There, Sergius argued that the flesh of the Lord never fulfilled its natural movement of its own impulse but 'when, and in the manner and in the measure in which God the Logos willed', and that the Logos's humanity was moved by his divinity, as the body is moved by the soul. [380]

[380] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 542. 19-544. 3. It can be assumed that Maximus was familiar with this part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius. It does not seem very likely that he had seen a copy of the epistle, but if this part of it was included in the *Psēphos*, Maximus must have been familiar with it through Pyrrhus's relevant letter to him (according to Sherwood, Maximus's reply was written at the end of 633 or early in 634 (*Annotated Date-List*, 37). Sherwood did not believe that this part of the epistle was part of the *Psēphos* (*Annotated Date-List*, 38), although a part of it is repeated in the *Ekthesis*, but his position cannot be considered conclusive. The remarks made here should be added to what was said in Ch. 2 concerning the question of what in fact belonged to the *Psēphos*.

Maximus in this *Ambiguum* is very close to Sergius's premisses and phraseology, but comes to different conclusions, in that he argues that the **end p.165** assumed humanity which is moved by the Logos or his divinity is endowed with a human energy. [381]

[381] If it is accepted that Maximus was familiar with the part of Sergius's epistle to Honorius to which we have referred, it can be argued that he adopted some of Sergius's premisses, which were part of the tradition and can be accepted if interpreted and used properly, perhaps in order to bring his opponents to his position more easily. Let us recall that Maximus tried to do something similar tin his letter to Pyrrhus with regard to the *Psēphos*.

Let us now examine the way in which Maximus understands the relationship between the Logos and his divine nature and will, on the one hand, and his human will, on the other. The question of how this relationship is to be understood is closely related to some of Maximus's statements in which the human will of Christ is presented as being moved and modelled (*κινούμενον καὶ τυπούμενον*) by the Logos, [382]

[382] *Opusc*. 1, 32A; *Opusc*. 3, 45C.

or by the divine will of the Logos, [383]

[383] In *Opusc*. 3, 48A, Maximus states that the human will of Christ was moved and modelled by his divine will.

The dative there may denote the agent, although the translation 'according to his divine will', which is open to a more Antiochean understanding of the relationship between the human and the divine will, cannot be excluded. There is a similar statement in *Opusc*. 3, 48D, where it is written that the natural will of Christ was

modelled by (or according to) his divine will and did not oppose it . Finally, in *Opusc*. 7, 80D, the human will of Christ is said to be moved and modelled by the divine will and according to it. *Opusc*. 7, 80D-81A, is very interesting, for it combines the *κινούμενον — τυπούμενον* phrase with the deification of Christ's human will, its *σύ νευσις* (agreement, inclination) to the divine will, the obedience of Christ to the Father, and his being a paragon for us (some of these elements will be commented on later).

or by the divinity. [384]

[384] *Opusc*. 3, 81D.

How are we to understand these statements within the context of the Confessor's thought? Do they imply that the human will of Christ is an instrument of the divine person or nature or will (as an 'over-Alexandrian' approach would suggest)? Or do they presuppose, by contrast, a certain self-determining consent on the part of the humanity of Christ, which allows itself to be moved by the divine person or will or nature (as an 'over-Antiochean' approach would suggest)?

Before elaborating on this, a number of points need to be made. To begin with, attention must be drawn to the fact that Maximus repeatedly states his belief that the human soul is not moved by another, but is self-moving (*αὐτοκίνητος*). [385]

[385] See *Opusc*. 1, 20B; *De Anima*, 357D.

Moreover, he elsewhere says that man has by nature a 'self-moving (*αὐτοκίνητον*) and masterless (*ἀδέσποτον*) power'. [386]

[386] *Ambigua*, 1345D; particular attention should be paid to the word translated 'masterless' (*ἀδέσποτον*), which indicates that man is master of himself.

In addition, he repeatedly characterizes the human will as self-determining (*αὐτεξούσιος*). [387]

[387] See the *Opusculum* attacking the *Ekthesis* (*Opusc*. 15, 153C-184C) and the *Disputatio*, 288A-353B.

end p.166

As has been shown, for Maximus the human will is characterized so fundamentally by self-determination that it can be identified with it. [388]

[388] Maximus identifies them in *Disputatio*, 301C and 324D, referring to Diadochus of Photiki and 'the Fathers'. In this connection, it is worth noting that elsewhere Maximus characterizes the (human) will as *αὐτοκρατορικόν* (*Ep*. 6, 432B-C).

The vital importance that Maximus attributes to the self-determinative character of the human will is also seen in the distinction he draws between the sentient (*αἰσθητική*) and the rational nature. The former is characterized by movement according to impulse (*ὁρμή*), [389]

[389] *Disputatio*, 301B.

the latter by self-determinative movement. [390]

[390] Ibid. 301B-C.

'In the irrational beings (*ἄλογα*) it is nature that moves/leads (*ἄγει*), whereas in man nature is moved/led (*ἄγεται*), for man moves (self-)determiningly [391]

[391] In *Opusc*. 1, 17C-20A, Maximus defines *ἐξουσία* (power). It is worth noting that this word does not express our power only over external things or actions but also over our appetite and *proairesis* (we have *ἐξουσία* not only over things which are in our *ἐξουσία* but also over our choosing them). For more on this issue, see also the discussion in Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 183-4.

in accordance with his will (*κατὰ θέλησιν*).' [392]

[392] *Disputatio*, 304B. In relation to the principal question of this section, attention must be paid to the fact that in man nature *is moved*, but it is moved *by man* (the person).

As regards the way in which self-determination must be understood, it is noteworthy that, for Maximus, the basis and archetype of man's self-determination is the self-determination of God. As we have seen, Maximus argued that man is self-determining (*αὐτεξούσιος*) because he is made in the image of the divinity, which is self-determining (*αὐτεξούσιος*), although he admits that there is a difference between divine and human self-determination (*αὐτεξουσιότης*). [393]

[393] Ibid. 324D-325A. For Maximus, God's *αὐτεξουσιότης* should be understood *ὑπερουσίως* (ibid.).

However, the objection could be made that the fact that Maximus believes that the human will is self-determining does not prove that he believes that Christ's human will is self-determining too. This objection must be dismissed, for two reasons. The first is that it would contradict the profound Chalcedonian logic of Maximus, according to which the human nature and will of Christ are authentically human and similar to ours in everything apart from sin. Given the importance of self-determination for the genuine character of the human will, if the human will of Christ were understood in such a way as to exclude self-determination, its authenticity would be undermined. The second reason is that there are passages in which Maximus overtly relates the self-determination which characterizes human nature and will on the **end p.167** whole to the self-determination that characterizes the human nature and will of Christ. [394]

[394] See ibid. 304C-305D, 324C-325B. Let us recall that Maximus refuted Pyrrhus's argument that the natural is compelled, and argued that everything in the intellectual nature is voluntary (*ἑκούσιον*) (ibid. 293B-296A); see also the interesting comments of Wolfson on this passage (*Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, 485-6).

But in the light of what has been argued so far, Maximus seems to be inconsistent. On the one hand, he says that the human soul is self-moving and that its basic faculty, the will, is self-determining; on the other hand, he says that the human will of Christ is moved by the Logos and his divine nature and will. How are we to reconcile this seeming contradiction? How is it possible to say with Maximus that the

human will is moved by the divine will without undermining, as some over-Alexandrian interpreters of his thought are in danger of doing, its authentic human character, which lies precisely in its self-determination? Moreover, if we are to protect the self-determination of the human will of Christ, how are we to interpret Maximus's assertion that it is moved by the divine? One solution would be to say that the humanity of Christ, including the human will, is moved by the divinity, including the divine will, because it allows itself to be so moved. But if we say that, how are we to avoid turning the humanity of Christ into a willing subject regulating its own decisions, as Tixeront for instance has argued, which would take us dangerously close to Nestorianism? [395]

[395] The over-symmetrical flavour of such a position has to do with the fact that the humanity of Christ is understood as a (second, next to the Logos) willing and acting principle in a way that puts the personal unity of Christ at risk. There will be an opportunity to go deeper into this in Ch. 4, sect. 2.

In order to find a solution, attention must again be paid to the all-important distinction between nature (and natural will), on the one hand, and person, on the other. It is one thing to say that the human will of Christ is moved by the Logos, and quite another thing to say that it is moved by the divine will (or by the divinity). To say that the human will of the Logos is moved by him is perfectly compatible with Maximus's thought, for time and again Maximus makes it explicit that the willing subject in Christ, the willer who wills as God and as man, is the enfleshed Logos. [396]

[396] For more on this, see Ch. 4, sect. 2.

Given that it is the willer who moves his will, and that the willer in Maximus's Christology is identified with the enfleshed Logos, it is the enfleshed Logos who moves his human will as well as his divine will. However, this does not in any way contradict the self-determination of the human will; on the contrary, it affirms it, by enabling its actualization.**end p.168**

How is this so? Let us consider for a minute what happens with us, human persons. We are endowed with a self-determining human will, a self-determining human power of willing, by virtue of which we are able to will in a self-determining manner. It is we as willers who actualize our self-determining power of willing in willing certain things. The case with Christ is similar. The incarnate Logos possesses a self-determining human will in virtue of which he is able to will as man in a self-determining way, and thus to actualize the self-determining power of his human will.

But to say that the person of the Logos moves his human will is not the same as saying that the divine nature or the divine will of the Logos move his human will. If we simply say that it is the divine will which moves the human will, no reference is made to the person of the Logos, who, as man, allows his human will to be moved by the divine will in a self-determining human way, and thus the human will is relegated to a more or less passive instrument of the divine will which moves it. [397]

[397] In addition, if we say that the divine nature moves the human nature or will of Christ, the former will be turned into a moving principle, which might be problematic. For more on this issue, see also Ch. 4, sect. 2.

If we want to avoid this, the only option with which we are left is to make the human nature and will the subject of willing which allows the divine will to move it; this, however, would sound Nestorian, as has been stated repeatedly.

Let us elaborate further. There are various instances in which Maximus refers to the human as being moved by the divine. In the course of the public disputation between Maximus and Pyrrhus, the latter argued that the human energy must be called passion, in contradistinction to the divine energy. [398]

[398] *Disputatio*, 349C.

Maximus rejected this, but nevertheless conceded that the human energy is moved, 'for all things that are from God and after God suffer being moved, because they are not self-movement or self-power'. [399]

[399] Ibid. 352A. In ibid. 352B Maximus deems that the fact that man is moved by God is due to the *logos* according to which he was created by God, which seems to imply that God moves man in the sense that it is he who has endowed man with the capacity of moving. The view that God continues to sustain this capacity cannot be excluded, but, on the contrary, seems to be in tune with the whole theological vision of the Confessor. For example, in *Ambigua*, 1217C-D, Maximus says that God is the beginning and the

end of the movement of beings, for they are created by him, are moved through (by) him , and will rest in him.

This phrase is also found almost verbatim in one of Maximus's *Ambigua*. There, Maximus notes that all beings suffer movement because they are not self-movement or self-power, but also hastens to say that the rational beings are moved willingly (κατὰ γνώμην) in order to achieve well-being. [400]

[400] *Ambigua*, 1073B-C.

Thus, it seems that the **end p.169** passivity of humanity does not annihilate the personal consent of those who move, but on the contrary presupposes it, as is indicated by the phrase κατὰ γνώμην. Maximus uses similar language on other occasions too—for instance, in one of his epistles, where he argues that 'there are, as they say, three things, God, nature and the world, which move (ἄγοντα) man, or rather towards which man moves according to will (βουλήσει) and *gnōmē* and *proairesis*'. [401]

[401] *Ep*. 9, 445C.

Furthermore, in one of his dyothelite works Maximus writes that the saints are moved and acted upon by God because of their entire inclination and disposition towards Him. [402]

[402] *Opusc*. 20, 233D-236A.

In a similar manner, he writes in the aforementioned *Ambiguum* that 'the Son will subject to the Father those who willingly accept to be subjected'. [403]

[403] *Ambigua*, 1076A; Maximus here alludes to 1 Cor. 15: 27-8.

This subjection will be possible, Maximus argues, because they will have handed over their self-determinative power (αὐτεξούσιον) willingly to God, and they will will nothing but what God wills. However, this does not signify the abolition of their self-determinative power, as Maximus makes clear, but rather its affirmation according to a gnomic surrender of it (to God), so that they desire *to be moved by God* and to be unable to will to move anywhere else but towards God, for they will have become gods by deification. [404]

[404] *Ambigua*, 1076B-C.

What is important in these two passages is that the movement of the saints by God presupposes the personal consent of those who are moved. God does not move the saints without their personal consent, and this, as well as its Christological equivalent with which we are dealing, has far-reaching repercussions for many theological issues, including of course the issue of the relationship between free will and predestination.

It is quite remarkable that in the passage from the *Ambigua* which we have just mentioned Maximus draws a parallel between the saints and Christ himself, who obeyed the divine will of the Father in Gethsemane. [405]

[405] Ibid. 1076B. To say that Maximus interprets the words that Christ addressed to his Father in a figurative way (as the word could arguably suggest) is absolutely alien to Maximus's thought, for time and again he makes it perfectly clear that Christ in Gethsemane *really* obeyed the Father.

Following Maximus, it can be argued that, by obeying the Father, Christ did something similar to what the saints also do, by allowing themselves to be moved by God in imitation of Christ. [406]

[406] An important difference of course always remains: the saints have a human person, Christ has a divine one.**end p.170**

This brings us to a very basic element of Maximus's dyothelite thought: namely, Christ's human obedience to the Father, perfectly illustrated in his prayer in Gethsemane. Let us recall here that Maximus was the first theologian to attribute the fiat to Christ as man in an unambiguous way. The acceptance of the cup is the apex of the soteriologically indispensable human obedience of the Son to the divine will of the Father, which is identical with his own divine will. To say in this context that the human will of Christ was moved by the divine will would invalidate the whole point. For it goes without saying that obedience presupposes as a *conditio sine qua non* the self-determining personal acceptance on the part of him who obeys—that is, on the part of Christ as man—of the desire of the will which is obeyed. [407]

[407] Maximus said in the course of his disputation with Pyrrhus: 'So, did He obey willingly or unwillingly? If he obeyed unwillingly, this can be reasonably called tyranny', and then hastens to clarify that Christ obeyed as man, which proves that he was θελητικός as man (*Disputatio*, 324A-B).

Maximus's claim that Christ obeyed the Father to the point of death, and in so doing offered us a perfect example to imitate by willing whatever God wills, makes sense only if this obedience of Christ to the Father was self-determiningly undertaken by him as man. Only in this case can we be asked to imitate him by personally obeying the divine will of God, as Maximus urges us to do. [408]

[408] See e.g. *Disputatio*, 305C-D.

To sum up, on the basis of such claims made by Maximus, it can be argued that Christ did what we should do, and what many saints did after him. Christ handed over as man his human will to the will of God, to the divine will, and, as man, allowed his own human will to be moved and modelled by the divine will of the Father, which is identical with his own divine will. Or, to put it another way, the Logos as God willed by his divine will, and the same Logos as man obeyed the divine will by his human will. [409]

[409] As Pyrrhus himself admitted, having accepted Maximus's arguments, it was the same who 'willed as God and obeyed as man' (*Disputatio*, 301D). Maximus uses a similar statement in *Opusc*. 6, 68D. Such a statement was also made by Saint John of Damascus, *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, 27. 9-13 (Kotter (ed.), p. 209).

Yet, one might still ask why Maximus uses this excessively Alexandrian-sounding expression: namely, that the human will of Christ is moved by the divinity and the divine will. Could he not use another expression to show that the Logos as man handed over his human will to the divine will in a supreme act of obedience and personal self-surrender?

In responding to this question, let it first be noted that Maximus used some other expressions, as has already been pointed out in this section. In addition, **end p.171** it must be remembered that Maximus was not an academic sitting at his desk in order to write a manual of systematic theology. He was faced with a concrete heresy and needed to defend himself against his opponents' objections. He proved extremely skilful in doing so. To counter the objection that his theology was Nestorian, he had to make unmistakably clear that it is one and the same person, the Logos incarnate, who wills as God and as man, and who consequently moves his human will as a personal willer. However, his main objective when he wrote that the human will of Christ is moved and modelled by the Logos or the divine will or the divinity seems to have been, as can be deduced from the context of the phrases, to refute an objection of Apollinarian provenance raised by his opponents against the dyothelite position. This objection was that if Christ had two wills, a divine and a human, the latter would be sinfully moving against the divine will. [410]

[410] It has already been seen that some monothelites used the argument that if there were two wills in Christ, they would oppose each other. That Maximus's motive is to counteract this argument can be deduced from what he says in the following passages: *Opusc*. 1, 32A; *Opusc*. 3, 48D; *Opusc*. 7, 80D and esp. 81C-D.

Obviously, by stressing the fact that the human will of Christ was moved by the (Logos and his) divine (nature and) will, Maximus nullified this objection. Another reason why Maximus wrote that the human will of Christ was moved not only by the Logos but also by his divine nature (and natural will) might be that, as we have seen, Maximus identifies the Logos with his divine nature according to hypostasis and according to nature, which may have made him at times a little careless in distinguishing between the two. Finally, it can be assumed that in some cases, including that with which we are now concerned, Maximus may have tried to express his Christology in a somewhat over-asymmetrical language, so as to render it more palatable to his adversaries and thus more effective in bringing them to the dyothelite position.

However, regardless of the validity of these speculations, what remains important is that by saying that the human will of Christ is moved by the Logos or by the divinity or by the divine will, Maximus in no way compromises the authentic human self-determining character of the human will of Christ. Maximus's thought points to the enfleshed Logos, who obeyed the divine will as man to the point of death, in this way submitting his human will to the divine will. It is precisely this which makes Christ a paragon who inspires us all to hand over our self-determining human will to the will of God, so that he can move it towards the fulfilment of our salvation in accordance with our own human, self-determining consent and self-surrender.end p.172

5.6 Conclusions

As has already been argued, Maximus's dyothelite position is, on the whole, convincing. With his dyothelite Christology, Maximus achieved a profound synthesis, integrating elements from both the Alexandrian and the Antiochean traditions. This synthesis took place against the backdrop of the Alexandrian tradition, which had been elaborated by the Fathers and ratified by the Councils. As we have seen, Maximus belonged to that very tradition which sees God the Logos as the unique person in Christology. However, the potential weakness of this tradition, which came to a head with Apollinarius, the anti-Chalcedonians, and finally the monothelites, was to downplay the integrity of the humanity of Christ and its self-determining and active participation in the work of our salvation. With Maximus, the full humanity of Jesus and his human obedience to the will of the Father, which were among the strongest and healthiest elements of Antiochean Christology, were given a secure place in the theology of the Christian Church.

Moving on to the subtleties of Maximus's dyothelite thought, it is important to draw attention to the fact that Maximus brought to completion the Leontian achievement of doing justice to the particular human idioms of Christ by attributing to his human will particular acts of willing, such as his obedience to the Father in Gethsemane. In so doing, Maximus not only protected the integrity and authenticity of the humanity of Christ, but also made it possible to regard the human history of Jesus as recapitulating and rewriting our history, not as a history of human rebellion against God but as a history of loving obedience to him.

For Maximus, the attribution of two wills to Christ—namely, of a human will alongside the divine will—does not necessarily entail either personal division or sinfulness. Maximus insisted on the unity of the person of the enfleshed Logos. For him, the Logos assumed our natural self-determining will and deified it. Thus, it is no longer a will subject to ignorance and deliberation, concupiscence and imperfection; it is not a will that can err, sin, and oppose God, but is steadily and unmistakably inclined to the good, moved and modelled by the Logos in accordance with the divine will for the fulfilment of our salvation.

In fact, according to Maximus's Chalcedonian logic, the unity between the divine and the human wills must be stressed as much as their distinction. This unity is implied by the unity of the two natures that bear the two wills in the one person of the Logos, who is the unique bearer of the two natures. The identity of the willer, the deification of the human will, and the fact that it is moved by the Logos, by the divinity, or even by the divine will itself, as **end p.173** Maximus argued, for the fulfilment of the will of the Father, indicate Maximus's desire to deny the separation and, what is more, the opposition of Christ's two wills, and, as his 'Chalcedonian logic' requires, to emphasize their unity while respecting their distinction.

But how is it possible to understand the unity and relationship of the two wills without endangering the self-determination of the human will? Following some of Maximus's insights, it has been argued here that the best way to do this is by employing the distinction between nature and person perhaps a little more consistently than Maximus sometimes did. Maximus's insistence on the self-determination of Christ's human will and on the human obedience of the Son to the Father points the way to the solution of the problem. If we were to say that it is the divinity or the divine will that moves the human will without at the same time stressing that the Logos as man allows his human will to be moved by them in an act of obedience, not only the whole point of the obedience of the Son to the Father, but also the self-determination of the human will of the Son, both of which Maximus insists upon so strongly, would be nullified. On the contrary, by emphasizing that the Logos as God wills by his divine will and as man obeys the divine will by his human will, the self-determination of the human will is secured.

We have mentioned the importance of the unity of the two wills of Jesus Christ. But this issue is related to the question of whether there are one personal or two natural subjects of willing in Christ, which requires detailed examination. It is, therefore, to this question that attention will now be given.
end p.174

4 Further Issues Relating To Saint Maximus's Dyothelite Christology and Their Theological Significance

1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall explore some further issues related to the monothelite controversy and the dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, to which we have so far paid little attention. The first main section will be devoted to an examination of the question of whether person or nature is to be identified with the subject of willing and acting in Christology. It will deal with the formula of the *Tome of Leo* ('agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione'), which suggests that the natures are the subjects of action in Christ, and with its reception during and shortly after the monothelite controversy. In this section, it will be argued that an alternative wording, used by Maximus the Confessor, which identifies the incarnate Logos with the subject of willing and acting, is preferable to Leo's formula.

While section 2 will deal with *person* and *nature*, and their legitimate or otherwise identification with the subject of willing, section 3 will briefly present some concluding remarks on the *will*, as understood by Maximus, and on its theological significance. The presentation of these remarks will make better sense at this stage, having almost completed the examination of Maximus's dyothelitism and having in mind a full picture of his dyothelite Christology.

Section 4 will point out that, despite his dyothelitism and dyoenergism, in some of his early dyothelite *Opuscula* Maximus accepted whole-heartedly the expression 'one energy', which, for him, signified the unity of the two natural energies. Based on this, I will examine the question of the possibility of accepting a carefully qualified monothelite terminology.

Finally, a brief epilogue will bring this book to an end. **end p.175**

2. Person Or Nature? Leo, Maximus, and the Question Of the Subject Of Willing

In the mid-fifth century, the Fourth Ecumenical Council ratified a short doctrinal treatise, which was destined to become one of the most controversial documents of ancient Christology: the so-called *Tome of Leo*. One of the *Tome's* disputed phrases played a significant role in the monothelite controversy, and is of particular interest for the purposes of this book.

Pope Leo wrote in the *Tome* that 'each nature [in Christ] works in communion with the other what is proper to it, the Logos working that which is the Logos', and the body accomplishing the things that are the body's'. [1]

[1] The Latin form of the text reads 'agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est. Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est'. The Greek text, which is of more interest to us, since it was the one mostly used in the monothelite controversy, reads: (see Schwartz (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, tome 2, vol. i, pt. 1, 14. 27-9. Leo did not express himself in this way only in the *Tome*. For example, in his epistle to Emperor Leo, he similarly referred to the flesh and to the Logos as subjects of action ('quid sit, quod caro sine uerbo non agit, et quid sit, quod uerbum sine carne non efficit', cited in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 95. 12-13). It is noteworthy, however, that after the above-mentioned formula of the *Tome of Leo*, the unity of Christ is also unambiguously emphasized (see e.g. Schwartz (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, tome 2, vol. i, pt. 1, 15. 3-8).

From the proceedings of the Council we learn that this passage of the *Tome*, followed by a sentence that reads: 'the former [the divine nature/the Logos] shines in the miracles, whereas the latter [the human nature] was subjected to passions', was objected to by some bishops at the Council. The grounds for their objection are not specified in the proceedings, but we know that the archdeacon Aetius showed the conformity of this passage of Leo to Cyril by invoking a passage from Cyril, the core content of which is that there are (legitimate) expressions that befit the humanity of Christ, whereas others befit his divinity, thereby dispelling their doubts as to its orthodoxy. [2]

[2] Eduardus Schwartz (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, tome 2, vol. i, pt. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1933), 82. 12-22. The tense atmosphere of the Council did not encourage detailed examination of this point. However, as J. S. MacArthur has noticed, 'whether Cyril would have seen the point of the comparison is another matter' (*Chalcedon* (London: SPCK, 1931), 121).

However, the principal problem with Leo's formula is not that it uses divine-like expressions to refer to the divinity of Christ and human-like ones to refer to his humanity, but that it turns the natures of Christ into subjects of action. In so far as the divine nature is concerned, it may be remarked that, as Leo uses the term, it is interchangeable with the person of the Logos, which **end p.176** perhaps points to his lack of sensitivity to the distinction between person and nature on the level of divinity. But it may be the case that Leo exhibited a similar lack of sensitivity in distinguishing between person and nature on the level of humanity too. For there seems to be a grain of truth in the criticism of the formula by Severus, the leading theological figure of the anti-Chalcedonian opposition, who argued that person and subject of action belong together: 'no nature ever works, unless it subsists as a person'.[3]

[3] The excerpt from Severus is found in Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 310, 18-19. It is noteworthy that Severus repeatedly criticized Leo's presentation of Christ's natures as subjects of action: see, for instance, three relevant excerpts of his in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 376, 1-11 and 17-21, and 378, 3-9. Anastasius of Antioch, however, opposed Severus's assertion by arguing that the human nature of Christ is not a hypostasis, because it did not perform its acts separately from the Logos but in union with him (Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 135. 23-136. 6).

The formula of Leo has been regarded in totally different ways in modern times. Charles Moeller went so far as to regard it as a kind of pinnacle of Christological orthodoxy, which 'assures the realism of each nature *and their indissoluble union'*.[4]

[4] Moeller, 'Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-Chalcédonism', 716-17, my emphasis. The fact that each nature is thereby identified with the subject of acting did not bother Moeller at all—quite the opposite. In Moeller the matter of the potential over-symmetrical overtones of the formula was not even raised.

Adolf Harnack, by contrast, speaks for many in considering the formula of Leo as overtly Nestorian. For Harnack, Pope Leo 'speaks of a peculiar mode of action on the part of each nature, and thus really hypostasises each nature. In Leo's view the "Person" is no longer entirely the one subject with two "properties", but the union of two hypostatic natures'.[5]

[5] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, iv. 205-6.

Finally, Grillmeier admits that 'the *"forma"*, i.e. the nature, is here [namely, in the formula of Leo] made the subject of the actions', and raises the question of whether the communion that Leo put forward is not too loose.[6]

[6] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 536.

However, he eventually gives a rather positive evaluation of the formula,[7]

[7] Ibid. 534-6.

although he recognizes that 'Leo's view of the divine-human working of Christ shows that Leo was inwardly a long way from the Alexandrian conception of the unity in Christ'.[8]

[8] Ibid. 534.

This brief account suffices to show how views are split as regards the evaluation of Leo's formula. It is important, however, for the purposes of this book to see how the formula was received and used by both parties during the monothelite controversy. The formula played a significant role in the **end p.177** controversy, and examining the way it was treated will hopefully reveal to us some of its strengths and weaknesses, and also cast more light on the Christology of the exponents of both monothelitism and dyothelitism.

The first interesting reference to the formula of Leo was made by the monothelite Cyrus of Phasis. In his first epistle to Sergius of Constantinople, Cyrus expressed his difficulty in accepting the one energy doctrine, deeming it incompatible with the *Tome of Leo*, which speaks 'of two energies in communion with each other'.[9]

[9] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 588. 7-592. 4. Our citation is at 590. 3-4.

What should not pass unnoticed here is that Cyrus does not even mention the two working natures but, taking for granted that two working natures evidently entail two energies, writes (inaccurately) that the *Tome* speaks of two energies. In his response, Sergius did not challenge the orthodoxy of Leo's formula, but pointed out, as has already been seen, that none of those who had interpreted the *Tome* took its relevant expression as indicative of two energies.[10]

[10] Ibid. 528. 24-530. 12. Macarius of Antioch also considered the formula of Leo as indicative of one energy (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 510. 17-18).

It is noteworthy that according to the text that both Mansi and Riedinger give, Sergius cites the formula of Leo correctly. [11]

[11] Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, xi, 525D, and Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 528. 25.

However, according to the text of Mansi (I will refer later to the text of Riedinger), in his second epistle to Cyrus, Sergius cites the formula of Leo using the dative case instead of the nominative for the words ἑκατέρα and μορφῇ. Thus, the formula takes the form ('Christ performs his actions by each of the two natures in communion with the other'), so Christ is turned into the subject of the actions and the natures become merely the means through which Christ performs the actions. [12]

[12] Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, x, 973C. On this, see also Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, 156.

Obviously, if the formula is changed as above, it is easier to understand it, as Sergius does, as in conformity with the statement that Christ performs the divine-like actions and the human actions through a single energy, and that every divine and human energy went forth from one and the same God the Logos enfleshed. [13]

[13] Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, x, 973C, and Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 136. 36-8.

In his epistle to Honorius, Sergius uses the formula of Leo again, but there the word ἑκατέρᾳ, according to the text of Mansi, is in the dative, whereas the word μορφῇ is in the nominative. [14]

[14] Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum Conciliorum*, xi, 537A.

The critical edition of Riedinger cites the **end p.178 f**ormula of Leo in the proper form: that is, with the two words in the nominative, in both aforementioned cases. [15]

[15] See Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 138. 1, and ii, pt. 2, 546. 16 respectively. Elert (*Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie*, 239), Doucet ('Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 417), and Bausenhart (*'In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde'*, 311) have made comments (not always accurate) on the different ways in which the formula of Leo occurs in seventh-century writers, but have not taken the whole point much further.

Unfortunately, his apparatus criticus does not provide any information as to alternative *lectiones*, so we cannot tell whether it is possible that the distorted form of the formula could be traced back to Sergius himself. At any rate, the probably deliberately false rendering of the formula, which occurs quite frequently, as we shall see, testifies to the difficulty of at least some (dyothelite) copyists in accepting the genuine form of the formula, as well as to their desperate endeavour to change it so as to present (the person of) Christ, and not his natures, as the subject of action. The endeavour was desperate indeed, for, if we put the words in the dative, the syntax of the formula becomes problematic, and so, consequently, does its meaning. [16]

[16] The Latin version of the formula, 'agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione' is of no help, since the types 'utra(que)' and 'forma' may well be either in the nominative or in the ablative (which is used in Latin in order to express the means through which something is accomplished, a function which in ancient Greek is performed by the dative). However, both texts, the Greek and the Latin, become almost nonsensical if the nominative is changed into the dative (in the Greek text) or into the ablative (in the Latin text). Dorner has rightly observed that in Leo's formula ' "forma" is in the nominative case' (*History of the Development*, 89).

Saint Sophronius of Jerusalem, the first to attack the doctrine of one energy, is an interesting case in point. In his synodical epistle, Sophronius at times regarded Christ as the subject of both the human and the divine actions, [17]

[17] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 440. 17-20, 442. 1-2 and 4-14, 444. 5-7 and 14-15, 448. 8-10, and 456. 6.

but at others regarded the natures as the subjects of their proper actions, adopting Leo's way of speaking. [18]

[18] Ibid. 442. 2-4 and 15-18 (Sophronius cites Leo's formula there), 442. 22-444. 2, and 444. 4, 10-11 and 16-18.

Sophronius argued that the formula of Leo is incompatible with Nestorianism for two reasons: first, because the two natures worked not in separation from, but in communion with, each other; [19]

[19] Ibid. 444. 1-2. To say that two working natures that are united is the equivalent of a working hypostasis, sees hypostasis merely as the sum of natures, namely focuses on the 'material' aspect of hypostasis. But the way I wish to put the question in this section is different. The question here is whether it is the (united, of course) natures which act or the (personal) hypostasis of the incarnate Logos.

and secondly, which perhaps follows from the first, because, despite the fact that there are two working natures, there are not two, but only one, working person. [20]

[20] Ibid. 442. 19-444. 7.

Thus, it seems that Sophronius treads a **end p.179** middle way between identifying (only) the natures as subjects of the actions and identifying (only) the person as such, without yet explaining how we are to distinguish between the two on that score. He seems to be aware that the formula of Leo is open to a Nestorian interpretation, hence he hastens to defend it; but we are bound to suspect that he makes repeated use of it because of the implicit dyoenergism therein. To protect orthodoxy on the matter of the energies was certainly Sophronius's chief concern, and to employ the sanctioned formula of Leo to that end was an apposite option in this respect. Yet, it is noteworthy that Sophronius felt the need to mention the one acting Christ at the same time too.

In his first epistle to Sergius, Honorius spoke of Christ as performing both divine and human acts. [21]

[21] Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 554. 11-12.

He mentioned that Christ works *in* the divine nature and *in* the human nature. [22]

[22] Ibid. 556. 14-15.

In the closing part of his epistle he forbade reference to either one or two energies, and argued that it must be confessed instead that Christ 'works *in* two natures those which are of the divinity and those which are of the humanity'. [23]

[23] Ibid. 558. 3-5.

In this epistle, Honorius did not mention Leo or his formula, but merely alluded to it by saying that the spirit of Christ works 'through the communion of each of the two natures'. [24]

[24] Ibid. 556. 2-5.

It is plain that in Honorius's version of Leo's formula the natures are no longer the subjects of action. For Honorius, the subject of action in this case is Christ. [25]

[25] Given that in his epistle Honorius basically endorsed what Sergius had argued in his first epistle to him, it might be plausible to suspect that the alteration of the formula of Leo by Honorius could reflect a similar prior alteration of the formula in Sergius's epistle to him.

A few years later, however, Honorius changed his attitude considerably. In his second epistle to Sergius, [26]

[26] Ibid. 622. 1-624. 20.

he made an interesting suggestion, as we have already seen. He suggested that neither one nor two energies should be confessed, and that instead of one energy we should refer to the one Christ who performs his acts in both his natures, and instead of two energies we should refer to the two natures which perform the acts which are proper to them. [27]

[27] See ibid. 622. 16-20, and esp. 624. 3-9. The influence of Sophronius's *Synodicon* on Honorius's second epistle has been pointed out repeatedly (see e.g. Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 421, who also refers to Grumel, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme' (1929), 274-82).

Let us reflect on Honorius's suggestion. Plainly, Honorius sees a link between the one energy doctrine and the identification of Christ with the unique subject of action, on the one hand, and between the two energies doctrine and the identification of the two natures as the subjects of action, on the **end p.180** other hand. [28]

[28] The link between dyoenergism and the *Tome of Leo* seems to have been recognized before the seventh century. Andrew Louth has rightly argued that 'it is not difficult to suspect Denys' language [Denys referred to "a new theandric energy"] of deliberately contradicting the *Tome of Leo* with its assertion that "each form does what is proper to it in communion with the other". It is hardly surprising that those who rejected the *Tome of Leo* called in support of their position this letter of Denys' (*Maximus the Confessor*, 54-5). It is noteworthy that Maximus also mentions that, according to the Severan pseudo-bishops whom he had met in Crete, the *Tome of Leo* implies two energies (*Opusc.* 3, 49C).

Apparently, if we say that Christ is to be identified with the subject of action and if, in addition, only one energy is attributed to him, his unity will be highlighted at the cost of the distinction between his two natures. [29]

[29] It is clear that by forbidding reference to either one or two energies and stating that the one Christ performs the divine and the human acts (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 160. 4-8), the *Ekthesis* rather overstresses the unity of Christ. The same goes for Honorius's first epistle to Sergius.

However, what is more interesting is that if we confess at the same time that Christ has two energies, as dyoenergite orthodoxy requires, *and* that the two natures are the subjects of action, our scope for denoting the unity of Christ will be seriously diminished.

Let us now turn to Maximus's use of Leo's formula. Despite the fact that the formula of Leo serves Maximus's dyothelite Christology well, in that it points rather towards two energies, and, by implication, wills, he makes use of it only a few times. Furthermore, in only one instance does he cite it correctly, if Migne's text is to be believed. In one of his dyothelite *Opuscula*, we encounter the form

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[30] *Opusc.* 15, 168A. It is noteworthy that in Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, there is a confession of faith which reads that Christ has two wills and energies 'in communion with each other', and that he performs the divine and the human acts '*in* each nature , in communion with the other' (285. 25-286. 3; the apparatus criticus does not provide any alternative *lectiones*). If the confession belongs to Anastasius Apocrisiarius, Maximus's disciple, who was in all probability the compiler of the *Doctrina Patrum* (see Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii, pt. 1, trans. Pauline Allen and John Cawte (London: Mowbray, 1987), 75), it may be argued that Maximus's way of speaking is here reflected.

('in each nature'), whereas in the Migne text of the *Disputation* we find the form .[31]

[31] *Disputatio*, 352B. However, Doucet, who edited the critical edition of the *Disputation*, informs us that the authentic *lectio* has the words ἑκατέρα and μορφή in the nominative, and remarks that the tendency to use the dative occurs in later copyists. According to Doucet, this may apply to *Opusc.* 15, 168A as well ('Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 417). Unfortunately, the long-awaited critical edition of Maximus's dyothelite works being prepared by Basil Markezines for CCSG is not yet available, so any definitive remarks in this respect will have to wait.

Elsewhere Maximus applies the communion to which Leo refers to the natural idioms of Christ.[32]

[32] *Opusc.* 8, 96D.

Finally, in one instance Maximus cites the formula of Leo correctly.[33]

[33] *Opusc.* 15, 176C-D.

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There are two very important points to be made here. The first is that nowhere does Maximus express himself as Leo did. He cites Leo's formula, and at least once he cites it correctly; but never does he incorporate it into his writings other than as a citation. In the only instance in which Maximus uses Leo's formula as part of his own way of speaking without mentioning Leo, the formula undergoes decisive alterations. Maximus writes that the Son performs the divine acts by his divine nature (or energy) and the human acts by his human nature (or energy), and that there is communion, coming together (*συμφυΐα*),[34]

[34] I am using here the translation of the word *συμφυΐα* suggested by Andrew Louth (*Maximus the Confessor*, 189).

and lack of division between the two natures (or energies).[35]

[35] *Opusc.* 9, 117B. Maximus uses the expression ὡς εἴρηται ('as has been said'), which implies that this is the way he understands the formula of Leo.

What is remarkable here is not only that Maximus makes the Son the subject of action, but also that he does not restrict himself to the word 'communion' in order to denote the unity between the divine and the human: he speaks also of coming together (*συμφυΐα*) and of lack of separation, thereby emphasizing Christ's unity.

The second point to be made is that Maximus never expanded the formula of Leo so as to make the natures *subjects of willing* too. That is, nowhere does Maximus say that each nature *wills* and works in communion with the other. *For Maximus, the willing and acting subject in Christology is the person of the incarnate Logos*. In contradistinction to Leo, Maximus was in the habit of writing that *the incarnate Logos wills the divine and the human (deeds) and performs as God and as man divine and human acts*, and this is the wording by which he identified time and again the person of the incarnate Logos with the subject of willing and acting.

Let us give some examples. Maximus writes that '[the enfleshed Logos] as God by nature willed the divine and fatherly [deeds] according to nature . . . and the same again as man by nature willed the human [deeds] according to nature'.[36]

[36] *Opusc.* 7, 77C-80A.

Later in the same *Opusculum* he writes that God the Logos enfleshed wills the divine and the human (deeds) and performs divine and human acts. [37]

[37] Ibid. 80B.

Further on, he writes that Christ is the subject of willing (*θελων*) and acting both as God and as man. [38]

[38] Ibid. 84B-C.

Elsewhere, he states again that the Logos willed and acted as man. [39]

[39] *Opusc.* 15, 157C.

Likewise, in another *Opusculum* he states that God the Logos enfleshed acts according to his natures, [40]

[40] *Opusc.* 16, 205C.

and a little later that Christ willed as man. [41]

[41] Ibid. 208B.

Repeated affirmations of Maximus that Christ wills and acts as God and as man occur also in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. [42]

[42] See e.g. *Disputatio*, 289A-B.

Only in Epifanovic's edition of Maximus's texts is there a passage according

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to which Maximus argues not only that Christ 'wills and works naturally according to both natures' but also that 'each nature wills and works in communion with the other'. [43]

[43] S. L. Epifanovic, *Materialy k Izuceniju zizni i Tvorenij prep. Maksima Ispovednika* (Kiev, 1917), 63. 5-6 and 9-10 respectively.

But the authenticity of the text is highly questionable. [44]

[44] For more on this, see Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, iii, 7707 (17).

Let us now briefly examine the conciliar attitude towards Leo's formula. In the proceedings of the Lateran Council it can be seen that some of its participants use the formula, [45]

[45] Sergius of Cyprus, e.g., cites the formula of Leo (Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 62. 4-5) and gives it a central place in his epistle to Theodore (ibid. 60. 36-64. 8); Leo's formula is also cited by Bishop Victor (ibid. 102. 1-3), by Pope Martin (ibid. 104. 32-4, 150. 21-3), by Bishop Maximus Aquileiensis (ibid. 244. 14-16), etc.

whereas others present the Logos as the subject of willing [46]

[46] See e.g. the report of Steven of Dora (ibid. 44. 4-5) or the comments of Bishop Deusdedit on the *Libellus of the Monks* (ibid. 58. 20-1). The *Libellus of the Monks* may have been drawn up by Maximus. The monks who address the Pope are Greeks (ibid. 50. 31) and know Greek but no Latin (ibid. 54. 35-40). Moreover, Maximus's well-known manner of referring to the natures of Christ 'out of which, in which and which' God the Logos incarnate is, is found therein (ibid. 54. 24-5). As we would expect, in the *Libellus* the monks are perhaps closer to seeing Christ, and not his natures, as the subject of willing and acting (ibid. 54. 14-30, esp. 22-4).

or acting. [47]

[47] See again the report of Steven of Dora (ibid. 44. 4-5); this is also occasionally the case with Pope Martin (ibid. 16. 17-21) or with Bishop Maurus (ibid. 24. 20-21).

What is more significant, however, is the official stance of the Council. In the introduction to its canons, the Council affirms that 'one and the same, our Lord and God Jesus Christ . . . willed and worked our salvation in a divine way as well as in a human way'. [48]

[48] Ibid. 366. 4-5.

In the canons of the Council, the natures are not presented as subjects of willing and acting either. On the contrary, canons 10 and 11 state that Christ 'wills and works our salvation according to both his natures' . [49]

[49] Ibid. 374. 10-26. For the Council, the Gospel utterances too must be attributed to the person of our Lord and God Jesus Christ (see its canon 16, ibid. 378. 9-14).

This choice of wording reflects the preferred phraseology of Maximus, [50]

[50] See e.g. Maximus's *Opus.* 6 (which; according to Sherwood, was written in 640-2 (*Annotated Date-List*, 44)), 68C-D, where he writes that Christ was known to be according to both his natures; *Opus.* 15 (written in 646-7, according to Sherwood, *Annotated Date-List*, 55), 160C, etc.

who was the theological mentor of the Council. [51]

[51] The influence of Maximus on the Lateran Council has been often pointed out. M. Messier, for instance, has suggested that Maximus may have been the redactor of the Council's canons: see 'Theandrisme', in *Catholicisme hier, aujourd'hui, demain*, xiv (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1996), cols. 953-6, at 955, cited by Coffey, 'Theandric Nature of Christ', 407.

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Let us now turn to the Sixth Ecumenical Council. In the Council's *Definition of Faith* a most interesting development can be observed. Not only is the *Tome of Leo* praised and his formula cited, [52]

[52] See Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 772. 31-774. 2 and 776. 3-5 respectively.

but there is also the declaration that 'each of the two natures [of Christ] *wills* and works what is proper to it in communion with the other, without division and confusion' . [53]

[53] Ibid. 776, 16-17. It is noteworthy that the alternative *lectio* ἑκατέρᾳ φύσει occurs in one of the manuscripts, as the apparatus criticus of Riedinger informs us, which again turns Christ into the subject of willing and acting and the natures into the means through which this takes place. With the two words in the dative, the text does not make as good sense as it does when they are in the nominative. In addition, since only one of the nine Greek manuscripts hands down this *lectio*, the *lectio* that has the two words in the nominative is overwhelmingly *potior*. But this again illustrates the difficulties that some Greek copyists had in viewing the natures of Christ as subjects of willing and acting.

Thus, the *Definition* of the Council presents the two natures of Christ not only as subjects of action but also as subjects of willing, whereas Christ is hardly said to be a willing and working subject therein. [54]

[54] Murphy and Sherwood have noticed that in the *Definition* of the Council the natures are the subjects, in contradistinction to what the canons of the Lateran Council read, and that the Sixth Ecumenical Council is more influenced by Chalcedon than by the Lateran Council (*Constantinople II et Constantinople III*, 238). With regard to the last remark, it must be made clear that to present the natures as subjects of willing and acting is due to the influence not of Chalcedon itself but of the *Tome of Leo*.

By contrast, in the Ἴδιετον of Emperor Constantine, which follows the decisions of the Council, it is mentioned that Christ willed as God and as man in accordance with his two natures. It is also mentioned that Christ worked in a divine way and in a human way, as well as that each nature acted, whereas the formula of Leo is also cited. [55]

[55] See Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 2, 844. 15-16, 846. 23-848. 2 and 846. 21-3, respectively.

Finally, Saint John of Damascus presents both Christ and his natures as subjects of willing and acting. In the *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, he writes that 'Christ works according to each one of his natures and "each nature works in him in communion with the other" '. [56]

[56] John of Damascus, *Expositio Fidei*, 59. 177-9 (Kotter (ed.), p. 151).

He also argues that 'because the hypostasis of the two natures is one, we say that one and the same wills and works naturally according to both natures', and further on states that 'each nature wills and works in communion with the other'. [57]

[57] Ibid. 58. 4-8 (Kotter (ed.), p. 137). It is probable that John was influenced on this point by the *Definition* of the Sixth Ecumenical Council.

Likewise, in his extensive dyothelite treatise he sometimes presents Christ as subject of **end p.184** willing and working, and at other times his natures. [58]

[58] John of Damascus, *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, 42. 1-19 (Kotter (ed.) pp. 227-8).

Elsewhere in the *Exposition*, Saint John states that since Christ is identical with his two natures, 'it is the same to say that Christ works according to each of his two natures and that each nature works in Christ in communion with the other'. [59]

[59] John of Damascus, *Expositio Fidei*, 63. 22-5 (Kotter (ed.), p. 161). It is noteworthy that the *Doctrina Patrum* cites a comment of Anastasius (Apocrisiarius, Maximus's disciple?), who argues that Cyril's statement that [Christ] worked as God and as man is equivalent to Leo's formula (Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 83. 2-6). It is doubtful whether Maximus would subscribe to this equation.

Obviously Saint John here sees the hypostasis of Christ from the point of view of its natures only: namely, as no more than their sum, and so does not clarify what the role of the person of the Logos as distinct from his natures may be with regard to willing and acting. [60]

[60] On this, see also note 19 above.

2.1 Conclusions

It has been seen that some of the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon raised objections to the formula of Leo, which was later openly criticized and rejected by Severus. It has also been seen that frequently in the texts of the monothelites and of Maximus, the formula was altered in order to present Christ as the subject of action. Furthermore, it has been seen that according to the *Definition* of the Sixth Ecumenical Council the natures of Christ are the subjects not only of action but also of willing. Moreover, we have seen that Maximus the Confessor, as well as the Lateran Council, used a different wording, according to which Christ is the subject of willing and acting, whereas other Fathers, such as Sophronius and John of Damascus, at times identify the subject of (willing and) acting with Christ and at others with his natures.

What were the reasons for this treatment of the formula of Leo? With regard to Severus, the answer is more or less clear. As can be deduced from the four passages in which he criticizes the formula, Severus had three objections: first, an acting nature is equivalent to a person; [61]

[61] This criticism has been already mentioned at the beginning of this section.

secondly, to accept *two* acting natures is divisive; [62]

[62] See Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ii, pt. 1, 376. 17-21. It is interesting that in this passage Severus argued that it is the one nature of the Logos incarnate which acts. Thus, he identified this *nature* with the subject of acting. However, Severus's identification of nature and hypostasis implies that perhaps in the aforementioned passage the acting subject is, for him, the hypostasis of the incarnate Logos. With regard to this, see also the reference to the common declaration between the Orthodox and the anti-Chalcedonian Churches in note 77 below.

thirdly, it may be that Severus also objected to the **end p.185** implicit dyoenergism of the formula, for, as he mentioned in one of the passages, the Logos transformed the assumed humanity into his own energy. [63]

[63] Ibid. 376. 1-5.

With regard to the monothelites, it can be deduced that their basic anxiety about the formula had to do with its implicit dyoenergism—suffice it to recall the first epistle of Cyrus to Sergius in this respect. On the other hand, it is quite likely that the formula of Leo was used by Fathers such as Sophronius and Maximus precisely because of its implicit dyoenergism. Sophronius, for instance, in his *Synodicon*, associated the formula of Leo with the preservation of Christ's natural qualities, [64]

[64] Ibid. 442. 14-18, and 444. 4-5.

by which the energies were in all probability implied, whereas after his references to the formula of Leo, he openly confessed the natural and essential energy of each one of the two natures. [65]

[65] Ibid. 444. 21 onwards.

Likewise, Maximus cited the formula of Leo as a proof of the existence of two energies in Christ. [66]

[66] *Opusc.* 15, 168A, 176D and *Disputatio*, 352B.

However, both Sophronius and Maximus also identified Christ with the subject of the actions, as we have already seen. Similarly, Saint John of Damascus on some occasions presented the natures of Christ as subjects of willing and acting, whereas, on others he presented his person as such. [67]

[67] It is noteworthy that John of Damascus wrote that 'the willer (ὁ θέλων) is he who uses the will, namely *the hypostasis*, for instance Peter' (*Expositio Fidei*, 58. 41-2 (Kotter (ed.), p. 139), and later that 'the working one is he who uses the energy, namely *the hypostasis*' (ibid. 59. 9-10 (Kotter (ed.), p. 144). In addition, he identified Christ with the subject of willing and/or acting on many occasions (see e.g. ibid. 59. 52-4 (Kotter (ed.), p. 146), 59. 192-4 (Kotter (ed.), p. 151), 62. 57 (Kotter (ed.), p. 159), etc.).

It must be admitted that the criticisms that the formula of Leo incurred in both ancient and modern times may not be wholly unjustified (apart from the criticism which has to do with its implicit dyoenergism). By introducing *two* acting and, according to its expanded form, *two* willing principles in Christology, and by turning Christ's human nature into a subject of willing and acting, the formula runs the danger of being misunderstood as quasi-hypostasizing it and as leading to an over-asymmetrical understanding of Christology. [68]

[68] Doucet downplays the importance of the difference between the Maximian-Lateran way of speaking, which identifies Christ with the subject of willing and acting, and that of Leo as developed by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which identifies the natures as such. Doucet's argument is that the logico-grammatical subject is not to be

identified with the real subject, which rightly seems to be for him the person ('Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?', 80). The problem with Doucet's position is that it somewhat underestimates the importance of language and of the form of the doctrinal expressions. Certainly language does not exhaust reality, but it is supposed to point to it in a faithful and reliable way. Accuracy in the language and terminology used in doctrinal matters has always been for the Church of paramount importance.

Furthermore, the acceptance in Christ not only of two wills **end p.186** and energies, but also of two willing and acting subjects seems to over-emphasize his duality. In addition, the formula seems to imply a natural maximalism, which in turn seems to overshadow the person of the incarnate Logos to whom our salvation is to be attributed. [69]

[69] There is a subtle but crucial difference between saying that the Logos obeyed the Father as man, on the one hand, and saying that the human nature of the Logos obeyed the Father, on the other. The first attributes the obedience, and thus our salvation, to the Logos, whereas the second attributes the obedience to the human nature of the Logos, and only indirectly to him, in the sense that he possesses it. Saint John of Damascus, for instance, seems to have gone a little too far in saying that the human nature of Christ obeyed the divine will (*De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, 43. 13-14 (Kotter (ed.), p. 229).

Undoubtedly, during the monothelite controversy the formula was useful from a practical point of view, because it could be invoked in support of dyoenergism. But from a theological point of view, it is not immune to criticism, if it is placed outside its patristic and conciliar context, which constantly emphasizes the unity of the enfleshed Logos, who is the personal subject of our salvation.

On the contrary, Maximus's formula, according to which Christ, the Logos incarnate, wills and acts as God and as man, is preferable to the formulae of Leo and of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. It protects the unity of the person of Christ in willing and acting, while, in the light of Maximus's dyothelite Christology, it does not damage the distinction of his natures and of their qualities. In this respect, and in comparing the two Councils, Léthel has argued that the Lateran Council expressed the faith in Christ in a more satisfactory manner than the Sixth Ecumenical Council, because it highlights the person of the Logos, who wills with both his wills our salvation, by contrast with the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which, in place of the unique willer that Maximus put forward, developed the formula of Leo by saying that each nature not only works but also wills in communion with the other. [70]

[70] Léthel, *Théologie de l'Agonie du Christ*, 112. Doucet criticizes Léthel's point with regard to the comparison between the two Councils ('Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes?', 78-80), but, in my view, his criticism does not suffice to invalidate the importance of Léthel's remark.

Therefore we conclude that the formula of Leo is in need of proper interpretation. Certainly, its adoption by the Greek Fathers had to do with their deference to the Council of Chalcedon, which, after some hesitation, had sanctioned the *Tome of Leo*. But, as we have seen, the Fathers of the Council accepted Leo's formula only on the basis of its conformity with the Christology of Cyril. For them, any interpretation of Leo's formula that **end p.187** contradicted Cyrillian Christology would be unacceptable, and what Cyrillian Christology suggests is that the Logos wills and acts, not his natures. [71]

[71] Nicolas has rightly noticed that according to the way Cyril would speak, the Logos acts (and by implication wills) *in* 'utraque forma' (M.-J. Nicolas, 'La Doctrine christologique de saint Léon le Grand', *Revue Thomiste*, 51 (1951), 609-60, at 644, cited by Bausenhart, '*In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde*', 311). For more on the relationship between Leo and Cyril, see Ch. 1, sect. 5.

Therefore, if we are to ally ourselves with them, and, as we have seen, there are theological reasons for doing so, the formula is to be understood in the light of the more 'Cyrillian' formula of Maximus and in a way which does not contradict it.

Thus, if we are to find a way to 'reconcile' the two alternative formulae, we should perhaps resort to the connection between nature and what is common, on the one hand, and person and what is particular, on the other hand. As Maximus seems to claim, natural will is oriented towards some general objects of willing, independently of any personal intervention. According to him, humanity wills by nature to be, to live, to move, etc. [72]

[72] See e.g. *Opusc.* 1, 12C-D. In addition, it can be argued that in so far as energy is concerned, our nature effects our growing, or heart beating, etc., without our personal consent.

In this sense nature 'wills', and this God-given, common, natural willing orientation offers a proper context within which particular acts of willing take place.

However, two points must be made here. First, as we have seen, human nature subsists not by itself but in particular persons. Thus, even when nature 'wills' or 'acts', it is the person who is the

ultimate bearer and so, indirectly, the subject of willing and acting. As Maximus aptly argued, nature is referred back to him who subsists, and energy is likewise referred back to him who acts .[73]

[73] *Opusc.* 16, 200D.

Secondly, the general willing orientation of human nature is particularized in concrete acts of willing thanks to the intervention of the person. Maximus mentioned, with reference to Gregory, that the object of willing (*θελητόν*) is referred back to the willer (*ἐπὶ τὸν θέλοντα*), and thus indicated the close relationship between them.[74]

[74] Ibid. 188B-C. For the reference to Gregory, see Sermon 29, 6, *PG* 36, 80B-81C, and Gallay with Jourjon (eds.), Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours* 27-31, 186. 1-188. 34. One of Maximus's *Ambigua* is devoted to the analysis of this passage (1261B-1264B). There Maximus argues at some length that the powers of the soul, including the will in particular, can be active, but cannot be effective without the consent of the person. The whole passage seems to me to indicate in a magnificent way both the active character of the powers of the soul and the role of the person as the subject of willing and acting who causes the efficient actualization of these powers towards a desired aim.

Maximus repeatedly pointed out that it is the personal willer who decides, in virtue of having a natural self-determining will, **end p.188** whether the natural desire to speak, for instance, will be actualized or not, and in what way.[75]

[75] As Louth has observed, 'what is unique [and thus personal] about each one of us is what we have made of the nature that we have: our own unique mode of existence, which is a matter of our experience in the past, our hopes for the future, the way we live out the nature that we have' (*Maximus the Confessor*, 59).

It is he who decides whether to speak or not, when to speak, what to say at any given moment, and for what purpose.[76]

[76] See e.g. *Disputatio*, 292D-293B, where Maximus clearly points out that the actualization of the will depends on the personal willer.

In like manner, the incarnate Logos 'moved and modelled' his human will in willing what pleased the Father, even when this required that he be put to death.

In light of what I have argued, it is possible and helpful to see the two formulae not antithetically, but complementarily. Maximus's wording, which presents Christ as the subject of willing and acting, is preferable to the formula of Leo, and must condition the understanding of that formula. The latter, however, emphasizes more clearly the inherently active status of our nature. Thus, it can also be useful, provided that it is not understood as dividing or overshadowing the willing and acting person of the incarnate Logos, which Maximus rightly placed at the centre of his Christology.[77]

[77] In this respect, it is noteworthy that in the first joint declaration of the Orthodox and the anti-Chalcedonian Churches (Egypt, 1989), it is stated that 'the enfleshed Logos is the subject of every act of willing and every action of Jesus Christ' , and in the second declaration (Geneva, 1990) it is stated that 'he who wills and acts is always the one incarnate hypostasis of the Logos' .

3. Concluding Remarks On Saint Maximus's Understanding Of the Will and Its Theological Significance

As has already been mentioned, in his effort to confront monothelitism, Maximus made the will central to his Christology, and can perhaps be considered as the first in the Christian East to have understood it as a fully fledged faculty. Before completing the examination of Maximus's dyothelite Christology in the context of which his concept of will basically developed, and in addition to what was said in earlier sections, I consider it important to focus briefly on some of the central characteristics of the human will as conceived of by Maximus and their wider significance.

For Maximus, the human will is common to all people and characterizes human *nature*. However, the way in which it is actualized depends upon and characterizes the *person*. This insight is related to Maximus's Christological vision, which points to the Logos as the personal subject who, in virtue of **end p.189** having a human natural will and energy, was capable of willing and accomplishing our salvation not only as God but also as man. Furthermore, it is an insight which seems to maintain a good balance between nature—common—logos, on the one hand, and person—particular—*tropos*, on the other hand, and on the level of the wills too.

In addition, for Maximus, as was shown earlier, will is related to, but is not identical with, intellect. This relative independence of the will from the intellect is in overt contrast to a substantial part of ancient Greek philosophy. Various strands of ancient Greek thought saw volition as being so dependent upon reason that it could not be conceived of as a distinct faculty, and was more or less reduced to a by-product of cognition. Thus, even the problem of evil was at times considered to be rooted in ignorance, and not in man's self-determining ill will. For Socrates, for instance, nobody fails or does evil on purpose. Every evil action is due either to ignorance or to the fact that the evil-doer acts against reason because his irrational impulses are stronger than reason. [78]

[78] Dihle, *Theory of Will*, 38-9.

Aristotle seems to see 'a link of necessity between the judgement rendered by the intellect and the immediate action following thereupon', which allows no room for a faculty of will. [79]

[79] See Berthold, 'Freedom and Liberation in the Theology of Maximus the Confessor', 149.

For the Stoics, 'volitions or desires are a kind of beliefs', [80]

[80] Susanne Bobzien, 'The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem', *Phronesis*, 43 (1998), 133-75, at 142.

and Plotinus is 'committed to the idea that the reasonable soul cannot willingly or knowingly sin'. [81]

[81] Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, 49.

If a Christian version of these ideas were endorsed, salvation would be said to come about basically through transmission of knowledge. By arguing that Christ assumed not only a human mind but also a human will, Maximus did justice to the biblical and generally Christian understanding of man's relationship with God and of his fall and redemption, which is different from, and often incompatible with, the above-mentioned philosophies. [82]

[82] The fact that Maximus associates self-determination with the rational part of the human will is indisputable, as is the fact that he sees a link between ignorance and sin. However, he does not reduce either will to intellect or sin to ignorance. For Maximus, sin is often not merely a result of a cognitional failure, but a self-determined act of our willing which differs from the will of God and often overtly opposes it (see e.g. *Opusc.* 3, 48D-49A, 56B-C; *Opusc.* 4, 60B; *Disputatio*, 292A-B). Correspondingly, the way in which Maximus understands obedience—e.g. with reference to the Gethsemane prayer—is hardly compatible with Seneca's dictum 'I do not obey God, rather I agree with him' (see *Epistle* 96. 2, cited by Dihle, *Theory of Will*, 18).

Moreover, as has been seen, drawing on Diadochus of Photiki, Maximus identifies the human will with self-determination. [83]

[83] See e.g. *Disputatio*, 301C, 304C.

This obviously implies **end p.190** that man, and Christ as man, is not subject to determinism, in overt contrast to what had been suggested in various forms of philosophical and religious doctrines prior to Maximus. [84]

[84] For the Stoics, for instance, 'every deed, even the most insignificant detail in every day life has been predetermined by nature or fate in the very same way as the cosmic phenomena' (Dihle, *The Theory of Will*, 41). The fatalism and determinism that characterizes the Valentinian gnosticism, at least with regard to the salvation of the pneumatics and the choics, has also been repeatedly pointed out (see e.g. Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 175-6; Dihle, *Theory of Will*, 150-7; Andreas Theodorou, *Θέματα Ἱστορίας Δογμάτων* (Athens: *ΟΕΔΒ*, 1992), 175).

As Doucet has rightly shown, Maximus implies that man is subject neither to external nor to internal determinism. [85]

[85] Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 181-3.

Maximus states that everything in the rational (*νοερά*) nature is voluntary, [86]

[86] *Disputatio*, 293B-296A.

and, furthermore, that man moves his own nature according to his will. [87]

[87] Ibid. 304C.

As has been argued previously, this does not seem to suggest that, for Maximus, man does not have sub-rational impulsive desires, but that he himself determines whether or not, and how and when he will satisfy them.

For Maximus, the human will is not necessarily either evil or even subject to the possibility of choosing evil. Maximus opposes the view put forward by Polemon, according to which the human will, even at the stage of deification, cannot overcome the mutability which might lead it to sin. [88]

[88] *Opusc.* 15, 169D-172A.

According to Maximus, human nature and its will are not evil, because they have been created by God. Thus, our human will does not need to be either suppressed by the divine will or absorbed into it. Christ assumed, healed and deified our will; far from destroying it, he accomplished our salvation through it. In him, it remains distinct from the divine will, as it does in the saints in heaven.

As has already been mentioned, for Maximus, the human will is characterized by self-determination. But this self-determination is not necessarily linked with the possibility of choosing between good and evil. Self-determination is a characteristic of will, not of choice. [89]

[89] On this, see Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 185-6.

This accounts for the fact that Christ and the saints in heaven possess a self-determining human will, although it is impossible for them to choose evil. However, Maximus's exclusion from Christ of the possibility of choosing evil does not necessarily mean that choice itself must be excluded from him. As Paul Helm has observed, 'since in theory there may be more than one "sinless" choice in a given set of moral circumstances, we do not have to adopt a strict determinism in order to account for Christ's non posse peccare'. [90]

[90] Cited by T. Hart, 'Sinlessness and Moral Responsibility: A Problem in Christology', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 48 (1995), 37-54, at 53-4. In this respect, it is worth recalling the above-mentioned remarks with regard to Christ's entering a house in the region of Tyre and Sidon and willing no one to know it (Mark 7: 24).

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The aforementioned remarks remind us that, according to Maximus, the self-determination of man reflects the self-determination of God (for whom the choice of evil is not available either). [91]

[91] In saying this, it is not my intention to endorse a kind of irreverent anthropomorphism which would suggest that God faces choices in the same way as we do, or that he has to comply with an ethical norm.

It seems that ancient Greek thought could not conceive of God as absolutely self-determining, due to the absence of a doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. As Plato argued in the *Timaeus*, God does not create the world, but forms the chaos into cosmos by using matter and forms which pre-exist independently of his will. Thus, even God's self-determination is constrained by factors external to him. This obviously means that human self-determination cannot find an ultimate ontological foundation even in God himself. On the contrary, the Christian God not only creates the world, but also interacts with it at will, the only limitations imposed upon his self-determining will being decided by himself.

However, if the ultimate ontological ground of man's self-determination is the self-determination of God, in that human self-determination is a reflection of divine self-determination, any act of willing which alienates man from God, or even overtly opposes his will, jeopardizes the relationship between man and God, who is the cause and source of man's self-determination, and thus opens the way to slavery to passions and to death.

John Zizioulas has argued that creation *ex nihilo* implies, for Athanasius for instance, that the world is ontologically grounded in God, and that the only way for it and for man to avoid returning to nothingness is through communion with God. [92]

[92] Zizioulas refers to Athanasius's treatise *On the Incarnation*; see his article ' ', *Σύναξη*, 2 (1982), 9-20.

Maximus seems to adopt this view of Athanasius. In one of the most important of his *Ambigua*, he argues that man was created in order to move towards God. However, because 'man moved *voluntarily* and mindlessly and against his nature (*παρὰ φύσιν*)' away from God, 'he ran the danger of returning to nothing', and thus God became man in order to save man. [93]

[93] *Ambigua*, 1308C-D.

However, for Maximus, salvation is not confined to the assumption of the human nature to which the *Definition* of Chalcedon points. It is also related to the human history of Jesus and the fulfilment of the will of the Father, which includes the human obedience of the Son to the Father, [94]

[94] Ibid. 1308D, 1309D. This obedience is by no means imposed. By contrast, it is a free expression of the Son's love for the Father.

which Maximus relates to the human will of the Son. Thus, Maximus's emphasis not only on the unity of our humanity with God, but also on the human self-determining

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obedience of Christ to the Father, bridges the gap between 'mystical' and 'ethical' approaches to Christology and soteriology which have been put forward in both ancient and modern times.
Finally, Maximus sees the broader implications of the restoration of our relationship with God. According to the *Ambiguum* to which I have just referred, through the fulfilment of the will of the Father, accomplished through Christ's human self-determining will—as we know from Maximus's dyothelite *Opuscula*—Christ succeeded where man had failed: namely, in bringing about the reconciliation of all divisions—between man and woman, paradise and the inhabited world, heaven and earth, the intelligible and the sensible, and, ultimately, between God and his creation [95]

[95] Ibid. 1308D-1312B. For an excellent analysis of this 'fivefold mediation', see Lars Thunberg, *Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of Saint Maximus the Confessor* (New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 80-91.

—which are bound up with man's ontological and existential predicament.

4. Saint Maximus's Early Acceptance Of 'One Energy' and the Possibility Of a Legitimate Monothelite Terminology

As has been argued in this book, monothelitism was an unsuccessful attempt to deal with the problem of the wills and energies of Christ, because, by ascribing to him only one will and energy, it failed to do justice to the distinction between the will and the energy of the humanity of Christ, on the one hand, and the will and the energy of his divinity, on the other, at the cost of the integrity of his humanity. The anxiety of theologians such as Maximus to protect Christology from the monophysite threat posed by monothelitism led to the development and conciliar vindication of dyothelitism, which, in contrast to monothelitism, gave due weight to the humanity of Christ by drawing the necessary distinction between the divine will and energy of Christ, on the one hand, and his human will and energy, on the other.

The question that is often raised with regard to dyothelitism, however, is whether it adequately indicates Christ's personal unity on the volitional level. For some, the response is definitely negative. In ancient times, dyothelitism repeatedly incurred the accusation of being intrinsically Nestorian, as we have seen. In modern times, this has occasionally been the case too. Wolfhart Pannenberg, for instance, has bluntly argued that 'with the doctrine of Christ's two wills . . . the perception of the concrete vital unity of Jesus was basically lost'. [96]

[96] Pannenberg, *Jesus: God and Man*, 294.

Such accusations are often due to ignorance of the true **end p.193** nature of (Maximian, at least) dyothelitism or to a failure to understand it. But they prompt us to raise the question of whether it could be legitimate to use a carefully qualified monothelite terminology in order to stress Christ's unity on the volitional level, particularly given the fact that Maximus himself used the expression 'one energy'.

Talk about Christ's unity may refer either to his ethical unity or to his ontological, hypostatic unity. With regard to the former, we may recall that Maximus had to emphasize the deification of the human will of Christ and the fact that it was moved and modelled by the Logos, or by the divinity, or even by the divine will itself, in order to exclude the possibility of an opposition in Christ between divine and human objects of willing, a matter of considerable concern to the monothelites from Apollinarius onwards. In this respect, Maximus was right to invoke his interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, *inter alia*, in order to show that the Logos willed as man what the divine will, common to the Father and to himself as God, willed, even when this entailed his own death, and from there to claim that natural dyothelitism in no way jeopardizes the ethical unity of Christ.
But what about Christ's ontological, hypostatic unity? [97]

[97] Ethical unity does not necessarily imply hypostatic unity, because there can be an ethical unity between two or more different persons. For more on this, see below.

How can it be indicated if the doctrine of the two wills is accepted? Chalcedon expressed not only the distinction in Christ, by speaking of two natures, but also his unity, by speaking of one hypostasis. How are we shown the hypostatic unity in Christ on the volitional level as adequately as we have expressed his natural distinction on the same level through the doctrine of the two wills?
Three responses may be given to this question. The first might be that the ontological unity of the two wills of Christ is implied by the fact that they belong to two hypostatically united natures, borne by

one and the same person, the incarnate Logos. This is fair enough, but it does not fully answer the question of whether the unity of Christ's wills could be expressed by an appropriate volitional terminology.

The second response might be that the unity of the two wills of Christ can be shown if it is pointed out that the subject of willing in Christ is one, identical with his hypostasis. This is correct, but it could be argued that the oneness of the willing and acting subject has been somewhat undermined by the vindication of the expanded form of Leo's formula, as has been seen. Even if the formula is complemented and conditioned by a counter-emphasis on the hypostasis of the Logos as the personal willer, the duality of the (natural) subjects of willing and acting remains. Furthermore, it could also be argued that to invoke the communion between the two willing and **end p.194** acting natures may not be sufficient to express the hypostatic unity of the Logos on the volitional level either, because even two personal willers may will and act in communion.

The third response might be to point to the oneness of the object willed (or of the work done), but this alone will not do. Maximus denied, at least in some of his later dyothelite works, that the result of Christ's acting was one, and Saint John of Damascus concurred on this point. [98]

[98] See nn. 123 and 159 below.

Most importantly, the object willed, and especially the work done, are closer to the external aspect of Christ's willing and acting, and thus do not directly relate to his internal, ontological unity. Moreover, it is perfectly possible for two personal willers to will the same thing (or to act together). Ethical unity does not necessarily imply hypostatic unity, because there can be an ethical unity between two or more different persons. It should not be forgotten that the Nestorians tended to understand the unity between Jesus and the Logos on the basis of the fact that the former willed whatever the latter willed.

However, even if none of the aforementioned reasons is by itself sufficient to express the ontological unity of Christ on the volitional level, all three together indicate it in a strong way. But this does not prevent us from examining the question of whether it might be legitimate to accept a monothelite terminology, understood not in opposition to, but on the basis of the indisputable orthodoxy of dyothelitism, aiming to show the hypostatic unity of Christ on the volitional level. In fact, as we will see, it is Maximian dyothelitism itself, as well as its background, that makes this examination necessary.

Let us therefore begin with some historical considerations. Monadic expressions with regard to the energies of Christ are not entirely absent from the tradition. Maximus attempted to interpret the 'new theandric energy' of Pseudo-Dionysius in a manner that would render it compatible with Chalcedonian dyoenergite orthodoxy and, given that he probably did not know that Pseudo-Dionysius was merely *pseudo*-Dionysius, this task must have been for him quite onerous. In one of his *Ambigua*, where he attempted to interpret Pseudo-Dionysius's theandric energy, he argued that it must not be understood as equivalent to one natural energy, because the word 'theandric' signifies not the abolition of the two energies, but merely their unity. [99]

[99] *Ambiguum* 5, 1056A-1060C, and Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 28. 184-34. 296.

Likewise, in his seventh dyothelite *Opusculum*, Maximus argued that the theandric energy indicates the divine and the human energies of Christ, and is not to be understood as one energy, either natural or hypostatic. [100]

[100] *Opusc.* 7, 84D-85B.

In his **end p.195** eighth *Opusculum*, he argued that the theandric energy denotes the unity of Christ's two energies, [101]

[101] *Opusc.* 8, 100B-101A.

which are known 'in each other and through each other' . [102]

[102] Ibid. 100D.

Finally, in the *Disputation*, he claimed that the theandric energy expresses the ineffable mode of the disclosure (ἔκφανσις) of the two energies, which is related to the *perichōrēsis* of the natures and the mode of communication. [103]

[103] *Disputatio*, 345C-348C, esp. 345D-348A.

Maximus could 'get away' with Pseudo-Dionysius's 'theandric energy', because the word 'one' was not mentioned therein explicitly. [104]

[104] Maximus himself pointed to the fact that Dionysius did not speak of *one* energy (see *Opusc.* 7, 85A).

However, it could be argued that to say that the expression 'theandric energy' is not somehow equivalent to the expression ' "one" energy' would be as bizarre as saying that the expressions 'theandric hypostasis' or 'theandric nature' are not somehow equivalent to the expressions 'one hypostasis' or 'one nature' respectively. Indeed, theandric energy is not to be understood as one *natural* or *personal/hypostatic* energy, but its 'oneness' can be understood to indicate the unity of the two natural energies, as Maximus himself argues.

At some point, Maximus became aware of the expression 'one connatural energy' (*μία συγγενικὴ ἐνέργεια*), which Cyril had used in referring to the raising of the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, [105]

[105] The expression is from Cyril's *Commentary on John*, *PG*73, 577C-D; cf. Mark 5: 41-2.

and tried to deal with it. In his seventh dyothelite *Opusculum*, he argued that the one energy of Cyril is neither hypostatic nor natural, but signifies the unity between the Logos and the flesh, [106]

[106] Maximus argued that 'the energy is shown to be one because of the union of the Logos himself with his most-holy flesh' (*Opusc.* 7, 88A).

as well as the unity, the mutual coming together (*συμφυΐα*), and the *perichōrēsis* of the two energies. [107]

[107] *Opusc.* 7, 88A. Interestingly, Maximus claimed that on this point Cyril imitated Dionysius (ibid. 85C), which implies that, even for Maximus, [Pseudo-]Dionysius's expression somehow points to one energy.

What is more, he claimed that we must not juxtapose the monadic expressions of the Fathers to their dyadic ones, but must interpret them properly. We must joyfully embrace and confess both, deeming that both are useful, the former, in which Maximus included the 'one incarnate nature of God the Logos' and the aforementioned expressions of Pseudo-Dionysius and Cyril, because they express the unity of Christ and oppose the division, and the latter, because they express the difference of the natures and oppose their confusion. [108]

[108] Ibid. 88B-89D.

end p.196

In his eighth *Opusculum*, [109]

[109] The relevant section is *Opusc.* 8, 101A-112A.

Maximus stated that the one energy of Cyril denotes the unity of the natural energies of Christ. [110]

[110] Ibid. 101B, D. Maximus seems to imply that the oneness of the energy corresponds to the hypostatic oneness of the Logos and his flesh, which he mentions a little earlier (ibid. 101B).

With regard to the kinship (*συγγένεια*) to which Cyril refers, Maximus argued that the kinship of Christ's flesh (and by implication of its energy) with the Logos (and by implication with his divine energy) is due to the deification of the flesh, which is in turn due to its union with the Logos. [111]

[111] Ibid. 105C.

Maximus argued once again that both the monadic and the dyadic expressions which refer to Christ's hypostasis and natures must be embraced and interpreted properly. What is more important for our purposes here, though, is that he drew a parallel between those monadic and dyadic expressions that refer to the hypostasis and the natures of Christ respectively, on the one hand, and those that refer to his energies, on the other hand, [112]

[112] Ibid. 104C-105C.

showing, it seems, the correspondence that exists between the two natures and the two energies (and by implication wills) of Christ, on the one hand, and the one hypostasis and the 'one' energy (and by implication 'will') of Christ, on the other. Moreover, he stated that if the monadic and the dyadic expressions are not both accepted, heresy cannot be avoided. As he put it:

> He who does not accept equally and appropriately both [viz. the monadic and the dyadic expressions], applying the former to the union and the latter to the natural difference, falls inevitably, as is normal, into either division or confusion. . . . For although the flesh became one with the Logos according to hypostasis and acquired the richness of his energy, it in no way ceased to be created according to essence. [113]

[113] Ibid. 105A. It is noteworthy that Maximus considers both expressions not only as potentially helpful but also as potentially dangerous. To say that the dyadic expressions are potentially dangerous is quite a statement!

In this statement, Maximus considers the acceptance of the monadic expressions, *including the expression 'one energy'*, as is obvious from the whole of the relevant passage, as *necessary* for an orthodox confession of faith in Christ. This seems to be in line with his stance towards the expression 'one incarnate nature', the confession of which he also considered necessary. Thus, his acceptance of 'one' energy alongside two energies seems to correspond to his acceptance of Cyril's 'one incarnate nature' and Chalcedon's 'two natures', and arguably reflects the general thrust of his Christology, which aimed at emphasizing not only the distinctions in Christ but also his unity.**end p.197**

In his twentieth *Opusculum* Maximus grappled with a passage from the work of Anastasius of Antioch against the *Arbiter* of John Philoponus, in which the former referred to one energy of Christ. [114]

[114] Sherwood thinks that *Opusc.* 7 was written between 640 and 642, probably *c.* 642 (*Annotated Date-List*, 51), *Opusc.* 8 *c.* 640 (ibid. 44), and *Opusc.* 20 by 640 or before 643 (ibid. 41-2). But *Opusc.* 20 must have been written after *Opusc.* 7, for in the latter Maximus implies that the only monadic references to energy are those of Dionysius and Cyril (see 88B-C), whereas in the former he is aware of the passage of Anastasius of Antioch too; therefore, for *Opusc.* 20 a date between 642 and 643 seems probable. What is important, though, is that all three opuscula belong to the period of Maximus's anti-monothelite activity prior to the disputation with Pyrrhus, in which and after which his position would change, as will be seen.

In Maximus's view, by confessing one energy, Anastasius did not intend to deny Christ's two natural energies, as is shown by the fact that he acknowledged the difference of the properties (ἰδιότητες) of his natures, but merely to indicate their insoluble union, communion, *perichōrēsis*, and relationship, as well as the oneness of the work done. [115]

[115] For Maximus's discussion of Anastasius, see *Opusc.* 20, 229B-233B.

It is noteworthy that Maximus once more related the monadic expressions with the hypostatic unity, and the dyadic ones with the natural difference, [116]

[116] Ibid. 233A-B.

and claimed that Anastasius's monadic expression protects against a divisive understanding of Christ's energies. [117]

[117] Ibid. 232D.

In the *Disputation* however, Maximus made a surprising move. At one point, Pyrrhus told him that when they (the monothelites) say that there is one energy in Christ, they mean one not in terms of the natural *logos* (namely, one natural energy) but in terms of the mode of the union. [118]

[118] *Disputatio*, 340D.

Thus, Pyrrhus seems to have argued in somewhat similar terms to Maximus himself. Maximus had accepted Cyril's one energy, and had linked the theandric energy with the mode of union [119]

[119] *Ambiguum* 5, 1056D, and Janssens (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris, Ambigua ad Thomam*, 30. 217-23.

and the one energy with the mode of economy [120]

[120] *Opusc.* 7, 88B, 108B.

or the *logos* of union [121]

[121] *Opusc.* 8, 108C; *Opusc.* 20, 232B-C.

(which is a stronger expression than the mode of union). But in the *Disputation* he did not remain consistent with his earlier position, and denied the possibility of speaking of one energy on account of the union. [122]

[122] *Disputatio*, 340D-341A. Maximus likewise argues that unity and relationship cannot produce one energy.

When Pyrrhus asked him whether he would accept one energy with regard to the end-product (ἀποτέλεσμα) of Christ's acts, Maximus replied that the end-product of Christ's acts is not one, thus contradicting his **end p.198** earlier position. [123]

[123] Ibid. 341B-D. Louth's remark that 'the result is clearly one: the actions of Christ are the actions of a single person' (*Maximus the Confessor*, 56-7) expresses Maximus's position in the *Opusculum* that we have examined, but is contradicted by what Maximus claims in the *Disputation*.

Additionally, when Pyrrhus referred to the one energy of Cyril, Maximus argued that by one energy Cyril referred to the energy of the divinity, which is one either without the flesh or with the flesh. [124]

[124] *Disputatio*, 344A-B. For the whole of Maximus's response, see ibid. 344B-345C.

Finally, when Pyrrhus asked Maximus about the theandric energy of Dionysius, Maximus interpreted it in his customary way. [125]

[125] Ibid. 345C-348C.

In his ninth *Opusculum*, which in all probability post-dates the *Disputation*, [126]

[126] According to Sherwood, this *Opusculum* was written between 646 and 648 (*Annotated Date-List*, 55).

Maximus interpreted Cyril's one energy as he had done in the *Disputation*. In addition, he cited a passage by Heraclianus of Chalcedon, which his opponents provided as evidence for the legitimacy of the simultaneous acceptance of one and two natures and movements (or energies). Heraclianus's text indeed speaks of one and two natures and movements (or energies), but, surprisingly, Maximus dismissed it as erroneous. [127]

[127] *Opusc.* 9, 125C-128B. This seems to be the only instance in which Maximus takes issue with a figure of the orthodox Christian past. Given the strong traditionalism which characterized Maximus and his era as a whole, this is very surprising. For Heraclianus's text, see Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, iii. 291 (6801) and Geerard and Noret, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum Supplementum*, 392 (6801).

Let us pause here and ask why it was that Maximus, who was generally a very consistent thinker, changed his mind over the possibility of accepting the expression 'one energy' in a qualified sense. It is plausible to think that he must have had a very good reason for doing so, not only because this meant that he would have to contradict himself—and we know that he was strongly averse to contradictions and tergiversations [128]

[128] Maximus himself acknowledged that Sergius's tergiversations were what appalled him most about him (*Disputatio*, 329C-332A).

—but also because he would need to give an interpretation to texts such as Cyril's which arguably distorted their meaning, or to dismiss others, such as that of Heraclianus. Perhaps he realized that his earlier position was theologically untenable, or, what is more likely, that such a *via media* between the 'one energy' and the 'two energies' formulae would eventually undermine dyothelitism. A closer look at Maximus's ninth *Opusculum*, however, may yield more reliable clues.

This *Opusculum* is addressed to the abbots, monks, and orthodox people of Sicily, and is apologetic in character. Maximus begins by stressing the value of peace, which comes about when the scandals are done away with, and goes on to defend himself against the charge that he accepted one and two,

end p.199 namely three, wills and energies in Jesus Christ. He categorically denies ever having confessed or written anything like that, [129]

[129] *Opusc.* 9, 112C-113C.

and devotes the rest of the *Opusculum* to proving that this doctrine is erroneous.

Towards the end of the *Opusculum*, Maximus reports that his adversaries used two of his epistles, one to the priest Marinus and the other to Pyrrhus, in order to prove that he adheres to this doctrine. [130]

[130] Ibid. 129A.

In so far as the epistle to Pyrrhus is concerned, Maximus mentions that he used flattering words to Pyrrhus in order to facilitate his return to the orthodox faith, but never did he succumb to his doctrine. [131]

[131] Ibid. 129C-132C.

But what about the epistle to Marinus?

Maximus acknowledged that he had sent several letters to Marinus. He claimed, however, that in no way had he ever supported the doctrine of one and two, namely three, wills and energies. On the other hand, he might also be implying that his opponents are referring to an epistle which, though not in itself spurious, has become so as a result of their interpretation. [132]

[132] Ibid. 129B. Sherwood, by contrast, thinks that Maximus denied having written the letter (*Annotated Date-List*, 55).

Be that as it may, it must be pointed out that in his seventh *opusculum*, addressed to Marinus and previously discussed, [133]

[133] In *Opusc.* 7 Maximus addresses Marinus as deacon (69B), whereas in *Opusc.* 9 he calls him priest. Perhaps Marinus was ordained a priest in the period between 640/2, when *Opusc.* 7 was written, and 646/8 when *Opusc.* 9 was written (in *Opusc.* 20, written before 643, Maximus addresses him as priest), which explains why Maximus calls him priest in *Opusc.* 9.

Maximus accepted one energy and two energies (albeit not three, as he pejoratively wrote in his ninth opusculum). He did the same, as we have seen, in his twentieth opusculum, which is also addressed to Marinus. [134]

[134] *Opusc.* 20, 228A.

Sherwood believes, with good reason, that Maximus was in Sicily when he wrote his ninth opusculum, and that he had already defended himself orally against the aforementioned accusation, as can be inferred by what he reports in this opusculum. [135]

[135] Sherwood refers to *Opusc.* 9, 113B in *Annotated Date-List*, 55.

Maximus's reference to Pyrrhus's complete deviation [136]

[136] *Opusc.* 9, 132C.

suggests a date after Pyrrhus's relapse into monothelitism—namely, after 646, [137]

[137] Sherwood, *Annotated Date-List*, 55.

which is just a few years before the Lateran Council in 649. In the light of these observations, it can be assumed that a hard-line dyothelitism and dyoenergism had been developing in Italy and Sicily—no wonder in view of the (over-?)symmetrical thrust of Western Christology—which by no means allowed for Maximus's qualified acceptance of one energy. This dyothelitism and dyoenergism found expression in the Lateran Council's anathematization of those who confess one and two wills and energies at the **end p.200** same time. [138]

[138] See canon 13 of the Council, in Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 376. 1-10.

If this hypothesis is correct, Maximus must have been faced with the dilemma of either allying himself to the hard dyothelite position which characterized the West, which had the determination and the ecclesiastical power to confront monothelitism, or holding fast to his earlier openness to the one energy expression, and thereby undermining the unity of the anti-monothelite camp along with his personal reputation and the reputation of his Christology. It could not have been too difficult for him to decide.

Two further documents remain to be examined. The first is an epistle of Maximus to his disciple Anastasius. Maximus reports that it was suggested that he should accept a doctrinal formula upon which all Churches had agreed: namely, the confession of 'two . . . energies on account of the difference and one on account of the union'. [139]

[139] *PG*90, 132B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 161. 15-16.

When Maximus asked his interlocutors whether the one energy is a third one next to the two or the two which have become one because of the union, they responded that the latter was the case. [140]

[140] *PG*90, 132B, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 161. 17-19

Maximus did not accept this solution, [141]

[141] *PG*90, 132B-C, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 161. 20-163. 30.

which, let us recall, roughly coincides with what he himself had previously argued. Finally, during his discussion with the monothelite representatives of the Empire and the Patriarchate of Constantinople in his exile in Bizya, Maximus argued that the 'one energy' of Cyril had been interpolated by the anti-Chalcedonian Timothy Aelurus, [142]

[142] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 148D-149A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 101. 299-301.

and refused to confess one will on account of the union, as Bishop Theodosius, his interlocutor, demanded. [143]

[143] *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 156D-157A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, 119. 490-121. 521.

Summing up, during his dyothelite activity Maximus made two contradictory claims. At an early stage he argued that the confession of both 'one energy' and 'two energies' is not only acceptable but also necessary; but this he later denied. [144]

[144] Some aspects of the development of Maximus's thought on this issue have been also pointed briefly by Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 443-6, 456-8.

As has already been argued, since Maximus's theology was developing simultaneously with the development of the monothelite heresy, as well as other people's responses to it, it would seem that at times his choices were justifiably conditioned by the exigencies of ecclesiastical politics. We cannot be sure whether and to what extent his decision to contradict his earlier acceptance of one and two energies was necessitated by tactical **end p.201** considerations, although there are good reasons to suspect this. At any rate, given the opportunism and unreliability of Maximus's monothelite adversaries, his option to follow a harder line himself seems justified. The acceptance of a monothelite/monenergite terminology prior to the unconditional acceptance of dyothelite orthodoxy and its conciliar vindication might have blurred the issue and been used to undermine dyothelitism. Moreover, Maximus's option to follow a harder line at a later stage is justified because of Rome's strict dyothelitism, as we have seen. But what is of primary interest for us here is not whether Maximus was historically justified in his options, but whether to speak of 'one' and two energies (and by implication wills), [145]

[145] For more on the reasons why Maximus did not speak of one and two wills, see below.

as he did, can be legitimate theologically.

Before going further, let us examine the attitude of a few more writers. Pseudo-Cyril, the writer of the important treatise *De Trinitate*, [146]

[146] See *PG* 77, 1120-1173. Pseudo-Cyril was believed to be a seventh-eighth-century unknown author mediating between Maximus and John of Damascus. Vassa L. Conticello, however, has argued that Pseudo-Cyril is a fourteenth-century writer (Joseph the Philosopher), dependent on John of Damascus; see 'Pseudo-Cyril's "De SS. Trinitate": A Compilation of Joseph the Philosopher', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 61 (1995), 117-39.

wrote that the theandric energy denotes the two energies which are one due to their coming together

and which cannot be distinguished in reality . [147]

[147] *De Trinitate*, *PG*77, 1157D. Pseudo-Cyril seems to imply here that since the two energies cannot be

distinguished in reality, they are distinct only , something which corresponds to the declaration of the seventh anathema of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, according to which the difference of the two natures is to be

considered only ('in the onlooker's mind', as Tanner translates it: *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 117). It is plain that in this way Pseudo-Cyril emphasized the unity of the energies.

Further on, he argued that the theandric energy must be applied to the act done, which is theandric and points to one and the same Christ who acts. [148]

[148] *De Trinitate*, *PG*77, 1160A.

Even further on, the same writer claimed that the object of willing, which, in contrast to Maximus, he called 'gnomic will', characterizes hypostasis, because each man wills something different. He went on to say that Christ had two natural wills, because he had two natures, but did not have two gnomic wills, because he was one hypostasis, [149]

[149] Ibid. 1160C-D.

which implies that Christ had one gnomic will because he was one hypostasis. Thus, Pseudo-Cyril seems to apply to Christ the link between natural will and nature, on the one hand, and gnomic will and hypostasis, on the other, by arguing that Christ had two natural wills, corresponding to his natures, and implying that he had one gnomic will, corresponding to his hypostasis.

It is noteworthy that Pseudo-Cyril dissociated gnomic will from the sinful **end p.202** traits that Maximus had attributed to it, [150]

[150] But Pseudo-Cyril in *De Trinitate*, *PG*77, 1161A, excluded from Christ a *gnōmē*/gnomic will only if it is understood as dependent upon deliberation, because this would imply that Christ was ignorant. On this point, Pseudo-Cyril definitely followed Maximus.

and that, although he identified gnomic will with the object of willing (*θελητόν*), he still called it gnomic *will* (*γνωμικὸν θέλημα*), which seems to imply that it is closer to the *will* (*θέλημα*) than to the object of willing (*θελητόν* or *θεληθέν*). Furthermore, Pseudo-Cyril elsewhere identified gnomic will

with *gnōmē* and argued that *gnōmē* is the rational movement towards the object of willing , [151]

[151] Ibid. 1160D-1161A.

thus drawing a clear distinction between *gnōmē*/gnomic will and the object of willing. Therefore, to say that Christ had one *gnōmē*/gnomic will in the aforementioned sense signifies not only his having one object of willing, but perhaps also the unity of his two wills, as expressed in the willing movement towards a common object of willing.

Let us now move on to Saint John of Damascus. Following Maximus, John of Damascus argues that the theandric energy should not be understood as one, dispensing with or superseding the two natural energies, but only as indicative of the new and ineffable mode of the disclosure of the two energies, which reflects the unity, *perichōrēsis* and communion of Christ's two natures. [152]

[152] John of Damascus, *Expositio Fidei*, 63. 2-12 (Kotter (ed.), p. 160).

However, a little later he speaks of *one theandric energy*, thus becoming the first orthodox writer to apply the number one to the theandric energy. [153]

[153] Ibid. 63. 49 (Kotter (ed.), p. 162). Pseudo-Cyril associated the theandric energy with the number one, but not as explicitly as John of Damascus. It is worth noting that canon 15 of the Lateran Council condemned those who consider the theandric energy as equivalent to one energy (see Riedinger (ed.), *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, i. 376. 25-34).

On another occasion, John makes a brief reference to the one energy of Cyril, which he seems to identify with the divine energy. [154]

[154] John of Damascus, *Expositio Fidei*, 59. 44-5 (Kotter (ed.), p. 146).

With regard to the will, he argues that Christ had two natures, and hence two natural wills, 'but because the hypostasis [of Christ] was one and the willer was one, the willed object, namely *the gnomic will (γνωμικὸν θέλημα), was one'*. [155]

[155] Ibid. 36. 117-21 (Kotter (ed.), p. 92).

The similarities between Saint John of Damascus and Pseudo-Cyril on this point are striking.

The tendency of these two writers to counterbalance the dyothelite emphasis on the distinction of the natural wills with an emphasis upon their unity is apparent. But there are other similar voices. The *Doctrina Patrum* provides an interesting relevant passage. This reports that some have interpreted the one connatural energy of Cyril as showing the end-product (of Christ's **end p.203** actions), whereas others have thought that, as the two energies show the difference of Christ's natures, the one energy shows the oneness of his hypostasis. [156]

[156] Phanourgakis and Chrysos (eds.), *Doctrina Patrum*, 132. 1-14. For some brief comments on this excerpt see Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 458.

What is significant is that no mention is made here of the interpretation of the Cyrillian passage suggested by Maximus in the *Disputation*, according to which the one energy of Cyril is the divine energy, despite the fact that the *Doctrina Patrum* was in all probability compiled by Anastasius, Maximus's disciple, as has been already mentioned. Even more significant is that this text appears to consider this qualified notion of one energy, which corresponds to the oneness of Christ's hypostasis, as orthodox.

Other theologians too seem to have felt the need to express themselves on the issue of Christ's wills and energies in such a way as to emphasize their unity. In the West, Thomas Aquinas, for instance, entitled his treatises on Christ's wills and energies as 'De unitate Christi quantum ad voluntatem' (The unity of Christ's will) and 'De unitate operationis Christi' (The unity of Christ's energy) respectively, [157]

[157] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, 3a.18 and 3a.19 respectively.

and, as Doucet has noted, he spoke of one end-product of Christ's acting, in contrast to Maximus's position in the *Disputation*, [158]

[158] Doucet, 'Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', 445.

as well as that of John of Damascus. [159]

[159] Doucet is wrong in saying that Saint John of Damascus speaks of one end-product contrary to Maximus (Ibid. 446). The opposite is true: John speaks of two end-products (*Expositio Fidei*, 59. 41-3, 104-18 (Kotter (ed.), pp. 146, 148 respectively), and *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, 43. 7-13 (Kotter (ed.), p. 229).

In recent years, some Eastern Orthodox theologians have tended at times to accentuate the unity of Christ's wills and energies by using a monothelite terminology in a qualified and often clumsy way. Without denying the profound orthodoxy of the dyothelite position, Serge Boulgakov commented on the difficulty of ancient dyothelitism to explain the unity of the two wills, and expressed the view that, had it not been for historical circumstances, we would have seen the development of a monothelite reaction in the aftermath of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, similar to the monophysite reaction against Chalcedon. [160]

[160] Serge Boulgakov, *Du Verbe incarné*, trans. Constantin Andronikof (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1982), pp. lxxx and lxxxiii. In fact, there was a reaction against the doctrine of the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 712, when Emperor Bardanis-Philippikos convoked a Council that restored monothelitism. But this restoration was short-lived. For the heresy of monothelitism and Byzantine society, see Panteleimon Tsorbatzoglou, ' ', *Scientific Annals of the Faculty of Theology, School of Pastoral and Social Theology*, vii (Thessalonica: 2001), 235-57.

In addition, he indicated the importance of the theandric energy for a true understanding of the (hypostatic) unity of the two natures of **end p.204** Christ, [161]

[161] Boulgakov, *Du Verbe incarné*, pp. lxxxii (where the theandric energy is characterized as 'une de deux') and 135-7.

and spoke of 'the unity of the theanthropic will proper to the Godman'. [162]

[162] Ibid. 172.

The Greek theologian Panayotis Trempelas wrote that 'the formula "a new theandric energy" was accepted, not in the sense of an energy composite of a divine and a human energy, but in order that the unity of the person of the Lord, who is one and the same, willing and acting in a divine way and in a human way, be emphasized'. [163]

[163] Trempelas, , ii. 83.

Another Greek theologian, Panayotis Christou, has argued, first, that if Maximus had remained as moderate as he was initially, he might have contributed to making the monophysites accept the Council of Chalcedon; [164]

[164] Panayotis K. Christou, '*Μάξιμος ὁ Ὁμολογητής*', in *Θρησκευτική καὶ Ἠθική Ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία*, viii (Athens, 1966), col. 616.

secondly, that 'the energies of Christ were united in *one* theandric energy'; [165]

[165] See Panayotis K. Christou, *Διονύσιος ὁ Ἀρεοπαγίτης*, introduction, text, translation and commentary, *ΕΠΕ*, 3 (Thessalonica: *Βυζάντιον*, 1986), 498, my emphasis.

and thirdly, that, for Maximus, Christ has two natural wills, corresponding to the two natures, and a unified power of choosing , which is the gnomic will, corresponding to his unified (ἑνιαίαν) hypostasis. [166]

[166] Christou, '*Μάξιμος ὁ Ὁμολογητής*', 622. Christou expresses the same view in his *Patrology*, where he additionally emphasizes that Christ's gnomic will is 'one and unique' (Panayotis K. Christou, *Ἑλληνική Πατρολογία*, v (Thessalonica: *Κυρομανώς*, 1992), 282. This view of Christou has been rightly criticized by Nicos Matsoukas, (Athens: *Γρηγόριος*, 1980), 353-4). Matsoukas is also right in criticizing the use of the word ἑνιαίαν for the person of Christ (ibid. 354).

Historical speculation as to what might have happened if Maximus had acted differently is debatable and seems over-optimistic, but it goes without saying that Maximus by no means claimed that Christ had either 'a unified power of choosing' or 'a unified will'. [167]

[167] Christou characterizes the will of Christ like this ('*Μάξιμος ὁ Ὁμολογητής*', 622).

For Maximus, Christ had two powers of willing and acting, a divine and a human power, and the question at issue in the present section is whether it might be legitimate to accept a monadic expression in order to signify their unity. Christou's erroneous view indicates, albeit clumsily, the need felt by many to find a terminology to denote the unity of Christ's two wills.

What are we to make of all this? Certainly a compromise, a *via media* between dyothelitism and monothelitism cannot be endorsed. Dyothelism is right; monothelitism is wrong. But it could still be argued that the rejection of monothelitism does not necessarily mean that a carefully qualified monothelite *terminology* could not be used in order to express the unity of the two wills and energies of Christ. **end p.205**

Such a suggestion presents its own problems, however. It is not always easy, or even possible, to dissociate the terminology we use from the doctrinal content to which it refers. Thus there is always a danger that monothelite terminology may undermine dyothelite Christology. Another difficulty is that if the expressions 'one' will and 'one' energy are accepted; the same terms—namely, 'will' and 'energy'—will be used to signify unity and distinction in Christ, which is also problematic. A way to avoid this might be to find a helpful qualifier for the 'one' will and the 'one' energy. Another solution might be to avoid using the word 'one' and use other monadic words in order to denote the unity of the two wills or the two energies of Christ. Although a discussion either of qualifiers for the 'one' will and the 'one' energy or of other monadic words which could be used instead of the word 'one' would be disproportionately lengthy here, the terms 'double' [168]

[168] This word was used by Maximus: see e.g. *Disputatio Bizyae*, *PG* 90, 153A, and Allen and Neil (eds.), *Scripta Saeculi VII*, III. 405.

and 'theandric' could perhaps be discussed in this context. On the other hand, it could also be argued that it is not absolutely necessary to give a name to the 'one' will and the 'one' energy, on the grounds that Maximus, for instance, did not give a name to his 'one' energy either. The argument that it is not proper to speak of 'one' will because Maximus spoke only of one energy during the monothelite

controversy (he had spoken of both one will and one energy before the controversy, as we will see) does not probably have much force. That Maximus did not speak of one will is probably because he did not have to, since no such expression was found in the Fathers. However, it seems that the rationale behind his acceptance of one and two energies can be applied to the wills too, in spite of the fact that the will represents a more fundamental faculty than the energy.

It may be helpful to remember that Maximus himself spoke of one will of God and man. [169]

[169] Maximus spoke of one will of men and angels in *Expositio Orationis Dominicae*, *PG* 90, 877B, and van Deun (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris Opuscula Exegetica Duo*, 33. 107-15 (cf. ibid. *PG* 90, 881A, and van Deun (ed.), *Maximi Confessoris Opuscula Exegetica Duo*, 37. 181-2). In *Ep.* 2, *PG* 91, 396C, he wrote that we can have one will and one *gnōmē* with God and with each other. In addition, also in *Ep.* 2, 401B, he spoke of one identical wish (*βούλησις*) and movement of the will of God and the saints. During the controversy, however, Maximus rightly argued that God and the saints can have the same object of willing, but not either the same will or the same *gnōmē* (*Opusc.* 1, 25A-28A). Maximus also spoke of one energy of God and the saints in one of his *Ambigua* (1076C). But in *Opusc.* 1, 33A, he argued that in 1076C he had referred to the deifying energy of God.

He did this before the monothelite controversy arose: namely, at a time when monothelitism was not a threat to the faith of the Church. [170]

[170] Given that Maximus spoke of one will before the monothelite controversy, had he not outlived the outbreak of the controversy and developed his dyothelite Christology, he may have been considered as a monothelite *avant le lettre*.

However, it could be argued that the case is not very different **end p.206** now. Namely, it could perhaps be argued that, after the conciliar vindication of dyothelitism, a monothelite terminology following the lines of some of Maximus's own suggestions and clearly restricted to signifying the unity of the *two* natural wills and energies of Christ (which is at any rate much stronger than the unity of will and energy of God and human beings, including the saints), would not be interpreted as contradicting dyothelitism (of course, as has been said, the danger here is that this terminology could eventually undermine dyothelitism). We have seen that the unity of the natures in Christ was signified not only by the expression 'one hypostasis', [171]

[171] Let it be recalled that the one hypostasis of Christ, if seen in its material aspect, expresses the unity of his two natures and is the sum of them. The 'one' will and the 'one' energy of Christ will correspond to this aspect of the hypostasis and not to the personal hypostasis of the Logos, for in the Trinity the will and the energy, as well as their movement, is one, divine, and common to the three persons. As the one (material) hypostasis expresses the unity of the two natures, so the 'one' will and the 'one' energy will also express the unity of the two natural wills and energies. As to the particularity of the actualization of the human will and energy of Christ, it will be arguably part of the 'more compound' idiom of the Logos and will contribute to the unity of the formal aspect of his hypostasis.

but also by the 'monophysite' formula of Cyril, without this giving rise to any suspicions of monophysitism. It could be argued that a similar case could be made with regard to a monothelite terminology, if the use of such a terminology might ever be helpful. To give an example, a monothelite terminology, despite the problems it presents, could be helpful as regards practical implications. For instance, given the recent doctrinal agreement between theologians from the Orthodox and the anti-Chalcedonian Churches, an understanding of 'one' will and energy as described above would perhaps enable the latter to interpret the monothelite and monenergite expressions of their theological ancestors in such a way as to be compatible with the dyothelite orthodoxy to which the mutual doctrinal agreement seems to subscribe. [172]

[172] It is noteworthy that even though the official joint declarations (of 1989 and particularly of 1990) of the representatives of the Eastern Orthodox and the anti-Chalcedonian Churches recognize that the two natures along with their wills and energies were united 'without confusion', neither of them speaks explicitly of *two* wills or of *two* energies.

This section cannot deal with all the dimensions of the question regarding the legitimacy of the use of a carefully qualified monothelite terminology. [173]

[173] One of these dimensions concerns the claim of Anastasius of Sinai that while Christ was on earth, he acted in heaven or generally in various places of the world by his divine energy alone (Karl-Heinz Uthemann (ed.), *Anastasii Sinaitae Opuscula adversus Monotheletas*, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca, 12 (Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1985), 108. 9-109. 50), which implies that the divine will and energy of Christ are not always actualized in unity with the human.

But it is to be hoped that the tentative exploration of the question here will shed some more light on the monothelite controversy and its subtleties.

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5 Epilogue

This has been a somewhat lengthy story, in which successful and unsuccessful attempts on the part of various Christian theologians to articulate adequately the faith of the Church in Christ have been examined. It has been argued that monophysitism in its various forms, from Apollinarianism to anti-Chalcedonian Christology, offered a less than satisfactory solution to the problems of Christology by undermining the integrity of the humanity of Christ, whereas Nestorianism is also unacceptable because it undermined Christ's personal unity. By contrast, the well-balanced approach of the Council of Chalcedon opened the way to a better approach to the mystery of the incarnation. Christ is one, but at the same time has two natures; he is fully God and fully man.

The Leontioi took the next decisive step. Their argument that the human nature of Christ was not a person distinct from the Logos, not because it was ostensibly less real or complete than ours, but because it never subsisted by itself, in separation from him, succeeded to a considerable extent in interpreting Chalcedon without violating either the personal unity of Christ or the 'without confusion' with regard to his natures. At the same time, it has been argued here, the Leontioi acknowledged the existence of the natural idioms of Christ's humanity, including, arguably, his will and energy. They also acknowledged the existence of the particular idioms of Christ's humanity, which were attributed to his person. Thus, by the end of the sixth century, it has been suggested, there had been an almost exhaustive discussion of the person and the natures of Christ, and the results reached were on the whole satisfactory.

However, the attempt of some seventh-century patriarchs to achieve unity with the anti-Chalcedonian Churches by promoting monothelitism threatened to destroy the achievements of previous centuries in the area of Christology. As has been shown, their monothelitism, which was for the most part a real monothelitism, did justice neither to the distinctiveness of **end p.208** Christ's natures nor to the integrity of his humanity. The background of this monothelitism is to be found not in the Cyrillian Chalcedonism of the sixth century but in some aspects of Apollinarian and anti-Chalcedonian monophysitism.

Maximus, the most prominent dyothelite theologian of the seventh century, adopted the basic tenet of the Chalcedonian faith: namely, that Christ is one hypostasis in two natures. On the basis of Chalcedon and the important work done by post-Chalcedonian theologians, he developed his 'Chalcedonian logic', which led him to confess two wills and two energies in Jesus Christ, without allowing for any division or opposition between them to occur, when the monothelite heresy, which, like all monophysitizing heresies, emphasized the unity of Christ and the predominance of his divine aspect over the human, caused his reaction, which shaped virtually the last and least well-known stage of ancient Christology. Maximus acknowledged not only the existence of the rational and self-determining human will of Christ, but also its actualization in particular acts of willing, and understood his human obedience to the Father in a realistic sense. In addition, by not focusing on the relationship between the two *natures* and wills of Christ only, but also—and primarily—on the *person* of Christ and his obedience to the divine will, he pointed to a proper solution of the problem of the relationship between the two wills, which, as has been argued here, cannot be reached unless the fact that the enfleshed Logos wills as God by his divine will and obeys as man by his human will is taken into account sufficiently.

Maximus's dyothelite Christology is superior not only to the Christology of the monothelites but also, in some respects, to some of the options put forward by other exponents of the orthodox faith. The fact that Maximus pointed to the Logos as the unique subject of willing in Christ has been accorded recognition in this book. Jesus Christ, God the Logos incarnate, one hypostasis in two natures, fully God and fully man, assuming and deifying whatever we have, sin apart, having two natural wills and two natural energies, willing and working our salvation in loving obedience to the Father: this was the Christological vision which Maximus confessed and for which he died.

Perhaps Maximus's achievement is not definitive. Theology must not be limited to a mere repetition of the past. But it must be inspired by visions such as the vision of Maximus in continuing to

bear witness, to confess, and to proclaim the same Christ and the same faith, at once old and new, which was once and for all delivered to the saints. [1]

[1] Cf. Jude 3.

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This is the victory that has overcome the world—our faith. [2]

[2] 1 John 5: 4.

Lord, it is good for us to be here. [3]

[3] Matt. 17: 4.

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For Maximus's works, I have given references to Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* (*PG*) as well as to the relevant critical editions. I have also used a few abbreviations: namely, *Disputatio* (for Maximus's *Disputatio cum Pyrrho*), *Opusc.* (for his *Opuscula theologica et polemica*), and *Ep.* (for his *Epistulae*). From Chapter 3 onwards, all references to Maximus's works are to *PG* 91, unless otherwise stated. This bibliography excludes incidental references to some ancient works.

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